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INTRODUCTION 
Farewell, mother, home and friends!  We may never meet again— 
Soon ’mid strangers I must roam:  Oh! the parting gives me pain— 
Tho’ I wander far away, Lonely o’er life’s stormy sea, 
Who will shed one gentle tear For a Wandering Refugee? 
Who will shed a gentle tear For a Wandering Refugee 
Farewell, sunny Southern home. Home I always loved so true— 
Oft will tear-drops dim mine eyes, When my mem’ry flies to you 
But the happy scenes of yore, I, alas! will never see— 
I’ll be roaming far away, A lonely Wandering Refugee! 
I’ll be roaming far away, A lonely Wandering Refugee1 
 
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed numerous refugee movements, 
some a result of internal persecution and tyrannical governments, others because of world wars or 
genocide. Each decade witnessed at least one major movement of people from the area in which 
they were born in search of safety elsewhere – within or without their national borders. From the 
Armenian Genocide in the aftermath of the Great War to the murder of over six million Jews in 
the Holocaust, the world had to take action to help the large number of refugees created from these 
circumstances.2 Following the Holocaust, the international community began the process of 
helping displaced people on a larger, more organized scale. For example, the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees not only defined them as a group but also provided international 
                                                          
1 Will S. Hays, The Wandering Refugee (Louisville: Louis Tripp, 1865 [?]).  
2 On the Armenian Genocide, see Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s 
Response (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004); Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic 
Conflict from the Balkans to the Anatolia to the Caucuses (New York: Berghahn Books, 1995). With regard to 
scholarly works on the Holocaust, there are too many to mention here. A good starting point on displaced persons 
would include Avinoam J. Patt, Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish Youth and Zionism in the Aftermath of the 
Holocaust (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2008); Arieh J. Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the 
United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Jacob 
Biber, Risen from the Ashes: A Story of the Jewish Displaced Persons in the Aftermath of World War II: Being A 
Sequel to the Survivors (San Bernadino, CA: The Borgo Press, 1990).  
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protection for refugees.3 It very much took place in the context of the Cold War where there were 
good refugees and bad refugees, used as pawns as the two superpowers battled for supremacy 
across the globe.4 The Cold War saw people displaced by wars in Central America and Vietnam, 
and oppressive regimes like Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.5 With the thawing of relations between 
the East and West, came power vacuums in which ethnic violence, increased poverty, and 
environmental disaster took hold and created new acts of genocide, now labeled ethnic cleansing. 
Here, the world saw the murder of the Kurds of Northern Iraq, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in 
the Balkans, and mass murder in Rwanda.6 Additional atrocities occurred resulting in the creation 
of the ‘Lost Boys’ of Sudan and other parts of eastern Africa came about as a result of the Second 
Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005).7 In 2014, there are the unknown number of Yazidis sent on the 
                                                          
3 Article 1. A. 2 defines a refugee as “any person who: owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country.” 
4 Caroline Moorhead, Human Cargo: A Journey among Refugees (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 37-
41. Here, Moorhead describes good refugees as people who had fled Communist regimes and sought help in the 
West. Bad refugees are described as individuals, not necessarily fleeing persecution, but in search of work or a better 
life through asylum in Europe or the United States. United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (Geneva: UNHCR Communication and Public Information Service, 
n. d.), 14.  
5 For more on people displaced by the wars in Central American during the 1970s and 1980s, see Maria Cristina 
Garcia, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006); Rossana Perez, ed., Flight to Freedom: The Story of Central American 
Refugees in California (Houston: University of Houston Arte Publico Press, 2007). For more on people displaced by 
the wars in Indochina, see Larry Clinton Thompson, Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975-1982 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010); Sucheng Chan and Audrey U. Kim, Not Just Victims: Conversations with 
Cambodian Leaders in the United States (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003).  
6 For more on the Kurds, see Mary Pipher, The Middle of Everywhere: Helping Refugees Enter the American 
Community (Orlando: Harcourt Books, 2002), 24-63; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 3rd Edition 
(New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004). For more on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, see Misha Glenny, The Balkans: 
Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011, updated edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); David 
Rhode, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997); Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meŝtrović, eds., This Time We Knew: Western 
Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 1996). For more on the Rwandan 
Genocide, see Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1999); Gérard Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).  
7 Mark Bixler, The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2013); Benjamin Ajak, Benson Deng, Alephonsion Deng, and Judy A. Bernstein, They Poured Fire 
On Us From the Sky: The True Story of Three Lost Boys From Sudan (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).  
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run by the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) in northwestern Syria and parts of southeastern Turkey 
continuing the need for international assistance for refugees.8 Modern refugee movements have 
been so terrible that they have even added new language, buufis, for example, when describing 
people affected by displacement.9 These modern displacements are violent and no amount of aid 
and relief efforts by the global community seem able to solve these crises.  
While these modern examples are much more violent and intense than past displacements, 
refugees and their stories have long graced the pages of world history. The word refugee was born 
in the wake of the Protestant Reformation in France in reference to the flood of Huguenot 
Protestants fleeing religious persecution during the sixteenth century following the French king 
Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. French refugees migrated to different 
empires during the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in search of religious 
toleration.10 It was not, however, until 1864 that the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Wounded in Armies in the Field met in Switzerland. It was a reaction to not only the 
Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century and the Crimean War in the 1850s, but also the 
American Civil War beginning in 1861. A combination of twelve kingdoms and empires signed 
the Geneva Convention, which provided for the treatment of soldiers and civilians in war, and was 
enforced by the International Committee of the Red Cross. This agreement would be in place until 
                                                          
8 Estimates are anywhere from 70,000 to 500,000 Yazidi refugees under threat from IS. BBC News, “Who, What, 
Why: Who Are the Yazidis?” accessed November 25, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-
28686607.  
9 The Somali word buufis has been used to describe a person’s dream of resettlement, often while they are living in a 
refugee camp. Such a dream can be so intense that when it is not achieved, it can have a severe impact on the 
individual. Anthropologists have argued that these experiences and expectations are impacted by transnational 
factors while in refugee camps. See Cindy Horst, Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope With Refugee Camps 
in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 161-200. 
10See Owen Stanwood, “Between Eden and Empire: Huguenot Refugees and the Promise of the New World,” The 
American Historical Review Vol. 118, No. 5 (December, 2013): 1319-1344. Issued by the Catholic King Henry IV 
in 1598, the Edict of Nantes granted some religious freedom to Calvinist Protestants in France.  
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1906 when the Second Geneva Convention superseded it.11 Soldiers and civilians in the path of 
the Civil War would not benefit from the first agreement made in Geneva. 
Civil War Displacement 
The war set into motion one of the greatest displacement crises ever witnessed by 
nineteenth century Americans. Throughout the Confederacy and the Border States, men, women, 
children, and occasionally entire families moved across the landscape in search of kin, safe haven, 
and/or relief from anyone who could provide it. “Some of its cities lay in rubble,” reminds historian 
David Blight, “large stretches of the southern countryside were depopulated and defoliated, and 
thousands of people were refugees from any sense of home.”12 As indicated above in the 1865 
song “The Wandering Refugee,” the conflict caused Southerners – both black and white - to 
wander the landscape in search of help wherever they could find it, longing for the life they lived 
before armies, guerrilla fighters, hunger, or other wartime factors forced them from their homes 
and communities. 
Displaced whites garnered the attention of the Union and Confederate Armies, debates in 
both Congresses, the aid of various benevolent organizations/aid societies, and, after the war, the 
Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Lands. Many accounts from officials who 
encountered displaced whites, like the following account from Bureau official Thomas Abel, 
detailed the challenge posed by people who wanted to help these ‘wandering refugees’ in the 
Trans-Mississippi West: “From statements of Genl. Hunt Courdy - Chaplain Springer Supt., and 
my own observation I am convinced that the condition of the Refugees in that vicinity is lamentable 
in the extreme many are without food, Raiment, or Home. Rations are issued to about thirteen 
                                                          
11 This would happen again in 1929 and 1949, rounding out the Four Geneva Conventions.  
12 David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University, 2001), 33. 
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hundred and the number is daily increasing.”13 Written in early 1866, it was clear that, with so 
many displaced whites still in need of help, the solution to this problem would not be an easy one. 
With the recently concluded sesquicentennial, it is surprising that historians have written so little 
about the plight of these displaced people both during and after the war. 
I chose displaced whites as the subject for this work because historians have ignored them 
west of the Mississippi River. As I will point out in the historiographical section below, much of 
the focus on displaced whites in the East. Historian Mary Elizabeth Massey’s focuses on refugees 
in this area in her 1964 work, which to this day is the only book-length study on refugees. Much 
of this focus is because of the availability of reliable primary sources from the large numbers of 
refugees in the East as well as Civil War historians’ overall fascination with the Eastern Theater 
and how the war affected people there. For displaced people in Missouri and Arkansas, they too 
left behind a great deal of records about their displacement. They were not easy to find, but they 
are there. In addition, the Freedmen’s Bureau, local governments, as well as the Federal 
government left behind a great many opinions of these displaced people – how and why they were 
displaced, their wartime condition, and what the various governmental agencies might do to help 
them. 
This study does not focus on the many displaced African Americans during and after the 
war. Often the term refugee, as the many aid organizations and governmental entities used it, meant 
white. Whether they were people escaping slavery or already free, many African Americans – 
displaced or not – are often lumped in under the heading contraband or escaped slaves by their 
contemporaries and historians have treated them accordingly. Additionally, the biggest problem 
                                                          
13 Report from Thomas Abel, January 20, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 7, National Archives, 
Washington D. C. 
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is, quite simply, the lack of any primary sources from freedom seekers and displaced free African 
Americans. So few freedpeople left any kind of record of their wartime experiences to put together 
any kind of reliable narrative on displaced African Americans. While there is room for more 
scholarship on displaced African Americans both during and after the war, scholars have recently 
visited the topic. 
This study illuminates the experiences of displaced Southern whites and shows that they 
played an important role in how both armies and civilian organizations operated and they were a 
factor in the early development of Reconstruction through the operations of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau. I hope to enhance historians’ understanding of these people in both their plight as well as 
their treatment by different government agencies and civilian organizations both during and after 
the war. Advancing historians’ knowledge of the displacement crisis triggered by the war, the 
expansion of federal power with regard to the handling of this crisis, and civilians’ experiences 
with these forces is the goal of the work presented here. Following the war, there is something to 
be learned from the Bureau’s establishment of schools, hospitals, and the allocation of abandoned 
lands and how these actions were tied to the rehabilitation of these people. As evidenced by a 
number of primary sources – personal letters and diaries, army records, congressional records, 
newspapers, pamphlets from various relief societies, and Freedmen’s Bureau records – displaced 
people occupy a great deal of concern and effort in the operations of these agencies and 
organizations. From daily wartime military matters through the early years of Reconstruction, 
accounts of these people are present in the historical record of the Civil War. It is through their 
experiences that I hope to develop a deeper understanding of their plight and offer a fresh take on 
this group and their relationship with the state and larger citizenry in the context of the war and 
Reconstruction. 
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Definitions and Distinctions 
In this study, I choose to use the terms displaced or uprooted as opposed to the more 
commonly used term refugee. While many of the primary sources used in this study use the word 
refugee in their descriptions and accounts of displaced people – this includes the armies, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, and both the United States and Confederate governments – I try to use 
displaced where possible when describing those people. The reason for this falls in line with 
historian Drew Gilpin Faust and her discussion of the terms refugee and displaced. In her analysis, 
Faust notes: 
The term refugee soon came to be used most often for wealthy individuals who had 
chosen to abandon their customary place of residence, frequently with an eye to 
keeping property, especially slave property, out of Union hands. . . . There were, 
especially in the later stages of the war, families and even whole communities 
forced from home by military action, as, for example, when Sherman compelled all 
citizens to leave Atlanta in the fall of 1864, but these individuals are more properly 
considered displaced persons, not refugees, at least in terms of the particular Civil 
War usage, with its frequent pejorative connotations of privilege and self-interest. 
The power of these connotations is evident, for example, in Mary Lee’s aversion to 
the label. She had not chosen her course of action; she had not abandoned her home; 
she was not running away, expecting others to take responsibility for her. She had 
been sent against her will, and this, she believed, gave her a morally superior status 
to those who could rightfully be called refugees.14 
Other historians, however, do not offer Faust’s differentiation in their description of displaced 
people – this goes for both older and newer studies. Massey used the word refugee a bit more 
liberally in her study of refugees. While she recognizes that so many different groups were forced 
to flee as a result of the war – Native Americans, African Americans, whites, and supporters of the 
Confederacy or Union. Instead, she wanted to “confine [herself] to the Confederate sympathizers 
who spent the war years trying to stay within the contracting Confederacy.”15 She also notes her 
                                                          
14 Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 40-41. 
15 Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
xii. 
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reliance on the wealthier segment of the South as they typically left records of their refugee 
experiences behind. While Massey’s work came out in 1964, other works have come out in the 
last decade that still use refugee in its more generic sense.16 While this study analyzes a cross-
section of people displaced by the war, I hope to focus more on people who were not of the 
wealthiest means and had few choices available to them when the time came to flee. 
I define displaced people as non-combatants who fled the war or consequences of the war. 
A person in this context fled out of a general fear of approaching armies or irregular fighters, the 
shortage or absence of food or medical care, the physical destruction of personal property, the fear 
of forced conscription by the Confederate army or irregular band, or the inability to procure the 
necessities of life. With these distinctions, I will focus on these people and not other groups who, 
at the surface, appear to be closely related to the region’s displaced whites. These groups included 
contrabands of war, migrants, and camp followers. In terms of race, this study will focus on the 
plight of the region’s displaced whites. This will be the focus because the primary sources indicate 
that when the armies, benevolent societies, or Freedmen’s Bureau agents discuss uprooted citizens; 
these organizations attempt to classify them as white.17 For example, an 1864 report from the 
Western Sanitary Commission was entitled Report on White Union Refugees in the South detailed 
“322 men, 679 women, and 1163 children, in all, 2164 white refugees were sheltered and provided 
for, and many of them sent on their way to friends, or places of employment in the free states.”18 
                                                          
16 See, for example, Yael A. Sternhell, Routes of War: The World of Movement in the Confederate South 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 140-151; Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and 
Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
17 See Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1964), 29; Clarissa W. Confer, The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2007), 116-143; and William E. Parrish, “The Western Sanitary Commission,” Civil War History Vol. 36, No. 1 
(March, 1990): 24. For more on Native American Refugees, see Leroy Fisher, “Confederate Refugees from Indian 
Territory,” The Chronicles of Oklahoma Vol. 57 (1979-1980): 451-462.  
18 The Western Sanitary Commission, Report of the Western Sanitary Commission on the White Refugees of the 
South: Their Persecutions, Sufferings, Destitute Condition, and the Necessity of Giving Aid and Relief on the 
Coming to Our Military Posts, St. Louis: R. P. Studley, 1864, 6. [Italics added] 
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This report, and others like it, explicitly mention displaced whites separating them from freedmen 
and women, contraband, and slaves. The report goes further to separate black from white detailing 
“the colored refugees sometimes called ‘contrabands.’”19 
The records of the armies, relief organizations, and the Freedmen’s Bureau make similar 
distinctions in their discussions of displaced people. The Bureau, whose records can be quite 
meticulous at times, was usually very clear when it was talking about displaced whites and very 
careful to differentiate between freedpeople and whites. For example, the Brigadier General 
Assistant Commissioner for Missouri and Arkansas asked of his subordinates: “I respectfully 
request that you direct all officers serving with you having in charge matters in reference to the 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands to at once report to me the condition of their work in 
detail, so that I may be advised of the number of White Refugees and Freedpeople who are now 
being subsisted in whole, or in part by the Government, their condition, and all information in their 
possession that will assist me in the discharge of my duties.”20 As a result, this study will look 
closely at the treatment of these Southern whites by the armies, benevolent aid societies, and the 
Bureau. 
Distinctions made in the field by the Union army and the Freedmen’s Bureau were often 
directives from Washington on how to handle the problem of so many displaced whites in need of 
help. For example, debates in Congress touched on this point as well. In one debate between 
Massachusetts Republican Thomas Dawes Eliot and Kentucky Unionist Green Smith, they 
discussed this very issue of race as it related to the Bureau. “I suppose refugees to be those who 
are not freedmen,” begins Eliot, “that is to say those who had not been in slavery. Colored refugees 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 26.  
20 J. W. Sprague to Major General Greenville, June 16, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of 
Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 1, National 
Archives, Washington D. C.  
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may be freedmen or they may not, but refugees may be white and when the terms ‘refugees’ and 
‘freedmen’ are used; I suppose the difference would be that the refugees were white.”21 
Government and army officials in Washington City and regional agencies and civilian relief 
providers took a great deal of care to differentiate between displaced whites and African Americans 
as freedmen, contraband, etc., therefore this study will focus on displaced Southern whites and 
their treatment by those who tried to help.  
Displaced People Described 
With an analysis on how these people were treated, the next question is who were they? 
Displaced Southern whites came from different parts of nineteenth century American society, 
demonstrating how one’s economic class did not necessarily preclude them from having to flee 
their homes and communities. Many displaced whites were poor or of very little means. Massey 
details this, but points out those wealthy Southern families became displaced as well, because they 
had more to lose in the presence of the Union army.22 For example, the nationally published 
Harper’s Weekly noted Missouri’s situation with regard to displacement in December 1861: “Truly 
enough, for at this hour thousands of refugees are fleeing from Missouri that they may find bread, 
and afterward a home in our happy Free State. Scantily clad, half famished, and pinched with cold, 
then enter our border towns and beg, for they have no money, that they may live. Nor are the 
ignorant poor – it is the better class in the Slave States who are faithful to the Union. Whole 
families and whole neighborhoods have come, and the roads leading to St. Louis and the city itself 
are filled with them.”23 Whether one was rich or poor, owned slaves, was young or old, male or 
                                                          
21 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 1866, 516.  
22 See Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1964), 28-47; Stephen V. Ash, “Poor Whites in the Occupied South, 1861-1865,” The Journal of Southern History 
Vol. 57, No. 1 (Feb., 1991): 50.  
23 Harper’s Weekly, December 28, 1861.  
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female made no difference in one’s displacement. The war reached people of all walks of life in a 
number of ways, forcing some to flee their communities. 
For so long historians thought that displaced people were mostly women, children, and the 
elderly – people who did not have the necessary resources to escape the many horrors of war. For 
example, Massey notes, “an overwhelming majority of the refugees were women, children, and 
aged, infirm men who had to stay behind when the younger men marched off to war.”24 Based on 
the research presented here, this still rings true, but it was not as clear as one would think in 
determining who these displaced people were. A majority of the wartime displaced were women, 
often widows of soldiers, and children. Detailed accounting of the number and condition of 
displaced people did were not consistent until the final few years of the war. According to the 
Western Sanitary Commission’s 1864 report noted how St. Louis came to be made up of “almost 
entirely of helpless women and children, widows, orphans and half orphans, often sick or 
debilitated by disease, poorly clad and bare-footed with few bundles of bedding, on arriving here, 
having no friends to go to. . . .”25 There were also post-war accounts written by displaced women 
that highlighted the female experience in the region.26 These accounts often focus on the 
reconstruction of the household after the war as well as how gender roles changed with the wartime 
displacement experience. While there is not enough evidence to refute this pattern of the make-up 
                                                          
24 Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
29.  
25 The Western Sanitary Commission, Report of the Western Sanitary Commission on the White Refugees, 3-4.  
26 Female refugee accounts written after the war includes Sarah Dorsey, Lucia Dare (New York: M. Doolady, 
1867); United Confederate Veterans of Arkansas, Confederate Women of Arkansas in the Civil War, 1861-1865 
(Little Rock: J. Kellogg, 1907). Secondary sources that focus on displaced women includes Joan E. Cashin, “Into the 
Trackless Wilderness: The Refugee Experience in the Civil War,” in Edward D. C. Campbell, Jr. and Kym S. Rice, 
eds., A Woman’s War: Southern Women, Civil War, and the Confederate Legacy (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1996), 29-53; Marilyn M. Culpepper, Trials and Triumphs: Women of the American Civil War (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 131-166; Stephen V. Ash, A Year in the South: 1865 (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2004). Here, Ash details the experience of Cornelia McDonald (who also occupies space in 
Massey’s work), a Confederate sympathizer/widow who becomes a wartime refugee in Virginia.  
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of these displaced people in the region, one has to take into account that women might be more 
inclined to write about their experience to take advantage of a greater amount of sympathy afforded 
to them, in order to secure aid in a timely manner. 
The experiences, backgrounds, and duration of displacement varied amongst men, women, 
and children in Missouri and Arkansas. For some, displacement was only temporary, for others, 
they had somewhere else to go, and for many, they were simply left to wander the countryside for 
months or more. During their displacement, people were sometimes very ill, injured, lost, or 
suffered the effects of starvation, dehydration, or exposure to the elements. According to the 
Western Sanitary Commission’s 1864 report, uprooted people who made their way to St. Louis 
were in rough shape, “consisting almost entirely of helpless women and children, widows, orphans 
and half orphans, often sick or debilitated by disease, poorly clad and bare-footed with few bundles 
of bedding, on arriving here, having no friends to go to…”27 Sources also indicate that a majority 
of displaced people were women, often widows, and children, sometimes orphans, though men 
certainly were displaced as well. 
White men, like women, were compelled to leave their homes with the outbreak of war. 
Many, however, are often neglected in the few studies that detail displaced people. Utilizing 
historian Carl H. Moneyhon’s figures as an example, eight counties in northwestern Arkansas 
experienced a 52-percent loss and Jefferson County “had a decline in male population from 1,424 
to 456,” Sebastian County declined “from 1,209 to 138,” and Phillips County “had a drop in 
population from 1,008 to 489.”28 Certainly, based on these numbers, the war displaced a number 
of men in the region. Why then, are men so often ignored or overlooked when it comes to studies 
                                                          
27 The Western Sanitary Commission, Report of the Western Sanitary Commission on the White Refugees, 3-4.  
28 Carl H. Moneyhon, The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on Arkansas: Persistence in the Midst of Ruin 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 119.  
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of displaced people? Perhaps, given nineteenth century ideals about masculinity, men might be 
less inclined to write about their experiences out of fear of being called a coward for not taking 
better care of their family or performing their duties by becoming a soldier in one army or the 
other. The fact that the war drove many men from their communities had an impact on the many 
women who remained behind, hoping for their eventual return. Many white women, like 
Missourian Partheny Horn of Linn, Missouri, were tasked with locating “their husbands who like 
all southern men had been compelled to leave Mo.”29 Many men left home to fight the war, but 
not all men left home of their own free will. Some were coerced with threats on the lives of their 
homes and family, even their own lives, while others were conscripted. This does not mean, 
however, that men were not displaced by the war just the same as women and children. It simply 
indicates that they were less likely to write about their experience. With this, we see how the 
backgrounds and experiences of these people are mixed and, to be sure, no experience was the 
same. As the armies continued to clash throughout the region, the number of displaced people 
continued to grow.30 
 While the number of men who could be recorded as being displaced is difficult to 
determine and have long since been undercounted, women made up a large number of uprooted 
                                                          
29 Partheny Horn Memoir, ca. February 14, 1919, Private Collection [Missouri Digital Heritage], 52.  
30 There are no exact numbers concerning displaced people during the Civil War. Poor record keeping, lost or 
missing records, and the number of uprooted citizens who slipped through the cracks all contributed to this fact. 
While exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, historian Carl H. Moneyhon nicely utilizes Arkansas auditor accounts 
from the war years. Moneyhon notes, “[s]tatewide, the number of persons liable to pay a poll tax decreased between 
1860 and 1865 from 47,317 to 27,246, a 42-percent drop.” See Carl H. Moneyhon, The Impact of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction on Arkansas: Persistence in the Midst of Ruin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1994), 119. The first year of the Civil War saw few displaced people - especially in the East - compared to the 
numbers during the last two years of the war. The fringes of the Confederacy, places like Missouri and Arkansas, 
saw more displaced people as Confederate and Union sympathizers sought to move themselves and their families to 
be more geographically in line with their loyalties. Unionists in northern Arkansas and southern Missouri might 
head further north while Confederate sympathizers and slave owners were likely to flee to more firmly controlled 
areas of the Confederacy. Missouri and Arkansas experienced more displaced residents in 1861 because of guerrilla 
warfare. See Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1964), 4-5. 
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residents. Historians have made note of the impact of the war on women and how they endured 
their displacement. “Women were frequently encouraged to become refugees,” notes historian 
Clea Lutz Bunch, “but those who abandoned their homes found that property left behind was 
frequently confiscated, looted, or destroyed.”31 There are many instances in the primary sources 
indicating this pattern. General Thomas Abel, for example, working in the capacity of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, described his encounter with a group of displaced people: “the former 
[displaced whites] are exclusively women and children, a majority of whom are said to be the 
widows and children of soldiers who died or were killed in the Union Army.”32 A good number of 
third person accounts of displaced people involved women, in addition, there were a number of 
first person accounts by women, often written after the war.33 These accounts often focused on the 
reconstruction of the household after the war as well as how gender roles changed with the 
experience of displacement. 
Understanding displaced people’s treatment by both government and civilian organizations 
requires a more detailed analysis of the people who dealt with them more directly. Within the 
Union army, it was the chaplains. To be sure, soldiers and their commanders encountered people 
who fled their communities, but army chaplains played an important role in dealing with any and 
all matters pertaining to displaced whites. In much of the army’s and the Bureau’s written 
correspondence concerning displaced people, matters were often referred to the chaplain of a given 
district to handle and report to a commanding officer. Chaplains also detailed the size and scope 
                                                          
31 Clea Lutz Bunch, “Confederate Women of Arkansas Face ‘the Fiends in Human Shape,” Military History of the 
West Vol. 27, (Autumn, 1997): 185.  
32 Report from Thomas Abel, January 20, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 7, National Archives, 
Washington D. C.  
33 See Sarah Dorsey, Lucia Dare (New York: M. Doolady, 1867); United Confederate Veterans of Arkansas, 
Confederate Women of Arkansas in the Civil War, 1861-1865 (Little Rock: J. Kellogg, 1907). 
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of the situation as well as the amount of supplies needed/received for these people. Chaplains’ 
writings offer a great deal of insight into the workings of the Bureau with regard to displaced 
whites, as they often recorded the number of people who needed the agency’s help, what they 
needed, and how they would get it. While chaplains assisted displaced people within the context 
of the Bureau, displaced people received assistance both during and after the war from both local 
and national aid societies. 
Benevolent aid and local relief organizations played a critical role in assisting both the 
Union army and the Freedmen’s Bureau in assisting both displaced blacks and whites. Examples 
of these organizations include the Western Sanitary Commission (WSC), the Northwestern 
Freedmen’s Aid Commission, the United States Sanitary Commission, the American Union 
Commission (AUC), the Ladies’ Refugee Aid Society and Ladies’ Union Aid Society, both located 
in St. Louis, and the Ohio Refugee Relief Commission – to name a few. There are many works 
that analyze the importance of these organizations, but few discuss these organizations’ direct role 
in aiding displaced whites in the West. For example, historian Herman Belz has detailed the role 
of the AUC and its push for the Bureau’s inclusion of displaced people in its mission.34 According 
to Belz, the AUC “was the principal organization for aiding loyal displaced whites. In addition to 
Belz’s work on these organizations, historian William E. Parrish has detailed the importance of 
the WSC in the western theatre of the war. As Parrish notes, “…the Western Sanitary Commission 
played a central role in helping to alleviate suffering by troops and refugees in the Mississippi 
Valley and the Trans-Mississippi Theatre during the Civil War….”35 In addition to Belz and 
Parrish, additional works discuss the American Freedmen’s Union Commission and its work in 
                                                          
34 Herman Belz, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865 and the Principle of No Discrimination According to Color,” 
Civil War History 21 (1975): 197-217.  
35 William E. Parrish, “The Western Sanitary Commission,” Civil War History Vol. 36, No. 1 (March, 1990): 17.  
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setting up schools as well as its larger mission.36 While little research exists on these relief 
organizations, there is enough in the primary sources that inform us about their operation.  
Geographic Scope: Arkansas and Missouri 
Newer scholarship on the war and Reconstruction tends to be more inclusive of the West. 
An increasing number of works that detail the military, social, and cultural aspects of the war in 
this region have helped to expand our knowledge of how people experienced the war. This includes 
both broad overviews of the war as well as more detailed local and regional studies. Some 
historians have been critical of this focus, most notably Gary Gallagher who has been critical of 
scholars who include guerrilla warfare and the West in discussions of the war and Reconstruction. 
At the same time, however, he acknowledges in a 2014 interview with the Civil War Trust that the 
Trans-Mississippi West “still isn’t getting much attention.”37 The West is important in the study 
of the war. To paraphrase historian Megan Kate Nelson, speaking at the Filson Historical Society’s 
2014 conference, “The Hard Hand of War: Irregulars and Civilians in the Civil War,” historians 
discuss the West all of the time in their discussions about the antebellum period. Historians analyze 
the Missouri Crisis, the Mexican-American War, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, John Brown and 
Bleeding Kansas, and the construction of a transcontinental railroad in their discussions about the 
coming of the war. Many historians, however, fail to include the West in any kind of discussion 
about the war and what it means. If scholars are going to discuss the West at great length in 
discussions about the coming of the war, should they not talk about how the war affected the people 
                                                          
36 See, for example, Ira V. Brown, “Lyman Abbott and Freedmen’s Aid, 1865-1869,” The Journal of Southern 
History Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1949): 22-38; Larry Wesley Pearce, “The American Missionary Association and the 
Freedmen’s Bureau in Arkansas, 1866-1868,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1971): 
242-259.  
37 Clayton Butler, “Understanding Our Past: An Interview with Gary Gallagher,” Civil War Trust, 
http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/civil-war-history-and-scholarship/gary-gallagher-interview.html, 
accessed November 26, 2014. 
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who lived there? It is with this sentiment that this study focuses on Arkansas and Missouri and the 
effects of war on the people who lived there.38 
The geographic scope for this study includes the Trans-Mississippi West with a focus on 
Missouri and Arkansas as well as the surrounding border regions of northern Louisiana, eastern 
Nebraska, and western Tennessee. In many ways, Missouri and Arkansas are linked within the 
Civil War story. One seceded and one did not, but both were slave states. As the Confederacy 
courted Missouri to join in the fight against what it called northern aggression, Arkansas served as 
President Jefferson Davis’s champion in this process. For example, a popular song on the lips of 
many Arkansans was “Missouri! Or A Voice from the South,” written by Harry McCarthy, also 
known as the Arkansas Comedian. One of its verses called: 
Missouri! Missouri! where is thy proud fame! 
Free Land of the West, they once cherished name? 
Trod in the dust by a tyrant’s command, 
Proclaiming there’s martial law in the land. 
Men of Missouri! strike without fear! 
McCulloch, Jackson, and brave men are near; 
Swear by your honor that your chains shall be riven, 
And add your bright Star to our Flag of Eleven.39 
Certainly, Arkansans and the rest of the South thought that Missouri was important enough to add 
to the Confederate ranks and, at least early in the war, these two states saw their fates tied together. 
The primary purpose for this geographic focus is, firstly, to have a study set within 
reasonable limits of research. The secondary purpose is that displaced whites were a particular 
problem in this region for a number of people and a number of reasons. The unique situation in 
the Western Theatre made this so. This point is best illustrated by Union Major-General Dodge’s 
                                                          
38 See also Adam Arenson and Andrew R. Graybill, eds., Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 1-14. 
39 Harry McCarthy, “Missouri! or a Voice from the South,” (New Orleans: A.E. Blackmar and Bro., 1861). 
McCarthy also wrote other popular Civil War era tunes like “Bonnie Blue Flag” and “the Volunteer.” 
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general order issued within the Department of Missouri in December 1864: “For the purpose of 
better providing for the wants and of improving the condition of the large number of refugees in 
this department, and to organize in the different districts a uniform system for their care, a refugee 
bureau is hereby established.”40 There are similar accounts from both armies, benevolent aid 
societies, local and national newspapers, Congress, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the wartime 
governors of both Missouri and Arkansas. As a result, a study of this region is needed if we are to 
understand how the war affected the people who lived there and how they put their lives back 
together with the help of the United States government and private aid organizations. 
There were a large number of displaced people in the region and how this happened are 
what differentiates the wartime experience in the west from the east. The first, and most important, 
reason concerns the political status of both Missouri and Arkansas. Missouri was a Border State, 
one of several slaveholding states that remained in the Union. Arkansas, on the other hand, joined 
the Southern cause, despite the fact that the loyalty of its citizens to the Confederacy was never as 
firm as citizens who voted for secession in South Carolina, Georgia, or other parts of the Deep 
South. Because of the unique political status of these two states, both the Union and Confederacy 
contested it from the start of the war and, as a result, there was a great deal of military action in 
the region, hoping to sway the local populations to one side or the other. The second reason, closely 
affiliated with the first, involves individual wartime loyalties throughout the region. Civilians’ 
loyalties to the Confederacy or Union mattered in the states whose populations were so divided by 
the war. Depending on which army approached, or the actions of guerrillas in the region, one might 
be inclined to flee based on their loyalties or, because displaced people came from a variety of 
backgrounds politically and socially and, with this, loyalties could be malleable as a means of 
                                                          
40 U. S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XLI, 944. [italics added] 
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survival. “Soldiers on the march,” notes historian Michael Fellman, “frequently commented on the 
desolation left behind where civilians had fled in panic.”41 The third reason contributing to the 
problem concerns guerilla activity that served to unsettle civilians in this region. Roaming irregular 
bands could sometimes be the deciding factor sending a family, or remnants of a family, on the 
run. Guerilla activity, perhaps combined with Johnny Rebs in the area deprived “the widow of her 
last chicken, burn[ed] her barn, waste[d] her corn, [stole] her money, and [drove] away her 
slaves.”42 Lastly, the large number of displaced people can be attributed to the sustained presence 
of the Union army and the fact that the army’s presence was rather firm early on in the war. The 
army remained here for much of the war and the increased number of non-combatants who came 
within their lines created a burden on the army for the remainder of the war. C. T. Christensen, a 
Union Lieutenant Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General complained in March 1865 that “[t]he 
retention of refugees at the South will be a serious embarrassment to the military service as well 
as a heavy burden upon the Army appropriations. The cost of transportation to points where they 
can obtain employment or be otherwise provided for will be less than the value of the rations that 
must of necessity be issued to them if they are retained.”43 
This relatively sustained presence of the Union army allowed for some rather 
unconventional military decisions from the start of the war. The earliest involved Union General 
John C. Frémont’s order of August 30, 1861, which proclaimed slaves within the Department of 
the Missouri free. There is also the lesser-known General Order No. 11 issued by General Thomas 
Ewing on August 25, 1863, which removed all but a handful of citizens from four Missouri 
                                                          
41 Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 76.  
42 Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas: The People and Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1976), 107-108.  
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counties – regardless of their loyalties – as a reaction to the increased guerrilla activity in the region 
and a recent raid in Lawrence, Kansas. Because of this order, “[t]he homes of 20,000 people were 
looted and burned, and their crops were confiscated or destroyed.”44 Unconventional military 
actions such as these helped to create displaced people, as did military clashes at Pea Ridge, 
Wilson’s Creek, or various skirmishes in southern Missouri and northern Arkansas. These factors 
or combinations of these factors uprooted civilians throughout the region. 
Periodization 
The proposed period of study for this study is 1861-1868, encompassing the beginning of 
the war through the early years of Reconstruction. Displaced people were a problem from the very 
start of the war in the West, especially in places like Missouri and Arkansas where there was a 
high degree of guerilla activity. Displacement was also triggered by the early campaigns of 
Nathanial Lyon and John C. Frémont in Missouri and the early Union successes in Arkansas at 
Pea Ridge and Little Rock. Furthermore, Federal control of the southern third of the Mississippi 
River by 1863 – as well as the capture of New Orleans - contributed to the crisis in the West. The 
pressures created by the presence of the Union army on both the local populations as well as the 
Confederate army played a key role in the initial displacement of these peoples. This in turn 
increased the number of displaced whites in the region early on in the war. By contrast, with a 
series of Confederate victories in the East during the first two years of the war, there was not a 
significant displacement problem there until mid-1863, accelerating in the year preceding the 
Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865. 
By March of 1865, the Federal government set up the Freedmen’s Bureau, in part, to aid 
these displaced whites. This study will focus on the Bureau’s strategies, engagement, and general 
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handling of displaced people until 1868. This year serves as the effective end of the Bureau’s 
operations in the states, with the exception of work performed by education superintendents and 
claims officers, therefore, dealings with displaced people declined incrementally in the period 
between Appomattox and the end of the Bureau’s operations.45 There are examples of this 
happening even earlier in some areas. By mid-1866, there are circulars - directions to Bureau 
officials - that “the issue of rations to Refugees and Freedmen will cease except in certain cases 
specified in the circular, as there have been no Government stores at this place and consequently 
no issue of the same.”46 As a result, displaced whites were forced to look for help elsewhere – 
charities, local governments, or friendly neighbors. 
  The situation in the West concerning uprooted whites and their treatment during and after 
the war is an area of Civil War scholarship that is ripe for further research and analysis. Displaced 
whites sent on the run from the very beginning because of roaming guerilla bands, the presence of 
both armies, and citizens’ divided loyalties came from a variety of backgrounds and experienced 
life quite differently because of their wartime displacement. Researching and analyzing displaced 
people from Arkansas, Missouri, and the surrounding border regions of these states can help 
historians better understand the plight of historically underrepresented civilians. Focusing on the 
period that covers the start of the war through the end of the Bureau’s state operations in 1868, this 
study reveals the different ways that displaced people factored into the efforts of different 
organizations both dealing with and addressing the needs of these people during this period. 
It is my hope that this study will fulfill the call by historian David S. Reynolds indicating 
that, “[t]here needs to be more books about the outliers of Civil War history – individuals who 
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affected politics and events even though they weren’t political or military leaders.”47 Telling the 
story of displaced whites in the Trans-Mississippi West are a step towards fulfilling this void. The 
West, in general, is far from the centers of power in the nineteenth century United States, which, 
in many ways, caused it to be overlooked by so many historians. Displaced whites in the region 
could not have been any further from national or even local centers of power and, as a result, fit 
the description of outlier in this context. 
Historiographical Context 
A study of displaced whites in Missouri and Arkansas is important for several reasons. 
First, it will help scholars better understand these people and how the war changed their lives. 
Second, such a study details the different ways federal and state agencies and benevolent aid 
societies/associations responded to the crises caused by the war. Finally, this study illuminates the 
experiences of displaced whites and their thoughts on displacement as well as efforts to help them, 
or lack thereof. A Lonely Wandering Refugee investigates Freedmen’s Bureau records, Official 
Records of the War of the Rebellion, sources from a number of regional benevolent aid societies, 
regional newspapers, a number of personal papers, as well as state and local governmental records 
examining each of these issues and help historians to better understand how the civilian population 
experienced the war and how Americans responded to the crisis that erupted in this understudied 
region of the war. 
A limited amount of material in the historiography focuses on displaced whites, their plight, 
and their treatment by the armies, government officials, and the many civilian organizations. 
Although numerous historians acknowledge and provide some insight on the existence of the 
crisis, only one monograph, a few chapter-length studies, and an article-length study comprises 
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the literature devoted exclusively to uprooted whites and their experiences. The monograph, 
Massey’s Refugee Life in the Confederacy focuses on Confederate sympathizers who were forced 
from their communities.48 Massey gives a great amount of detail with regard to displacement, how 
they lived their lives in that capacity, and their treatment by local populations. It is an excellent 
starting point for this study given the amount of material that she provides in the book. This work, 
however, is not without its limitations. Massey’s book focuses on people who tended to be more 
upper class because, as she notes “[t]he poorer, uneducated people composed the majority of those 
displaced, but less is known about this group because few left records of their experiences.”49 
Furthermore, her work centers on the problem of displacement in the East including Georgia, 
North and South Carolina, and especially Virginia. 
While Massey offers the only book length study on displaced whites, other historians have 
offered shorter or tangential accounts of their wartime experiences and interactions. Historian Joan 
E. Cashin’s chapter-length study, “Into the Trackless Wilderness: The Refugee Experience in the 
Civil War,” examines Southern white women and the reconstruction of households following the 
war.50 This work does not move very far beyond the domestic impact of displacement. While this 
is still an important study of displaced people, Cashin’s work does not address the larger problem 
with regard to these people or their treatment by the many different groups that encountered them 
in the West. 
In addition to the many uprooted whites and African Americans, the war also displaced 
large numbers of Native Americans and, in many instances, the Union army labeled them as 
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refugees. This is another area that is ripe for more research and analysis. In the other chapter-length 
study on displaced people, historian Clarissa W. Confer analyzes the plight of members of the 
Cherokee Nation as refugees, mostly on the fringes of Arkansas and into Indiana Territory 
(Oklahoma).51 Confer does a very good job differentiating between displaced Confederates and 
Unionists as well as detailing aid received from the federal government for these people. This work 
is a valuable addition to the scholarship, but only paints part of the picture in the Civil War West. 
Other works focus on small segments of the civilian population and how they were 
impacted by the war. Historian John F. Bradbury, Jr. offers an article-length study of the 
interactions between displaced people and the Union army in the Ozarks of Arkansas.52 Bradbury’s 
work does a fine job of putting these people and their interactions with the Union army at the center 
of Arkansas Civil War history, but it has its limitations given that it is only an article-length study 
ending in 1865. These works provide an excellent starting point in addressing the problem, but 
they fail to detail the problem in the West, at least beyond Arkansas and they do not move beyond 
the end of the war in their periodization. 
Recently, historians have developed more unique ways to view the war and its impact on 
civilian populations. Historian Yael Sternhell’s 2012 work, Routes of War: The World of 
Movement in the Confederate South, very nicely details the Confederacy’s rise and fall by looking 
at the paths connecting the battlefield and the homefront.53 While her focus are people escaping 
the maelstrom of war, very few pages discuss displaced people in the West, though there is a brief 
mention of displaced people in Mississippi. In addition, some of the first-hand accounts are widely 
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available, including the accounts of Cornelia McDonald, Arthur Fremantle, and Kate Stone – 
widely available published primary sources. Indeed, this work is a welcome addition to the 
scholarship of how civilians experienced the war, but it is also an example of why the research 
presented in A Lonely Wandering Refugee is needed. Historians must dig deeper to bring the plight 
of displaced Southern whites to a wider audience.54 
In the broader historiography of the Civil War Era, there is a problem in how historians 
position displaced people within larger discussions of the local/regional military operations. If 
uprooted people are discussed at all, they are often discussed as a nuisance to the Union army or 
as a source of intelligence for enemy positions or there are some casual mentions within the context 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau as the agency tried to establish itself during the final months of the war. 
More recent works, like the work of historians Earl J. Hess, Stephanie McCurry, and Andrew F. 
Smith offer more coverage of displaced whites in the context of the war, but more needs to be said 
about their experiences beyond the scope of military operations and the operations of the Bureau. 
To Hess’s credit, he does discuss the use of contraband as laborers and as troops by Union General 
Benjamin Butler. Hess details the plight of both displaced blacks and whites in the context of the 
Union army in the West, but he offers more reactions to these people from army officials rather 
than any detailed analysis of these people’s role in the operations of the army. For example, as 
Hess describes, “Sherman’s men needed supplies, but they also needed to lose the black and white 
refugees who had tagged along since the Federals left Columbia.”55 The recent work of Andrew 
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Smith briefly discusses displaced people, but it is in the context of food shortages in the South and 
its contribution to the Confederacy’s defeat. For example, Smith notes, “military operations in 
northern Virginia during the first two years of the war sent a deluge of people into Richmond – 
many of them penniless, jobless, and occasionally homeless.”56 Stephanie McCurry’s Confederate 
Reckoning focuses on slaves and white women’s exclusion from the Confederate political 
community. Her work offers a few brief mentions of displaced people in this context, usually 
referencing people applying for aid/relief following the war.57 In terms of the recent scholarship, 
as detailed above, historians have moved the discussion of displaced whites from the margins of 
Civil War history, but work remains to be done in examining displaced people from the start of 
the war through Reconstruction. In addition to these more recent works, there are a number of 
older and newer state-level studies that discuss the impact of the war on local communities in 
Arkansas and Missouri.58 These studies are valuable in that they help to set the stage for the 
military situation and civilians’ responses to this, but they offer very little insight into the plight of 
people displaced by the war in these same regions.  
The Bureau performed a very important task with regard to displaced people as laid out in 
its original form in March 1865. The original bill stated with regard to these people that, “the 
Secretary of War may direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful 
for the immediate temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen 
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and their wives and children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct.”59 With the 
revisionist scholarship regarding Reconstruction, works of the Freedmen’s Bureau have garnered 
much reconsideration. Very few of these works, however, focus on the Bureau’s dealings with 
displaced Southern whites and, understandably, focus on the needs of freedmen and women. 
Scholarship on the Bureau, while not as voluminous as that on President Abraham Lincoln, Civil 
War battles, or the changes wrought by the war, has expanded since the mid-twentieth century. 
Part of this comes from Eric Foner’s monumental 1988 work, Reconstruction: America’s 
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. In a reaction to Foner’s work, a number of historians responded 
with a number of studies about different aspects of Reconstruction, studies on the Bureau included. 
Before Foner, only a few works existed that offered any kind of insight on the operations of the 
Bureau. 
Prior to Foner’s work, the most prominent scholarship on the Bureau was George R. 
Bentley’s A History of the Freedmen’s Bureau published in 1955. To be sure, other works by 
William S. McFeely, Joel Williamson, and Leon Litwack looked at the Bureau and its role in race 
relations.60 And while understanding the world made for freedpeople by the war is important, these 
works do not tell the whole story about the Bureau’s operations in the South. Bentley’s work was 
the standard for our understanding of the agency, its history, and its actual operation throughout 
the South. Bentley’s major argument is that the Bureau simply tried to do too much for African 
Americans in that it acted as an extension of the Radical Republicans. A few years before Bentley 
published his study of the Bureau, LaWanda and John Cox put forth an article length analysis of 
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the Bureau’s head, Oliver Otis Howard, refuting many of the long-standing claims that the agency 
had been mishandled and inefficient.61 Following Bentley and the work of the Coxes, many article-
length studies about the Bureau exist, but they often limit their focus to a single state or a region 
of a state in the former Confederacy. Many of these studies were Ph. D. dissertations, which often 
gave a blow-by-blow account of the day-to-day operations of the Bureau or used newer evidence 
to clarify some misconceptions about the Bureau.62 
Bentley’s interpretation of the Bureau was the widely accepted account of the Bureau and 
its operations until more recently when Paul A. Cimbala rejected Bentley’s argument in The 
Freedmen’s Bureau: Reconstructing the American South after the Civil War in 2005. Here, 
Cimbala generally agrees with LaWanda and John Cox, by arguing that, for the most part, the 
Bureau functioned as a useful ally to freedpeople and was not as mismanaged as previous 
historians had suggested. Cimbala zooms out from Howard, providing a view of the entire agency 
in his study. Other works on the Bureau focused on issues such as gender - Mary Farmer-Kaiser’s 
Freedwomen and the Freedmen’s Bureau, labor - the Freedmen and Southern Society Project’s 
Wartime Genesis of Free Labor – in the upper and lower South, or land - the Freedmen and 
Southern Society Project’s Land and Labor, biological issues - Jim Downs’s Sick from Freedom, 
reuniting freedpeople’s families - Ira S. Berlin’s Families and Freedom and Heather A. Williams’s 
Help Me to Find My People. There were also a variety of studies that detailed the creation of 
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hospitals, schools, and financial institutions affiliated with the Bureau in some way.63 Very few of 
these narrow Bureau studies, however, devote attention to displaced people and the studies that 
offer some discussion of displaced whites, do so in the most modest of terms. This project seeks 
to shed some light on the plight of these people and offer a fresh take on this group of people and 
their relationship to the state and the larger citizenry.  
This study relies on the voluminous records of the Freedmen’s Bureau. These records 
include a vast amount of communications between Bureau officials in the region as well as 
communications between the Bureau and Washington D.C. While these primary sources provide 
a wealth of information about Bureau relief efforts, schools, and hospitals, Bureau records can be 
– at times - difficult to read and sometimes difficult to follow stories as they present themselves. 
Historian Mary Farmer-Kaiser has noted this difficulty when she wrote: “Although the records of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau concerning relief are incomplete and generally frustrating for researchers, 
they nonetheless show that the distribution of food, clothing, and medicine remained an important 
task throughout the agency’s short lifetime. Its relief activities met a critical need despite the many 
obstacles it encountered. There was no post experience to guide bureau officials in the distribution 
of relief on such a grand scale, in such a momentous time, and under such difficult conditions.”64 
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Despite these difficulties faced by, not only myself but other historians of the Bureau, this study 
presents a picture of the agency and how it helped displaced whites through relief, schools, and 
hospitals through 1868. 
With an understandable focus on the Union and Confederate military campaigns and the 
larger operations of the Freedmen’s Bureau, few historians address the circumstances that led 
different organizations to take action in order to provide relief to uprooted people. Nor has there 
been any kind of focus on the circumstances that forced people from their communities, their 
identities, how state governments, the armies, or the Bureau treated them. The Bureau’s treatment 
of displaced people is further complicated by the famine that gripped the South during the early 
part of 1867. The minimal attention given to displaced people in the historical scholarship warrants 
a study such as the one presented here. With the research and analysis of displaced people and 
their treatment by the aforementioned organizations in the pages that follow, historians can better 
understand their plight in the West and the ways in which their treatment helped to shape early 
Reconstruction policy toward these people. This study is a step in that direction. 
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CHAPTER 1: ORIGINS 
 
“If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it out to 
break. For the present, however, this contest is laid asleep.”1 
- John Quincy Adams on the Missouri Compromise (March 3, 1820) 
 
The history of settlement, the geography, and politics of the Trans-Mississippi West 
influenced Arkansas’s decision to secede and Missouri’s decision to remain in the Union as well 
as the emergence of the displacement crises in each state during the Civil War. To understand its 
creation, one must first understand the history, geography, and politics of the region, as each factor 
influenced many individuals’ wartime decisions to flee their homes and communities. The region 
became a battleground for the slavery question that brought about civil war in 1861 and this can 
be seen in the decades leading up to the outbreak of war. Antebellum events linked with the 
westward expansion of slavery influenced the politics in each state, especially during the 1850s. 
The influence of national events during the antebellum period played a role in each state’s 
decision to secede, as would settlement patterns and geography. Though Missouri was a slave state 
since its admittance to the Union, its location prevented it from producing the kind of plantation 
agriculture and large slave holdings seen throughout much of the Deep South and its politics in by 
1860 reflected this fact. Arkansas had a climate favorable to plantation agriculture allowing cotton 
to be grown in areas along the Mississippi through the center of the state. The Ozark Mountains in 
the northwestern corner of the state did not grow cotton; this combined with pro-Union sympathies 
led to strong anti-secessionist sentiment amongst its local populations by 1860. With Lincoln’s 
election in 1860, each state thought of secession as a last possible resort and exercised as much 
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caution could be allowed. The Confederate firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861 exhausted that 
caution, causing each state to seriously consider secession in its aftermath. Missouri ultimately 
refused secession, causing an internal political firestorm that resulted in two wartime state 
governments. Arkansas did its best to avoid leaving the Union, but the firing on Fort Sumter and 
Lincoln’s subsequent call for troops proved to be the last straw; with the state’s slaveholding cotton 
planters leading the way, they brought Arkansas in line with the Deep South. The seeds for these 
events are found with the United States purchase of French Louisiana in 1803. 
The Louisiana Territory 
The Louisiana Territory, a French possession since the late seventeenth century when 
Robert de La Salle explored the region, served as an expansion for the lucrative French fur trade 
with various Native American tribes. The French colony, however, failed to attract large numbers 
of settlers and, as a result, never saw the rise of plantation agriculture like France’s Caribbean 
possessions. Despite this failure, it did not prevent the French introduction of slavery in the 
Mississippi River Valley. Prior to the introduction of African slaves, the French dealt in Native 
American slaves provided by indigenous tribes, then they imported nearly six thousand African 
slaves to the region between 1719 and 1731. African slaves served as forced migrants in a failed 
effort to sustain the colony. During the early eighteenth century, Frenchman Philippe François 
Renault is credited with bringing the first African slaves to the Mississippi Valley from Haiti to 
work in the lead mines in present-day Missouri.2 Nearly a third of the African slaves died shortly 
after their arrival and the remainder either ran away and formed a variety of maroon settlements 
in the region or were difficult to control, leaving a 2:1 black majority in the region. In addition, 
these African slaves fought on both sides of the Natchez uprising against the French (1729-1730) 
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and concocted a variety of plots to overthrow the French. It is important to note that Franco-
Spanish slavery differed from American slavery in that manumission as well as a slave’s ability to 
purchase his or her freedom was much easier and laws banning interracial unions were quite lax. 
Because of this, a larger number of free blacks were present in New Orleans by the early nineteenth 
century.3 
The French lost Louisiana, at least temporarily, because of their defeat to the British in the 
Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), when they ceded the territory to Spain in addition to ceding 
Canada to Great Britain with the Treaty of Paris (1763) that ended the war. Spain controlled 
Louisiana until 1800, when the Spanish returned it to France via secret treaty, though the Spanish 
continued to administer the port of New Orleans to keep up appearances that they were still in the 
control of the territory.4 During this period of Spanish control, there were a series of tensions 
between the United States and Spain over American rights to the Mississippi River until the 
Americans secured rights to the port of New Orleans through the Pinckney Treaty (1795). With 
the convulsions of the French Revolution (1789-1815), future French emperor Napoleon 
Bonaparte, then First Consul, hoped to recapture the North American empire lost by the French 
because of the Seven Years’ War as well as counter British control of Canada to keep a balance of 
powers between the European powers on the North American continent. Whatever plans that the 
French had for this vast territory along the Mississippi Valley, these plans came crashing down 
with the Haitian Revolution. 
With the explosion of the French Revolution in 1789, its effects rippled across the Atlantic 
to the French Caribbean island of Saint Domingue (Haiti) beginning in 1791. Haitian slaves rose 
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up against their French masters in an attempt to form a republic built upon the promises of the 
French Revolution. Napoleon attempted to quell the rebellion when in 1802, because of the lull in 
hostilities with Great Britain, he sent thirty thousand troops to the Caribbean island. This attempt 
to overtake the slaves failed with many of these troops killed off or dead from yellow fever and, 
without the lucrative sugar plantations of Haiti, and the certain renewal of hostilities with Great 
Britain, any dream of a North American empire ended. Napoleon feared New Orleans would be 
lost to British forces, thus rendering the rest of the territory useless, upon the renewal of hostilities 
and decided that it would be best to sell all of the Louisiana Territory. Following a series of abuses 
regarding treaty privileges by the Americans, the Spanish closed New Orleans to American traffic 
in the fall of 1802. When Napoleon’s ministers approached President Thomas Jefferson regarding 
the purchase of French Louisiana, the Americans were more than willing to listen to his offer.5 
President Jefferson initially hoped to purchase the port of New Orleans and Florida (East 
and West Florida, controlled by the Spanish) and, in April of 1803, he instructed his French 
minister to do as such. Jefferson instructed the American Minister to France, Robert R. Livingston, 
to offer of $6 million dollars for the purchase of New Orleans and Florida from the French. The 
French were unwilling to sell such a small part of the territory; so instead, they offered all of 
Louisiana to the Americans for $15 million. With the help of fellow Virginian James Monroe, who 
Jefferson sent to Paris to help with the negotiations, Livingston went over the president’s head and 
purchased all of Louisiana – approximately nine hundred thousand square miles of land stretching 
from the Gulf of Mexico to British Canada - for France’s asking price of $15 million. This was 
well beyond anything Jefferson could have hoped. Before the deal became official, the treaty had 
to go before the Senate for ratification. In the meantime, Jefferson began second-guessing the 
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constitutionality of the purchase, wondering to himself if he would first have to have some kind of 
amendment to place him on strong constitutional ground. Eventually, Monroe and Livingston 
convinced the president to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification – without the amendment. 
The United States Senate ratified the treaty in October 1803 by a margin of 24-7 making the 
Louisiana Purchase part of the young nation. This was a big step for the new nation. The Louisiana 
Purchase became, what historian Gordon S. Wood has termed, “the most popular and momentous 
event of Jefferson’s presidency.”6 Wood goes further, laying out the significance of the Purchase 
in that “not only did it end the long struggle for control of the Mississippi’s outlet to the sea, but it 
also, as Jefferson exulted, freed America from Europe’s colonial entanglements and prepared the 
way for the eventual dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.”7  With his 
doubling the size of the nation, Jefferson had a vision of a nation of yeoman farmers moving 
westward, creating the American ideal - Jefferson’s dream. 
Nearly doubling the size of the United States, the Louisiana Purchase paved the way for 
Thomas Jefferson’s dream of a nation of yeoman farmers and what he termed as an empire for 
liberty. For Jefferson, the acquisition of this territory would produce what historian Walter Johnson 
called “a harvest of self-sufficient, noncommercial white households headed by the yeoman 
patriarchs whom he associated with republican virtue, a flowering of white equality and political 
independence.”8 With the continued and later intensified presence of slavery in the West, 
Jefferson’s dream turned into what Johnson has termed Jefferson’s nightmare. Though Sage of 
Monticello was aware of the fact that slavery was very dangerous for the developing nation, it did 
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not stop him from reflecting positively on American civilization. For example, Jefferson detailed 
the advance of American civilization in an 1824 letter to William Ludlow: 
Let a philosophic observer commence a journey from the savages of the Rocky 
Mountains, eastwardly towards our sea-coast. These he would observe in the 
earliest stage of association living under no law but that of nature, subscribing and 
covering themselves with the flesh and skins of wild beasts. He would next find 
those on our frontiers in the pastoral state, raising domestic animals to supply the 
defects of hunting. Then succeed our own semi-barbarous citizens, the pioneers of 
the advance of civilization, and so in his progress he would meet the gradual shades 
of improving man until he would reach his, as yet, most improved state in our 
seaport towns. This, in fact, is equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of 
man from the infancy of creation to the present day.9 
Jefferson, some two decades later, did not view his addition of so much land to the infant republic 
as a nightmare. He was still very sure that his dream of the progress of the white yeoman republican 
was coming true, despite his many misgivings on slavery. Shortly after Jefferson’s purchase of the 
Louisiana Territory, a small number of frontier-minded Americans embarked in an attempt to 
make his dream (and theirs) a reality in the Mississippi Valley. Another war with Great Britain 
proved to be the spark for this westward movement. 
The Settlement of Missouri, Crisis, and Statehood 
The War of 1812 served as the catalyst for Missouri settlement in a variety of ways. The 
construction of a series of protective forts in what became Missouri preceded large-scale American 
settlement here. With the start of the war, these forts served to guard the western frontier and 
delayed settlement of the region for a few more years. In 1812, just before war began, Congress 
carved the state of Louisiana from the territory acquired as a part of the Louisiana Purchase. After 
Louisiana’s entrance into the Union, the remainder of the Purchase lands became known as 
Missouri Territory. With the Treaty of Ghent in late 1814 came the end of the war and, as a result, 
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the United States was no longer a neo-colonial possession of the British, allowing it to shift its 
focus from the east to the west. American settlers streamed in from the east with the hopes of 
taking advantage of opportunities presented by the west. From 1815 onward, white settlers came 
to Missouri Territory from all points east: New England, Philadelphia, the Midwest, and Virginia.  
Many of these new Missouri settlers took the newly built National Road in search of 
western opportunity; others rode down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers from a variety of points 
out east. Settlers from the western parts of Kentucky and Tennessee made their way to the Ozark 
region in the southwestern part of the state. Settlers also came from closer, neighboring states like 
Illinois. For many of these settlers, their push to build homesteads in the countryside did not come 
without problems. The first Missourians had to deal with both squatters and land speculators who 
often served as an impediment to clear land titles. Nonetheless, the first American settlers in 
Missouri Territory settled along the Mississippi River valley, centered in the growing city of St. 
Louis. Located at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, St. Louis quickly grew 
into a major urban center and served as a major western port. From St. Louis, settlers sold goods 
and supplies and traded down the Mississippi. The area around St. Louis proved to be very fertile 
land for farmers as it was located in the flood plain of the two rivers. Settlement in St. Louis also 
offered some protection for these early Missouri settlers against various Native American tribes in 
the region.10 
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The primary Native American nations in Missouri Territory included the Missouria, the 
territory’s namesake, as well as the Osage, Delaware, Kickapoo, Shawnee, and Cherokee. Other 
nations, like the Fox and Sauk, ventured into the state from time to time, usually for hunting and 
trading with the other nations. Once the United States purchased their lands as a part of the 
Louisiana Purchase, many of the Native American nations signed treaties with the American 
government. For example, the Osage signed a treaty with the United States in 1808 where they 
gave up all land claims for what today constitutes much of southern Missouri in exchange for 
$1200 in cash as well as merchandise totally about $1500 dollars. In another example, the Osage 
signed another treaty with the Americans in 1825 where they gave up the rest of their lands in 
Missouri and Arkansas as well as part of their land in Kansas for a total of $7000 dollars in annual 
Fig. 1.1: Map of Missouri and Territorial Arkansas, 1831. Missouri Valley Special Collections, Kansas City 
Public Library, Kansas City, Missouri. Source: 
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~216126~5502328:Missouri-And-Territory-
Of-Arkansas 
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payments over seven years. For the Osage, these treaties left their nation near starvation and in 
great poverty only a decade later. Missouri Territory also saw the creation of various Native 
American reservations for Native Americans that the United States government moved from other 
states. The Kickapoo, who had lived in Missouri since the mid-eighteenth century, were relocated 
to a reservation in southwest Missouri in exchange for ceding all of their lands in Illinois and 
Indiana in 1819. From 1819-1824, a number of Kickapoo made their way to southwestern 
Missouri. By 1832, the American government had again moved the Kickapoo to a reservation in 
Kansas, near Fort Leavenworth. These moves came about because of the incursion of white 
settlers, especially after the War of 1812.11 
Once the United States government pushed these Native Americans bands further to the 
west, white settlers moved into the lands vacated by these bands. For example, in the southern part 
of what became the state of Missouri, lead mining quickly developed as a valuable economic 
activity attracting a great number of settlers to that part of the state. Americans looked west to the 
Mississippi Valley for economic opportunities. Historian Adam Rothman notes how the American 
government provided opportunities to potential settlers, “The national government encouraged 
economic development in its new acquisitions through nation-building measures that included the 
survey and sale of public lands, the improvement of transportation infrastructure, and the 
imposition of a tariff on foreign sugar trade.”12 The combination of trading, farming, and mining 
quickly brought settlers to Missouri during the latter part of the 1810s and, by 1819, the state was 
prepared to make the move from territory to state. By 1816, Missouri created a territorial 
government and, by 1817, Missouri citizens began petitioning Washington for statehood. 
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Missouri’s population at the time of statehood included an increasing number of African American 
slaves, which made Missouri’s entrance into the Union a stormy one. 
Missouri slaves labored in a variety of areas in the state’s economy. Missouri, as many 
Northern politicians would argue during the Missouri Crisis (1819-1821), was too far north to 
grow significant amounts of cotton. While some Missourians grew cotton, particularly in the 
southern part of the state, the growing season was far too short to allow the state to become a major 
cotton producer like states in the Deep South. As a result, it negated the need for the large-scale 
plantations worked by twenty or more slaves that were more prominent in the Deep South, which 
is why so many Missourians both black and white, toiled on smaller farms. Even if Missouri was 
too far north to grow cotton, as some Northerners claimed, this did not mean that slaves could not 
be used to grow hemp, tobacco, or foodstuffs. Slaves in Missouri often worked as field hands on 
the small farms located along the Mississippi River. At the time of statehood, nearly three quarters 
of its white population worked in farming and, those who had slaves, used them on these smaller 
farms.13 With each successive decade beginning with the state’s entrance into the Union until the 
firing on Fort Sumter, Missouri’s slave population increased, with most of these slaves spread out 
along the banks of the Mississippi as well as throughout the state’s central counties. Though few 
large-scale plantations existed in this part of the state, this area of the state became known as Little 
Dixie (see Fig. 1.2). Just south of Little Dixie, St. Louis also had slaves labor within its city limits. 
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During Missouri’s territorial stage, St. Louis grew as an industrial center, processing and 
shipping many of the state’s raw materials, including hemp and tobacco, down the Mississippi for 
consumption. Along the St. Louis riverfront, slaves also worked as draymen and stevedores.14 
“Rope and bagging manufactures established ropewalks and factories all along the Missouri River 
to process hemp for products used in the southern cotton trade.”15 St. Louis served as a terminus 
for the state’s raw materials made possible because of slave labor. By the time Missouri applied 
for statehood, the ratio of white settlers to slaves was approximately 5:1, with settlement in both 
rural and urban areas. As a result, the state was prepared to move from the territorial stage to 
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statehood. Before Missouri statehood could be made possible, however, questions about slavery 
in the territories had to be addressed on a national level. This triggered the Missouri Crisis of 1819-
1821. 
The roots of the Missouri Crisis lie in the immediate aftermath of the American Revolution. 
The first attempt to legislate with regard to slavery came with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
Passed by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance 
banned slavery in the territories that would later become the Midwest. While it expressly 
prohibited slavery with Article VI of the Ordinance, it did have a fugitive slave clause that served 
as the model for the one that eventually appeared in the Constitution. “Legally speaking,” notes 
historian David Waldstreicher, “the ban on slavery in the Northwest implied its protection in the 
Southwest. If a ‘compromise of 1787’ occurred, it formed the first of the great line-drawing 
territorial compromises over slavery, while simultaneously making the Constitution itself possible. 
If the Congress helped the convention resolve its fragmentation over the representation question, 
it suggests that the first compromise of 1787 did more than initiate the process that continued with 
the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850.”16 This compromise set the bar for 
negotiations over slavery in the territories going forward. By 1819, Missouri’s admission again 
stirred these debates over slavery in the territories and how these states would be admitted into the 
Union, continuing the sectional bargaining over slavery. Situated in what would become the 
geographic center of the United States, Missouri’s application for admission into the Union in 
1819 made it the center of the slavery debate that had gradually intensified since the founding of 
the republic.  
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Slavery, though not mentioned by name in the Constitution, was the ever-present hurdle 
for Congress in antebellum discussions of statehood. Provisions in the founding document 
including the 3/5 clause (Article I, Section II), a fugitive slave clause (Article IV, Section II), and 
a non-importation clause (Article I, Section IX) mark the beginning of a series of sectional 
compromises concerning slavery. For the most part, these compromises in the United States 
constitution achieved their intended goal of sectional harmony at a national level and allowed the 
framers to create a federal Union. In the succeeding decades, however, the United States expanded 
territorially to the West and slavery took on a much more important role in the developing and 
expanding nation. “Territorial issues,” observes Waldstreicher, “including the disposal of western 
lands won or secured during the war [Revolutionary War], set states in competition but also created 
the promise, or potential, of a federal future in which key issues would be resolved by consensus 
or compromise.”17 This competition was economic and political. So, with Missouri’s desire to 
enter the Union as a slave state in 1819, came a national debate over the peculiar institution and 
its future in the territories. 
The 1819 Missouri Crisis threatened the national balance between slave states and free 
states. At the time of Missouri’s application for admission into the Union, eleven free states and 
eleven slave states composed the Union. Congress sought to maintain that balance between free 
and slave states, preserving sectional harmony and addressing easterners’ contrasting visions for 
the West. Some Americans wanted the area kept free of slavery so that white men could move 
west and recreate the wealth they saw in the already settled Northeast. For these Americans, that 
was what made the North superior is that it offered wage earners a form of independence that slave 
labor did not. Keeping wealthy slaveholders and their slave out of the West was the best way to 
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achieve this result. This group of whites who believed that free labor was preferable to slave labor 
- both economically and socially. Other Americans wanted the region to be open to slavery so they 
could recreate the wealth in the southeastern part of the country. For them, moving west was the 
only way to fight soil exhaustion and capitalize on the new cotton and sugar boom.18 Missouri’s 
move for statehood threatened that harmony. Historian David M. Potter observes that Missouri’s 
admission raised “the question of slavery for the whole area of the Louisiana Purchase and 
present[ed] the imminent possibility that slave states would outnumber free states in the Union.”19 
For the first time since the framing of the Constitution, slavery threatened the future of the United 
States along sectional lines. If Congress allowed Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state, it 
would throw off the sectional balance. This caused many Americans, including an aged Jefferson, 
to worry. For Jefferson, “this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and 
filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. [I]t is hushed indeed for the 
moment. [B]ut this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence."20 Jefferson’s dream was indeed 
becoming a nightmare. National debates over slavery in the context of the Missouri Crisis clouded 
Jefferson’s vision for the future of the United States. Missouri’s proposed entrance into the Union 
caused a number of politicians to scramble to find a viable political solution to the crisis, causing 
a disruption in the Era of Good Feelings. 
New York senator James Tallmadge spearheaded the first attempt to resolve the Missouri 
Crisis. On the day that Missouri’s enabling act was introduced to the House of Representatives on 
February 13, 1819, Tallmadge proposed that Missouri be admitted, but without the importation of 
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future slaves as well as the promise that the children of slaves be set free at the age of twenty-five. 
In short, he proposed a gradual emancipation amendment as a condition of Missouri statehood. 
Tallmadge triggered a very passionate debate over the future of slavery in the United States earning 
Tallmadge and his supporters the label of “restrictionists.” The senator from New York and his 
Northern colleagues battled over the institution’s future with their Southern counterparts. The 
debates over the amendment became so heated that some congressional representatives threatened 
civil war. Tallmadge defended his amendment to Missouri statehood, “Its present threatening 
aspect, and the violence of its supporters, so far from inducing me to yield to its progress, prompts 
me to resist its march. Now is the time. It must now be met, and the extension of the evil must now 
be prevented, or the occasion is irrevocably lost, and the evil can never be contracted.”21 In addition 
to the measure in Missouri, Tallmadge enlisted the help of  his fellow New York Congressman, 
John Taylor, to ban slavery from the territory that lie to the south of Missouri, Arkansas Territory. 
The House of Representatives passed Tallmadge’s measure. The U.S. Senate refused any kind of 
restriction on slavery and did not hold a vote resulting in Congressional deadlock. With either side 
willing to budge, the bill died on March 3, 1819. While the Tallmadge Amendment demonstrates 
how slavery had the potential to ruin Jefferson’s vision for the expanding nation, it also 
demonstrates the political nature of the Missouri Crisis.22 
The Tallmadge Amendment and the Missouri Crisis in general, caused a much-heated 
debate in Congress for a variety of reasons. Why the heated debate? First, such a debate came 
about because of the rise of political parties and newspapers during the early republic period. As a 
result, politics no longer took place behind closed doors. Second, slavery had grown more 
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entrenched in the Southern states since the ratification of the Constitution, because of westward 
expansion, easier cotton processing with the cotton gin, and the discovery of easier to produce 
cotton. Representatives from slave-holding states refused to give any ground to their Northern 
neighbors. Third, the Missouri Crisis was a manifestation of Northern resentment towards the 
additional Southern representation some attributed to the three-fifths clause in the Constitution. 
Many Northerners had grown tired of the South’s bloated numbers in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, as well as the long line of Virginians who had ascended to the presidency because 
of the three-fifths clause. President James Monroe also had to be cautious with regard to the 
Compromise. “The hysteria shown by Southern congressmen during the initial Tallmadge 
Amendment debate alerted Monroe and his political associates that they were vulnerable to attack 
from the South because of their broadly national stance; they could hardly allow themselves to 
appear flexible in defense of slavery.”23 The Compromise and the Tallmadge Amendment was a 
touchy subject for all involved and, as a result, a number of opinions emerged regarding the 
Compromise. 
Opinions about the crisis came from both sides of the debate. Antislavery groups reached 
out to their representatives to rid the nation of the scourge of slavery. “Resolved, That the members 
of the late congress who opposed the admission of slaves into the proposed state of Missouri,” 
announced a October 29, 1819, antislavery meeting at the Trenton, New Jersey, state house, “have 
the sincere and respectful thanks of this meeting for their manly and unanswerable opposition to a 
measure fraught with so much mischief and disgrace to our country.”24 On the other side, the 
veteran South Carolina Congressman Charles Pinckney, argued the proslavery position on 
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Missouri’s statehood in a debate with New York Senator Rufus King: “However we may all wish 
to see Missouri admitted, as she ought, on equal terms with the other States, this is a very 
unimportant object to her, compared with keeping the Constitution inviolate – with keeping the 
hands of Congress from touching the question of slavery. On the subject of the Constitution, no 
compromise ought ever be made.”25 While King argued that the various compromises regarding 
slavery only applied to the original thirteen states and that Congress should abolish slavery beyond 
the original states, Pinckney argued that this was not the case. The Constitution applied to the 
original and any future states carved from the territories, even going so far as to argue that slavery 
was not evil, but beneficial to the United States. To find a national solution to this sectional 
problem, Congress sought a compromise that would appeal to both the proslavery and antislavery 
interests in the United States. Such a compromise came under the leadership of Henry Clay in the 
form of the Missouri Compromise.26 
Debates over the Missouri Crisis, as noted above, caused a great deal of national political 
consternation. Because of this, the Congressional debates were deadlocked over what to do with 
Missouri. The Compromise, brokered by Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky, finally broke the 
deadlock over the state’s admission. Clay proposed that Missouri enter the Union as a slave state 
as it requested. To maintain sectional balance between slave and free, Maine would be broken off 
from Massachusetts and it would enter the Union as a free state. To address the slavery issue in 
the remaining Louisiana Purchase Territory, a line would extend along Missouri’s southern border 
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along the 36° 30’N line. North of this line, any and all territory would be free of slavery while 
south of this line was open for business as far as slavery was concerned. This would prevent 
another crisis when Congress carved other states from the Purchase territory. At the time, many 
Americans, both North and South, considered the Missouri Compromise a success – each side 
gave a little to gain a little and averted a national crisis. In hindsight, however, the Compromise 
only served to postpone the crisis, as other compromises were needed and all failed to avert civil 
war. The next step for Missouri was drafting a state constitution.27 
Missouri’s admission to the Union was not finished until the state constitution was 
completed. Following the congressional debates over the Compromise, Missouri delegates drafted 
a state constitution “that called for a law prohibiting free blacks from entering the state.”28 They 
took this step as part of a long history of white Americans’ hostility toward free blacks who they 
saw as social, economic, and threats to the institution of slavery. Northern Congressmen argued 
that this violated the Privileges and Immunities clause in Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution. 
As a result, a majority in the House did not approve Missouri’s constitution with this law present 
in the document, threatening to undo the hard-fought compromise. Clay worked behind the scenes 
to ensure that the compromise did not fall through the cracks on this issue and, in February 1821, 
Missouri agreed not to violate the Privileges and Immunities clause in its state constitution. On 
August 10, 1821, Missouri entered the Union as the twenty-fourth state. As the Missouri Crisis 
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ended, the shift from Jefferson’s dream into a nightmare began. This is perhaps best summarized 
by Wood when he wrote that Jefferson “always sensed that his ‘empire of liberty’ had a cancer at 
its core that was eating away at the message of liberty and equality and threatening the very 
existence of the nation and its democratic self-government; but he had mistakenly come to believe 
that the cancer was Northern bigotry and money-making promoted by Federalist priests and 
merchants.”29 With the Missouri crisis it was evident that the cancer was the institution of slavery 
and competing ideas about its role in the nation and influence on American life. While Missouri’s 
path to state was wrought with sectional debates over the slavery question, Arkansas’s path to 
statehood was less dramatic. 
The Settlement of Arkansas and its Path to Statehood 
Arkansas’s path to statehood was very closely linked with the destiny of its northern 
neighbor. By the time Jefferson purchased Louisiana from the French in 1803, there were a number 
of peoples in what became Arkansas Territory. A holdover from French control of the region, there 
were a small number of Frenchmen, scattered along the banks of Arkansas’s various rivers and 
streams, where they fished, hunted, and trapped in the vast Arkansas wilderness. At the frontier 
town of Arkansas Post, located on the Mississippi River at the mouth of the Mississippi and the 
Arkansas Rivers, “there were about thirty dwelling houses, built in the French style . . . besides 
several stores, a mill, and a hotel.”30 The number of French holdovers in Arkansas had dwindled 
since France transferred the territory to the United States, dropping to about 200 people by the 
time Arkansas became a territory in 1819, down from about 400 inhabitants in 1803.31 French 
                                                          
29 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 737-738. 
30 Marie Cash, “Arkansas in Territorial Days,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vo. 1, No. 3 (Sep., 1943): 224. 
31 Ibid; Kathleen DuVal, “Debating Identity, Sovereignty, and Civilization: The Arkansas Valley after the Louisiana 
Purchase,” Journal of the Early Republic Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 2006): 47. 
50 
 
 
 
inhabitants also traded, from time to time, with the various Native American groups located in 
Arkansas. 
When Arkansas became a part of the United States in 1803, because of the Louisiana 
Purchase, very few Native Americans resided there. With local Native American populations as 
high as 15,000 to 20,000 during the seventeenth century, disease because of contact with 
Europeans greatly reduced the numbers of Native Americans here.32 The Western Cherokee were 
the primary group in the territory along with a number of Caddo located in the Red River area in 
the southwestern part of the territory, Osage located in the northwest part of the territory, and 
Quapaw who occupied the mouth of the Arkansas River. These different peoples had different 
goals when it came to their dealings with the Americans. For example, the Osage were under the 
impression that the trading relationships that existed under French and Spanish rule in the region 
would continue with the Americans. The Osage were mistaken and, when the Americans attempted 
to “civilize” them by making them adhere to European cultural customs living and landholding. 
American officials viewed the Osage as the least civilized of the Native groups in Arkansas. 
Osages did their best to resist these efforts during the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
Because of frequent battles with other Native groups and the pressure applied by the Americans, 
the Osage ceded land to the United States with the 1808 Osage Treaty that included an exchange 
for goods and protection, and moved west. Feeling the pressure of the Americans’ push west, the 
Cherokee, who were the Osages’ main rival, attempted to position themselves as an ally of the 
Americans. They used this relationship to drive the Osage west as well as protect their way of life, 
which included slavery. In the end, the Cherokee strategy failed. Like the Osage, they ceded their 
lands in the eastern part of the state to the United States and agreed to move the western part of 
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the state with a July 1817 treaty. In 1818, the Quapaw ceded land claims in the area between the 
Red and Arkansas Rivers to the area that would become Little Rock. Arkansas’s change to 
territorial status served to speed up Native American relocation. 
After Arkansas achieved territorial status, the American government extinguished 
whatever friendly relationships existed between different Native groups. With a civilization policy 
that began with Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, the United States government developed an 
increasingly compulsory Native American removal policy.33 This was evident once the 
government granted former Louisiana Purchase lands territorial status. With territorial status, 
white settlers had more backing when it came to fighting Native Americans over land claims in 
the territory. Put simply, white Americans future vision of their nation did not include Native 
Americans. As a result, Native Americans were pushed west by the government. For example, in 
1825, the federal government moved the Quapaw again, this time further to the South along the 
Red River in Louisiana. This was because of the increasing number of cotton plantations in the 
area. For the Cherokee, another treaty in 1828 moved them to Indiana Territory in exchange for 
their lands in the territory. Historian Kathleen DuVal notes “every time that the civilization policy 
came into conflict with white Americans’ ambitions, white citizens won. By 1828, all Native 
American land claims in the territory were extinguished.”34 The relocations of these Native 
American groups paved the way for white settlement in Arkansas. Americans were willing to deal 
with Native Americans in Arkansas until lands attained territorial status. Once this happened, the 
government was fully on the side of the territories white settlers.  
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Like Missouri, Congress carved Arkansas Territory out of the Louisiana Purchase, and 
settlers made their way there relatively quickly once the United States government opened the area 
up for American settlement. Some of the earlier American settlers came as early as 1804 and 1805, 
adding to the approximately 500 French settlers already in what became Arkansas. By 1810, more 
Americans made their way to Arkansas by way of the Southwestern Trail, which extended from 
St. Louis to the Red River region in Texas. By the 1820s and 1830s, the Southwestern Trail served 
as a settler highway, bringing an increasing number of settlers from the east to Arkansas. Most of 
these early white settlers were of English and Scots-Irish descent and they came from eastern states 
like Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia. Historian Allen Guelzo points out that 
“with the sudden boom in cotton, slaves and masters began shifting south and west, first to 
Georgia, and then after 1810 into the new territories of Alabama and Mississippi, finally lapping 
up the Mississippi River into Tennessee and across the Mississippi into Arkansas and Missouri.”35 
After the War of 1812, Arkansas saw a great deal of veterans of that war settle there. The United 
States government promised veterans 160 acres of public lands located in what constituted the 
Louisiana Purchase. Following Missouri’s application for admission into the Union, the U.S. 
government organized Arkansas as Arkansas (Arkansaw) Territory in 1819. 
 Once it achieved territorial status, Arkansas developed quickly, like its counterparts in the 
Deep South. Congress defined Arkansas Territory with the Mississippi River as its eastern 
boundary, the new state of Missouri as its northern boundary at the 36° 30’N line, west of the 
Missouri bootheel. The state of Louisiana as its southern border, and its western border consisting 
of a line running along the 100 Meridian from the Red River north to the Arkansas River, including 
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much of present-day Oklahoma.36 Arkansas Post, located near the mouth of the Arkansas River, 
served as the territorial capital from 1819-1821. In 1821, territory officials moved the capital to 
Little Rock as it was more centrally located. During the territorial stage, Arkansas’s population 
grew from about 14,000 in 1820 to 30,000 residents in 1830. The flow of settlers to destinations 
like Texas increased the volume of traffic through the territory, causing many to settle there. Most 
settled along the various fertile river valleys, but over time, settlers began moving into the forest 
and more mountainous regions in the northwestern part of the territory. This was difficult as once 
one moved away from the rivers, transportation was difficult. Travelers along the Arkansas River 
“freely commented on the equatorial wilderness, impossible travelling conditions, and noticeable 
lack of refinement among early settlers.”37 Like other frontier settlements, Arkansas had its fair 
share of frontier lawlessness, especially in its towns and cities. For example, “[t]he lawlessness of 
society was exemplified by the fact that the citizens of the town [Little Rock] refused to venture 
into the streets unless armed with a gun or Bowie knife, commonly known as the ‘Arkansas 
toothpick.’”38 It was during the 1830s that Arkansas really saw a boom in settlement, with 
population numbers approaching near 98,000 settlers by the end of the decade. Many of these 
settlers, especially those in southeastern part of the territory brought their slaves. 
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Like its northern neighbor, Arkansas saw a steep increase in its slave population as well as 
its small free African American population during the territorial stage. With the increase in white 
settlement during the territorial period came an increase in the slave population. Most of 
Arkansas’s slaves were located within its Gulf Coastal Plain and Delta regions (See Fig. 1.1), 
located in the southeastern part of the territory, where the growing of cotton was the most 
prevalent. This is not to say that only cotton planters held slaves. For example, historian John 
Soloman Otto details slavery in Yell County, Arkansas, from the statehood through the Civil War. 
His study indicates the number of slaves who labored on small farms in the Arkansas backcountry. 
Slaves here brought in to cultivate cotton, but they also brought in to grow corn, wheat, rye, 
legumes, and potatoes.39 Overall, Arkansas’s slave population in 1820 numbered 1,617 and it 
continued to climb in the succeeding decades.40 Much of this increase resulted from the fact that 
many of the state’s new settlers brought slaves with them from eastern slave states like Tennessee, 
Kentucky, and Virginia. Arkansas Territory also had a very small free African American 
population. According to census data, Arkansas had two free African Americans in 1810, fifty-
nine in 1820; and 141 in 1830. More than half of the free African Americans were located in the 
northwestern part of the territory.41 While the numbers of free African Americans were small, the 
number of slaves continued to increase, even after statehood. Because of Arkansas’s geography, 
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its early population developed politically and economically according to the region in which they 
settled.42 
During the territorial stage, two different regions developed in Arkansas – they were 
different both politically and economically – and these regions would play a role in the state’s 
development through the Civil War. The lowlands, located in the southeastern part of Arkansas, 
was the cotton belt and ruled by the planter class. While there were a number of yeoman farmers 
and lower class whites in this region, they did not oppose the slaveholding planters in their 
economic and political goals. This part of Arkansas was heavily Democratic. The northwestern 
part of Arkansas was, geographically, very different. Here, rolling hills dotted the landscape, as 
did the Ozark and Ouachita Mountains – not suitable for the growing of cotton. This region devoted 
its agricultural resources to the growing of potatoes, tobacco, corn, wheat, and the raising of cattle. 
This region, politically, consisted primary of Whigs and they offered the greatest opposition to the 
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Democratic planter class in the southeast region of Arkansas. These two sides shaped the debate 
over Arkansas’s entry into the Union.43 
As the Arkansas population continued to grow during the early 1830s, territorial leaders 
became increasingly anxious in their desires for Arkansas to enter the Union. It was in the debates 
concerning statehood that the regional differences mentioned above came to a head. The push for 
statehood came about in 1833 when Arkansas officials received word that Michigan had requested 
an enabling act from Congress, the first step in the statehood process. Arkansas territorial delegate 
Ambrose Sevier urged Arkansas to do the same with the hopes of maintaining the nation’s free-
slave balance among the states.44 Therefore, the initial push for statehood came out of interests in 
protecting slavery. By early 1835, Congress refused to issue an enabling act for Arkansas – even 
though the territory had reached the requirements in terms of population – pushing Sevier to act at 
the state level. The new territorial governor, William S. Fulton, insisted that Arkansas wait until 
the following year to seek statehood. Fulton correctly viewed this as acting outside of Congress’s 
authority and refused to take part. Sevier and his supporters were determined not to wait for Fulton 
or for an enabling act from Congress and pushed that a convention be ordered to draft a state 
constitution. Sevier gave assurances to President Andrew Jackson that he and his supporters would 
abide by the laws of the territory until Congress acted on their state constitution. While both the 
state’s Democrats and Whigs were in favor of statehood for Arkansas, they disagreed over the 
nature of representation in the constitutional convention.45 
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Initially, after the two state houses compromised over the choosing of delegates, delegates 
for the state convention were to be split between the state’s two regions – twenty-one from the 
northwest and twenty-one from the southeast. Representatives from the southeast objected, 
demanding representation based on the apportionment in the state legislature. It is easy to see why 
representatives from the cotton counties would want it this way – three-fifths of the slaves in these 
counties were counted when apportioning representation in the state legislature. Representatives 
from the southeast got their way, and this apportionment method was now ready for a vote. 
Northeastern representatives would not go down without a fight. State Whig representatives, led 
by David Walker and Absalom Fowler, objected. They pushed back and, led by Walker, were able 
to forestall the vote. In the end, delegates reached a final compromise in which each region had 
twenty-six representatives to the state constitutional convention. Walker and his colleagues had 
the sense that this compromise would be only temporary. Reporting to his constituents, Walker 
stated: 
It was insisted on by gentleman, in behalf of the east and south, that they possessed 
much the most wealth and particularly a large slave population, and insisted, as of 
right, that they should have an additional representation equal to three-fifths of their 
slave population; while other gentlemen on the same side, towards the close of the 
debate very modestly insisted that districts of county should have votes in 
Convention, independent of population. On the other hand, it was insisted by the 
northern and western members . . . that the only true basis of representation was the 
free men of the county, whether they live in the north or the south.46 
This local debate concerning how the state selected constitutional delegates demonstrates how 
important regional influence had grown in the emerging state of Arkansas. It also serves as a small 
example of what was to come nationally. 
 Once state representatives hashed out the details of representative apportionment, they 
moved forward with the statehood process. Next was the matter of drafting the state constitution. 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 239. 
58 
 
 
 
By February 4, 1836, the constitution was finished and published in the Arkansas Gazette for the 
citizens to see. The finished product did not face the same kind of debate as the apportionment 
issue. While there were debates over church and state and if ministers could run for governor or 
the legislature, there were no debates over slavery in the framing of the document. The final 
document was flexible, brief, and modeled on the United States Constitution.47 Sevier waited for 
news of the newly drafted state constitution in Washington, D.C. and was excited to receive a copy 
of the Gazette’s printing of the constitution and on March 1, 1836, he presented it to the House of 
Representatives. The Senate passed the Arkansas bill the following month and the House debated 
the bill, along with the Michigan bill, through early June. Then, on June 15, 1836, Congress 
admitted Arkansas to the Union making it the twenty-fifth state.48 Sevier became one of the state’s 
two U.S. senators while Arkansans elected James Sevier Conway as the state’s first governor. 
Much like Arkansas’s and Missouri’s entrance into the Union, political and moral debates over 
slavery at the national had become increasingly stormy. 
The Coming Storm Arkansas and Missouri: Slavery and Secession 
Led by the rising Abolitionist movements, debates over slavery and its expansion increased 
during the antebellum period. Influenced by the Second Great Awakening, the Abolition 
Movement reached its height during the 1830s continuing through the start of the Civil War, 
agitated against slavery and contributed to heightened section tensions. Leaders of the movement, 
like William Lloyd Garrison and Angelina Grimké, spoke and published across the nation 
advocating for some form of slavery’s national abolition. “So convinced, and certain of ultimate 
victory,” writes historian James Brewer Stewart, “youthful holy warriors set out to persuade each 
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American citizen to repent the sin of slavery.”49 Abolitionist activists worked tirelessly to open 
American’s eyes to the evils of slavery. Part of a larger moral suasion movement in the United 
States during the early 19th century, the Abolition Movement influenced a number of politicians, 
causing many congressmen to take an antislavery stance with their politics, however they remained 
a political minority, even in Whig politics, when compared  to their counterparts in the anti-slavery 
or free soil movement.50 
Supporters of slavery in Missouri and Arkansas did not welcome abolitionists or their 
message. A November 5, 1847, article in the Liberty [Missouri] Tribune warned of an abolitionist 
meeting in nearby Sparta or Eden, Illinois, and that “[t]hese worthies seem bent on tampering with 
the rights of other people, and it will be well for the people of Missouri to be on the alert for their 
property is in danger.”51 Concerned citizens alerted slaveowners in Missouri to be on the lookout 
for abolitionists bent on taking their property. Similarly, in Arkansas, a Whig newspaper, Times 
and Advocate, criticized Governor Archibald Yell for not being tough enough on slavery when 
they felt that he was not vocal enough in speaking out against abolitionist petitions.52 Agitation 
over slavery not only increased tensions in Missouri and Arkansas, but it created a growing 
sectional divide between the North and the South., especially with the United States’ continued 
westward expansion across the continent during the 1840s and the 1850s. 
Westward expansion in the United States greatly accelerated from the mid-1830s through 
the late-1840s. Beginning in the 1820s, American settlers began making their way to Texas, 
Arkansas’s neighbor to the southwest. American settlers made their way to Texas as it promised 
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vast opportunity as well as fertile farmland. Settlers came to Texas from Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Missouri – many bringing their slaves with them - hoping to make good on this 
opportunity. The problem for white settlers there was that slavery was illegal in Mexico. This was 
only one way in which white settlers openly flaunted Mexican law. Because of this flagrant law 
breaking, Mexican officials had enough and marched troops into Texas to ensure that the Texans 
followed Mexican law. By early 1835, Texas was involved in a war for its independence from 
Mexico and, a few months later, won. A few years later, in 1837, the Lone Star Republic sought 
annexation by the United States. This annexation would be hard fought and stir many debates over 
the nature of American expansion and where the institution of slavery fit into that expansion. 
The United States’ annexation of Texas became a political hot potato following its defeat 
of Mexico in 1835. Whigs, who felt that expansion was dangerous, were very much against the 
annexation of Texas. Democrats, on the other hand, were in favor of Texas’s annexation, as they 
believed that Americans had a right and responsibility to spread liberty through physical territorial 
expansion. As a result, the debate over the annexation of Texas by the United States occupied, at 
least in some way, five U.S. presidents. The Banner of Liberty, Missouri, published the letter of 
an “intelligent friend in a distant county in this state” in which he stated:   
Let it be shown that this opposition in the part of the Whigs of the West, is insincere, 
and every other kind of cidal that is either wicked, impolitic or devilish; that it is 
indeed nothing but a claptrap of Clay and his associates to catch the votes of the 
Abolitionists, whom they regard as strong enough in some parts of the free States 
to hold the balance of power betwen [sic] Whigs and Democrats. That there is now 
no chance but to take Texas in, or she is gone forever to Britain, and delineate in 
proper colors the consequences of the establishment of that curious, ambitious, 
avaricious people there. The certainty that it will result in the abolition of slavery, 
and perhaps final subjugation of these States.53 
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This “intelligent friend” in Missouri posited the annexation of Texas as urgent because, first, the 
United States could lose it to Great Britain. Second, without Texas, slavery would be doomed and 
the abolitionists would get their way. Both Whigs and Democrats stuck to the party line rather than 
the sectional line on the Texas controversy. Texas’s annexation served as a critical moment in the 
coming of the Civil War. The conflict over Texas’s annexation and, as historian Joel H. Silbey 
argues, “the political fallout from it, has fair claim to be considered as the critical base point on 
which the rest of the crisis of the Union grew. . . . framing a long process that culminated, a decade 
later, in a profound reorganization of American politics and then in southern secession and Civil 
War – crucial in ways that earlier sectional crises had never reached.”54 Annexation finally came 
in December 1845 following the election of expansionist James K. Polk as president. Texas served 
as Polk’s first effort at expansion, the next came at the cost of an unpopular war with Mexico 
beginning in 1846. 
The Mexican War (1846-1848) followed an attempt by President Polk to purchase 
California and New Mexico from Mexico for the price of $25 million and settle the Texas border 
issue.55 When Mexican authorities refused his offer, Polk grew more determined to wrest this land 
from Mexico. During the late spring of 1846, the president sent American troops, led by General 
Zachary Taylor, to the disputed border between newly acquired Texas and Mexico near Corpus 
Christi. Mexican troops attacked the Americans, as they perceived them to be on Mexican soil, 
therefore invading Mexico. With this, the U.S. war with Mexico had begun. Immediately after the 
start of hostilities, Polk asked Congress for $2 million with the hopes that he would be able to 
                                                          
54 Joel H. Silbey, Storm Over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to Civil War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), xvii-xviii. 
55 Texans had long claimed that the Rio Grande River served as Texas’s border with Mexico. Upon annexation by 
the United States, they too held to this same border claim. Mexico claimed that the border was further north, at the 
Nueces River. 
62 
 
 
 
negotiate a peace treaty with Mexico by the summer. When Congress began debating Polk’s 
request, some began suggesting that for Polk to have this appropriation; questions would have to 
be asked regarding slavery’s limitations in the potential territory acquired from Mexico. The cat 
was out of the bag; Polk went to war to gain territory from Mexico, though not necessarily to 
spread the institution of slavery. Others, both politicians and the public, saw it differently. 
Debates raged in Congress over the war and the meaning of territorial expansion – debates 
on the Constitution’s view on slavery and territorial expansion.56  Whigs, who were against the 
annexation of Texas, were against the war as they thought that it would only lead to the expansion 
of slavery. “America’s mission,” Whigs argued, “was to spread republican institutions by example, 
not be coercion.”57 This did not mean, however, that all Americans were against the principle of 
territorial expansion. Author Fergus M. Bordewich notes: “Most Americans supported territorial 
expansion if for no other reason than that it was a means to acquire cheap land on which to settle. 
For slave-owning southerners, however, it was a strategy for survival.”58 The war also faced public 
scrutiny in the United States, especially from the abolitionist stronghold of the Northeast. Henry 
David Thoreau penned his famous essay, On Civil Disobedience, as a protest against the war and 
served jail time for his refusal to pay taxes as he did not want any of his money to support the war. 
Abolitionist leader Frederick Douglass also spoke out against the war: “[Mexico] may be 
conquered and subdued; her government may be annihilated – her name among the great 
sisterhood of nations blotted out; her separate existence annihilated; her rights and powers usurped; 
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. . . but, so sure as there is a God of justice, we shall not go unpunished.”59 While many Americans 
supported the war, those against wanted to be clear: they did not support a war whose purpose was 
to extend slavery. In an attempt to allow the Americans to have their cake and eat it too, 
Congressman David Wilmot had a plan for the territory acquired from Mexico in the war. 
To alleviate both anti-slavery supporters and abolitionists’ fears about the spread of slavery 
while at the same time quenching Americans’ thirst for westward expansion, David Wilmot, a first 
term Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania, attempted to attach a proviso to the funding of 
the war in 1846. This proviso sought to prohibit slavery from any potential territory acquired from 
Mexico in the war. “If any event in American history can be singled out as the beginning of a path 
which led almost inevitably to sectional controversy and civil war, it was the introduction of the 
Wilmot Proviso.”60 The Wilmot Proviso passed the House of Representative many times, but failed 
each time that it reached the pro-South Senate. In the end, Wilmot’s Proviso had been defeated. 
The debate over the proviso took its toll on the Democrats, causing a rift between the northern and 
southern wings of the party. For Whigs, it was the beginning of the end of their party on the national 
stage. Party loyalties that had held strong began to crumble in exchange for sectional loyalty. On 
any issue relating to slavery, Missouri and Arkansas would now cast their lost with the South rather 
than the two political parties. The Mexican War continued and whatever territory the United States 
acquired from Mexico would have no restrictions placed upon it. By March 10, 1848, the Senate 
ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, effectively ending the war with Mexico. The war with 
Mexico was over, but not without a great deal of land acquired because of the United States’ 
victory and not without a nation more divided over the institution of slavery.  
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After the war ended, Congress hoped to have some time to determine how the slavery issue 
would be handled in this vast new territory, including more than 500,000 square miles. The 
discovery of gold in 1848-1849 at Sutter’s Mill in California ended that hope. Because of the Gold 
Rush of 1848-1849, California’s population exploded almost overnight, making it ready for 
statehood – catching Congress unprepared. In 1849, California delegates wanted to enter the Union 
as a free state, potentially upsetting the balance between free and slave states. Negotiated over the 
summer of 1850 by Kentucky Senator Henry Clay and, with the help of Illinois Senator Stephen 
Douglas, the Compromise of 1850 sought to ease sectional tensions and avoid potential civil war. 
The compromise included five parts: the admission of California as a free state; settlement of the 
border dispute between Texas and New Mexico; the ending of the slave trade in the District of 
Columbia; establishment of New Mexico and Utah Territories with no restrictions on slavery 
(popular sovereignty); and a stronger Fugitive Slave Law. Historians, however, differ on the 
effectiveness of the compromise. For example, Robert Remini argues that the Compromise of 1850 
was successful as it bought time for the North to industrialize: “The resulting Compromise of 1850 
delayed the catastrophe of civil war for ten years, and those ten years were absolutely essential for 
preserving the American nation under the Constitution.”61 Paul Finkelman, on the other hand, 
posits the Compromise as “The Appeasement of 1850.” The Compromise was proslavery, 
explaining the broad support for the Compromise across the South, and Finkelman dismisses the 
heroic analysis of the Compromise. “In the end,” argues Finkelman, “the compromise failed 
because it was never a compromise at all. It gave almost everything to slavery and almost nothing 
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to freedom.”62 While historians may disagree on its effectiveness, the Compromise of 1850 served 
as another catalyst for war and Missouri and Arkansas felt its impact. 
The Compromise of 1850 created little resistance among the citizens in Arkansas and 
Missouri, though it did cause some rumblings politically. Many Missourians hailed the 
Compromise of 1850, especially the Fugitive Slave Act. Because free states bordered Missouri, 
slave owners were in constant fear that their slaves could escape to neighboring states, never to 
return.63 The Fugitive Slave Act eased many Missourians’ fears with regard to their slaves. While 
slaveowners were put at ease, Democrats in the state viewed the compromise with some 
skepticism. For example, Missouri senator David Rice Atchison remarked, “Although in my 
opinion the slave States did not get equal and exact justice, yet we escaped dishonor and 
degradation. Let us hold our northern brethren to a strict observance of all the terms of settlement; 
they must comply with their part of the bargain.”64 Arkansans, like much of the South, viewed the 
Compromise as a triumph of moderation. Politically, the Compromise caused some rumblings in 
the state Democratic Party dividing it between those in the north and the west, who supported the 
Compromise and those in the southern and eastern part of the state who shared Atchison’s 
sentiments. Whigs in the state, and throughout much of the South, enthusiastically support the 
Compromise, while Democrats supported it reluctantly.65 Despite these political disagreements in 
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each state, no major damage was done – to either the Compromise or the state political parties. A 
few short years later, another national debate over the western spread of slavery ignited in Kansas. 
The 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, drafted by Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas, opened up 
the possibility for slavery to take root in that portion of the former Louisiana Purchase lands where 
it had been forbidden as part of the Missouri Compromise in 1820 as it was north of the 36° 30’N 
line. Douglas’s solution in the Kansas-Nebraska Act was popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty 
allowed the residents of a territory decide upon the issue of slavery for themselves. As a result, 
territorial legislatures drafted state constitutions with or without slavery and put it to the citizens 
for a vote. With the Compromise of 1850 completed only a few years before, Americans hoped to 
put the divisive slavery issue to rest for the last time. The Kansas-Nebraska Act only served to 
reopen old wounds with regard to the institution of slavery. “To mitigate the expected northern 
reaction,” notes historian Sean Wilentz, “Douglas’s new bill organized two territories, Nebraska 
west of Iowa (which seemed to mark it for free soil), and Kansas west of Missouri (which seemed 
to mark it for slavery).”66 Many Northerners were angry that the Illinois senator outright destroyed 
a hard fought and delicate compromise over slavery. Northerners asked themselves why the 
senator would allow the Missouri Compromise to unravel.67 Southerners took offense when 
Northerners spoke out against the introduction of slavery to the Sunflower State, as evidenced by 
the caning of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner by Southerner Preston Brooks.68 The Kansas-
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Nebraska Act destroyed the perceived sectional harmony only a few years after the Compromise 
of 1850. In effect, popular sovereignty invalidated the Missouri Compromise making slavery 
permissible north of the 36°30´ Missouri Compromise Line. The Kansas-Nebraska Act had 
national ramifications in that it solidified the Republicans’ place in the newly developed party 
system; it also had ramifications locally in both Missouri and Arkansas.  
The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had important consequences on both the state of 
Missouri and the coming of the Civil War. This legislation set off massive emigration campaigns 
for both free soilers and proslavery advocates who sought to settle the territory therefore 
influencing the territorial legislature to their respective political persuasions with regard to slavery. 
Slave-owning Missourians feared that a free Kansas would create a haven for fugitive slaves, even 
with the recently passed Fugitive Slave Act, just on the other side of their western border. Free 
staters, backed by abolitionists and emigrant aid companies, settled in Manhattan, Lawrence, and 
Topeka. Proslavery settlements existed in Leavenworth and Atchison. By late May 1854, many 
proslavery Missourians, led by Missouri Senator David R. Atchison, outnumbered free soilers 
across the border and intended to push them as far west as possible so that slavery may be extended. 
By the time of the fall elections in 1854, many Missouri ‘border ruffians’ made their way over the 
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border and voted in favor of the proslavery candidates there in which they succeeded sending a 
proslavery candidate to Congress. Proslavery Missourians felt justified engaging in fraudulent 
voting practices in Kansas as “they thought Northerners were breaking the law and wanted to beat 
them at their own game.”69 Though Andrew Reeder, the territorial governor of Kansas, cried foul 
and ordered new elections in many districts, proslavery candidates still won. As a result, free and 
proslavery forces raced to set up governments in Kansas that reflected their respective views. 
The competition between free and slave forces resulted in two governments in Kansas 
Territory – one free and one slave. In late 1855, Kansas free soilers called their own convention at 
Topeka to counter the fraudulently elected pro-slavery legislature. Here, free staters drafted a free 
state constitution (Topeka Constitution) making it the center for free state forces there. This free 
state constitution most reflected the views of Kansas’s actual residents. Free state delegates passed 
this constitution in December of 1855. Delegates forwarded the constitution on to Washington 
only to have President Franklin Pierce reject it. In response to the Topeka Constitution, the 
proslavery forces met at Lecompton in September 1857 where slavery supporters drafted the 
Lecompton constitution – a proslavery constitution. After Lecompton, many anti-slavery Kansans 
took matters into their own hands, as they quickly began outnumbered proslavery settlers. Many 
of these anti-slavery settlers arrived from New England funded by emigrant aid societies located 
there equipped with Beecher’s Bibles, inspired by abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher who had 
claimed the Sharp’s Rifle as a moral instrument. Because of the competing legislatures, Kansas 
had two territorial governments by late 1857, one in Topeka and one at Lecompton. With many of 
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the free soilers and proslavery settlers heavily armed, it was only a matter of time before violence 
broke out in Kansas.70 
The violence in Kansas began with the murder of a free soiler by a proslavery man in 
November 1855. Following this incident, a shooting war occurred bringing about Bleeding Kansas. 
The move towards violence began when approximately 1,500 Missourians marched across the 
border into Kansas while Federal troops stationed there did nothing. President Pierce refused to 
act and possibly make the situation there worse. The situation that began in November 1855 was 
eventually defused by an unseasonable harsh winter only to reignite the next spring. Following an 
incident where a proslavery judge ordered the indictment of the free state legislature, proslavery 
Missourians took it upon themselves to attack Lawrence, Kansas – viewed by many proslavery 
settlers as the hotbed of abolitionism in the state. A proslavery posse made its way into Lawrence 
and destroyed much of the town, including its newspaper offices, a hotel, the home of the free state 
governor, and many homes and businesses. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat, an antislavery 
newspaper, published a dispatch on January 19, 1856, that demonstrated the situation on the 
ground in Bleeding Kansas. “The extra declares that the war has again commenced, and . . . 
inflammatory appeal to the people to rally at once. I think a serious difficulty has occurred, growing 
out of the Freesoil election the other day, and regard this as but another move to get up a civil war 
in Kansas. It is the last desperate game of the Atchinsonites.”71 The violence in Kansas continued 
sporadically over the next couple of years. The last violent act came with the Marais des Cygnes 
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Massacre on May 19, 1858, in which proslavery forces attempted to execute eleven free staters on 
the banks of the Marais des Cygnes River in western Missouri along the Kansas border.72 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act and the resulting violence along the Kansas-Missouri border had 
an impact on Arkansas politics as well, with state Democrats and Whigs offering different opinions 
in the events there. Arkansas Democrats and state Democratic organs praised the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act and Stephen Douglas. Democrats felt that the Act was a nod to Southern principles and the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise was in the best interest of the states, especially slave states, 
and the territories. The Arkansas State Gazette and Democrat viewed it as an exorcism of the 
abolitionists: “The dark demon of abolition agitation, which has so long possessed a part of the 
Congress of the United States, has been exorcised . . . .”73 Whigs in the state, however, felt very 
differently about the Act. Nationally, the Whig Party viewed the Act as a national issue, not a 
moral one. Whigs, along with Free Soilers and Anti-Slavery Democrats were “weary of carrying 
the South’s water in national affairs.”74 While much of their opposition was in line with the rest of 
the Whig Party in the North, there was a key variation from the national party. Arkansas Whigs 
felt that the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its effective repeal of the Missouri Compromise put 
Southern slave owners in peril as they could lose assurance that slavery would be permitted below 
the Missouri Compromise line. Like most Southerners, they were not pleased with the concept of 
popular sovereignty as they wanted no restrictions on slavery, but they figured that they would 
take what they could get with regard to slavery. Whig newspaper editors in the state found the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act to be against the best interests of the South and took the sectional line rather 
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than the party line. Neither side, however, were moved enough to make the short journey to Kansas 
and partake in the events happening there. Only when violence in Kansas broke out did Arkansans 
show real concern about what was happening in Kansas.75 
No matter an Arkansan’s political affiliation, they were well aware of the fact that the 
battles in Kansas were only a short distance away from their home state and the violence there 
raised concerns over the future of slavery, especially among proslavery Arkansans. The 
northwestern part of Arkansas was very close to Kansas and Arkansans were well aware of this 
fact and Arkansas newspapers called for citizens to act before the violence spread to their state. 
Proslavery advocates called for collections to aid pro-slavery forces in Kansas. In addition, 
proslavery newspapers in the state called for proslavery men to go to Kansas and fight the 
abolitionists there, as it was better to fight them in Kansas than it would be in Arkansas. For 
example, the True Democrat in Little Rock editorialized that “Arkansas has been too lukewarm. 
She has yet to contribute to the cause, through her interests in the issue are second to those of no 
State in the Union. Let us do our duty. . . . Kansas is on the very border of Arkansas. With Kansas 
a Slave State, all will be well. With it a Free State, our property will be rendered insecure, and 
troubles and annoyances the lot of our people.”76 Quite simply, it was a call for retaliation. If they 
did not retaliate, the Arkansas press warned, there would be a variety of dangers if Arkansas 
became an outpost for slavery if the free staters were to win in Kansas. While some Arkansans 
from the eastern and southern part of the state and to a lesser degree, western Arkansas, moved to 
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help proslavery forces in Kansas, nothing of significance came of these measures pushed by the 
Arkansas proslavery press. Why did proslavery Arkansans not heed the call in Kansas?   
Arkansans were fully aware of the situation in Kansas, but few citizens there intervened. 
Historian Granville D. Davis argues that Arkansans failed to take any noticeable concern over 
Kansas because of the states’ relatively small population and the fact that many Arkansas were in 
the state for the short term. By 1860, Arkansas’s white population was only 324,143, a low number 
considering size of the state.77 Many Arkansans went to Texas, Louisiana, and California, not 
swayed by the pleas of proslavery advocates in their state to head to Kansas. Davis’s research 
shows that between 1850 and 1860, “the number of Arkansans in Texas rose from 4,693 to 11,319, 
in Missouri from 2,120 to 4,395, in California from 350 to 2,216, and in Louisiana from 803 to 
1,314.” Only 448 went to Kansas.78 To be sure, it was not a result of a misunderstanding or the 
Arkansas press not reporting enough on the events in Kansas. The Arkansas press constantly 
reminded readers of what could happen if they failed to help in Kansas – it would become a haven 
for fugitive slaves. The Arkansas True Democrat reported, “Our citizens have a deep stake in the 
issue. – With Kansas a slave State, all will be well. With it as a free State, our property will be 
rendered insecure, and troubles and annoyances unnumbered will be the lot of our people.”79 Even 
with these pleas, Arkansas planters failed to register any kind of concern about the events in 
Kansas. The ultimate reason for planters failing register any major concern regarding the events in 
Kansas, notes Davis, was that planters knew that Kansas’s soil was not ideal for the growing of 
cotton. In short, “Arkansas bowed to the inevitable,” since cotton could not be grown there, it was 
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pointless to be a part of the fight in Kansas.80 They would remain focused on the political 
developments that resulted from the episode in Kansas. 
Nationally, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the violence that followed enabled 
the rise of the Republican Party. For the Republicans, the actions of both Brooks and the Border 
Ruffians along the Kansas-Missouri border demonstrated that the Slave Power would stop at 
nothing to introduce slavery into the territories. Bleeding Kansas and Bleeding Sumner became “a 
powerful weapon in the Republicans’ propaganda arsenal” during the 1856 presidential election.81 
The events in Kansas enabled Republicans to have an unprecedented showing in the 1856 
presidential election, winning the vote in the North with Missouri’s own John C. Frémont as its 
candidate. While the Republicans lost the election to Democrat James Buchanan, the result of the 
Republicans’ showing in the 1856 presidential election demonstrated that they had supplanted the 
dying Whigs as a viable party in the North. This showing demonstrated that the newly formed 
Republican Party would not be a temporary success. Events beyond those in Kansas would play a 
key role in further shaping the Republicans as well as escalate tensions surrounding this sectional 
party. 
During the mid-1850s, the events in Kansas and along the Kansas-Missouri border played 
an important role in the transformation of the American political landscape in the form of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Sumner, and the Lecompton constitution. These 
actions also had political implications in Arkansas and Missouri. For the Republicans, the events 
in Kansas confirmed that the Slave Power was encroaching against the North and had no limits – 
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not even the Missouri Compromise. Republicans utilized the events in Kansas to boost their party 
as the nation’s premiere sectional party, absorbing many northern Whigs and nativists into their 
ranks. For the Democrats, it hurt Stephen Douglas’s presidential aspirations in that he was 
alienated from the Democratic Party due to his stance on Lecompton. The events in Kansas 
signaled the end of the Democrats in the North, making room for the Republicans. The elimination 
of both the Whigs and the American Party, combined with the decline of the Democrats enabled 
the Republicans to become the party of the North. The first national issue to confront this new 
party was the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford handed down in 
1857. 
With the case of Dred Scott, a Missouri slave who challenged his freedom in the Missouri 
state courts for nearly a decade, the United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the slavery 
issue in the territories in a single decision. In its most simple form, the case involved Scott’s claim 
to freedom by his residence in a free territory - Illinois and Wisconsin Territory. Initially, Scott 
won his freedom through the local courts, winning his case as high as the Missouri Supreme Court, 
but through subsequent challenges to this decision, Scott saw his case before the Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, a Marylander and slavery supporter, not only ruled that Scott was 
not a free man, but that he was not a citizen of the United States when he wrote the majority opinion 
in March 1857, just two days after the inauguration of James Buchanan as president of the United 
States. The decision, notes historian Eric Foner, “propelled to the forefront of public debate 
questions that would dominate politics until the outbreak of the Civil War: the founders’ intentions 
regarding slavery; whether slavery should be viewed as a local or national institution; and the 
constitutional authority of the federal government to prohibit slavery in the territories.”82 It was 
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Taney’s constitutional interpretation that the Missouri Compromise that caused particular trouble 
in the West. Taney, in an attempt to cripple the newly formed Republican Party, went further to 
declare that Congress did not have the authority to legislate slavery in the territories. Taney 
declared, with regard to the Missouri Compromise, “it is the duty of this court to declare it void 
and inoperative, and incapable of conferring upon any one who is held as a slave under the laws 
of the United States.”83 In short, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Missouri 
Compromise was invalid - unconstitutional. This decision set the stage for increased sectional 
tensions as well as Abraham Lincoln’s election as president – but not before it sent ripples through 
Missouri and Arkansas.84 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Dred Scott case had implications nationally, but it 
also had effects at the state level in Missouri and Arkansas. In 1857, Arkansas attempted to pass a 
proposal that would enslave all free blacks who did not leave the state within one year. The 
proposal failed, but after Dred Scott, this proposal had new life. Because of Taney’s decision in 
the case, the Arkansas legislature passed an expulsion act in 1859 causing Arkansas’s free African 
Americans to leave the state post haste.85 In Missouri, the Dred Scott decision negated the 1824 
decision in the state case Winny v. Whitesides. In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court declared, 
citing the Northwest Ordinance as their legal authority, that once an African was free, he or she 
would always be free. Once the United States Supreme Court made its ruling in Scott v. Sandford, 
however, the Winny case would no longer serve as the legal standard in the state of Missouri. Chief 
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Justice Taney’s ruling in the case and an attempt by John Brown, the abolitionist who earned a 
fanatical reputation in Kansas, to foment insurrection in the mountains of Virginia would serve as 
the final steps towards secession and civil war. 
John Brown’s raid on the arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in the fall of 1859 inched the 
nation ever closer to war. Brown, and twenty of his supporters, hoped to begin an armed slave 
revolt by seizing the federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry. The plan failed and Brown was defeated, 
brought to trial, and executed for his role in his attempt to bring about a massive slave insurrection 
in the South. Brown and like-minded Northerners who wished to destroy slavery in such a manner 
horrified Southerners.86 Newspaper editors in Arkansas used the opportunity to defend slavery as 
a positive good as well issue a warning. “We would warn crazy fanatics that the slaves in the South 
are,” the [Little Rock] Arkansas Gazette editorial read, “as a general thing, in a better condition 
than the poor laborers of the North – that they are happy and contented, and that no part of the are 
at all likely to participate, either in sentiment or action, with any attempt of madmen to change 
their present condition. We hope, however, with the manifest hopelessness and thanklessness of 
such undertakings, and the fate of Brown staring them in the face, that no fanatic will be mad 
enough to make a similar attempt in the future.”87 Papers in both Missouri and Arkansas painted 
Brown as a fanatic, a lunatic, and a madman. They also warned that Brown acted outside of the 
Constitution. Other papers, like the St. Louis Christian Advocate, published accounts of John 
Brown sympathizers who defended Brown’s stance against slavery, but not his methods.88 
Generally speaking, newspapers in Missouri and Arkansas were either highly critical of Brown or 
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they took some kind of middle way to prevent any kind of controversy. The national excitement 
surrounding John Brown’s raid would give way nearly a year later with the election of the 
Republican nominee for president, Abraham Lincoln. 
With the election of Republican Abraham Lincoln in fall of 1860, many Southern states 
began the process of secession, igniting civil war. During his campaign for president, Lincoln ran 
against slavery’s westward expansion though he clearly stated that he would do nothing to the 
peculiar institution where it already existed, placing him in the middle ground of Republican 
opinion.89 While compromises had worked to save the Union in the past, compromises over the 
slavery issue were out of the question for the president-elect. Following the election, Congress put 
forth a variety of compromises with the most prominent of these being the Crittenden Compromise 
in December of 1860, proposed by Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden.90 A series of 
constitutional amendments and Congressional resolutions, this compromise sought to protect 
slavery in the United States as well as extend the Missouri Compromise Line to the West. Lincoln, 
however, held firm to his stance on preventing the westward expansion of slavery and Republicans 
in Congress rejected the proposed compromise. Lincoln again made his stance clear in his 
inaugural address given on March 4, 1861. For secessionists, Lincoln’s platform went against 
everything that they believed for both the South’s and the nation’s future. As a result, Southern 
secessionists viewed Lincoln’s election as their opportunity to create a better future for slavery. 
Historian Stephanie McCurry notes: “Secessionists saw a bright future for slavery if they could set 
its destiny in a new republic. To them slavery was no worn-out vestige of the past but a social 
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system uniquely adapted to the conditions of the modern world.”91 With Lincoln’s election, South 
Carolina made the first move out of the Union and the first move towards their slave-based nation. 
For the Deep South, Lincoln’s election was the last straw. The events of the 1850s 
combined with a Republican in the Executive Mansion proved too much for the cotton states. The 
first to secede was South Carolina who passed an ordinance of secession on December 20, 1860. 
South Carolina voted 159-0 in favor of secession. South Carolina was the first to secede because 
it was a state where “the ideological and political defense of slavery had been assiduously nurtured 
since the origin of the republic, fire-eaters really did hold sway by the fall of 1860.”92 Mississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana followed the Palmetto State out of the Union in January 
of 1861. February of 1862 saw the secession of Texas, putting the newly formed Confederacy at 
seven states early in the new year. The Deep South rationalized that the only way to escape Black 
Republicanism was secession. “States’ rights, historical political abuses, territorial questions, 
economic differences, constitutional arguments[,]” argues historian Charles B. Dew, “all these and 
more paled in significance when placed alongside this vision of the South’s future under 
Republican domination.”93 The Upper South took a wait-and-see approach with regard to how the 
Lincoln Administration would act. Once in office, President Lincoln made multiple attempts to 
resupply a Federal garrison inside of Fort Sumter, located in Charleston Harbor. On April 12, 1861, 
South Carolina forces fired on the fort, bringing about the start of the Civil War. Federal forces 
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inside of the fort surrendered and the nation was at war. President Lincoln soon acted in an attempt 
to put down the rebellion in the cotton states. 
Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Charleston Harbor, President Lincoln 
issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion in the South. While many Northern 
states happily contributed troops to quash the rebellion, this action triggered the Upper South’s 
secession from the Union. After Lincoln’s call for troops in April 1861, the Upper South, 
comprised of Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina, seceded that April and May. The 
decision to secede in the Upper South was not as clear as it had been in the Deep South – given 
the fact that secession was not made possible in the Upper South until South Carolina fired upon 
Fort Sumter. “On April 12 but not before, the Upper South impasse - between Unionists and 
unreconciled secessionists, between United States and Confederate States – was finally broken.”94 
With this, the planter class of the cotton states achieved their goal of forcing slaveowners in the 
Upper South to choose between the Union and the Confederacy. These states could no longer hold 
the middle ground. “By precipitating war,” notes author Bruce Levine, “the cotton masters had 
indeed forced their more cautious brethren to choose sides in a fight defined by their own most 
basic institutions and values.”95 The Upper South chose to side with the cotton states, as they felt 
that this was in their collective best interests. These eleven states of both the Upper and Lower 
South composed the Confederate States of America. There were, however, four slave states whose 
fate still hung in the balance. 
Four slave states – Missouri, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky – did not secede from the 
Union. These states held the political status of Border State in that they were slave states, but did 
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not secede from the Union. They did not seceded because these states shared ties with both the 
North and the South. Unionism here edged out secessionist sentiment. To be sure, their place in 
the Union was not guaranteed, as secession remained a possibility in each of these states for the 
duration of the Civil War as Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland had “large and resolute 
secessionist minorities.”96 Both Missouri and Kentucky had competing Confederate and Unionist 
governments. As a result, this Border State status in these four states was one that Lincoln sought 
to preserve, not wanting to give these states any reason to join the Confederacy.97 Lincoln had to 
walk gently as any of these states, perhaps with the exception of Delaware, could have gone to the 
Confederacy with even the most minor political or military miscalculation. Their importance was 
not lost on the president. “These states had the white population of 2.6 million – a little less than 
half that of the Confederacy – and about 420,000 slaves. Maryland and Kentucky, with their 
diverse economies and key strategic positions, were especially crucial to Union prospects.”98 
Lincoln’s task, however, would not be easy, as the case of Missouri and its two wartime 
governments demonstrate. 
Many Missourians were not happy with the outcome of the 1860 presidential election, but 
this did not mean that they wanted to secede from the Union. “Missouri does not unite with them 
[the Southern States] in their desperate schemes[,] notes the Liberty [Missouri] Tribune. “With 
annoyances in regard to her slave property ten-fold greater than those endured by the ‘Cotton 
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States,’ it has never entered into the minds of her people that Disunion would improve their 
condition. They are, with few exceptions, steadfast in their devotion to the Union.”99 Northern 
Democrat Stephen A. Douglas carried the state with 58,801 votes; Constitutional Unionist John 
Bell came in second with 58,372 votes; Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge received 312,317 
votes, while Republican Abraham Lincoln received only 17,028 votes.100 Most Missourians in the 
center of the state, wanted to avoid secession, but not at the cost of their Southern institutions – 
slavery in particular. With both the Republican Party and the state’s new German immigrants 
actively against the spread of slavery, Missourians in Little Dixie grew increasingly tense over the 
fate of the peculiar institution in their state. As a result, a clash between an old and a new Missouri 
over their state’s future came about because of Lincoln’s election.  
The old Missouri consisted of planters who had been in Missouri since it became a state. 
The new Missouri consisted of a variety of new immigrants from the east who came to take 
advantage of the newer, booming industry in the state. Most prominent among these newer 
immigrants to the state were the Achtundvierziger – the newly arrived Forty-Eighters, from 
Germany – centered in St. Louis. The Achtundvierziger were a powerful voting bloc and tended to 
vote Republican. In addition, they did not view the planter class in a very favorable light. “For 
such men, and even for their less radical compatriots” notes author Adam Goodheart, “Missouri’s 
slaveholding class represented exactly what they had detested in the old country, exactly what they 
had come here to escape: a swaggering clique of landed oligarchs, boorish aristocrats obstructing 
the forces of modernity and progress.”101 Because of the Germans stance on the slavery issue, they 
often clashed with the state’s older settlers – the “Damn Dutch” they were called, a corruption of 
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Deutsch. As fall turned into secession winter in Missouri, the new governor would have to make 
a decision regarding his state’s future in the Union. 
Missouri’s newly elected governor Claiborne Fox Jackson, at least initially, felt the same 
way as many Missourians regarding secession. Jackson, a planter from Little Dixie who 
participated in horse-trading, card playing, and led a group of armed Border Ruffians during 
Bleeding Kansas, remained neutral on the issue of secession. “As matters are at present,” Jackson 
stated in his January 5, 1861, inaugural address as the new Missouri governor, “Mo., will stand 
her lot, and hold to the Union so long as it is worth an effort to preserve it.”102 Jackson’s inaugural 
address gives the impression that he wanted to maintain some form of armed neutrality for his 
state. Despite his veiled neutrality for Missouri, one of Jackson’s first acts as governor was to seek 
approval for a statewide convention to determine Missouri’s fate in or out of the Union. Jackson 
and the state legislature, where nearly three-fourths of the delegates were slaveholders, were 
unsure as to which way Missouri citizens would vote.103 Governor Jackson, along with his 
lieutenant governor and avowed secessionist Thomas C. Reynolds, pushed the Missouri legislature 
to authorize a convention to vote on an ordinance of secession. Shortly after Jackson’s 
inauguration, the Missouri legislature authorized this convention. In the meantime, Jackson 
worked behind the scenes to plot a takeover of the different Federal arsenals located in his state. 
The convention, made up of many men who were not secessionists, met for the first time in late 
February 1861 and again in March to decide Missouri’s fate. Each meeting of the convention failed 
to produce an ordinance of secession of as many delegates present at the convention were against 
federal coercion, but not prepared to move the state closer to secession. Not seeing any kind of 
rapid movement by the convention with regard to secession, Jackson pressed the legislature to 
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grant him broad military powers in the form of a military bill so that he may deal with any 
emergencies that might arise in the meantime. Initially, the legislature refused to do so – until the 
president’s call for volunteers on April 13, 1861.104 
As it was in other Southern states, Lincoln’s call for troops looked like it might be a turning 
point for Missouri’s secession debates in early 1861. With the president’s call for volunteers after 
Fort Sumter, the Missouri legislature passed Jackson’s military bill, giving him the broad military 
powers that he desired. Because of this new military authority, Jackson controlled the St Louis 
police and organized the pro-Confederate state militia who would seize a Federal arsenal in 
Liberty, Missouri, on April 20, 1861. Some Missourians, including Congressman Francis P. Blair 
and Captain Nathanial Lyon in particular, wondered if Jackson was working behind the scenes to 
secure Missouri’s secession. On April 17, Jackson wrote to Confederate president Jefferson Davis 
for some kind of military support. Davis responded in early May by sending captured Federal 
canons and ammunition to Governor Jackson, which he placed in a fort on the outskirts of St. Louis 
named Camp Jackson. Jackson did this in preparation for any possible military action against the 
Federal government. While Jackson attempted to do this secretly not to arouse any suspicion, Blair 
and Lyon’s watchful eyes would foil Jackson’s plans with the arsenal. 
At the same time that Jackson moved Jeff Davis’s canons into Fort Jackson, Captain Lyon 
organized a number of regiments composed of the staunchly Republican German-American 
population of St. Louis. This was the beginning of the Camp Jackson Affair. On the evening of 
April 25, 1861, Lyon very astutely loaded up many of the Camp Jackson’s surplus arms and 
shipped them across the Mississippi River so that pro-Confederate forces could not use them. Lyon 
then went one-step further and captured the artillery as well as the 700 pro-Confederate militiamen 
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without a shot at Camp Jackson on May 10. Lyon and his men then marched their prisoners through 
the streets of St. Louis as a crowd gathered throwing both blunt objects and insults at the German-
American soldiers present. Then, shots rang out and killing or wounding twenty-eight civilians 
and two soldiers. More violence followed the next day. The Camp Jackson Affair demonstrated 
how close the state of Missouri was to a civil war of its own.105 
Following the Camp Jackson Affair, the seeds were sown for the creation of Missouri’s 
two wartime governments. By July 31, 1861, a new state convention met in Jefferson City and 
declared the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, and the seats of the general assembly vacant, 
and called for new elections to fill vacancies with Hamilton Rowan Gamble seated as the new 
governor of Missouri. The new state government under Gamble occupied Jefferson City “with the 
older one growing ever more shadowy as the war went on.”106 With Captain Lyon occupying the 
state capitol at Jefferson City, Governor Jackson and the remaining state officials withdrew to the 
southwestern part of the state so that they could better communicate with Confederate officials. 
Here, Jackson and his supporters plead for help from Jefferson Davis so that they might have a 
chance at taking Missouri for the Confederacy. From this point forward, Jackson cast his lot fully 
with the Confederacy and led an illegitimate pro-Confederate government on the run. 
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Unfortunately, for Jackson, his absence from Jefferson City allowed the Unionists to tighten their 
grip on the state government.107 
By siding with the Confederacy, Jackson and his cabinet became a government on the run 
and did what it could to survive. On August 5, 1861, Governor Jackson, then at New Madrid, 
Missouri, declared the state its own sovereign republic. While neither side recognized this action, 
Jackson did this with hopes of encouraging Confederate assistance. His plan worked, because the 
next day the Confederate Congress appropriated one million C.S.A. dollars in aid for the state. In 
October 1861, then at Neosho, Missouri, located in the southwestern part of the state, Jackson’s 
government ratified the Confederate Constitution and elected representatives to the Confederate 
Congress in Richmond. A month later, on November 28, 1861, the Confederate Congress admitted 
Missouri into the Confederacy, making the fugitive government legit, at least in the eyes of the 
Confederacy and Jackson. The satisfaction of this action would be short-lived for the refugee 
governor. 
The Missouri government-in-exile would have its resolve tested by the end of 1862. 
Governor Jackson died in Little Rock on December 6, 1862, forcing the lieutenant governor, 
Reynolds, to assume the exile governorship of the state. Reynolds, who was staunchly loyal to 
Confederate president Jefferson Davis, worked hard so to get the most out of Missouri for the 
Confederacy. For example, Reynolds worked to recruit Missouri troops for the Confederate war 
effort an estimated 15,000-20,000 Missourians within Confederate lines.108 He moved the refugee 
government to Marshall, Texas, in November of 1863 to maintain better communication with 
Confederate officials in Richmond. Marshall, Texas, remained the home of Missouri’s exile 
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government for the remainder of the war.109 Missouri’s move for secession from the Union was, 
to put it bluntly, messy. The story of Arkansas’s secession is nowhere near as complicated as the 
Missouri case, though there were some similarities in the general sentiment surrounding secession 
in that state. 
Unlike other states from the Deep South, like South Carolina or Georgia, Arkansas never 
had an extremist position with regard to secession or state’s rights. Until Lincoln’s 1860 election, 
most Arkansans were satisfied with the Compromise of 1850, feeling that it was the best long-term 
solution to the sectional issue. Arkansas, long a Democratic state, did not buck this political trend 
when they went with John C. Breckinridge, the Southern Democrat, in the 1860 election. Unlike 
other Southern states, Arkansas did not bow to the radical politicians who drummed up paranoia 
among their citizens over Bleeding Kansas and John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in October 
of 1859. With Lincoln’s election in 1860, an uneasy feeling came over many Arkansans, eventually 
pushing the state to secession. The year 1860, notes historian James M. Woods, “witnessed the 
culmination of another trend, a metamorphosis of the state toward Deep South culture and 
economy.”110 Not just planters in the state feared Lincoln and the Black Republicans. White 
workingmen in Little Rock had developed fears about what would happen to their jobs if African 
Americans were emancipated because of future Republican policies. White citizens in the state 
capital as well as planters in the south and in the east came together with their realization that 
secession was Arkansas’s best option.111 Not all Arkansans, however, favored leaving the Union. 
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Citizens in the north-central counties of Arkansas, three of which bordered Missouri, 
organized into an organization known as the Peace Society or Peace Organization Society in early 
1861 opposing the secession of their state. With the tide of Confederate support in the state, these 
societies met secretly, out of the site of possible pro-Confederate neighbors. Peace Societies were 
fully formed in that they had a constitution, oaths, passwords, and signs as a part of their operation. 
Unionism in a Confederate state was something that was often difficult to hide, and, with this, 
Confederate sympathizers discovered them and carried out extralegal arrests. Because the state 
government considered the peace societies as treasonable organizations, many Confederate 
sympathizers tracked down accused members of these societies and, in some instances, given a 
choice as to their fate. Governor Rector offered some captured members of the peace societies two 
options: standing trial or serving in the Confederate army. Those who chose the former could not 
be convicted, as there was not enough written evidence of their treason as the societies were very 
good about leaving very little evidence in the way of written records. Men who chose the latter 
served in the 2nd Arkansas, which proved to be a failure for the Confederacy in that many of the 
men who served were too old for military service. Despite the Unionist sentiment in both the north-
central and northwestern part of the state at the very start of the war, it was not enough to keep 
Arkansas in the Union.112 
Lincoln’s victory in the 1860 presidential election caused a spike in secessionist sentiment 
in Arkansas, eliminating any potential obstacles for joining the forming Confederacy. The state’s 
Democratic governor, Henry Massey Rector, felt very strongly that Arkansas should leave the 
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Union, as there was no chance for reconciliation with Lincoln in office.113 Voting for the 
convention began across the state on February 18, 1861, and citizens voted in favor of a convention 
to decide if they would leave the Union. The decision to hold a convention was not necessarily a 
signal that the secessionists had won, as many anti-secessionists/Unionists felt the need to hold 
one as well. Unionist candidates received more than 5,000 more votes than secessionist candidates, 
indicating Arkansans’ desire to remain in the Union. Much of the state’s opposition to secession 
remained strong in the northwest and north-central part of Arkansas.114 The state legislature called 
a convention on March 4, 1861, in Little Rock – the same day as the president’s inauguration in 
Washington, D.C. – to decide the future of their state.115 
The March 4 convention met in the Old State House in Little Rock to debate the recent 
events. Delegates gave fiery speeches and emotions ran high for the entire two and a half weeks 
that the convention remained in session. The convention failed to provide an ordinance of 
secession for Arkansas with a 55-15 against secession. The convention delegates even failed to 
pass a resolution denouncing Lincoln’s inaugural address. Many delegates hoped that, as in the 
past, some kind of compromise would be reached to avoid civil war and put an end to the state’s 
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consideration of secession. Convention delegates wanted to be sure that delegates took every 
measure to preserve the Union until some kind of outrageous act had been committed.116 With this, 
delegates agreed to return home and meet again in August following a special election that would 
allow the people of Arkansas to decide on the secession question for themselves. This special 
election never came. 
Once war broke out in April, anti-secessionist feelings in Arkansas faded fast, led by 
Governor Rector, and Arkansas sealed its fate as a part of the Confederacy. The president’s call 
for troops a few days later only intensified secessionist feelings in the state. The president’s call 
for troops generated outrage among many of the convention delegates. Governor Rector too took 
the president’s call for troops as an insult and refused. In the meantime, the governor ordered 
Arkansas state militia to take the Federal arsenal at Fort Smith and began to organize and prepare 
these same regiments for service in the Confederacy. In addition, Rector looked to the west for 
help when he appealed to the Cherokees to join forces with the South.117 Nevertheless, by May 7, 
1861, the convention signed an ordinance for Arkansas secession in its second session, paving its 
way to join the other Southern states, with a 69-1 vote. The only dissenting vote came from the 
future Unionist governor of the state, Isaac Murphy of Madison County. A few days later, on May 
10, the convention approved the provisional constitution of the Confederate States of America by 
a 63-8 vote. On May 20, Arkansas was admitted into the Confederate States of America. Why did 
Arkansas move from a stance that hoped to avoid secession to one that dove headlong in separating 
itself from the Union? 
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The make-up of the delegates at the convention provides some insight to indicate why 
Arkansas voted in favor of secession. Only four of the delegates were native-born Arkansans, the 
rest were born in other states, mostly in Tennessee. Convention delegates were mostly lawyers and 
farmers, some of which grew cotton. The typical convention delegate in Arkansas was a 
slaveholder, typically one with smaller holdings of slaves, usually less than twenty. Because many 
of the delegates had small slave holdings, few of them wanted to dive headlong into civil war by 
taking Arkansas out of the Union. Slaveholding and wealth were the driving factors pushing an 
individual to support secession, usually people who resided in the cotton counties.118 Many of the 
anti-secessionists in northwestern and north-central Arkansas were less wealthy, owned few or no 
slaves, and often lived in the more remote parts of the state.119 These political divisions in the 
immediate months before the war foreshadow the same divisions that forced many in the state to 
leave their homes. 
Conclusion 
The development of Arkansas and Missouri during the antebellum period played a critical 
role in each state’s response to the national crisis in 1860-1861. Beginning with the rapid 
settlement of both states following the conclusion of the War of 1812, settlers, many of whom 
brought their slaves, quickly settled the area. The rapid settlement of Missouri increased national 
tensions over slavery during the Missouri Crisis. Beginning with the Missouri Crisis of 1819-1821, 
sectional tensions over the westward expansion of slavery increased with each succeeding decade. 
Though Congress averted crisis in this instance through compromise, it was only temporary. Over 
three decades later, the Kansas-Nebraska Act invalidated the prohibitive Missouri Compromise of 
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1820, opening up the possibility for slaves in those territories through Stephen Douglas’s doctrine 
of popular sovereignty. Missourians did not want the territory sitting immediately to their west to 
become a haven for runaway slaves. Arkansans were concerned, but simply lost interest because 
the region was not hospitable for the growing of cotton. It was with the election of Abraham 
Lincoln that each state grew weary of their place in the Union. Despite their weariness, each state 
hoped that crisis could be averted through compromise, as it had been done before. The outbreak 
of civil war in April 1861 changed this. The leadership of both Missouri and Arkansas, because of 
their slave populations, thought that their states should go with the South. After much heated 
debate, Missouri remained in the Union while Arkansas made the decision to leave. Governor 
Jackson of Missouri tried to steer his state out of the Union, but was foiled by the Union military 
with the Camp Jackson Affair. Following the Camp Jackson Affair, Missouri would be a state with 
two governments – one loyal to the Union and the other, Jackson’s, loyal to the Confederacy. 
While Arkansas leaders did their best to act with caution regarding secession, Lincoln’s call for 
troops was the signal for cotton planters located in the central and eastern part of the state. The 
Ozark region of the state, where there were very few slaves, hoped the state remained in the Union. 
Much to these anti-secessionists chagrin, by May 1861, Arkansas became a part of the 
Confederacy. Each state’s creation, settlement, and moves for secession form an important 
framework in which displaced people in the Trans-Mississippi West are viewed and understood. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGING CRISIS 
Come all ye sons of freedom and our southern band 
We’re going to fight the enemy and drive them from our land 
Justice is our motto and Providence our guide 
So jump in the wagon and we’ll all take a ride 
 
CHORUS 
Wail for the wagon 
The Secession wagon 
The South is a wagon 
And we’ll all take ride120 
 
A parody of the popular tune Wait for the Wagon, this Southern version entitled The 
Southern Wagon, written at the start of the Civil War, enthusiastically asked Southerners to pile 
on and come for a ride. For many Southern whites, such enthusiasm was short-lived and many 
chose or were forced to use their wagon for much different purposes – to flee their homes. After 
secessionists in South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter in April 1861 and President Abraham 
Lincoln’s subsequent call for troops to quell the rebellion, Arkansas joined the Confederate States 
of America – and began its ride on the secession wagon. With the Confederate victory at Bull Run 
in Virginia that summer, the war began in earnest. Before long, citizens in Arkansas, Missouri, 
and the rest of the West would see both armies marching through their communities interspersed 
with guerrilla bands fighting for citizens’ allegiance. 121 Consequently, people scattered throughout 
the region had to ask themselves if they would remain in their homes or be forced to flee. 
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The wartime displacement of people in Arkansas and Missouri was not a single, 
simultaneous act – but many. Some families fled their homes and communities at the very start of 
the war, while others were able, for a variety of reasons/factors, to wait out much of the war before 
displacement affected them. In short, every wartime experience was different in both duration and 
hardship for residents. Sometimes, these men and women had some control over their situation. 
They were able to buy time by disguising their loyalties for part of or even the entire war. Hence, 
they might have been deemed useful by the armies operating in the region allowing these people 
to provide food for soldiers, or perhaps their home was used as an official’s headquarters for a 
time. There were others, however, who did not have this luxury. 
The large number of displaced people in the region came out of a variety of factors – some 
unique to the West, some not. Unique factors to the region, including guerrilla warfare, wreaked 
havoc on local populations causing many people to flee. Divided allegiances existed among 
communities throughout the Border States, and these were especially acute in Missouri and 
Arkansas. Factors common to war like food shortages, clashes between the armies, and the 
inability to secure their family’s safety sent many to seek refuge. The clashes between the regular 
armies did not always play by the rules of conventional warfare. Unconventional army policies 
and irregular warfare in the region are the most prominent examples of this. Historian Louis S. 
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Gerteis notes, “[c]onventional warfare took on an added significance in Missouri because of the 
intensity of guerrilla activity.”122 Ewing’s order that evacuated a swath of Missouri’s western 
border complicated the already growing crisis in western Missouri, as did military clashes at 
Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, Prairie Grove, and others in the Western Theatre. Sometimes, just one 
of these factors displaced citizens, other times it was a combination of them. 
The Western Theater encompassed the lower Mississippi Valley as well as areas to the 
west including Texas, Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma), and other territories all the way 
to the Pacific Ocean. Many of the military heroes of the Eastern Theater gained valuable 
experience in the West - like General Ulysses S. Grant who earned his military acumen at Forts 
Henry and Donelson being the best example. Conditions in the West could be tough not only for 
its citizens, but for the armies as well. Western military leaders often had to do more with less in 
that their armies lacked necessary supplies and rail lines were sparse throughout the region.123 
Battles in the Western Theater include Pea Ridge, Wilson’s Creek, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and 
Shiloh – played an important role in the outcome of the war. Union victories here brought about 
the eventual defeat of the Confederacy, mostly because of their ability to control key points along 
the Mississippi River, cutting the Confederacy in two. 
To control Missouri was to control the mighty Mississippi as it snaked south – deep into 
the Confederacy. As a result, controlling it became a Union army objective at the start of the war. 
“At the outbreak of war,” notes historian Allen C. Guelzo, “the importance of controlling the 
Mississippi River and its vast system of tributary rivers was obvious to both the Union and the 
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Confederate governments.”124 Controlling the river would allow the Federals to divide the 
Confederacy in two and destroy the two halves in detail, as it was a vital interior artery of the 
Confederacy. The army’s understanding of this explains their desire to launch offensives in both 
Missouri and Arkansas. 
The War Comes West: Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove 
Missouri passed its first test when it navigated the waters of secession early in 1861. The 
next test for it came at what became known as the ‘Bull Run of the West’ - the battle of Wilson’s 
Creek.125 In an attempt to pursue Missouri’s secessionist government as it fled for the Arkansas 
border, Union General Nathanial Lyon under the command of John C. Frémont gave chase during 
the first week of August 1861 in the southwestern corner of the state near Springfield. At the same 
time, Confederate Generals Benjamin McCulloch and Sterling Price and their approximately 
12,000 troops approached Springfield in southwestern Missouri. Lyon was at a disadvantage. He 
had about 5,500 troops and added to his disadvantage when he divided his smaller force in the face 
of the enemy. Lyon hoped to deceive his enemy by making his force appear larger than it was. The 
armies clashed under the hot Missouri sun on August 10, 1861. Each side lost about 1,300 men, 
but Price and McCulloch drove Lyon from the field in defeat. While the defeat did not cause 
Missouri to reconsider secession, the Confederate victory here kept guerrilla activity alive for the 
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remainder of the war.126 Following the battle came the first significant surge of displaced whites 
in the West. 
  
The carnage of Wilson’s Creek led to the creation of the Western Sanitary Commission. 
While injured Union soldiers necessitated its creation, the Commission also helped with the influx 
of the dispossessed in the region. While one might generally assume that people who sympathized 
with the Union made their way north, while uprooted persons who cast their lots with the 
Confederacy headed south, people’s experiences were not always this clear-cut. People fled to 
places where they felt protected. Unionists, many displaced because of the Union defeat, fell back 
with the army to Rolla, Missouri, then eventually to St. Louis.  
Rolla, located about halfway between Springfield and St. Louis, was an important location 
of activity regarding displaced people in Missouri. According to a Western Sanitary Commission 
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Report detailing the initial flood of people to the city, “this military post [Rolla] has been a city of 
refuge for many refugees from Southwest Missouri. An average of three hundred persons have 
been sheltered and rationed here by the Government all the time, and thousands have reached this 
post and passed on to St. Louis to scatter themselves through the free States of the West.”127 Rolla 
was the epicenter of the displacement crisis during the first two years of the war. The large numbers 
of people who massed here created a logistical problem for the army, as they had to find a way to 
feed and clothe this large, ever-increasing number of people.  
The mass of people at Rolla would be one of the first large encounters between displaced 
people and the army and philanthropic organizations in the region. This small central Missouri 
community would also be the starting point on how both civilians and military officials treated 
displaced people. By 1860, the rail line west from St. Louis was finished only as far as Phelps 
County and while it served as the end of the line in a railroad-sense, it was the beginning of the 
end for many peoples’ journey northward. Here was also the potential for transportation further 
north to receive aid and supplies. The stories of the men, women, and children who arrived at Rolla 
from various points in Missouri and Arkansas were certainly extraordinary. One undated account, 
that involved an unnamed blind woman at Rolla, detailed her husband’s murder at the hands of 
guerrillas early in the war. This woman “and her poor family of six children, who had walked all 
the way from Arkansas to Rolla, MO., her little children leading her several hundred miles by the 
hand . . . .”128 Others, with similar stories, made their way from points across Arkansas and 
Missouri to escape murderous guerilla bands in search of aid and protection in St. Louis. There is 
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little doubt that this woman and her family made their way here for this reason. The problem at 
Rolla intensified with other military engagements sent an increasing number of people here. The 
Union army transported many of the dispossessed in central Missouri further east to St. Louis, 
where they received whatever help they needed from the various aid societies located there. 
With the start of hostilities at Wilson’s Creek, St. Louis also saw an increasing number of 
displaced people approach its borders. Few cities played a more important role in wartime crisis 
than did St. Louis. Cities, in general, were important for people on the run because they provided 
police protection, employment, a better opportunity for living arrangements, opportunities to 
socialize, and safety in numbers.129 The city was the gateway to the West and, given its location 
on the Mississippi River, the path to the heart of the Confederacy. It became one of the primary 
hubs for benevolent aid societies like the Western Sanitary Commission and the Ladies’ Union 
Aid Society and had some of the best hospitals in the West. The Gateway City became a ‘hospital 
town’ as the Federals transported many wounded troops here from battlefields to the south and the 
west. “From spring 1862 through the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863,” Louis S. Gerteis 
observes, “St. Louis had the largest concentration of wartime medical activity in the West.”130 
Because of its location, available medical treatment, and benevolent aid societies located in the 
city, many displaced people made their way to this Mississippi port seeking relief at the war’s 
outset.131 
Many people who found themselves in St. Louis came from Rolla, Missouri, and places 
further to the south and west – most notably Texas and Arkansas – usually by train and others on 
foot and in wagons. People who arrived here were often very ill, injured, suffered the effects of 
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starvation, dehydration, or exposure to the elements. According to the Western Sanitary 
Commission’s 1864 report on refugees, many entered St. Louis “consisting almost entirely of 
helpless women and children, widows, orphans and half orphans, often sick or debilitated by 
disease, poorly clad and bare-footed with few bundles of bedding, on arriving here, having no 
friends to go to . . .”132 In St. Louis, aid societies gave people food, money, clothing, and assistance 
in locating lost or missing family members. For this reason, the Gateway City served as an oasis 
in the desert of war for many displaced people.  
By the spring of 1862, Union forces controlled much of Missouri. Military commanders 
here had to defend the state from Confederate aggressors who hoped to take the state for the 
Confederacy. The situation in Arkansas was different. Arkansas had seceded however reluctantly 
from the Union and therefore the army had to wrestle control of the state from Confederate 
authority. The second year of the war served as an important year for the army and its activity 
within Arkansas. The year would see the Federals begin to loosen the Confederate grip on the 
state. Two key battles that resulted in Union victory - Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove – did just that. 
The battle that took place at Pea Ridge on March 6-8, 1862, would be the first step in the army 
establishing control of the Ozark region of the state. 
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Riding high following their victory at Wilson’s Creek, the Confederate army entertained 
hopes of striking a military blow that would help bring Missouri into the orbit of the Confederacy. 
At Pea Ridge, located in the northwestern corner of Arkansas near the Missouri border, 
Confederate General Earl Van Dorn and his force comprised of about 16,000 troops would clash 
with the smaller Union forces of General Samuel R. Curtis, who had about 11,000 men. A 
Confederate victory at Pea Ridge was only a part of Van Dorn’s larger goal – an invasion of 
Missouri and a chance to take on the forces of Ulysses S. Grant in a deciding battle for the Border 
State bringing it within the orbit of the Confederate States of America. Despite the fact that 
Confederate forces outnumbered him, Curtis was prepared and defeated an overzealous Van Dorn. 
Historian James McPherson has called it “the most one sided victory won by an outnumbered 
Figure 2.2: Map of Arkansas Civil War battles. Source: http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/ARmap.htm 
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Union army during the war.”133 Confederate forces tucked tail and scattered in virtually every 
direction.134 Major General Thomas C. Hindman’s Confederate forces retreated to northwestern 
Arkansas, where there were ample foodstuffs for his troops while the rest of the Confederate troops 
moved east of the Mississippi to help battered forces in Tennessee. While a series of smaller 
skirmishes took place over the summer and fall like the battle of Whitney’s Lane/Searcy in north-
central Arkansas, the next major battle would not come until the following December. 
The Confederate Conscription Act 
As the second year of the war approached, Confederate leaders came to the realization that 
their armies could not sustain themselves unless they replenished the ranks. By the time the smoke 
had cleared on the Pea Ridge battlefield on March 8, 1862, the Confederacy had lost 67,233 men 
to that point.135 While Richmond could never replace the men that it lost in earlier battles, at the 
very least they hoped that it would spur enlistment in the army. The increasing death toll on the 
battlefields during the first year and a half of the war forced congress to act and attempt to refill 
the ranks. The Conscription Act went into effect on June 20, 1862, making all able-bodied white 
men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five subject to a three-year term of service in the 
army.136 There was the option of hiring a substitute for one’s service and even an exemption for 
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owners of twenty or more slaves, causing a great deal of class conflict throughout the South. The 
act was later expanded to include men up to the age of forty-five and then, in 1864, was revised 
again to include the all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty years old. Historian Mary 
Elizabeth Massey adeptly made the connection between the draft and displaced people, in that it 
“ironically increased the ranks of both the army and the refugees.”137 Fears of conscription were 
more prevalent in the Trans-Mississippi West as the army needed more troops here than the 
number provided by men who volunteered for service. These fears were especially strong in 
Arkansas where there remained pockets of wartime Unionism. 
Even before the draft commenced, Arkansans in the north-central and northwestern part of 
the state organized into what they called the Arkansas Peace Society. The Peace Society, a loose, 
local organization of men opposed to the state’s secession from the Union and committed to 
protecting their homes, might be the first organized resistance to the Confederacy in the South. 
These Peace Societies existed in secret throughout the northern part of the state beginning in the 
fall of 1861 and they opposed impressment into service when Governor Rector called for the 
raising of state militias. While there was a concentrated effort by local Confederate officials to 
arrest and put them on trial for treason, society members in Van Buren, Fulton, and Izzard 
Counties, men who were not caught were simply flushed into the arms of the army or laid low, 
simply wanting to be left alone. Others spied or scouted for the army near their communities. 138 
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Loyalty to one side or the other could offer peace of mind or it could cause a family’s 
displacement. Southern whites faced constant tests of loyalty. George W. Heath’s 1872 play, 
Southern Refugees, or The South during the War: A Military Drama in Five Acts, detailed the 
importance of loyalty. The play narrates the travails of Fred Weston, a Union sympathizer in 
Brazoria, Texas. Fred, a planter who had studied engineering before the war was forced to choose 
sides and, according to others in his hometown, chose wrong. Following a heated debate in which 
Fred refused to vote in favor of secession for Texas, the town’s leading secessionist, Harrison 
Rathbone, attacks him. A shot rings out and Fred falls to the ground, seconds later, his slave Dolph 
and friend Catastrophe kill Rathbone saving Weston’s life. Soon thereafter, secessionist forces 
accuse Fred of murder and horse stealing. After a family discussion in which they determine that 
it is not safe for the family or himself if he stays, Fred went north, in search of the Union army. 
Once in Union territory, he will becomes a spy for the army with numerous narrow escapes along 
the way. Upon hearing about her brother’s displacement, Carrie Weston laments in Act II, Scene 
1: “Oh, my poor father, what will become of us? My brother a Southern Refugee; yourself doomed 
to a Southern prison; while mother and I are left to the mercy of a reckless mob. May God protect 
us all.”139 Throughout the twists and the turns of the play, there is a message with regard to the 
dispossessed and loyalty to the Union. At the conclusion of the play, Fred presumably turns to the 
audience and reminds them about the sacrifice of these people in the name of loyalty: “Our 
Drama’s ended; ‘Our Flag is there[,]’” Fred notes in the play’s final scene, “Long and hard did we 
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labor to bring it back, and severe were the sufferings of the SOUTHERN REFUGEE. . . .let us not 
forget, that, while the North was pouring forth her patriots, resolved to do or die, there were some 
LOYAL HEARTS in THE SOUTH DURING THE WAR.”140 As the play’s final scene 
demonstrates, the constant testing of loyalties caused a strain on many communities in the region 
and contributing factor the problem there. 
Fear of the conscription law generated such fear among Arkansans – especially Unionists 
- that they left their communities.141 At the local level, the Confederacy had already impressed a 
number of men into service with the local militias. The new conscription law made recruitment 
efforts much more widespread and, as a result, made it much more difficult for Union men to 
dodge attempts at recruitment into the Confederate army.142 With this law, notes historian Nola A. 
James in her study of Independence County, “[m]any of those who had hoped to remain neutral 
or, at least, avoid military service, became frantic. Some found a place of safety behind the lines. 
Beginning in late June 1862, many Southern citizens, especially Unionists, fled their communities 
fearing that the Confederacy would force them to fight. Several Pro-Union citizens tried to make 
their way to Missouri, but Confederate picket lines prevented it.”143 
With the Conscription law, many Unionists in the Ozark Mountains of northwestern 
Arkansas, known as Mountain Federals, did their best to remain out of view so as not to be drawn 
into any conflicts with their pro-Confederate neighbors. Because of the Conscription Act, many of 
these Arkansas Unionists fled out of fear, not wanting to fight against the nation for which they 
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professed their loyalty. Unionist men from both Arkansas and Missouri fled as they feared 
conscription by the army or, for men already on the run, faced a very real threat of capture, forced 
conscription, or death for refusing to fight for the Confederacy. Fear of conscription also pushed 
these Union men into the arms of the army as recruits.144 
Unionist families in Arkansas lived life on the edge, imagining that they might have to flee 
at a moment’s notice. Should they leave? Should they stay and hide the fact that they were 
Unionists? Citizens throughout the region did what they could to hold on as long as they could. 
For example, Lina Hermann who lived in the German settlement of Hermannsburg in Washington 
County asked herself these very questions in her wartime diary. Her entry on November 12, 1862, 
elaborated upon this internal fear of Confederates discovering that they were Union supporters. 
“We live in constant fear and danger. It is said that all men must join the Southern army. A negro 
stole a horse, saddles and took my Melinda with him. We have been considered sympathizers for 
the South so far but if the Northern troops come we will openly declare ourselves. Today starving 
secessionists were in our mill and acted as if it were their property.”145 Because of this tension, 
families sometimes arrived at the decision to flee their homes rather than forced service in the 
Confederate army.146 Before the year was out, the Hermanns would come to that decision. 
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While conscription made things more difficult for Unionists, not just Unionists who 
resisted. Moneyhon’s research on southwest Arkansas demonstrates how Confederate conscription 
polluted enthusiasm for the Confederate cause by opening class divisions in that part of the state. 
By the winter of 1862, poorer citizens there were openly hostile against the government in protest 
of what they viewed as favoritism towards the area’s wealthier citizens. Through various 
exemptions for wealthier individuals in the southwestern corner of the state, poorer citizens there 
saw conscription for what it was – making it a rich man’s war, but a poor man’s fight. Because of 
the events in late 1862 into 1863, the Confederacy never regained the support that it had from that 
region at the start of the war.147 
As the war moved into its second and third years, the government had to ensure that white 
Southerners remained dedicated to the cause. Officials in Richmond moved against any activity 
deemed unpatriotic or interfered with the effort. “By late 1861 authorities in the individual states 
and the central government were already moving hard against the Unionists,” notes historian 
Stephanie McCurry, “jettisoning protections for freedom of speech and assembly, abandoning 
distinctions between sedition (disloyal speech) and treason (disloyal acts), encouraging vigilante 
action within communities, and moving anew to bring the power of the state down on its internal 
enemies.”148 The Conscription Act was just a part of a larger government program stripping away 
its citizens’ rights to ensure the government’s survival. 
A white Southerner’s decision to flee to avoid conscription can be viewed as a form of 
protest against it and an indication of the various positions white southerners held toward the 
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war.149 While the law was not the only cause of one’s displacement, it could sometimes be the 
deciding factor, especially as the conflict continued. The law served as a test of loyalty for many 
whites in a region where devotion to secession was fragile. Loyalty tests lasted for the war’s 
duration. “They report that all the men that could be found have been conscripted,” detailed an 
October 1864 account in the Fort Smith New Era, “and that a great many are secreted in the hills 
and brush.”150 Unionists scattered everywhere in an effort to evade Confederate officials who 
might press them into service for the army. Missouri’s Springfield Journal noted that hundreds of 
men had made their way to Missouri in the weeks before the conscription law was to take effect 
in Arkansas.151 Most importantly, if someone could make their way into Union-controlled territory, 
it would all but assure their safety from conscription. Because of this, many of the dispossessed 
made their way to Missouri and places further north using their feet in protest of the draft law. As 
the army increased its presence in Arkansas as 1862 turned into 1863, there was less of a need for 
citizens to flee the draft law because of reduced Confederate army activity in the state. 
Following a string of Union victories in the Northern part of the state, commanders 
prepared to take the state capital with the hopes that it would secure Arkansas. Curtis, who was 
determined to press on to Little Rock, had to secure the state’s northern region and this included 
removing Hindman’s forces. During the summer of 1862, the Union army was able to establish 
itself at the river town of Helena, a key site on the Mississippi. From here, Curtis was able to 
establish supply lines for his men allowing him to focus on Hindman and eventually help with the 
siege of Vicksburg. In the campaign, the two armies squared off over the course of five months in 
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a series of skirmishes at places like Whitney’s Lane/Searcy, in north-central Arkansas, and Cane 
Hill in the northwestern part of the state. The two armies finally met on the morning of December 
7, 1862, at Prairie Grove, about ten miles west of Fayetteville. At day’s end, Union losses were 
over 1,200 casualties while Confederate losses were over 1,300 casualties. Tactically a draw, the 
result of the battle was an end to Confederate offensive operations west of the Mississippi River. 
The Federals were able to move in and secure most of the state for the remainder of the war.152 
In the immediate aftermath of Prairie Grove, it was not yet determined that the blue coats 
were there to stay. Civilians who lived in the path of the retreating Confederate army bore the 
brunt of the hardships near the battlefield as many soldiers scavenged the countryside for whatever 
food and supplies that they could find. Sometimes, these soldiers pestered local families for 
supplies or simply took whatever civilians refused to provide to the battered and hungry men. Tales 
of wartime theft and harassment of these families were frequent – especially if these civilians were 
Unionists and/or had men serving in Union regiments.153 
The Hermann family, founders of Hermannsburg, experienced a number of fearful 
incidents in the aftermath of Prairie Grove.154 Brothers John (Johann) and Karl Hermann and their 
wives, Nanni and Lina (Wilhelmi) were German immigrants who came to Arkansas in search of 
prosperity and stability during the 1850s in the aftermath of the failed Revolutions of 1848 in their 
homeland. Once there, they established a steam-powered mill that processed wheat, corn, sawed 
lumber, and wool. Both Hermann couples, as well as about a dozen or so German immigrant 
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families and Native Americans who lived in the general vicinity, experienced relative prosperity 
during the 1850s. Then the war came.155 The location of Hermannsburg, in western Washington 
County, put them in the direct path of the moving armies – especially in the aftermath of the recent 
battles in the area. This put families in some rather difficult situations. 
By November of 1862, the Hermanns determined that their best course of action was to 
seek the help of Federal troops, so brothers John and Karl went north in search of protection, 
leaving their wives in charge of the mill in Hermannsburg. The women faced numerous instances 
of harassment from Southern troops that November, mostly Hindman’s Confederate soldiers. Both 
Nanni and Lina noted their hardships in their respective diaries. Indicating just how bad the 
situation had become, Lina wrote on November 16th “We dare not undress to sleep and even the 
children sleep with their clothes on.”156 The women and their children faced harassment and 
incidents of theft from Confederate troops nearly every night. In addition, the lack of supplies was 
taking its toll on the families. “I cut up window curtains and also used a piece of floor carpet and 
bed-spreads,” noted Nanni in her November 26th diary entry, “for it is impossible to secure clothes 
elsewhere.”157 As December approached, Nanni, Lina and the eight children between them, had 
heard no word from John and Karl and their situation grew increasingly tense. This was evident in 
Nanni’s December 12th entry in her diary: “We cannot hold out much longer. During the night, 
robbers came to Lina’s house. What terror!”158 Thankfully, for their sake, good news was soon to 
arrive in Hermannsburg. 
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Following the Confederate defeat at Prairie Grove, the Hermanns finally received word 
from their brother Fritz that a Union escort of 100 men would help them flee the area. On December 
19th, the Hermanns, nineteen men, women, and children made their way to General F.J. Herron’s 
camp at Prairie Grove. “We had to flee, leaving all possessions behind, but we have our men.”159 
The party spent Christmas Day camping in Fayetteville, the pain and suffering of the previous 
months wearing on everyone. Karl Hermann reflected on recent events when he wrote, “The 
Christ-Child had lost its magic that day. Satan was ruling the land. Looking up at the star-studded 
sky, our memory saw again the lighted Christmas trees in our Fatherland.”160 From Fayetteville, 
they made their way to Rolla via an army commissary train. Many in the party, including John, 
had taken ill during the journey north in the early months of 1863. February and March of 1863 
saw them on the road to St. Louis, their ultimate destination of refuge. By April, they had reached 
St. Louis only to have tragedy strike once more - Nanni fell ill and died six days later on April 30, 
1863. As Federal troops were able to solidify their presence in Arkansas that same year, Unionists 
and residents who only demonstrated a half-hearted support of the Confederacy started to feel a 
sense of security. For die-hard Confederates in the state, they too would have to make decisions 
on whether or not to stay in their home state. 
Planters on the Move 
While the draft made things uncomfortable for many Unionists in Arkansas forcing some 
to flee, Confederates there became equally uneasy with the increasing presence of the Federals as 
they pushed further south. Of special concern was their chattel property – slaves. This military 
uncertainty in Arkansas and Missouri, caused many in the Confederate planter class to flee and 
they were not about to leave their slaves. Many white Southerners feared that their slaves would 
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flee plantations seeking protection from the closing Union army, especially after the Lincoln 
Administration moved towards a policy of emancipation beginning in the summer of 1862. In 
consequence, Confederates decided to take their property elsewhere with the hopes of preventing 
their slaves from reaching Federal lines. 
Confederate supporters had much more to lose when compared to people in the other 
Southern states. Most masters owned less than twenty slaves. For Southerner planters, twenty 
slaves served as the dividing line between large-scale plantation agriculture and small, yeoman 
farms. Moneyhon points out that by 1860 “an estimated 50 percent of all slaves in Arkansas were 
on holdings of under 20 slaves, a figure considerably higher than the 38.0 percent in the Lower 
South.”161 While there were not as many slaves in Arkansas as in other states across the antebellum 
South, more whites owned slaves here. Slave owners located in the Ozark and Boston Mountains 
in the northwestern part of the state tended to grow more food than cotton, so slavery was different 
here. Because of the mountainous nature of the region, cotton was more difficult to grow and, 
therefore, there were fewer slaves here.162 With the start of the war, Arkansas ranked only eleventh 
out of the fifteen slave-holding states with 111,115 slaves concentrated in the southern and eastern 
part of the state.163 Missouri on the other hand, according to its 1860 census, had 112,032 slaves 
within its borders.164 This number is relatively small when compared to the slave populations of 
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other states in the Deep South during the same period.165 Once the war began, slave owners had 
something else to fear: large numbers of their slaves leaving the plantation in search of freedom. 
Many slaves fled plantations throughout the South to reach Union lines, in search of 
freedom. Slaves also played an important role in the Confederate war machine. Within the 
Confederate Army, slaves “dug trenches and built fortifications . . . serve[d] as teamsters, cooks, 
and hospital attendants” and “labored on the home front, tilling fields, raising crops, and picking 
cotton, so their masters could go to war.”166 James McPherson notes that “[s]lave labor was so 
important in Confederate armies as well as on the home front that the government impressed slaves 
into service before it began drafting white men as soldiers.”167 Correspondingly, a combination of 
military measures followed up by more stable measures from the federal government by the 
summer and fall of 1862. Through a series of acts, both generals in the field and the Lincoln 
Administration chipped away at the slave labor component of the Confederate Army and attempted 
to deal with the increasing numbers of slaves making their way to Federal lines.  
The evolution of the Lincoln Administration’s emancipation policy during the first year 
and half of the war demonstrates how unprepared both the president and Congress were for the 
number of slaves who fled Southern plantations.168 Lincoln’s move toward emancipation, 
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culminating with the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation issued after the battle of Antietam 
in September 1862, came through a series of smaller, incremental measures in 1861. The move 
towards a Federal emancipation policy began in the battlefields of Virginia almost as soon as the 
war began. With the start of the fighting, three slaves, who had been leased by their masters to the 
Confederate army, presented themselves at Fort Monroe in Hampton Roads, Virginia. When their 
masters requested their return, General Benjamin Butler refused to return them and instead labeled 
them as ‘contraband of war.’169 Building upon Butler’s treatment of escaped slaves as contraband 
of war, the First Confiscation Act, issued in August of 1861, enabled the Union Army to confiscate 
any slave put into service by the Confederate Army.  
What to do with slaves who made their way to Union lines not only created confusion in 
the upper levels of the United States government, but it also forced military commanders to create 
ad hoc ways of dealing with this unforeseen consequence of the war. General John C. Frémont 
issued what amounted to a battlefield emancipation measure early in the war. Frémont, in August 
of 1861, proclaimed all slaves within the Department of the West free in an effort to erode 
Confederate sympathies in Missouri and strike a blow to guerrilla fighters there – as these people 
were the ones supporting them.170 President Lincoln was not enthusiastic about Frémont’s field 
order emancipation, feeling that it would force his hand with regard to emancipation. As a result, 
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he ordered Frémont to rescind his order. It would take that summer to nudge Lincoln closer to 
embracing the kind of emancipation found in both Frémont’s and Hunter’s orders and building 
upon the First Confiscation Act.171 
Another measure that paved the way for the Emancipation Proclamation was the Second 
Confiscation Act, passed by the United States Congress in July of 1862. This act enabled the 
confiscation any slave of persons supporting the rebellion by Federal troops. The primary focus of 
this act concerned eliminating the return of fugitive slaves back to Confederate lines, unless their 
masters remained loyal to the United States. Together, the Confiscation Acts aimed at “the 
backbone of Confederate power – property, cotton, and slaves – and to use these resources for the 
benefit of the Union armies.”172 It was a step for the president to clarify a variety of issues – both 
legal and constitutional – in a move towards eventual emancipation.173 These acts dealt with slaves 
in the Confederacy, what about African Americans in the North who wanted to help the war effort? 
The summer of 1862 served as a turning point for the Federal government’s emancipation 
policy. On the same day that the Second Confiscation Act passed, July 17, 1862, the United States 
Congress also passed the Militia Act. This act allowed free African Americans’ enlistment in the 
army, though it did not stipulate that they be armed and allowed to join in battle.174 The Militia 
Act essentially relegated African American enlistees to the manual labor positions vacated by the 
white soldiers who left for the front lines. It provided for “persons of African descent . . . 
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employment in any military or naval service for which they may be found competent and granted 
freedom to slave men so employed, as well as to their families, if they, too, were owned by disloyal 
masters.”175 As enslaved African Americans continued to come into Union lines, many wanting to 
participate in the war effort, the army moved towards more uniform emancipation policies. These 
measures demonstrate the ways in which the United States government put formal policies in place 
to deal with the increasing number of slaves making their way into the lines. 
By that same summer, there were formal policies put forth by the federal government on 
how to handle the large numbers of slaves running away from Southern plantations. To prevent 
their slaves from falling into Federal hands, many fleeing slave owners sent their slaves out of 
harm’s way – and out of the way of the army. Many slave owners feared that their slaves would 
flee if the Federals came close enough to their communities and, by 1863 the possibility of this 
happening was very real in the West. Therefore, many planters removed both their families and 
their slaves further south in a practice called refugeeing.176 
Drew Gilpin Faust notes that Texas was a very popular place for the planter class, calling 
it “that favored destination for planters hoping to locate slaves out of the reach of Union armies.”177 
Refugeeing planters came to Marshall, Waco, and Tyler, usually settling in central or eastern 
Texas.178 Sometimes, just the slaves were sent further south, other times, their owners went along 
                                                          
175 Berlin et al., 41. 
176 Refugeeing was not without its problems for the planter class. Some slaves resisted attempts at their relocation, 
while others ran away once their masters relocated them. The increased number of runaways often increased fears of 
insurrection throughout the South because of this refugeeing. For more on the practice of refugeeing during the Civil 
War, see Ira Berlin, et. al., Slaves No More: Three essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 56-57; See also Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1979), 240; Bruce Levine, The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil War and the Social 
Revolution that Transformed the South (New York: Random House, 2013), 195-199; William W. Freehling, South 
vs. the South: .How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 142-143. 
177 Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 43. 
178 Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
92-93. 
116 
 
 
 
as well. “Refugees from Arkansas and Louisiana come to Texas with their slaves,” noted Harper’s 
Weekly in early 1864, “[t]hey should be welcomed.”179 For loyal Confederates, they had to protect 
their slaves and not allow them to fall into the hands of the Federals. These slaves, once moved, 
labored on cotton plantations elsewhere in the South.180 Slave owners usually had a tough go of it 
as they could not grow enough or sell enough cotton to make ends meet. As a result, they had to 
rent their slaves out “to public and private war industries, as teamsters, ironworkers, and even 
‘nitre diggers.’”181 For these slave owners, this was vital to preserving the Confederacy. 
In a sense, it was the patriotic duty of every true Southerner to do what they could to move 
these slaves from the reach of the Union army. Other Southern whites, however, did not always 
view it in this way, viewing these planters as being very unpatriotic for leaving when the time 
became difficult.182 Soldiers were fully aware that these Southerner planters were sending their 
slaves away for safekeeping. Soldiers saw it both first hand and in print in periodicals like Harper’s 
Weekly.183 Some slave owners did this well before President Lincoln even hinted at emancipation 
as a war policy during the summer of 1862. Union soldier Joseph Trego noted in late 1861 that 
“on our return we learned that a man who own a number of slaves was about to move them South 
and was going himself to join the southern Army.”184 The man described by the Union soldier sent 
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his slaves for safekeeping further south. “Wartime refugeeing, like prewar slave sales, showed that 
planter paternalism, sometimes impressive in flush times, grew more tenuous in disruptive 
times.”185 While planters who took their slaves with them when they fled or sent them for safe 
keeping further south often had more available to them than other displaced white Southerners, in 
terms of wealth and resources, their actions are telling. The idea that many displaced Confederates 
would add to their already difficult task of seeking refuge by protecting the peculiar institution 
demonstrates the importance of slavery to so many white Southerners. 
The Search for Food and the Sudden Displacement of War 
The war was particularly hard for Southern civilians as it attacked both their populations 
and economy. With each passing year of the war, the United States government moved away from 
conciliatory policies to one of hard war – with the help of General William Tecumseh Sherman.186 
“We are not only fighting armies,” observed Sherman as he prepared to take Savannah, Georgia, 
late in the war, “but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard 
hand of war, as well as their organized armies.”187 The army destroyed sources of food production 
as well as the rail networks that distributed that food as it pushed deeper into Confederate territory. 
Even before the war, the Confederacy’s rail system was very fragmented and, with the coming of 
the war, strained to a point that rendered it virtually useless.188 Playing a key role was the Federal 
government’s Anaconda Plan. 
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With the start of the war, the Lincoln Administration needed to develop a strategy to limit 
the effectiveness of Southern armies. The implementation of General-in-Chief Winfield Scott’s 
Anaconda Plan at the start of the war only magnified the South’s strained rail networks as the war 
continued. Scott’s plan made it difficult for Southern ports to receive much needed food and 
supplies. The navy blockaded Confederate ports in the Atlantic, all along the Mississippi River, 
and the Gulf of Mexico, applying an increasing amount of pressure on the Confederacy, like a 
giant snake. The Union navy blocked the ports of Charleston, New Orleans, Mobile, and 
Vicksburg, thus restricting trade between different parts of the Confederacy and making trade with 
Europe much more difficult. The goal of the plan was simple, the Confederacy’s isolation. 
Historian Andrew F. Smith points out that “[n]o one can seriously believe that the North could 
have won the war without the blockade.”189 The blockade made it very difficult for Southerners to 
obtain everyday supplies as well as maintain any kind of steady income. This combined with the 
Confederacy’s self-imposed cotton embargo made it difficult to export whatever crops planters 
were able to produce. 
In an attempt to bring much-needed goods to Southern ports, the lucrative business of 
blockade running came about. A key defect in Old Fuss and Feathers’ Anaconda Plan was that it 
would take time to be truly effective and Southern merchants took advantage. “During the early 
days of the war,” notes Steven Woodworth, “no such purpose-built blockade-runners were 
available, and none were needed, as ordinary merchant vessels came and went from southern 
harbors with only moderate risk of apprehension by the thin cordon of blockaders.”190 Profit-
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minded Confederates built fast, sleek blockade-runners, often constructed in England, to sneak 
goods past Federals gunboats enforcing the blockade – especially as the blockade became stronger. 
Goods smuggled through included ammunition, tea, salt, liquor, and medicines with cotton sent 
out for sale to European markets. Often working out of ports in the Caribbean like Nassau or 
Havana, blockade-runners sought both glory and profit. The success of the blockade, however, 
was limited. While more than two-thirds of blockade-runners were successful early in the war, and 
that number decreased to about fifty percent later in the war, it was nowhere near what would have 
come through had a blockade not existed. Furthermore, the demand for supplies was greater during 
wartime.191  
Much of the South’s farmland grew crops like cotton and tobacco – not wheat and corn. 
As a result, the South relied on the North for much of its food in 1860. The North produced “half 
of the nation’s corn, four-fifths of its wheat, and seven-eighths of its oats,” despite the fact that 
only 40 percent of the North’s population engaged in agriculture compared to 84 percent in the 
South.192 This, combined with the increasing number of slaves leaving plantations as the war 
progressed, forced these communities to rely on themselves to produce a great deal of their food. 
Historian Sam Bowers Hilliard points out the need for Southern self-sufficiency with regard to its 
pre-war food production. “Food was essential to the sustenance of the area’s populations, but in 
some areas the temptation to grow cotton resulted in periodic shortages and, consequently, a 
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dependence upon other areas for food.”193 As food production became more difficult with each 
passing day of the war, the Confederate government had to come to a decision on how to remedy 
this problem facing its communities. 
Because of the Anaconda Plan, the Confederacy had to develop other means of procuring 
necessary supplies – especially food. The government resorted to taking the food out of the mouths 
of its own citizens with the Impressment Act of 1863. Because of the difficulty in procuring 
supplies, the Confederacy turned to their citizens from the start of the war for those very supplies 
– especially food. Unofficially, these policies began in 1862 and eventually became law by 1863 
in the form of the Impressment Act passed by the Congress. Impressment enabled Southern 
soldiers to take much needed supplies – portions or entire crops, horses, wagons, etc. – in exchange 
for what amounted to IOUs. These IOUs were supposed to be a fair market value for the supplies 
taken by the army, but this was usually not the case if they ever received payment at all.194 In 
addition, the government also told its citizens what crops it could grow and which ones that it 
could not. “In adopting measures that told farmers what they could and could not grow, and in 
allowing for the seizure of individual citizens’ crops,” notes historian Chandra Manning, “the 
Confederate government and southern state governments touched white Southerners’ daily lives 
far more directly than the Union government ever had, and not in ways that advanced individual 
white Southerners’ interests.”195 Citizens also had to endure the tax-in-kind policies, 10 percent of 
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one’s crop, imposed by the government. Tax-in-kind policies appeared to be more orderly on the 
surface, but they affected citizens just the same. 
The inability of families to produce food for the family played a role in the displacement 
of people in the region, often tied to the presence of the armies or guerrilla fighters there. An irony 
of the Confederate South is that one of the world’s most powerful agricultural economies,” remarks 
historian James L. Roark, “people went hungry.”196 As the armies crisscrossed the countryside 
seeking or avoiding a battle, they caused similar destruction of foodstuffs in addition to that of 
homes and businesses. Armies and guerrilla fighters destroyed mills, homes, cattle, and crops. 
Soldiers often noted this as they moved through Arkansas and Missouri. “Left Camp Davidson 
this morning[,]” noted Union soldier David Allan writing from southeastern Missouri on 
November 13, 1862, “and after a march of about 10 miles encamped on the banks of a creek near 
the ruins of a mill which was destroyed by Heckers [sic] Division on account of it being a source 
from which Confederates drew their supplies.”197 Guerrilla fighters often consumed remaining 
crops to sustain them during their campaigns. These armies lived off the land, taking whatever 
crops or livestock they needed to survive while destroying what they did not need to keep it out of 
enemy hands. “The Yankees had stripped the country pretty well of horses, cattle, hogs,” the only 
pro-Confederate paper in Arkansas, the Washington Telegraph, reminded its readers, “and had 
thus put it out of the power of the citizens to raise a subsistence, even if there was an assurance 
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that they could keep it when made.”198 The Union army often punished civilians who they believed 
to be aiding the enemy and, sometimes, this meant destroying their ability to survive.  
Like the Union army, the Confederate army also participated in the destruction of private 
homes and public buildings and their ability to produce food. Citizens, who witnessed this 
devastation perpetrated upon civilians, often questioned its effectiveness. Some spoke out against 
this military carnage. For example, a March 1862 article did just that. “To destroy public stores 
and provisions is military good sense,” the article began, “To destroy private property (not 
necessarily for military subsistence) is decided nonsense. A house is of no use to the enemy. They 
get along just as well in tents. Why burn the houses? Whom does it hurt? Them or us?”199 Written 
in response to Confederate General Earl Van Dorn’s destruction of various homes in Arkansas, 
the author details the frustration experienced by so many citizens at these armies and their 
disregard of personal property. For example, areas in the northwestern part of the state experienced 
food shortages and hunger after the Confederate army moved north following their defeat at Prairie 
Grove. Many people shared this experience as armies moved back and forth through their 
communities living off the land – oftentimes, their land.  
Many civilians fled their communities because they were hungry. Because of the blockade 
and increasing presence of Federal troops, food became difficult to find and produce. Arguing that 
hunger played a key role in the defeat of the Confederacy, Smith notes that “[b]y the war’s end, 
an estimated 400,000 Southerners had left their homes – in many cases, farms or plantations – and 
many had taken refuge in Southern cities. Hence, less food was being produced in what remained 
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of the Confederacy while the need for food was growing, especially in urban areas.”200 Individuals 
on the ground, soldiers and guerrilla fighters in particular, noticed this fact as they passed in and 
out of their communities. “Luxuries such as sugar, coffee, and tea were unknown even on the 
tables of the most fortunate [,]” noted Confederate guerrilla fighter and native Arkansan Joseph 
Bailey, “[t]he plainest of food only was to be had, and many families were already destitute and 
dependent on their more fortunate neighbors for bread.”201 Sometimes, families left because of 
conscription and impressment, as each affected a community’s wartime food production. With 
many able-bodied men away from home to either fight the war or resist conscription, many families 
had to farm without their patriarch, therefore limiting food production. This absence of the head 
of household resulted in a major disruption of the yearly farming cycles. No form of destruction, 
however, was more devastating to these communities than the destruction of gristmills. 
An important part of life for nineteenth-century communities was the gristmill. Gristmills 
were a key element in a community’s ability to produce food. Historian Michael A. Hughes notes 
“[b]eyond processing the flour and meal providing the nineteenth-century staff-of-life, the rural 
mill was the factory of its day.”202 Often, one of the armies or guerrilla fighters, in an effort to 
prevent the other side from being able to use them in support of their troops, demolished these 
mills. Therefore, the loss of gristmills and other property was a key factor in driving people from 
their communities. Gristmill destruction hindered the production of foodstuffs for many 
communities throughout Missouri and Arkansas. “[W]e cannot appreciate the policy of devastating 
our own country on our retreat [,]” noted the March 5, 1862, Washington Telegraph, “[t]he houses 
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and mills and goods which are devoted to the flames belong, not to the enemy, but to ourselves.”203 
Soldiers also noticed the destruction of the farms and mills in the countryside. For example, Union 
soldier Robert Carnahan described the conditions in central Missouri: “This war has ruined the 
country Splendid houses and Farms and Deserted and the army distroying [sic] the Hay Corn and 
Fences, and the Furntur [Furniture] in the Houses taken by the troops.”204 The loss of these mills 
eliminated the means by which these communities produced food – sometimes leaving them 
unable to do so during the cold of winter – making their situation more miserable, forcing some to 
leave their communities. For citizens who chose to remain, they saw very quickly the land’s 
inability to support them for any duration. 
Like the wartime destruction of homes, farms, and mills by guerrillas, the same destruction 
by the armies often disrupted the production of food for many communities and served as 
important factors in driving many people away from their communities. War not only devastated 
many farms in the region but it also created straggling soldiers who wreaked havoc. In addition, 
crop failures in the summer of 1863 made starvation a reality for many of these people.205 Both 
armies created paths of destruction as a part of their own military strategies made evident when it 
came to food and the inability to produce food in these communities. 
The forcible separation of families and, in some cases, the removal of children from their 
parents further added to the troubles of displaced people. In St. Louis, all kinds of stories of 
mothers forcibly separated from their children. One such instance involved a Mrs. Hargrave who 
fled Arkansas for the relative safety of the city. Upon her arrival during the spring of 1863, her 
                                                          
203 “Burning Towns,” Washington Telegraph [AR], March 5, 1862. 
204 “Robert Carnahan Letter to My Dear Wife,” November 5, 1861, Robert Carnahan Letters, Wilson’s Creek 
National Battlefield Civil War Museum, Republic, Missouri, [Missouri Digital Heritage]. 
205 Leo E. Huff, “The Martial Law Controversy in Arkansas, 1861-1865: A Case History of Internal Confederate 
Conflict,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1978): 164; Bell I. Wiley, The Plain People 
of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1944), 36-69. 
125 
 
 
 
children “were spirited away and found in the Covent of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart. . . . Soon 
after, they were missing again, and found in another institution of the same kind. They were 
rescued a second time, only to be abducted again, and have not been discovered yet.”206 Whether 
or not the Convent of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart had good intentions or not is unclear, but the 
story certainly adds to a long list of hardships endured by displaced people. Accidental or 
incidental separation of families took a terrible toll on families. These partings were sometimes 
temporary, as weeks, months, or years down the road, families were reunited and moved on with 
their lives. Other times, family dissolutions were permanent as stories of death while seeking 
refuge were common.  
Many white Southerners forced from their homes lost contact with friends and family in 
their communities. This left many of them to wonder where their loved ones had gone, leaving 
them searching for weeks, sometimes months. Relatives of the uprooted often placed ads in papers 
throughout the region searching for their loved ones, hoping to locate them. “Information Wanted” 
- read one of these ads in search of a loved one during the final days of 1863 – “The undersigned 
desires to obtain information of the whereabouts of his parents C.W. and Elizabeth Patterson. They 
formerly resided at Lake Providence, Louisiana [just south of the Arkansas border]. He has not 
heard from them since the Federals occupied the country some 18 months ago. He supposes them 
to be some place about Red River or in Texas. Any information concerning them will confer a 
favor, which will be gratefully acknowledged.”207 Like other displaced people, they may have 
trekked out of harm’s way into a federal fort or found a train that was to take them to safety. Now, 
presuming they reached a safe place of refuge, the task was to reunite the family. Others, 
sometimes separated from their families in their flight, made similar pleas for help in finding their 
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loved ones: “John Leonidas Murray, a displaced Unionist, left independence county, Arkansas, in 
the month of January, 1863, for the purpose and with the intention to reach Fayetteville, Arkansas, 
where the 1st Arkansas and 11th Illinois cavalry were then stationed. Since then nothing has been 
heard from him. His mother and family have since removed to Ironton, Missouri, and any 
information of his whereabouts would be thankfully received by his anxious mother [Amelia 
Murray].”208 These notices were scattered in papers throughout the region and indicated the 
suddenness of displacement from one’s community. Another notice in a Missouri paper included 
a “brother refugee” looking for his relatives from Texas. Possibly separated from each other in 
their refuge, such a request indicates the difficulty of the journey.209 Some of these notices ran a 
single time or only a few times in a single paper, others ran for weeks and weeks sometimes in 
multiple papers across the state or region. In many cases, they indicate the traumatic impact of 
displacement upon many families. 
Displacement in Little Rock and Fort Smith 
By the fall of 1863, the Union army had exerted a considerable amount of control within 
Arkansas. While the state was far from won, the presence of the army allowed displaced Arkansans 
to relocate to areas within their home state. With victories at Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove, the 
army was able to build upon these successes on the field of battle and provide a “real blow to 
Confederate authority in Arkansas” with the Confederate surrender of Little Rock on September 
10, 1863.210 This made the ‘little river town’ relatively safe for people on the run – especially 
displaced Unionists. They felt much safer in the larger city under the protection of troops than they 
would have wandering the Arkansas countryside. Historian Nate Coulter notes that, even with 
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Little Rock in Federal hands, there was still “reason to believe that central Arkansas represented 
one of the safest places to be found in the state. Consequently, more than a few drifters or refugees 
probably sought the confines of Pulaski County during the 1860s.”211 The fall of Vicksburg in July 
1863 combined with the fall of Little Rock, cemented the Federal presence in central Arkansas by 
the end of the year. This, in turn, led to a number of displaced persons to seek refuge in Little Rock 
and Fort Smith 
With the growing Union presence in Arkansas and increased guerrilla warfare in the northern part 
of the state, Fort Smith attracted a great number of the wartime dispossessed because of its capacity 
as a Federal military base. Located at the Arkansas border with Indian Territory, at the confluence 
of the Poteau and Arkansas Rivers, the fort saw a number of uprooted citizens enter its borders 
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from the surrounding areas, especially people from Texas and the countryside of western Arkansas. 
These forts offered protection, food and supplies, and the opportunity to obtain transportation to 
points further away from the war zone. “The town is full of refugees from the country,” began a 
November 1863 article in the New Era, “of whom a large number is supported by the Government. 
This is deplorable, not so much because of the expense of feeding them, as from the injury the 
community at large is receiving by the almost total suspension of farming operations. The cause 
of all this is bush-whacking.”212 The fort experienced a steady stream of displaced people once the 
Federals were in control after 1862, only to increase in number. One Union army chaplain noted 
in September 1864 that “he issued 40,000 rations to those poor people [at Fort Smith alone], and 
from the 22d of May to the 22d of June, 49,000, issuing to none who were not in absolutely 
destitute of circumstances.”213 While the exact number of people who made their way to the fort 
is difficult to determine, displaced persons numbering in the thousands would not be an 
unreasonable estimate. The federal fort served as a final stop for some Arkansans while others 
continued on to Texas or Kansas seeking refuge.  
The large number of displaced people at Fort Smith created a burden upon the facilities 
there. “At this time all of the Federal posts had numbers of refugee families stationed near them,” 
writes author William Monks in his 1907 work, History of Southern Missouri and Northern 
Arkansas, “entirely destitute of food and raiment, and relying entirely for their preservation upon 
the small amount of help they received from the government.”214 Under Confederate occupation, 
commerce all but stopped. Armies and guerrilla fighters cut supply routes, businesses closed, and 
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most citizens had left in search of safety. Further complicating the situation, the Arkansas River at 
the fort was very shallow, making it difficult for the delivery of supplies. The situation here was 
so dire that citizens petitioned President Lincoln in February of 1865, asking him either to curtail 
the army’s rations or to send stores independent of the army so that the loyal citizens there could 
purchase these supplies.215 An official communication from John M. Thayer, a Brigadier General, 
to John Levering, the Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arkansas conveyed a similar 
request on behalf of the people there:  
SIR: I would respectfully call your attention to the fact that there is a large number 
of persons at this post entirely destitute of the means of living and to whom the 
refugee rations are issued by the post commissary. There are also many families 
here who have the means to purchase, but there is nothing here in the way of 
breadstuffs outside of the commissary. Frequent applications are made to purchase 
at the commissary, which, of course, cannot be granted. There is great suffering 
among these people. I send off the destitute as fast as there is transportation. I would 
request that some instructions be given in regard to the matter.216 
The federal fort had a very simple problem: too many people and not enough food. This food 
shortage was a result of the large number of people who had made their way to the fort by early 
1865. Military officials would be unable to find a complete solution to this problem, but it would 
plant that seeds for farm colonies (discussed in a later chapter) as an alternative solution to the 
problem at the fort.  
With the establishment of control in many of Arkansas’s key outposts, Unionists from other 
Western states began to trickle into the state. Roads from a variety of points in the Lone Star State 
made their way east to Fort Smith. “Refugees from Texas continue to arrive constantly” begins a 
November 1864 account in the New Era about Texans coming into Arkansas.217 By mid-1863, a 
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steady stream of displaced Unionists left Texas because of constant harassment and threats of 
violence by Confederate sympathizers. They felt that it was safe to seek refuge here. For example, 
New Era reported in October 1864 that 
Several families of refugees came in from Texas [to Fort Smith], yesterday. They 
are the wives of Union men who are in the service, and were driven from their 
homes. . . . They were five weeks on the road. Will the Copperheads make a note 
of this; that while they are growling at the way their rebel friends are treated, these 
same gentry are oppressing the poor and defenceless [sic] families that are left in 
their midst. We feed the families of the rebels and they in turn, starve ours.218   
Besides detailing the fact that displaced Texans came to and through Arkansas, it is also revealing 
in that this account calls out Confederate sympathizers for being unsympathetic to the plight of 
displaced Unionists in Arkansas. The New Era and its editor, Valentine Dell, used the nearby 
Union army to his advantage. He wrote in support of, and asked for the protection of displaced 
Unionists in the area.219 
Guerrilla Warfare and General Orders No. 11 
The first two years of the war saw guerrilla fighters terrorize citizens throughout the Trans-
Mississippi region. Historian Nicole Etcheson best summarized the wartime situation in Missouri 
and Arkansas: “Unionist civilians likewise frequently found themselves a partisan target. 
Bushwhackers might shoot an unarmed farmer despite his wife’s pleadings, or they might show 
mercy. Neighbors might settle a grudge by telling the guerrillas that someone was a Union 
sympathizer. Victims often refused to even identify guerrillas they recognized, for a fear of savage 
reprisals.”220 To put it simply, guerrilla warfare in the region was unpredictable and brutal. The 
mere mention of infamous guerrilla fighters like “Bloody Bill” Anderson, William Quantrill, or 
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James Henry Lane sent chills up any person’s spine. The actions by Bushwhackers and Jayhawkers 
were instrumental in sending people on the run. For many people, guerrilla bands could be the 
deciding factor sending their family on the run.  
For many communities in Missouri and Arkansas, they were often unable to determine for 
whom the guerrillas fought – the Union, the Confederacy, or themselves. “For thousands of people 
in the northern half of Arkansas,” observes historian William L. Shea, “the Civil War was not only 
a contest between organized military forces, but also a desperate struggle for survival against 
barbarism.”221 External appearances of these guerrilla groups meant nothing. Guerrilla fighters 
changed appearances often to conceal their identity as well as their next move. Bushwhackers with 
long, scraggly hair, beards, specially made shirts, covered with blue, Union Cavalry coats operated 
the border between Missouri and Kansas as well as the southwestern border between Arkansas and 
Missouri.222 Jayhawkers looked much the same and operated in many of the same areas. Their 
methods and reasons for resorting to guerrilla warfare varied almost as much as their physical 
appearance. These men attacked communities to elicit support for their cause, take food and 
supplies for their campaigns, or recruit men for service in the army.  
Whispers concerning approaching guerrillas, whether valid or false, contributed to the 
displacement of so many in the Trans-Mississippi West. These rumors, often from unfounded 
reports of an approaching army or guerrilla band sent towns into panic, causing citizens to flee or, 
at the very least, consider that as an option. Writing from Mornington, Missouri, transplanted 
Michigander and farmer Alonson Royce wrote, on New Year’s Day 1862, “An awful panic has set 
                                                          
221 William L. Shea, “1862: A Continual Thunder,” in Mark K. Christ, ed., Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in 
Arkansas (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1994), 92. 
222 For more on the appearance of guerrilla fighters as well as the role of gender in their mission, see Joseph M. 
Beilein, Jr., “The Guerrilla Shirt: A Labor of Love and Style of Rebellion in Civil War Missouri,” in Jonathan Earle 
and Diane Mutti Burke, eds., Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Missouri: The Long Civil War on the Border (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2013). 
132 
 
 
 
afloat, among the union people, some of the most astounding conjectures with regard to the 
ultimate intentions of their enemy. False reports, and unfound[ed] alarms, together with ingenious 
lies, have brought upon us the reign of terror.”223 Both individuals and newspapers often talked in 
false reports and what people might be forced to do if they proved true. By the summer of 1862, 
Royce had fled to Illinois selling many of his belongings at about thirty percent of its worth. Shortly 
after his arrival, he invested in some land in New Douglas, Illinois – about 47 miles east of St. 
Louis.224 Royce made his move permanent, not wanting to take any chances on his life or his 
property. For many civilians in the region, rumors were just that, rumors. Eventually, some turned 
into threats, which only intensified panic among civilians here. 
Some threats proved to be very real, sending citizens in the region on the run. For example, 
author Ward L. Shrantz noted in his compilation of the history of Jasper County, Missouri, that 
“[m]any union residents about this time [1861] received anonymous warning to leave the country 
at once or it would be worse for them and a wholesale exodus of the peaceably inclined seems to 
have resulted.”225 Not all citizens, however, received this kind of advanced warning. Many citizens 
had to go by what they heard via word-of-mouth and this often induced community-wide panic. 
Communities that lay in their path took potential guerrilla threats very seriously. Historian Michael 
Fellman’s research findings support Royce’s actions when he noted that “[n]ews of the approach 
of a large band of guerrilla bands or the Union army was sufficient enough to drive many potential 
victims away, at least until the immediate threat passed.”226 After nearly two years of these 
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guerrilla attacks, the Federals tired of the effects on these communities in western Missouri and 
took very controversial measures to prevent their continuation. 
Guerrilla activity put many citizens in a position where they had to decide, rather quickly, 
if they were going to leave and, if they made that decision, where they would stay for the future. 
Describing a loved one who left an account of approaching irregulars near their home in Laclede 
County in south-central Missouri, Elizabeth ‘Lizzie’ Gilmore detailed the experience of a civilian 
encounter with these guerrillas in December of 1864. She noted that these Bushwhackers  
were in one mile of us the night he stayed at home they robed [sic] Sister Helen’s 
house that night took two fine mares $350 about 25 dollars worth out of the house 
Sister was at our house to see Mr. Gilmore Mr. Pridgen was at Lebanon with the 
train so you see there was no person but the children at home the cruel demons 
threating to shoot the childrens [sic] brains out.227 
Threats of property destruction, theft, and murder were made very real by these men, and often, 
left citizens no choice but to flee their homes and communities if they hoped to survive. In so many 
instances, families chose to flee simply out of a fear of the unknown as it related to guerrilla activity 
in the hopes that it would spare their property and, most importantly, their lives. 
Once a person left their community, it did not mean that they were out of harm’s way. 
There are accounts of people who left home because of guerrillas only to run into another guerrilla 
band somewhere else. One account contained in author William Elsey Connelly’s Quantrill and 
the Border Wars, detailed the story of a group of Bushwhackers, led by the infamous Bushwhacker 
William Clarke Quantrill, who caught up with some displaced Missourians in Kansas. Some 
displaced residents were Germans whose “lives were forfeit to any guerrilla who might find 
them.”228 These Bushwhackers went door to door searching for their targets only to discover they 
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have escaped, thanks to some quick thinking by both the men and their wives.229 Just because 
citizens fled one area that posed risks, it did not mean that they were completely safe. Life of a 
displaced person was one of constant looking over one’s shoulder and making ready on a moment’s 
notice to escape danger.  
In some instances, displaced people settled old scores with neighbors through guerrilla 
activity – by actually taking part. Divided loyalties made for a very tense situation for many who 
lived there. Confederate sympathizers held prejudices against local Unionists and vice-versa when 
the war began. As it continued, these tensions increased creating what might be termed mini civil 
wars in various borderland communities in Arkansas and Missouri. For example, Elvira Weir 
Scott, a Southern sympathizer living in north-central Missouri, recorded the impact of Jayhawkers 
operating near her home on March 9, 1862.  
Generally they have a malicious, envious feeling toward their neighbors who by 
honest industry have surrounded themselves by the comforts of life. They openly 
boast that they will have possession of their fine farms, & they think that the time 
has arrived for them to take the time to better their fortunes. Such are nine-tenths 
of the Union refugees. We know some of them from the east in this country. They 
owned nothing, were in debt, & had lived off the community as long as they could. 
They left of their own free will & became Union refugees. Now they are creating 
sympathy by their support of the free States. Or they are jayhawking in other 
counties of the State . . .230 
Displaced people actively taking part in these guerrilla activities demonstrate just how fragile 
North-South relations were throughout the different communities that dotted the region. Guerrilla 
activity provided an opportunity for residents seeking some kind of revenge against Confederate 
sympathizers in their communities.  
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While people in New York City and Washington D.C. crowded around newspapers 
detailing the Confederate shelling of Fort Sumter, guerrilla warfare gripped Western communities 
and sent many residents on the run. Historian Christopher Phillips nicely details a general 
trajectory of the guerrilla violence that would plague the region. Phillips has recently argued that 
not only did guerrilla attacks on civilians grow with each year of the war, but guerrilla attacks 
escalated following the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. Part of this, Phillips argues 
was because these irregular fighters sought to unleash “collective retribution on the West in part 
to preserve slavery and terrorize people who sought – and fought – to end the peculiar 
institution.”231 In Arkansas, there was an increased intensity of guerrilla attacks corresponding 
with the increased Union presence in the state. In a review of the Union Provost Marshall Papers 
in Missouri, files including the terms ‘guerrilla,’ ‘guerrillas,’ or ‘bushwhackers,’ increased by 61 
percent. In 1863, 75 percent of guerrilla-related activities occurred in the spring, immediately 
following the Proclamation, representing “a clear extension of emancipation related violence.”232 
Guerrilla violence in both Missouri and Arkansas plagued citizens there, creating a very fluid crisis 
in that there was no set or well-defined period in which individuals fled. However, based on 
Phillips’ evidence, more people left their homes because of guerrilla attacks in 1864 and 1865.  
The constant presence of guerrilla fighters in the Trans-Mississippi region brought about 
some rather unconventional military decisions that could trigger or intensify crises. 233 None was 
more unconventional than Ewing’s General Orders, No. 11. Ewing, a lawyer and judge originally 
from Ohio, had no previous military experience but was determined to make a name for himself 
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in the war.234 In an effort to deal with these irregular forces, Union military officials sought 
alternative solutions to their problems in the region, Missouri in particular. General Orders, No. 
11, issued on August 25, 1863, removed all but a handful of citizens, probably around 20 percent 
- from the counties of Bates, Cass, Jackson, and part of Vernon County in western Missouri.235 
Inhabitants had one week to vacate their homes in the affected area. If residents could prove their 
loyalty to local Union officials, they would be relocated within the district; otherwise, they had to 
leave. These four counties had seen some of the most intense guerrilla warfare. Ewing’s thinking 
behind this order was that guerrillas lived off civilians and the found both sympathetic and 
vulnerable people in western Missouri. Sympathetic residents furnished guerrillas with the food, 
shelter, and information they needed for their campaigns. Guerrilla violence in western Missouri, 
notes historian Don R. Bowen, “concentrated on the western border of the State in Jackson County 
proved to be the longest lasting, the most costly, and virtually impossible for the Union occupation 
forces to contain.”236 Citizens had to evacuate within fifteen days of the order.237 
Ewing issued this unpopular order as a means of curtailing the activities of guerrilla leader 
William Clarke Quantrill, who sacked Lawrence, Kansas, only four days before. Quantrill and 
approximately 500 men looted and wreaked havoc in the town, killing at least 150 civilians in the 
raid before fleeing with their loot into the dense Missouri woods, out of the reach of Federal troops. 
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A witness to the attack, the former publisher of the Kansas Free State newspaper R.G. Elliot 
recounted to his sister a few days later that “[s]ome were murdered in their beds, others after they 
had given up all they had [text stricken through] and surrendered themselves as prisoners were 
shot down in cold blood. Every man who was seen on the streets was pursued and shot, even 
prisoners that were wounded and saved by some of the more human were butchered by others 
while under guard[.]”238 One historian considered this order to be “one of the cruelest and most 
unusual orders issued by a general during the Civil War.”239 While General Orders, No. 11 created 
many enemies for the Union army, militarily it achieved its goal. Following Ewing’s order, much 
of the guerrilla activity there declined. While historians like Charles R. Mink question the orders’ 
effectiveness and its necessity, one thing is certain: this order created a large number of displaced 
people along the Missouri-Kansas border with an estimated displacement of about twenty thousand 
Missourians.240 
Despite its controversy, President Lincoln only cautiously approved of the order. If the 
president felt that a military order or action might jeopardize the government’s standing in a state, 
Lincoln had no problem rescinding the order. This example had been set with his rebuke of General 
Frémont for his emancipation order in Missouri as well as his ending of assessments on disloyal 
citizens in the state. While the president did not immediately comment on Ewing’s order, he did 
share his feelings with General John M. Schofield a month later. “With the matter of removing the 
inhabitants of certain counties en masse; and of removing certain individuals from time to time, 
who are supposed to be mischievous,” the commander-in-chief hesitantly endorsed the order in a 
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letter to Schofield on October 1, 1863, “I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your own 
discretion.”241 The president’s confidence in his Western generals allowed the order to remain in 
place. 
 Homes and businesses had been torched and destroyed to prevent them from being used 
by any returning guerrilla fighters, causing the area to earn the nickname the ‘burnt district.’ The 
St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican took note in a November 2, 1863 article: 
Our border counties south of the Missouri river suffered incalculable, not only 
much directly, but even more indirectly, from the operations of the bandits. Our 
authorities, when Curtis was in power, identified the whole people with them, and, 
by a monstrous and dreadful assumption, made the whole people liable for outrages 
which, disarmed as they had been, they were utterly powerless to prevent or punish. 
We have seen the deplorable consequences – consequences at the sight of which a 
Christian or civilized world may well, as Lord Brougham says, “stand aghast.” The 
silence of death no reigns over those border counties. Burke’s description of the 
Carnatic ravaged by Hyder Ali is realized in Jackson, Cass, Bates, and other once 
flourishing counties in our state.242 
Union troops destroyed crops and drove off or slaughtered livestock making the four counties 
uninhabitable. Furthermore, troops enforcing the order and subsequent evacuation failed to 
differentiate between Unionist and Confederate supporters in both person and property.243 
Confederate troops, like the Confederate surgeon William M. McPheeters, detailed the destruction 
in simpler terms during Price’s 1864 raid: For several days, [we have been] traveling through the 
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border counties of Mo. – Jackson, Bates, Cass – every house has been burned and the whole 
country devastated by the Yankees.”244 This was more than a year after Ewing had issued the order, 
evidence of the total destruction committed by the Federals. 
 While clashes between armies understandably caused families to leave their homes, 
General Orders, No. 11 did not give them a choice. Some civilians searched out family, some 
wandered the countryside, and others left to places as far away as Texas. In this instance, loyalty 
made no difference. Ewing’s order displaced both loyal and disloyal residents in the region. 
Missouri resident Partheny Horn noted that “[i]t was this last order that caused me to emigrate to 
Texas.”245 The outright removal of citizens from the four western counties in Missouri not only 
intensified the situation in that region in an instant, it also created many enemies of the Federals 
as a result, sending many citizens impacted by the order into the arms of guerrilla fighters in the 
area. Nationally, observes Michael Fellman, General Orders, No. 11 “appeared to be a wildly 
punitive attack on noncombatants in a Union state.”246 Citizens would not be allowed to return the 
four Missouri counties until January 14, 1864, under an order from General Egbert B. Brown. 
 Artist George Caleb Bingham’s detailed the resulting crisis in his 1870 painting (see Fig. 
2.4) of citizens torn from their western Missouri homes while their neighbors’ homes burned in 
the background as Ewing looked on. The artist faced criticism for his work; many thought that his 
painting was disrespectful to Union troops. Other critics felt that he criticized the wrong side. The 
year after his panting came out; he defended himself against many of these accusations in a public 
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address in Kansas City, Missouri. Bingham’s 1871 public address made no apologies as he stated 
that he painted simply what he saw. 
The great mass of the adult male population were immediately compelled to seek 
safety in flight. The few who ventured to linger with their wives and daughters until 
they could pack up such scanty effects as absolute necessity required, did so at their 
peril; as they were shot down, without hesitation, whenever they dared to venture a 
word of expostulation, or denunciation against the cruel injustice of their 
oppressors. It was the evident purpose of spoilers to appropriate themselves 
everything of value, and to allow the distressed inhabitants to bear with them, in 
their friendless and hopeless exile, nothing but the clothing which covered their 
persons, and rarely, indeed, were they granted a sufficiency of this. That this 
purpose might be fully accomplished, all wagons and teams, fit for the service of 
transportation, were seized and freighted with the spoils of robbery. An occasional 
dilapidated cart, and a few blind or superannuated horses, were spared to the 
refugees. These relieved, to some extent, the mothers and infants, and the aged and 
infirm, and rendered more striking the melancholy aspect of the processions in 
which, as to the funeral of every earthly hope, the exiled inhabitants slowly move 
from their once happy homes, to find a resting-place, they knew not, in the wide 
world, where. 247 
Even with such a description of the displaced Missourians created by the order, he still felt that 
both words and even the strokes of his pencil were not enough to convey the suffering of uprooted 
citizens. For Bingham, who became involved in politics later in life, illuminating this event was 
his duty as both an artist and as a citizen. 
 In many ways, Kansas was a wartime no man’s land in that it was a place that lacked any 
enforceable authority from either side. The state saw its share of small-scale military engagements, 
including Baxter Springs in 1863 and Marais des Cygnes in 1864, as well as its fair share of 
guerrilla activity. There were Union forts at Fort Scott and Fort Leavenworth, offering some 
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protection for displaced people – but they were also targets for irregulars. Both displaced people 
and guerrilla fighters used Kansas as a place to gather. However, this was not their greatest fear; 
their greatest fear was the elements. Many of the displaced who made their way to the Sunflower 
State were scantily clad and had to face the brutal Plains winter with few blankets and very little 
food. Forts here had few supplies for the winter and many of these garrisons had not planned on 
taking on so many people. The area’s climate challenged many during the winter months, as did 
its frontier setting with its limited supplies and protection. The best that the army could do was, 
with the cooperation of the railroads, offer free transportation of supplies from any citizens who 
wished to donate them for displaced people.248   
Many arrived in Kansas by rail with many trains originating in places like Fort Smith. 
“Government-sponsored train,” notes historian Kenneth Burchett, “could sometimes be 250 
wagons long – six mules to a wagon – carried refugees and their belongings across the border to 
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Figure 2.4: George Caleb Bingham’s 1870 painting “Order No. 11.” It detailed Ewing’s General Orders No. 11 of 
August 25, 1863. The painting was quite large – it measured 56”x78. Source: 
http://shs.umsystem.edu/historicmissourians/name/b/bingham/ 
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safety.”249 Newspapers in both Missouri and Arkansas reported the departure of these refugee 
trains quite often. For example, the New Era reported in October 1864, “[a] large train of refugees 
left here [Fort Smith] the first part of the week for Kansas.”250 Another newspaper noted “There is 
more suffering among these poor families than can be realized; many of whom have seen better 
days. . . . They are among us, demanding our sympathies and our charity.”251 Some were fortunate 
enough to have friends and relatives in the Northern states and, as a result, many displaced 
residents made their way north. 
While General Orders No. 11 reduced attacks in the region, they did not come to a complete 
stop. Guerrilla attacks affected citizens in a variety of ways. For example, it often deprived “the 
widow of her last chicken, burn[ed] her barn, waste[d] her corn, [stole] her money, and [drove] 
away her slaves.”252 Vast destruction accompanied these guerrillas as they made their way across 
the Trans-Mississippi landscape. Attacks were sudden and it could be quite intense. Guerrillas 
erupted against armies, railroads, civilians, and their property. In this orgy of violence, they burned 
homes and farms, confiscated or destroyed crops, and these guerrilla bands took valuable 
possessions. In an 1864 letter to her brother Edwin, Lizzie Brannock described these conditions 
around her home in western Missouri. “Our country is desolate,” Lizzie began, “indeed almost 
entirely a wilderness, robbery is an every day [sic] affair so long as their [sic] was anything to take 
our farms are all burned up, fences gone, crops destroyed no one escapes the ravages of one party 
or the other; we will remain where we are this winter but this spring we shall be obliged to leave. 
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Where I shall go, or what do; I do not know. . . .”253 The constant threat of robberies and destruction 
by these irregulars, especially along the Kansas-Missouri border, put fear in the hearts of many 
residents there. This forced them to contemplate their immediate futures in those communities as 
a result. Treacherous conditions forced many families to flee, decisions were made very quickly, 
and one had to be careful on how he or she navigated their journey. 
While guerrilla violence and the federal policies enacted to eradicate it had an effect on 
citizens in the West, one had to be careful not to be caught in between. Consider the case of Sarah 
Jane Smith, a native of Washington County, Arkansas. According to trial proceedings, eighteen-
year-old Sarah cut down four miles of telegraph poles and wires between Springfield and Rolla, 
Missouri, during the spring of 1864. This was in direct violation of an 1861 order (General Orders, 
No. 32) that made such an offense punishable by death.254 Smith’s background had already put her 
at a disadvantage in the eyes of the military – her mother had died, her father served in Price’s 
Confederate army, and she had been known to associate with her cousins who were known 
guerrillas active in the region. Court records indicate that she acted in concert with her cousins 
when she cut down the telegraph poles, claiming that some citizens in Rolla, who she indicated 
were lawyers from Rolla, promised her five dollars for each pole taken down. She also claimed 
membership in a secret society, probably the Order of American Knights.255 While Smith pled not 
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guilty to the charges against her, the military commission convicted her and sentenced the woman 
“to be hung by the neck till dead, at such time and place as the General Commanding may direct.”256 
Smith’s life would not end at the gallows, as Union doctors at the U.S. Military Prison Hospital, located in 
St. Louis, deemed her to lack the mental capacity to understand her crime. As a result, the commission 
spared her life and paroled Smith in April 1865.257 
While Smith’s case is indeed interesting, it might perhaps shed some light on how locals 
might have exploited so many displaced people’s unfortunate situations. Smith, who was unable 
to read or write, gave the following statement during her trial in front of the military commission 
during the fall of 1864: “I am Eighteen years of age. My father and mother are in Arkansas. I have no 
friends or relatives in Mo. I left home without any money. I came to Springfield with a family of refugees 
from Arkansas. I didn’t know it was wrong to cut the wires at the time I did it. They didn’t pay me the 
money they promised me. I never saw them again.”258 While it is difficult to know for sure, it is possible 
that the Rolla citizens who she claimed offered her money for cutting down the telegraph poles had taken 
Smith advantage. Rolla was a known haven for people displaced by war and it is possible that people who 
lived there took advantage of people who made their way there. It is also possible that Smith acted in the 
interest of her guerrilla cousins or the secret society to which she claimed membership. 
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Guerrilla violence in Arkansas and Missouri continued, even as the Union army mounted 
more and more victories and as Confederate morale plummeted.259 In fact, guerilla warfare 
continued and, as historian Daniel E. Sutherland notes, “[t]he internal war of neighbor versus 
neighbor, not to mention swarming bands of deserters and outlaws, disrupted the southern 
homefront for the remainder of the war.”260 Not only did it last throughout the Civil War, 
newspaper reports during early 1865 as well as after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox indicate that 
guerrilla violence continued into the early stages of Reconstruction. For example, one report in the 
North Missourian [Gallatin] reported on May 4, 1865, that bushwhacker activity continued in 
Warrensburg, Missouri. “They [bushwhackers] told citizens they were going to the Law and Order 
District of North Mo.,” concluded the report, “and they would show them that Mo. was not yet in 
a state of Law and Order, by at least a year.”261 While the threat of guerrilla attacks in Missouri 
dwindled, they were certainly not over. 
Paths of Displaced People 
Most displaced people fled on foot or were able to pile a few of their belongings into a cart 
or wagon drawn by a horse. This often occurred in a very haphazard fashion and there is no way 
to quantify the ways in which people fled their homes and communities. The long distances that 
they had to travel caused many horses and wagons to break down which forced exhausted people 
to continue their journey on foot. Travel for displaced people was made more difficult by the poor 
state of Southern infrastructure. Roads were terrible, gunboats threatened individuals who 
attempted to travel by boat, and railroads could be overcrowded, slow, and in desperate need of 
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repair.262 Many displaced whites travelled hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles in search 
of family and friends, or they hoped to find somewhere they could find help. Each passing year of 
the war found more and more people having to travel further and further to find a place of refuge. 
Seeking other modes of transport was important for these civilians if they hoped to survive the 
war.  
The railroad was one way that many citizens fled the dangers they faced. Displaced people 
could put more distance between themselves and whatever dangers they faced at home by using 
one of the many railroads in the region. Destinations might include Texas, Kansas, Kentucky, and 
Illinois. An October 1864 New Era article noted: 
A large train of refugees left here the first part of the week for Kansas. Among them 
were many of our best Union citizens, farmers and mechanics who remained here 
through the summer, hoping that they would be permitted to return to their homes 
and farms this fall; but the unsettled state of the country and scarcity of provisions 
make it necessary for them to winter in the North. Many, when the troubles are 
over, will come back to Arkansas, but most of them will permanently settle in 
Kansas and the States of the North-west.263 
To take the train required these people to, first, make their way to a rail hub located in cities like 
St. Louis, Memphis, or Fort Smith. Once citizens were at the train station, they received 
transportation tickets to board the train and travel to their destination. Rail travel, according to 
various newspaper accounts, was often free or discounted for many as such large numbers arrived 
with only the clothes on their back and whatever possessions they could carry. The Western 
Sanitary Commission often arranged for this free transportation for the dispossessed.264 Upon their 
arrival at the departure station, if they were lucky enough, displaced people received clothing from 
benevolent aid societies before they began their journey west. Displaced whites likely welcomed 
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and appreciated this gesture as traveling in the winter months could be brutal. For people who 
made it this far, unless a more well off family riding the train took pity on them and paid for coach 
passage, traveled along with the freight. 
Newspaper reports and observations from nearby soldiers tell us a great deal about who 
this displaced were and what their condition was upon arrival. From various accounts, some 
displaced people were very poor while others were more well off – at least before the war came to 
the West. For example, Union soldier Christian H. Isely notes in an October 1864 letter home to 
his family in Arkansas that the  
Refugee Train [starting out in Ft. Scott, Kansas] consists rich & poor, young & old, 
men, women & children. . . . The rich folks, or rather those that were rich before 
the war, look as poor, as poor folks generally can look, and what I shall say them 
of then of the poor, I cannot begin to discribe [sic] their intense poverty many 
children are without shoes, and but thinly clad in rags, many are sick and several 
died already, they are not only houseless & homeless, but also friendless & helpless, 
and most of them had once comfortable homes which were dear to them, but far 
their countrys [sic] sake they became as poor paupers.265 
To be sure, people who were poor and destitute at the war’s start were worse off because of their 
flight. Isely’s account, however, also details the impact of a wealthier person’s sudden 
displacement. 
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A life on the run, and the war in general, certainly took its toll on people considered a 
community’s better citizens. It caused many to go through whatever money they had at the start of 
the war – paying for food, shelter, and other necessities of life on the run. “It is reported home that 
the federals are going back and I do not think it likely that many of them will remain long in 
Washington County[,]” notes Arkansan W.C. Braly in January 1863, “[i]f they have destroyed and 
devastated our country as it is represented I do not see how the people can live there.”266 Like 
people who started the war poor whose condition only worsened, there were likewise families who 
started the war rich only to end up poor because of their lives on the run. Newspapers like the New 
Era recognized the condition of the displaced people in its midst when it noted that an August 
1864 refugee train “was composed of a better class of people than have gone heretofore. . . . These 
refugees will for the most part become citizens of the new North-western States, adding to them 
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wealth and prosperity, and making for themselves homes where they can follow the industrial arts, 
agriculture, &c., in peace and quietude.”267 The newspaper lamented the fact that, because of the 
war and the resulting displacement, it will lose some of its better citizens to the states in the North. 
The paper pondered the end of the war and Arkansas’s future with so many of its citizens displaced 
and, perhaps, some never to return.  
This journey by rail was not without risks for displaced residents – especially in the winter 
months. Freight cars had no stoves or any other method of providing heat for its distressed 
passengers, who often stood for hours on their journey during the winter. Many people suffered 
on this journey with some losing their lives because of exposure to the elements. J.H. Leard’s 
account, reported in the New Era on February 25, 1865, noted the tragedy that displaced people 
risked on this journey: “. . . four persons, two adults, widows, and two of our orphan children, had 
perished with the cold.”268 Leard, who served as a Union Chaplain and Agent for Refugees, also 
detailed the passing of mothers who left behind orphan children, further complicating the situation 
for individuals trying to help. With many Unionists living in the Ozarks of northwestern Arkansas, 
making one’s way to Fort Smith and boarding a train to any point west proved the most effective 
way to seek refuge, but it was not without its hazards. For many who inhabited the region, however, 
this was their only option. “To remain we saw no help,” Leard noted, “to go was to suffer.”269 
In addition to the internal dangers of utilizing the railroad to seek refuge – factors like the 
cold and lack of food, there were external dangers as well. Many citizens, displaced because of 
guerrilla attacks in their communities, were victimized again while on the trains relocating them 
to safety. Irregular fighters took advantage of any opportunity to wreak havoc on civilians and this 
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included attacking trains. “Dispatches from St. Louis report the burning of a train and brutal 
massacre of some 80 men and women[,]” read an account published nationally in Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper, “Union refugees from Jacksonville [Arkansas] – at Salem, Ark., by a band 
of 300 guerrillas.”270 These rail attacks by guerrillas, who some soldiers simply called Rebs, left 
many people with nowhere to hide notes Union soldier Christian Isely in October 1864 “[l]eaving 
the poor downtrotten [sic] & chasticed [sic] Widows & Orphans clothless [sic] & foodless out on 
the bleak Prairie exposed to hunger & cold about 1000 in number.”271 Many people in the region 
boarded these trains with the hope that they would leave their troubles behind. Repeatedly, 
guerrilla bands attacked these trains to not only take whatever supplies might be on the train, but 
to also terrorize soldiers and civilians alike. While the Federal army offered protection of these 
trains, they were not always successful leaving many people to seek refuge on foot. 
While a number of Unionists made their way north, Confederate sympathizers also fled 
their communities. Many displaced Confederates from Arkansas tended to move west if they felt 
threatened. If Rolla, St. Louis, and places further north and east served as a refuge for Unionists, 
Texas was certainly a hotbed for Confederate sympathizers. Those sympathizers who lived in 
pockets of Arkansas and Missouri where they were outnumbered by Unionists made their way to 
Texas to bide their time until the Confederacy was victorious and they could return to their homes. 
Uprooted Arkansans Mrs. George H. Goddard wrote to friends in Camden, which the Confederacy 
held for much of the war, telling them about her experiences in Wood County, Texas, during 1864. 
Goddard spoke very positively of Texas as a place for displaced Confederates, for her “Texas has 
                                                          
270 “Arkansas,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, June 18, 1864, 194. 
271 “Christian H. Isely to Marie Elizabeth Dubach Isely,” October 24, 1864, Wichita State University, [Missouri 
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proved a refuge for the oppressed.”272 Displaced Missourians and Arkansans made their way to 
Texas because of family connections or because of its remoteness and relative safety from 
molesting armies or guerrilla fighters. Texas, however, was not for everyone, as many would make 
their way back east to Arkansas and Missouri. 
Final Throes: General Sterling Price’s 1864 Invasion of Missouri 
After being convinced by Missouri guerilla fighters that the state’s pro-Confederate 
citizens would rise up if given the opportunity, Confederate General and former Missouri governor 
and state legislator Sterling Price agreed to take advantage of this potential support in the form of 
a raid in the state.273 Beginning in the fall of 1864, Price organized a force of approximately 12,000 
cavalry from the region and moved from Arkansas into Missouri. Price’s men, along with vast 
numbers of guerillas, including famed fighters “Bloody Bill” Anderson as well as Frank and Jessie 
James, moved north and disrupted rail and wagon traffic and even wreaked havoc on steamship 
traffic on the Mississippi. Price and his men moved towards St. Louis, hoping to inflict chaos on 
this Union stronghold. Price and his forces enjoyed reasonable success until Ewing pushed him 
back on September 27 at Pilot Knob, located in the southeastern part of the state. The Union victory 
here earned the battle the nickname the “Thermopylae of the West.” 274 
Military engagements like the one at Pilot Knob always tested one’s loyalty. Arkansas and 
Missouri civilians’ allegiances mattered because of each state’s divided wartime loyalties, as it 
created hardships for many people, sending them on the run. Depending on which army 
approached a given community, one might be inclined to flee or remain in their homes based on 
                                                          
272 “Camden Refugees in Texas,” n.d., 1864, Camden, Arkansas, Civil War Record Book, 42, Special Collections of 
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Times Opinionator, September 29, 2014. See also Bryce A. Suderow and R. Scott House, The Battle of Pilot Knob: 
Thunder in Arcadia Valley (Cape Girardeau, MO: Southeaster Missouri State University Press, 2014). 
152 
 
 
 
their individual loyalties. Early Confederate successes in the region left many Unionists in this 
region to go it alone, as the area was virtually empty of Union forces that could offer assistance. 
The many people that they encountered did not overlook the fact that citizens’ devotion to the 
Union brought them hardship: 
You little know the hardship of these loyal men of Southern Missouri have endured. 
When I have wandered by their ruined farms, and have seen their wives and 
children, shoeless, half-starved, eking out their existence in loneliness, I have 
bowed down in spirit before the heroic patriotism of these men and worshipped it. 
None of us have made sacrifices no man whose family has been in security, and 
beyond the reach of the terrible hazards of war, has made sacrifices compared to 
them. Honor them, reverence them, aid them. Do as much as you can to relieve 
them, and after all that, you can enjoy your quiet houses here, and will not discharge 
one-tenth of your gratitude to them.275 
This unidentified Union soldier’s account again details how individual allegiances affected the 
lives of these citizens. Newspapers often detailed displaced Unionists and Confederates, and other 
variations on a person’s loyalty. For example, the Daily Missouri Republican noted that there were 
“a large amount of suffering among the Union refugees,” or the Reverend Galusha Anderson’s 
account that “there was a still larger number of rebel refugees.”276 Regional military actions and 
the resulting questions of loyalty raised by these battles caused an upheaval of citizens sending 
them in complete disorder across Missouri. Further destruction caused by the marching armies did 
little to help improve their situation. 
Following the engagement at Pilot Knob, Price moved to the west, with even more guerrilla 
bands swelling his ranks, but Union militias were now in pursuit. By late October, Price’s 
Confederate forces were outside of Kansas City when they were defeated again, pushing him south 
towards Arkansas and then Texas. This second phase of Price’s Raid would be no more fruitful 
                                                          
275 Thomas Ewing Family Papers, 1757-1941, Box 213, Pilot Knob Folder, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
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276 Daily Missouri Republican [St. Louis], January 15, 1863; Galusha Anderson, The Story of a Border City During 
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than the first. This proved to be the end of his raid into Missouri. Contemporary pro-Confederate 
observers labeled the raid a disaster because it destroyed so many guerrilla bands that had been 
active in the state as well as caused the deaths of many guerrilla leaders including “Bloody Bill” 
Anderson. This weakened the guerrilla movement in the West, making things easier for the Union 
army there. This raid was the last organized Confederate resistance in Missouri for the duration of 
the war. 277 
Because of any one or a combination of the factors discussed above – threats from guerrilla 
fighters, encroaching armies, hunger, forced out of their homes by military order - many displaced 
Southern whites endured a number of hardships in search of safety and protection. This was evident 
in so many descriptions of peoples’ condition. Once people made the decision to flee, they left 
their homes and communities in a very vulnerable condition. This condition often worsened as the 
war dragged on. A good number of people who witnessed displaced persons along the way 
including both soldiers and fellow citizens observed their ragged condition. Ozias Ruark, a soldier 
in the 8th Missouri (Union) Militia, noted their condition as they passed by his camp in 
southwestern Missouri in February of 1864. “He and I had many refugee families they are poor 
and needy almost naked some of the women and children barefooted.”278 Ruark’s account 
demonstrates just how arduous one’s journey could be. People here were often in need of 
everything – clothes, food, money, and a home. Many left home with the clothes on their back and 
a few items that they carried with them because of the haste with which they departed. Some were 
lucky enough to have a horse or oxen-drawn wagon, enabling them to bring a few more supplies 
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for the unknown journey that lie ahead. Furthermore, these accounts indicate that many displaced 
people were not simply poor people who had nothing to begin when the war came. When that time 
came, citizens throughout the Trans-Mississippi West were displaced in search of some kind of 
safe haven to ride out the rest of the war. Others hoped that their local officials would protect them 
or offer some form of aid and, consequently, prevent them from having to leave their homes and 
communities. 
Conclusion 
The large number of displaced people in the Trans-Mississippi West was the result of a 
variety of factors – factors military, humanitarian, and political. While these individual factors 
were each very different, the one thing that they all had in common was that individuals had no 
control over these factors and, as a result, forced them to flee. Raids by guerrilla forces throughout 
the region happened often and with very little warning, both striking panic into civilian populations 
and sending many of these people on the run. The destruction of all or parts of communities in this 
region left many civilians with no choice but to seek refuge. In addition to this guerrilla warfare, 
avoiding physical destruction from the many clashes between the armies was often a factor that 
sent people on the run. The presence of the armies or guerrilla fighters tested loyalties of displaced 
people, also playing a role in their decision to flee their communities. Destruction of crops and 
mills by these combatants left many people hungry and sent them in search of food and safety. 
Uprooted people made their way to a variety of places, both in Missouri and Arkansas, but they 
also went beyond the borders of these states to places like Kansas, Texas, and Illinois. To get to 
these places of refuge, displaced people used whatever form of transportation was available to 
them to find safety. While fleeing on foot was the most common method, people also utilized the 
railroads, wagon trains, and steamships to reach their destinations out of harm’s way. The Civil 
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War forced the planter class to seek refuge for themselves and their families, but it also forced 
them to do the same for their slaves – the raison d’etre, in their eyes, for their rebellion. Through 
the process of relocating, displaced slave owners were able to put their slaves out of harm’s way 
to places of safekeeping, they hoped, until the war was over. The act of removing slaves to prevent 
them from escaping behind Union lines was important in preserving the Confederate cause while, 
at the same time, preserving the lives and the property of the slave owner. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ARMIES & THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH DISPLACED PEOPLE 
 
Dark are their destinies, 
Nameless their miseries, 
Count not their frailties, 
While they endure, 
When, with imploring hand 
They at your threshold stand,  
Speak to them kind and bland - 
God’s lowly poor.1 
 
When reading the above poem, published in the Fort Smith New Era in March of 1865, 
one cannot help but wonder if the paper’s editors were thinking about the plight of displaced people 
so prevalent in the region. Newspapers, government officials, and people who lived in the 
communities touched by the war certainly discussed these uprooted citizens. People in the region 
wondered how they would take care of them both during the war and after. As armies crisscrossed 
Arkansas and Missouri, they too encountered a number of displaced whites. What did these armies 
have to say about them? So often, when there is talk of war and the armies, historians say little 
about armies’ impact on the people who they encountered. “Popular historians have created a body 
of work overwhelmingly focused on armies and generals that routinely neglects, or ignores 
altogether,” notes historian Gary Gallagher, “the larger political and social implications of military 
campaigns.”2 This chapter looks at the different ways that the Union and Confederate armies 
interacted with displaced residents and who attempted to alleviate their suffering. The crisis met 
the Western armies head on and they had to devise ways to deal with these people to not only win 
the hearts and minds of Southern communities, but to reduce the burden on army resources.  
                                                          
1 “God’s Lowly Poor,” March 4, 1865, Fort Smith [AR] New Era. The Irish newspaper the Dublin Nation originally 
published this poem and it was reprinted in the New Era. 
2 Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 121. 
157 
 
 
 
Displaced people needed food, shelter, clothing, and, most importantly, protection from 
roaming bands of guerrillas and the armies provided the best hope for aid and protection. The 
Union army proved to be their best bet when it came to aid. It was usually better equipped, 
increasingly numerous, and it proved to be the best at putting uprooted families and individuals in 
touch with various aid organizations that could help. “That the citizens could find such comfort in 
the proximity off the Yankee occupiers suggests how deeply they feared,” notes historian Stephen 
V. Ash, “and how thoroughly they repudiated, the mayhem of bandits.”3 Compared to the 
Confederate army, the Federals did a better job – even with its own limitations - of aiding and 
protecting displaced Southern whites. A number of Southern whites and blacks came into Union 
lines as the army’s presence in Arkansas grew with each passing year of the war. 
The Confederate army did very little to help or protect Southern citizens in the region. By 
1863, the Yankees gradually pushed Confederates to the fringes of Arkansas and, with this, 
Southern troops became increasingly scarce in the region. With regard to Confederate military 
operations, the region was more diverse in that Native Americans fought for both sides, more 
cavalry units operated here, and Southern armies were often undermanned and undersupplied.4 As 
Confederate soldiers encountered these people, many began to worry about their own families 
back home. For many white Southerners, that was what they were fighting for – home. With their 
families and homes in jeopardy, many simply deserted and went home to offer whatever protection 
they could. Because the war displaced a number of Confederate soldiers’ relatives, they made the 
choice to leave the ranks of the army to help their families. For these soldiers, this was a 
fundamental goal of the war – protecting one’s family. 
                                                          
3 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 208. 
4 Thomas A. DeBlack, With Fire and Sword: Arkansas, 1861-1874 (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 
2003), 35. 
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Displaced citizens created a burden on the armies and military commanders did whatever 
they could to minimize the resulting drain on their resources. The increasing numbers of displaced 
men, women, and children – entire families sometimes - drained an army’s resources needed to 
fight a war. The fact that there were still so many who remained displaced and destitute at the end 
of the war demonstrates both armies’ inability to handle the problem. Despite their desire to reduce 
the encumbrance placed on it by these people, neither army was able to develop any kind of 
uniform, consistent policy towards them. This lack of an official policy was evident in each army’s 
daily interactions with the region’s displaced people. In her 1964 study of refugees, mostly people 
in the Eastern Theatre, historian Mary Elizabeth Massey wrote, “neither army ever adopted 
consistent policies in dealing with the people, and for this reason civilians never knew what to 
expect.”5 Through the Union army’s distribution of rations to the dispossessed, its attempt to pay 
for their subsistence, and a few different plans to settle uprooted people on abandoned Confederate 
plantations, the army did what it could to help. The army also attempted to absorb some of the 
displaced males either through their enlistment in the ranks or as spies. The Federals’ willingness 
to constantly push the issue to the margins, either doing the bare minimum to help them or pushing 
them onto benevolent aid societies or points beyond their lines, only served to amplify and prolong 
peoples’ suffering. The Confederate army did even less for the uprooted Southern whites that it 
encountered given its difficulty providing food for its own troops. 
Initial Expectations and Opinions: Displaced People and the Army 
As uprooted citizens encountered an army, one wonders – what did they expect? Displaced 
residents, to be sure, wanted protection from the cold and from hunger, but they also wanted 
protection from the depredations of the guerrilla fighters who constantly harassed them and 
                                                          
5 Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
204. 
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wreaked havoc in their communities as well as protection from the armies. The local devastation 
wrought by the grind of war was an important factor that uprooted many people from their 
communities and drove them into the lines of the army. Because of the frequency with which many 
towns changed hands from secessionists to unionists and back, especially in Arkansas, combined 
with the divided loyalties of the region, some sort of army presence was required to protect the 
remains of so many of these communities. Historian Michael B. Dougan observed, “Civil 
government proved too weak to deal with the crisis. Martial law was invoked in and around Fort 
Smith and Little Rock on several occasions.”6 Displaced people hoped that the army would 
compensate them in the absence of any constructive action by both state and local governments. 
As a result, these people made their way into army lines or forts in hope of that protection. 
Complicating the Union army’s initial contact with displaced people were each group’s 
suspicions of each other. Union soldiers, who came from all over the North with a heavy 
concentration of Midwesterners, made all kinds of generalizations about the locals they 
encountered. In historian William Shea’s study of how these Midwesterners viewed Arkansas and 
the people who lived there, he reminds us that, “[f]ew Federals had anything complimentary to say 
about the Arkansans they met in the countryside.”7 In short, soldiers often viewed even the most 
ordinary Arkansan as being beneath them. Reasons for this came from the fact that, as historian 
Carline Janney points out, “fighting transformed both sides’ disdain of the opposing section into a 
venomous hatred of the enemy and reinforced the perceived sectional differences.”8 For the state’s 
displaced citizens, soldiers did not view them in any better light. Historian John F. Bradbury, Jr. 
                                                          
6 Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas: The People and Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2010), 112. 
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points out how this still affects Civil War historians today: “It is no easier now for historians to 
judge their [displaced people] individual sympathies than it was for military officers of the time.”9 
Despite the fact that the army viewed many people with suspicion, especially in the war’s early 
stages, there is ample evidence that the army helped these people in a variety of ways – despite 
these suspicions. Northern soldiers of many different backgrounds often shared their feelings on 
displaced people most commonly in letters home to loved ones. To be sure, soldiers’ opinions ran 
the gamut – some expressed dislike and viewed them with suspicion while others expressed 
sadness and genuinely felt horrible for these people and their unfortunate situation. 
Union military commanders issued orders regarding first contact with displaced people, 
instructing the men in the ranks to view them with caution. “Deserters, refugees, and other persons 
coming in at any military post in the Division of West Mississippi,” begins one order, “. . . will be 
carefully examined by a discreet officer.”10 The Federals were not exactly trusting of refugees the 
moment that they came into their lines or they sought protection in a Federal fort, perhaps fearing 
some of them as spies. Soldiers also viewed them with distrust and suspicion for a variety of 
reasons – especially early in the war. The fact that both armies used uprooted citizens as spies 
served as one source of distrust among soldiers. In addition, the fact that these people, given their 
desperate situation, may do or say anything for food, clothing, or shelter also caused soldiers to 
view them with an air of distrust. 
Soldiers often felt that displaced people would do anything to get what they needed to get 
by – including taking advantage of Unionists or the families of Union soldiers. This might include 
one’s taking advantage of a situation or seizing every opportunity to procure food or shelter. “The 
                                                          
9 John F. Bradbury, Jr., “’Buckwheat Cake Philanthropy’: Refugees and the Union Army in the Ozarks,” The 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 57, No. 3 (Autumn, 1998): 236. 
10 “General Orders, Headquarters Department of the Gulf, Numbers 69,” June 10, 1864, O.R., Series 1, Vol. 34, Part 
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country is filled with refugee Missourians,” noted John Worthington, a Union soldier from 
Arkansas, “who are committing all kinds of mischief, plundering the families of soldiers who are 
serving in our regiment and the First Arkansas Infantry.”11 For soldiers from the Arkansas and 
Missouri, it was personal. Such an account reveals the role of loyalty and communal ties in one’s 
view of displaced people. Here, this soldier viewed these people with contempt, as these same 
people may have been his neighbors seeking revenge on these soldiers for their loyalties.  
Not all Northern soldiers, however, viewed displaced Southern whites in a negative light. 
In many instances, soldiers felt sorry for these uprooted people. Many watched people forced from 
their homes and perhaps thought of their own families. Illinois soldier Robert Carnahan noted this 
occurrence while at camp in Missouri late in 1861. “[T]he Roads are filled with moovers [sic] the 
town of Springfield has not this day over 30 families left they all follow the army it is a sad sight 
to see hundreds of families men women and children leave thear [sic] home to follow the army for 
protection and as a general thing they are the best families of Mo.”12 Carnahan viewed the scene 
with great sadness, he did not comment on their loyalties nor did he comment on what 
circumstances uprooted these people. He took the moment to reflect on what the war had done to 
these families – it had filled many with fear and uncertainty about their future, causing them to 
flee. 
Like soldiers’ different suspicions and subsequent reactions to displaced people, civilians 
also reacted in a variety of ways when they encountered the army. Not everyone was happy to see 
the approaching Union soldiers, so some stayed and maybe kept to themselves while others left 
town. In short, it was very difficult for military men in charge to determine the intentions of 
                                                          
11 “Numbers 2, Report of Captain John I. Worthington, First Arkansas Cavalry (Union),” January 8, 1864, O.R., 
Series 1, Vol. 22, Part 1, (Little Rock), 781. 
12 “Robert Carnahan Letter to Mrs. Carnahan,” November 16, 1861, Robert Carnahan Letters, Wilson’s Creek 
National Battlefield Civil War Museum, Republic, Missouri, [Missouri Digital Heritage]. 
162 
 
 
 
displaced people just as it was difficult for citizens to determine the intentions and actions of 
soldiers. One must remember, however, that there was a war to win and this would be the primary 
focus for soldiers from both sides. The nation tasked these men with winning a war and, therefore, 
displaced people were not an immediate priority.  
For the Union army, aid towards the uprooted citizens was sometimes a part of winning 
their hearts and minds. Providing aid could go a long way in preventing them from joining the 
Confederate army or pushing them into the arms of a guerrilla band. The army often issued rations 
or partial rations in an attempt to alleviate peoples’ suffering, if only temporarily. These rations 
might include some amount of salted beef or pork, hardtack, flour, salt, or beans and rations could 
be issued to displaced residents in varying amounts, depending on what was available at that time 
and place and who needed these rations, children were sometimes given half rations. The army 
also actively tried to alleviate potential health threats, especially in garrisoned towns in the region, 
in that they performed sanitation functions as well as controlling contagious diseases.13 Given the 
high number of displaced persons, they consumed a great many rations and easily became a burden 
on the army if they stayed for any extended period of time or, having nowhere else to go, followed 
the army. The decision to issue rations to people was one that weighed heavily on many military 
commanders in the West. For example, one 1864 dispatch from W.D. Hubbard, a Union First 
Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant- General instructed a chaplain in the area to the 
following: “The general commanding directs that you will see that subsistence is furnished to all destitute 
refugees until they can be started to and transported to Rolla, Mo. Refugees, like other people must eat or 
starve. They need subsistence every day, and it is the policy of the Government to give every day to such 
as cannot obtain food for themselves. When we send them forward to Rolla our obligations do not cease 
                                                          
13 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 85-86. 
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until they are delivered at that post.”14 On the one hand, commanders had to look out for their troops 
and make sure that they had enough supplies to make it through a given period. On the other hand, 
commanders desired to help these people without it becoming a burden on their army nor did they 
want to create any kind of long-term dependence among displaced residents. 
Opinions of them grew more sympathetic as the war dragged on because, as historian John 
F. Bradbury, Jr. notes, “[t]here were fewer and fewer able-bodied men in the crowds, which were 
composed of the aged, the infirm or disabled, and women alone with multitudes of children.”15 
While soldiers’ opinions of uprooted citizens varied, it is safe to say that most viewed them with 
a sympathetic heart, as an unfortunate byproduct of the war. Issues surrounding a person’s loyalty 
certainly influenced one’s opinion of displaced residents, as the above examples indicate. As 
resistance faded with the Union presence there, many soldiers softened on their views on these 
people. 
To be fair to the armies, it was very difficult to determine the number of people who would 
need their help. A variety of factors contributed to this difficulty including the fact that displaced 
people had no set pattern on when they left or where they sought refuge. Historians have offered 
a few estimates that quantify the situation. For example, Ash observes that “by early 1865 and 
estimated eighty thousand white refugees had come into Federal lines.”16 Ascertaining an exact 
number of displaced people for the war on a national or even a regional basis would be quite 
difficult. For the armies, this meant that they were often unprepared to handle the large number of 
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people who came to their forts and into their lines. Because of this, armies did not have enough 
supplies and often sent uprooted citizens elsewhere, often to benevolent aid societies. This was a 
key factor in the Union army’s failure to develop any kind of consistent policy with regard to 
displaced residents. 
The Role of Loyalty and Assessments 
One’s loyalty often determined if the army would offer aid or protection. With the region’s 
divided loyalties came an air of suspicion and distrust between the army and local citizens. Because 
of the evolving hard war policy set forth by the Federals, aid was usually withheld from anyone 
who demonstrated any kind of Confederate sympathies. “But official policy was that indigent 
citizens living in hostile districts should not be provisioned,” Ash reminds us, “unless they were 
Unionists, but instead ‘should be sent South to feed upon the enemy.’”17 There were a few reasons 
for this policy. The most important reason was that Union officials feared that by giving aid to 
able-bodied displaced citizens; it might prevent them from aiding the Union cause. As a result, 
military officials hoped that withholding rations might drive them into the ranks of the army, 
increasing their numbers in the region.18 
Civilians in Arkansas and Missouri fled their homes because they feared retribution – even 
death – from guerrilla bands and armies for their loyalty. “If the advent of directed destruction and 
confiscation of civilian property and, however infrequent,” observes historian Christopher Phillips, 
“the killing of civilians judged disloyal by military personnel is the point at which conciliatory 
warfare gave way to hard war, it was reached not in the seceded states in the war’s last years but 
                                                          
17 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 102-103. 
18 Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy (Boston: Northeastern 
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rather in the Border States early in the conflict.”19 The evolving hard war policy stemmed from 
the searching out of loyal or disloyal citizens in conquered areas. Hard war began in Missouri and 
Arkansas long before Sherman’s March to the Sea late in the war, often as a response to guerrilla 
warfare in the region creating a large number of displaced people.20 
Unionist families in the region especially relied on the army. Loyalists in Arkansas faced 
endured the same difficulties as Confederate Arkansans – food shortages, the scarcity of clothing, 
salt shortages (for the preservation of meats), and high prices – but they faced the difficulties of 
being victimized by their Confederate neighbors for their Unionist sentiments.21 Historian Robert 
Mackey details the plight of these citizens when he writes, “[h]owever victimized the bulk of the 
population and the refugees were, their travails pale in comparison with the terrorizing of the 
avowed Unionists.”22 The Federal command in the West, however, was woefully unprepared when 
it came to dealing with these people. While Unionists were especially dependent on the army, all 
displaced people, regardless of their loyalties, needed the army in some way. The burden of 
displaced residents increasingly fell on the back of the army as it took more and more territory in 
Arkansas with each passing year of the war. “No family known to entertain Union feelings,” put 
bluntly by the New Era, “is safe out of the reach of U.S. troops.”23 One’s loyalty could put them 
in danger in the face of the enemy or it could save that person’s life in the face of certain death. 
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Loyalty oaths or one’s actions that demonstrated loyalty were preconditions for any 
uprooted citizen to receive help or protection from the army. By the war’s midpoint, the Union 
army put piecemeal policies in place to deal with the issuing of rations/supplies to displaced 
people. For example, in Missouri, loyalty became a condition for receiving any subsistence from 
the army with Special Orders, No. 270, issued in October of 1863: 
Hereafter all issues of subsistence stores to suffering and destitute refugees, &c., 
will be confined strictly to loyal persons, and such only as can prove, by reliable 
witnesses, that they are, and have been, loyal to the Government of the United States 
since the breaking out of the present rebellion, and that they are, at the time the 
issue is made, in actual want and in danger of starvation if not temporarily relieved. 
In all cases when, "after careful examination," it shall be deemed advisable to issue 
subsistence to indigent loyal refugees, the issue will never exceed half rations of 
meat, bread, beans, and hominy.24 
These conditions of loyalty, like all of these early orders issued by the different commands in 
Arkansas and Missouri, varied from time and place and served, at least for all practical purposes, 
to be nothing more than suggestions. 
This informal military policy of requiring one’s loyalty as a precondition for aid from the 
Union army was in effect not only in the field, but at federal military installations as well. Later in 
the war, outside Federal military posts like Fort Smith, the army cut rations in half for people in 
need because so many needed help – but this was still at the discretion of the officer in charge at 
that particular post. Because of displaced people’s drain on the army’s resources, loyalty became 
an important factor in the distribution of aid. For example, another directive regarding the issuing 
of rations to needy individuals, issued by Assistant Adjutant General Frederic Speed while in New 
Orleans in December 1864, detailed when they would be issued rations, with citizens’ loyalties an 
                                                          
24 “Special Orders, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, No. 270,” October 3, 1863, O.R., Series 1, Vol. 22, 
Part 2, (Little Rock), 600. [Italics added] 
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underlying factor. “The only reason for issuing rations to refugees are these,” Speed began in his 
letter: 
First. Because it sometimes is the case that the refugees cannot be examined the 
day they arrive, and have to be retained for that purpose; but the cases should be 
very few that require detention for that purpose more than one day. Second. There 
may be a few cases of absolute indigence; for instance, helpless women and 
children, who it would be charitable to allow to remain for a time for the want of 
proper accommodations elsewhere.25  
Speed’s directive continues suggesting that citizens in contact with the dispossessed to direct them 
to some kind of aid society, if possible, and reminds them to issue rations to only Unionists – 
raising questions about the dangers of the Union or the Confederate army helping these displaced 
people. This demonstrates how directives like Special Orders, No. 270 were local in nature, as it 
appears that it had little impact on how the army issued rations in its operations further south. 
The Federals’ use of loyalty as a qualification for aid was not always a factor on whether 
or not people received aid. While displaced Confederates received initial rations to prevent 
starvation on the army’s watch, they were to “be returned from whence they came.”26 This further 
underlines the fact that there was no unified policy concerning displaced Southern whites and, 
because of this, numerous suggestions sprang from the different military commands in the region. 
The fact that the Union army gave minimum rations to citizens who were determined to be disloyal 
indicates that, for people looking for help, loyalty was important but not necessary to receive aid 
from the army. 
As the Federals encountered large numbers of uprooted citizens, they immediately realized 
the cost of providing aid to many people in the region. In an effort to raise funds to help displaced 
                                                          
25 “Frederic Speed to Provost-Marshal Parish of New Orleans,” December 3, 1864, O.R., Series 1, Vol. 41, Part 4, 
(Price’s Missouri Expedition), 753. It is worth noting that that act of giving aid to these loyal individuals is in line 
with Lincoln’s decision to treat the Confederacy as a rebellion and not as an independent nation. These people, 
loyalists, were United States citizens and they enjoyed certain benefits and protections befitting their status. 
26 Ibid. 
168 
 
 
 
people who came, either into Federal lines or nearby communities, the army attempted to place a 
share of the burden on disloyal citizens in Missouri through a series of assessments – a tax placed 
on these citizens by the military. An assessor sent by the Union army would determine the value 
of disloyal citizens’ property and then affix a tax comparable to the value of that property. General 
Henry Halleck’s board of assessors, which included two officers and a number of loyal citizens, 
oversaw all of this. The board was also in charge of collecting the money owed by these disloyal 
citizens. The army used the revenue thus generated from these assessments to help needy and 
displaced people in and around that community. While it is difficult to determine exactly how 
much money came from the assessments, they did indeed help the army in its care of these 
people.27 
Collecting money from disloyal citizens benefitted the Union army with regard to its 
problem in Missouri in two ways. First, officials were able to raise funds to help displaced 
residents, while at the same time lessening the burden that these people exerted on the army. 
Therefore, in many ways, this was a public relations win for the Federals as they were aiding them 
at the expense of disloyal Missourians. Second, these assessments served as a punishment for the 
disloyal citizens who remained within the reach of the Federals, especially in St. Louis. The army 
also hoped that these taxes would discourage guerilla activity, though there is no evidence that this 
occurred. For loyal citizens, they took a measure of satisfaction given the pain that so many 
disloyal citizens had caused them since the war began. The Federals made their actions against 
disloyal citizens public through circulars or special orders handed down from military officials, 
often published in local newspapers.28 
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28 Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 174-177. 
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Assessments in Missouri began at the end of 1861. With so many Missourians displaced 
following the war’s early battles in the region, military leaders sought ways to both alleviate their 
suffering as well as lessen the burden on the army and the Federal government. General Orders, 
No. 24, for example, issued from the Headquarters of the Department of the Missouri by Halleck, 
served as one of the first assessments of its kind in Missouri. Issued on December 12, 1861, this 
order detailed how this tax, aimed at the disloyal citizens of St. Louis, would work in six sections. 
First, Halleck’s orders laid out the situation with regard to displaced residents and pointed the 
finger at disloyal citizens who, in many instances, caused these citizens to flee in the first place. 
“Those in arms with the enemy who have property in this city [St. Louis],” and “those who have 
furnished pecuniary or other aid to the enemy, or the persons in the enemy’s service,” and “those 
who have verbally, in writing, or by publication, given encouragement to insurgents and rebels.”29 
Next, the order created a board of assessors who determined the assessed amounts. Third, the board 
of assessors notified assessed citizens of the amount and the collection date. The fourth part of this 
order allowed for what translated as an appeal process for citizens assessed to prove their loyalty 
if they felt that they were wrongly accused, but there was a 10 percent fine on people who did not 
affirm their loyalty. Fifth, the order detailed the distribution of supplies and it reiterated the purpose 
of the assessment, promising to use it to aid displaced people. Finally, General Orders, No. 24 
stated that the army would punish citizens who resisted the order with arrest and possible trial 
before a military commission or it their refusal could result in the seizure and sale of their 
property.30 Halleck’s orders, and others like it, made it clear that disloyal citizens would pay both 
                                                          
29 “General Orders, No. 24,” December, 23, 1861, Rolla [Missouri] Express. These assessments continued until 
March 1862 when Halleck dissolved the board. 
30 General Halleck did order property seized and sold when a round of assessments in January 1862 were not paid. 
The board assessed fines of $16,340.00 and collected $10,913.45 – mostly from the auction of seized property. See 
Louis S. Gerteis, Civil War St. Louis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 175. 
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a literal and figurative price for their disloyalty.31 In some instances, these assessments allowed 
disloyal citizens to make charitable contributions in cash, food, clothing, etc. to benevolent aid 
societies to satisfy the assessment imposed on them. This occurred periodically until the president 
suspended these assessments in early 1863. 
Disloyal citizens were not pleased with these assessments and they complained publically 
and, in some instances, complained to Washington – though a few years would pass before the 
government addressed their complaints. The dissatisfaction among disloyal citizens – at least 
individuals accused of being disloyal by Union military commanders - was evident in the fact that 
many never paid their assessed amounts. For example, twenty-four St. Louisians, including the 
prominent doctor William M. McPheeters, wrote an open letter to Halleck in protest of the order 
on December 26, 1861: “We cannot, however, give to you authority in the premises even such 
recognition as might be implied from our voluntary payment of the sums required of us. We have, 
therefore, concluded respectfully to protest and remonstrate against it, and to decline paying the 
same.”32 In addition to such written protests, actions (or lack of action) of the state’s secessionist 
citizens spoke just as loudly. This form of taxation eventually expanded from Halleck’s initial 
policy in St. Louis to the rest of the state. For example, assessments in Schuyler County, Missouri, 
were estimated at $314,700.00, however not one cent was collected. An assessment in Lewis 
County, Missouri, was valued at $54,287.47 and, again, the army assessors collected nothing from 
these disloyal citizens. This appears to be case in most of the assessments in Missouri, though this 
does not mean that assessors never collected money from individuals accused of being disloyal. In 
                                                          
31 Gerteis notes that Halleck had three classes of disloyalty. The first were those who were in Confederate service. 
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32 Cynthia DeHaven Pitcock and Bill J. Gurley, eds., I Acted From Principle: The Civil War Diary of Dr. William 
M. McPheeters, Confederate Surgeon in the Trans-Mississippi (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 
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Chariton County, Missouri, for example, officials assessed $82,000.00 on the disloyal citizens and 
the assessor assigned here collected $34,231.38.33 There were instances where the Federals 
collected money, though it was not the norm, officials continued to levy assessments on these 
citizens in Arkansas and Missouri through 1862, even expanding the scope of how the government 
would use assessment revenue. 
Confederate silence when it came to protecting its displaced citizens should be noted. The 
Confederate government never launched any kind of relief campaign for those citizens suffering 
because of the war.34 There were examples of a similar assessment policy by Confederate officials 
in the region. To be sure, the increasing Federal presence and control of the area by 1863 would 
have dashed any effort by authorities to do so. While the Federal government did what it could to 
raise funds for its own displaced and uprooted citizens, the Confederate government stuck to its 
mantra of protection of the home. McCurry has noted this fact: “Confederate citizens of all sorts 
readily subscribed to the view that the Civil War was a defensive war waged for the protection of 
hearth, home, and womanhood. State officials subscribed to it, too, or at least they said they did. 
Citizens thus not unreasonably expected that military deployment would be shaped by, or at least 
accommodate, those social goals.”35 
Building upon the General Orders, No. 24 precedent, Special Orders, No. 60, issued on 
December 2, 1862, by the Union Headquarters of the Central District of Missouri hoped to dig a 
little deeper in the pockets of disloyal individuals: 
                                                          
33 These assessment figures were taken from W. Wayne Williams, “An Experiment in Counterinsurgency: The 
Assessment of Confederate Sympathizers in Missouri,” The Missouri Historical Review Vol. 35, No. 3, (Aug., 
1969): 371. See also Dennis K. Boman, Lincoln and Citizens’ Rights in Civil War Missouri: Balancing Freedom 
and Security (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2011), 63-92. 
34 Elna C. Green, This Business of Relief: Confronting Poverty in a Southern City, 1740-1940 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2003), 72. 
35 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 94-95. 
172 
 
 
 
The sum of $10,000 is hereby levied upon the disloyal inhabitants of Johnson 
County [Missouri], whereof the sum of $2,500 will be applied to subsist the 
enrolled militia whilst engaged in active service, and the remaining $7,500 is 
appropriated to the relief of the destitute families of the soldiers engaged in actual 
service, and to relieve the temporarily destitute refugees who have been driven from 
their homes by rebels or guerrillas, and of the citizens who have become destitute 
in consequence of the lawless acts of disloyalists.36 
These orders placed blame for the displacement of so many people on the shoulders of people who 
either helped guerrilla fighters or chose to look the other way while various guerrillas perpetrated 
various acts of destruction in their communities. The potential cash generated by this assessment 
not only went to aid uprooted Missourians, as “most rural Missourians had become refugees, inside 
or outside the state[,]” but to help pay for militia units to protect these communities as guerrilla 
activity continued to plague the army in the region.37 As these additional examples show, it appears 
that these assessments not only varied with time and place, but they also expanded in scope as the 
war went on and the crisis intensified. 
General Orders, No. 24, however, was not the only military-ordered assessment issued in 
the region as these taxes were enacted in other parts of the region. Other measures that 
communicated assessments in other Missouri communities may have had different wording, but 
they had the same goal as General Orders, No. 24 – help uprooted loyal citizens at the expense of 
disloyal citizens and Confederates in Missouri and Arkansas. For example, an 1863 circular 
appeared to follow the directive included in that order: “The provost-marshal of the District of 
Eastern Arkansas is therefore instructed to levy assessments upon such citizens [disloyal citizens], 
and collect and disburse the same, for the use and benefit of loyal refugees within our lines.”38 
                                                          
36 “Special Orders, Headquarters Central District of Missouri, Numbers 60,” December 2, 1862, U.S. War 
Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 
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Until Washington said otherwise, military commanders throughout the region used taxes as a tool 
to assist displaced residents but also to relieve their burden on the army. Assessments served as a 
divisive issue among Missourians and have the potential to aggravate its Border State status. 
Assessments in Missouri would end in early 1863 because of these complaints. Citizens 
there questioned the legality of these assessments and others wondered if it was really worth 
upsetting the state’s conservative citizens. Not to mention the fact that many thought that the 
assessments were futile. President Lincoln, not wanting to upset the delicate balance between the 
federal government and a Border State, instructed his Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to put a 
stop to the assessments in Missouri.39 As a result, on January 20, 1863, Stanton communicated the 
president’s wishes to military leaders in Missouri: “The order suspending for the present any 
further action upon assessments for damages was not designed to be limited to Saint Louis, but 
was meant to include all such assessments in the State of Missouri. You will, therefore, suspend 
them until further instructions.”40 Union commanders in Missouri speedily communicated 
Lincoln’s order to other commanders in the region and the assessments officially stopped shortly 
after. 
Ultimately, the assessments had little to no impact because Federal officials collected such 
small amounts as many expected. “Not only did the assessments fail to check bushwhacking,” 
historian W. Wayne Williams observes, “the also exacerbated the politics of Missouri.”41 For 
Lincoln and his cabinet, these assessments were more trouble than they were worth. For military 
                                                          
39 Throughout much of 1862 and 1863, President Lincoln did not want to commit to any actions that might upset the 
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officials, they failed in their attempt to relieve displaced people at the expense of Missouri’s 
disloyal. While the military officials attempted to alleviate the their suffering by shifting the burden 
of care on disloyal citizens there, the impact of these assessments only confirmed citizens’ 
misgivings about the policy. 
Confederate Worries: Displaced Families 
After observing wandering Southern whites, soldiers wondered about their own families. 
While, for instance, the Arkansas state government attempted to provide for the families of 
Confederate soldiers in times of hardship, these efforts were often inefficient.42 This brought many 
questions to soldiers’ minds as they wrote their letters home. Had the army or irregulars forced 
one’s family to flee? Had these men deprived their families of all of life’s necessities? Soldier 
William Wakefield Garner of Quitman, Arkansas, who served as a 1st Lieutenant in the Home 
Guard Company of Mounted Cavalry, wrote home sharing those fears. “If I could only be home 
to see you and our dear little children. . . .[,]” remarked Garner, “but . . . not knowing or having 
any chance to know whether they are sick or well, have plenty or are destitute, whether they have 
a home or robbed or burnt down and many other things the mind will naturally picture out, I almost 
come to the conclusion that I am one of the most miserable men that lives.”43 For many 
Confederates, they wondered if events caused their own families to flee. Thoughts of their 
families’ condition weighed heavily on a number of soldiers. This caused some to desert the army 
altogether or join guerrilla or bandit fighters in order to protect their homes. This was a fear among 
commanders across the Confederacy if their soldiers’ families were not cared for. Writing from 
                                                          
42 See William Frank Zornow, “State Aid for Indigent Soldiers and Their Families in Arkansas, 1861-1865,” The 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer, 1955): 97-102. 
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East Tennessee in the war’s final months, soldier John Stanfield reminded Jefferson Davis that 
“CSA soldiers’ families are left destitute; fears ‘this army will break off into garilla [sic] bands if 
something more is not done.’”44 Other soldiers heard about former neighbors forced from their 
communities because of approaching armies. “I saw an old man a few days ago that left his family 
last November[,]” wrote Frances Gilliam in an 1864 letter to her husband Robert. Robert C. 
Gilliam served in the Confederate army. “He says his property would have sold for $3000 when 
he left and if he had it he would give every dollar of it if he had his family here. He says he knows 
he could make a living for them. He says he has seen so many from there that tell him how the 
famllys [sic] are treated. I am willing to stay here as long as the army is here. I don’t think that I 
can stay if it crosses the river.”45 The Gilliams, who lived in Paraclifta, located in southern 
Arkansas, saw their friends and neighbors come and go. Robert, a plantation owner and 
businessman, very much worried about what would become of his property in southern Arkansas. 
Hearing reports from home, like the one above from his wife, only exacerbated those fears for 
many soldiers fighting on the front lines. 
As these men witnessed town after town damaged or destroyed by the armies, soldiers and 
their families worried not so much about the regular armies, but more about the irregular warfare 
that took place there. “Citizens demanded the return of military units to their home counties,” notes 
historian Stephanie McCurry, “the protection of their settlements from marauding Union troops 
and undisciplined Confederate cavalry. . . .”46 For example, Confederate Lieutenant George 
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46 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 137. 
176 
 
 
 
Taylor, Company H, wrote to Rebecca Stirman Davidson about the devastation brought about in 
her hometown of Fayetteville, Arkansas. Davidson had left town in 1862 after Confederate troops 
set it ablaze. A few years later, the Federals banished Davidson from her hometown when they 
accused her of aiding the enemy. Taylor wrote her about the condition of Fayetteville in 1862: 
Fayetteville presented indeed a sad spectacle when we pressed through on the 20th, 
I could not but contrast the beautiful quiet little town of last May when we were so 
heartily welcomed. Tho then devastation and waste and ruin manifest all around. 
Heaven help a country where an army must linger, he a friend or foe. What citizens 
now left in Fayetteville seemed perfectly panic-stricken – seemed to be utterly 
regardless of anything like protection of property. Stores all along Main Street were 
thrown open to the Missouri and Arkansas soldiers.47 
By late 1862, the Federals used banishment as official policy against disloyal citizens in the region, 
usually the wives of prominent Confederate generals and political figures.48 Because of the 
guerrilla activity in northwest Arkansas, Taylor opined that some kind of regular army was 
required to save the town. Confederates had become more worried about the protection of their 
homes and families than they had the larger war effort. 
Confederate soldiers from the region often wondered about the impact of the war on their 
communities and officers used these incidents to motivate its troops. As Confederate soldiers saw 
community after community in various parts of the South with its citizens displaced or serving in 
the army and homes and businesses destroyed, they often thought of their own homes. Lieutenant 
General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor, tried to use this destruction to his 
advantage in a published plea to the people of western Louisiana in the spring of 1864. “Along 
100 miles of his path the flying foe, with more than savage barbarity, burned every house and 
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village within his reach. You extinguished the burning ruins in his base blood, and were nerved 
afresh to vengeance by the cries of women and children, left without shelter or food.”49 While it is 
difficult to determine if this ploy actually worked in keeping men focused on the larger war effort, 
it does demonstrate how aware Southern commanders were of men worrying about home. 
Southern civilians and soldiers away at the battlefront had to worry about so much more as they 
worried about their families on the homefront. 
While Confederate commanders were unable to do anything of substance to keep men from 
worrying about their homes, local and state governments did what they could when it came to 
helping soldiers’ families made destitute or displaced by the war. By improving these families’ 
situations, even if only a little, the government hoped to ease soldiers’ minds and keep Confederate 
troops at the front, knowing that their families were cared for. For example, the Arkansas state 
legislature “appropriated $1,200,000 to help refugees from the northwestern part of the state.”50 In 
addition to the state legislature, local governments did what they could for the troops as well. 
Moneyhon notes, “the Hempstead County Court enacted a one-half of 1 percent property tax for 
the relief of the families of volunteers and accepted payment in food and other essential supplies.”51 
Responding to the lackluster support from Richmond to keep men in the ranks, state and local 
governments did what they could to achieve that goal. Historians have noted, however, that these 
efforts did very little in accomplishing their goal of reducing the number of Confederates who 
deserted their units.52 
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The destruction experienced by so many Southern communities at the hands of guerrilla 
fighters was so terrible that it pulled soldiers, especially Confederates, from the ranks so that they 
could check on their families and their homes. Many of the accounts read by soldiers concerning 
Bushwhackers and Jayhawkers could certainly cause a soldier worry knowing what their friends, 
family, and neighbors had experienced. For example, Confederate soldier Dandridge McRae 
relayed a message from Confederate General Thomas C. Hindman about just how real the threat 
from these “Kansas Jayhawkers and hired Dutch cut-throats,” really was. “These bloody ruffians 
have invaded your country,” McRae wrote in an undated letter, “stolen and destroyed your 
property, murdered your women, driven your children from their homes and defiled the graves of 
your kindred.”53 Hearing such reports caused many men, especially men in the Confederate army, 
to return home in an attempt to protect their family and their homes from these irregular 
combatants. 
Southern soldiers’ desire to return home was especially high later in the war when things 
were not going so well for the Confederacy. For example, Elias Davidson noted a fellow soldier’s 
situation in 1864: “Luke Holmes has been in from Arkansas. He has gone back after his family. 
He say that the[y] have lots of bushwhackers there. The[y] are makin[g] up componies [sic] of 
militia there and from what he sees the[y] are killing each other every day.”54 While fighting for 
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the Confederacy was important for these men, their family and their homes came first. For many 
men, that was what the war was about – family and the home.55 Threats to the home front could 
certainly weigh heavily on the minds of soldiers from Arkansas or Missouri fighting a war very 
far away from the one that was happening in their very own communities.56 
Displaced People and the Army: Interactions and Policy 
Displaced Southern whites who sought protection, food, or clothing from the Union army 
only served to slow it down, thus creating a burden. Nineteenth century warfare required armies 
to move as freely as possible so that they could gain any tactical or geographic advantage as 
quickly as possible. The best example of this burden on the Federal army and it occurred in the 
East and it involved Sherman’s March to the Sea. As Sherman moved forward from Atlanta 
beginning in late 1864, more and more displaced African Americans joined his army, slowing the 
army down considerably. The burden that these freedom seekers put on Sherman’s army caused 
him to issue his Special Field Orders, No. 15, which, in short, provided forty acres and a mule for 
freedpeople following his army. This, in effect, lessened the drag on Sherman’s army, freeing his 
army to continue its campaign. 
The crisis of displaced whites coming into Union camps was so severe during the war’s 
final months that it could take a great many rations to subsist them for even a short period. This 
was especially true among displaced persons encountered by the Union army. In western Arkansas 
for example, the New Era noted in the war’s final months that, “nearly as many rations are issued 
to refugees at this point, Van Buren and Fayetteville as to the troops.”57 Such accounts demonstrate 
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just how heavy of a burden these people became on the army and, because this burden was so 
great, loyalty played an important role in the distribution of aid to people, as only sworn Unionists 
would receive rations from the army. While the army determined the number of rations for its 
soldiers with known numbers, it did not have this information, as it encountered displaced people. 
This meant that aid for these people varied based on each situation and circumstance and 
sometimes meant that the only aid they received was whatever soldiers had on them at the time of 
the encounter. This might have been a few spare rations, maybe an extra blanket. Often, the army 
directed displaced people to the next military installation where supplies were potentially more 
plentiful. 
With each year of the war, the number of displaced persons mounted and the army had to 
take action. More and more people appeared at Federal military installations in Arkansas from 
Pine Bluff and Lewisburg to Helena and De Valls Bluff. For example, C.T. Christensen, a 
Lieutenant Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General complained in March 1865 that “[t]he 
retention of refugees at the South will be a serious embarrassment to the military service as well 
as a heavy burden upon the Army appropriations. The cost of transportation to points where they 
can obtain employment or be otherwise provided for will be less than the value of the rations that 
must of necessity be issued to them if they are retained.”58 Uprooted citizens not only slowed the 
army’s movements, but they also consumed vital army supplies intended for its soldiers. Here, the 
army would not be so bold as to issue any kind of military directive allotting tracts of land or army 
supplies for displaced persons in need of the army’s help. Simply moving them out of the war 
appeared to be the best and most cost effective way to remove this burden from the army in the 
region. 
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It was simply cheaper for the Union army to pay displaced peoples’ transportation costs to 
points beyond the army where they could receive aid. This policy was better for the army when 
compared to allowing them to linger around military bases or following the army hoping for rations 
and other aid. Supplies were critical in the West, more so than in the East, as the armies located 
here were so far away from supply depots, making it more difficult to move supplies to these 
soldiers and, if too many civilians consumed their supplies, it could take a considerable amount of 
time to before the quartermaster replenished their storerooms. Army officials attempted to deal 
with the problem through a variety of ways including assessments and the issuing of rations to 
relieve the suffering of displaced people – if only temporarily – this, however, was not enough. It 
would not be enough until the military brass developed some kind of uniform policy towards 
displaced people. Uniform policy or not, people came to expect some kind of help from the army. 
Both armies sought to use uprooted citizens to their advantage and having an advanced set 
of eyes to track the enemy’s movements could be valuable. Displaced persons, in many instances, 
had traversed the countryside for many weeks or months. They knew the lay of the land and they 
were familiar with residents who might have valuable information about the position of the enemy. 
While the use of displaced people as spies by the Union army are plentiful, there are not a lot of 
sources that indicate if and how many displaced people the Confederate army recruited for the 
war. This is not to say that it did not happen, but it does indicate that it did not happen as often as 
it did in the Union army. The Federals recruited and enticed many displaced residents into the 
army, especially in areas where Union sentiment was strong, places like Arkansas where the Ozark 
Mountains in the northwestern part of the state was the home to many Mountain Federals. After 
the army pushed Confederate troops out of Missouri and northern Arkansas in the months leading 
up to their victory at Pea Ridge in March of 1862, located in north-central Arkansas, made 
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recruitment easier.59 When in the enemy’s territory, a spy proved to quite valuable. Spies detailed 
positions and movements of the opposing army and, often, displaced people were willing to take 
up the task of spying. Because of this, locals might have been privy to the opposing army’s 
movements or have their collective ear to whatever news might have spread throughout the 
community, which proved to be helpful to the army.60 
Most importantly, the recruitment of the region’s uprooted citizens as spies provided an 
opportunity to settle scores in their communities. Spying was a game of trying to gain information 
on the enemy, while at the same time planting all kinds of misinformation to cover an army’s path. 
Deserters, locals, escaped slaves, and displaced citizens were all used as sources of information 
with some being more reliable than others. These displaced people who served as informants did 
not reveal their affiliations or previous affiliations. Were they Unionists? Dissatisfied 
Confederates? Ex-Confederates? “Refugees,” notes former National Security Agency officer 
Edwin C. Fishel, “looking for a welcome, were generous with their talk, but on average they had 
far less information than soldiers.”61 Throughout both local and national publications as well as 
published personal accounts after the war, there were instances of spies aiding the Union army. 
“Refugees and spies report to me that Price’s division is very much demoralized,” details a 
communication between army officers, “and that the men deserted in great numbers while crossing 
Red River.”62 For these officers, displaced people proved indispensable to their operations in many 
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parts of the Western Theatre. While using them as spies could sometimes work against the army, 
as they could work for both sides or be captured, it allowed them to utilize these divided loyalties 
in their favor. “Captain Benter reports that the enemy called his name,” noted one Union General 
Fitz Henry Warren, “and appeared to know that he would be out there, and that refugees report 
that our affairs in Indianola are known in the interior.”63 Displaced residents could have concealed 
themselves very easily and they would have been able to move about the countryside without 
arousing any suspicion from the Confederate army. If the enemy did take notice of these people 
and become suspicious, one could blend in very easily to his surroundings. Their motivations for 
aiding the army in this way are not clear, perhaps they were returning a favor or perhaps they were 
attempting to demonstrate their loyalty with their efforts, or perhaps they were looking to get even 
with their disloyal neighbors for whatever reason. 
Being a spy was an exciting endeavor and various wartime publications detailed stories of 
these spies. One account, published in an 1864 novel with title Thrilling Stories of the Great 
Rebellion detailed the experience of displaced Arkansan, De Witt C. Hopkins written by Charles 
S. Greene. Greene, “late of the United States Army,” hoped to add some detail to the individual 
wartime experience. Hopkins, who served as a Union general’s ‘guide’, “determined to revisit his 
home, and if possible put him in such an attitude that he could remain there until other opportunities 
should be presented to give information to the Federal army.”64 In Greene’s account, Hopkins was 
able to report near the Arkansas-Missouri border various Confederate movements enduring narrow 
escapes with the enemy along the way – even going undercover in the Confederate army as a 
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double agent. Greene’s story paints a positive picture of the Union spy. “Courage on the battle-
field, questionable ofttimes, as advancing columns approach each other, is thoroughly roused by a 
few volleys, but the cool, deliberate daring of the spy – the resolution that braves reproach, 
ignominy and death, belongs to men of other stamp.”65 Hopkins faced further danger, at one point 
Confederate officials had him arrested, tried, and nearly hung, but he escaped death through a 
technicality. Confederates then almost killed Hopkins as revenge for the murder of a Confederate 
sympathizer, only to escape again. Hopkins would move from Union spy to soldier fighting for 
the army at Pea Ridge and eventually made his way up to the rank of captain. 
While Hopkins’s story is thrilling as written by Greene, what does it say about displaced 
people acting as spies? First, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of Hopkins’s tale recounted 
here because this is a work of fiction. Was this what really happened or was this story simply 
sensationalized to sell a few books?  Perhaps the publishers hoped to use Hopkins’s tale as a 
demonstration of so many citizens’ loyalty to Union. In addition, with his decision to join the army 
and fight at Pea Ridge as well as his escaping death so many times, the story demonstrates 
Hopkins’s bravery and commitment to the Union. While being a spy went a long way to prove 
one’s loyalty, there was no greater demonstration of loyalty to the Federal cause than joining the 
army. 
Both the Union and Confederate armies utilized the service of displaced people in the 
region. Only Tennessee had more Union recruits than Arkansas among the Confederate states, 
Arkansas having more than eight thousand white volunteers for the Federal army, though most 
volunteers were not spies.66 In some instances, displaced people would build upon their service as 
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a spy and then take the next step by joining the army. Joseph H. Trego, a Lieutenant in the 5th 
Kansas (Union) Cavalry reported in an early letter home to his brother that “many a spy has come 
in representing himself as a refugee and in some cases have gone so far as to enlist in the army.”67 
The service of displaced people in the Federal army was not required to receive aid, but it did help 
reinforce their loyalty in the eyes of the army. 
The reasons that citizens chose to join the Federals, outside of staunch Unionists living in 
the region, were not always clear. Perhaps they were simply tired of being on the run or being 
hungry; maybe this was the best way to guarantee a steady meal and shelter or they joined out of 
revenge against the Confederate army or guerrilla bands that harassed or destroyed their 
communities. It was also possible that the Federals pressured or refused subsistence to these people 
if they did not join. Whatever their reasons for joining the army, officials capitalized on these 
men’s situation and used them to bolster Union regiments or create new units late in the war. 
Some military officials felt that displaced residents should be forced to join the ranks of 
the Union army. Army officials refused to provide handouts to displaced whites who they 
encountered; instead, they offered service in the Union army as a means to earn a subsistence. 
Media outlets assured Northerners that uprooted citizens were not forced into service and men who 
served did so of their own free will. In a description of a sketch detailing the plight of the 
dispossessed, Harper’s Weekly noted that “[t]hese refugees, whether they come from Richmond 
or from the Southwest, are invariably provided for in every possible way, and are not in any case 
compelled to enter our armies.”68 It was not, however, always the practice by army officials in the 
field. Historian Richard Current details how uprooted citizens were compelled to join the ranks of 
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the army when he details the actions of Missouri General Egbert B. Brown. Current notes that if 
these men were slow to join, Brown both refused rations to able-bodied men and “sent and 
expedition into Arkansas to fetch recruits. As a result of his efforts, men were enlisted faster than 
they could be equipped.”69 General Brown did what was in his power to ensure that he bolstered 
his fighting force while, at the same time, removed an opportunity for his enemy to do so. In 
addition, Brown decreased the number of displaced people around his army. In this instance, it is 
the proverbial win-win situation for the Federals and for General Brown. Brown was not alone in 
his efforts to recruit displaced residents into the ranks as other officials did the same in their attempt 
to recruit them into their units. Other army officials used more standard recruitment tactics. 
Regardless of their methods, Union officials were able to persuade a number of displaced 
men to join Western units of the army. Numbers of recruits for local regiments were across the 
board. For example, the Missouri Adjutant General John B. Gray reported to the Secretary of War 
Henry Stanton that Missouri raised 1,727 men into service for Missouri “composed principally of 
refugees from Arkansas.”70 In other instances, the number of displaced men recruited could be 
rather small. Reports made to the Missouri Senate for 1865 detailed three uprooted citizens from 
Franklin County, Missouri, who officials organized into provisional companies.71 Reasons for 
these men joining the ranks, even late in the war, varied from man to man – just as their reasons 
for fleeing during the war varied. Displaced Arkansans and Missourians provided needed troops 
for Union regiments late in the war. 
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Historian Gary D. Joiner points out the difficulty in fully understanding how many 
uprooted men made their way into the Confederate ranks when he wrote, “Trans-Mississippi 
accounts, especially Confederate letters, are very rare. . . .”72 There are few accounts that offer 
evidence of frequency and numbers of displaced men recruited by the army in the region. This is 
not to say that it did not happen. General Theophilus Holmes, for example, wrote President 
Jefferson Davis in August of 1862, telling him that there were some uprooted white Southerners 
who wanted to join the army. “Regts in this state almost new and undisciplined and probably five 
thousand men without arms of any kind, besides these there are six or seven thousand men in the 
Indian Country and a great number of refugee Missourians on the border seeking to be mustered 
in the service, to command and instruct this army at least six additional Brigadier Genls. are 
necessary.”73 While instances such as this are few and typically limited to 1861 and 1862, there is 
evidence that Confederates brought displaced men into their ranks. However, it does not appear 
that the army was able to recruit them in any kind of significant numbers. 
By 1863, Confederate armies were still desperate to fill their ranks. The increasing numbers 
of men lost to battles, disease, and desertion weakened the army’s strength as a fighting force. 
While the Confederate draft “raised a larger portion of its troops by drafting than did the north,” it 
did not push the number of men into the Southern ranks needed to win the war.74 Confederate 
General John Marmaduke, a Missourian, was able to incorporate displaced men into his command 
in his home state. “Marmaduke’s Cavalry consists principally of refugee bushwhackers from 
Missouri,” noted the Daily Missouri Republican, “and is variously reported at from 5,000 to 
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8,000.”75 Perhaps Marmaduke, as a Missourian, was able to play to individual state loyalties to 
recruit these uprooted Missourians for service or, like their Unionist counterparts, sought revenge 
against the Union army for depravations committed against their homes or families. Though his 
methods were unusual, the general demonstrated that it was possible to recruit displaced men for 
the Southern cause. Accounts of such recruitment are much more difficult to come by when 
compared to Union attempts to do the same, however, it does show that some displaced men still 
believed in fighting for the Confederacy. 
Reasons for this Confederate failure to recruit higher numbers of uprooted Southern whites 
are many and include the fact that many soldiers deserted the Confederate army to check on their 
homes or families. Other Confederate soldiers simply lost interest in the cause as the war moved 
into 1864 and 1865 and victory seemed less likely, especially in Missouri and Arkansas. One can 
also read into the fact that they army had to press citizens into service against their will, alienating 
a number of Southern whites. This caused some people to leave, as they did not wish to fight for 
the Confederacy because of either their loyalties or their desire to decline participation in the war. 
There are accounts, especially in Arkansas, after the Federals gained a solid hold on the northern 
and central parts of the state in 1863, where Confederate troops not only stopped fighting, “but 
became Unionists and joined the Northern Army.”76 For whatever reason – weak ties to the 
Confederate States, the need to survive, caring for loved ones or maybe they were coaxed into 
service - these men, at least in this instance, joined the Union army. 
As more and more people poured into Union lines, the army had to devise other means of 
helping them. If the army’s rations on hand were too small to supply them, commanders at these 
                                                          
75 “The War in Western Arkansas,” January 3, 1863, Daily Missouri Republican [St. Louis]. 
76 Robert F. Smith, “The Confederate Attempt to Counteract Reunion Propaganda in Arkansas: 1863-1865,” The 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1957): 55. 
189 
 
 
 
posts might turn them away or send them to the next closest military post. No standard military 
policy existed that dealt with displaced people coming into army lines. Looking through the 
Official Records, one will find numerous mentions of Union officers both concerned with the 
situation that they faced as well as how they handled it. Military officials’ reactions to the large 
numbers of people varied from place to place. “If they [displaced people] remain here we are 
obliged to feed them, or they must starve. It is absolutely necessary to remove them to points where 
supplies are more plentiful than here.”77 This response demonstrates that the Federal army wished 
to help, but was unable to do so because of a simple lack of supplies. The Federals were cognizant 
of the fact that if they continued to feed and supply these uprooted citizens, they would remain 
near the army and drain valuable resources. What the army failed to consider was not that these 
people desired to stay near these military posts necessarily, but that they could not go back to their 
communities – for a variety of reasons. Therefore, when they were short or low on rations, army 
officials quietly underrepresented the amount of rations they had on hand to push civilians in need 
on to someone or somewhere else. 
Later in the war, the Union army considered other alternatives to help displaced people 
including transporting them to points where aid could be more centralized and, therefore, more 
efficient. Doing this also allowed the army to help these people while lessening their burden on 
the army for relief. The army assisted them, as they did in the above account, by providing 
transportation to other places where people could receive aid – perhaps from one of the many 
benevolent aid societies like the Western Sanitary Commission headquartered in St. Louis. Other 
accounts demonstrate that the army was able to help displaced people and did – even if the help 
was temporary. They made the plight of displaced persons the plight of the army and made it clear 
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that officials would provide for them. Again, this policy was not an across the board policy, limited 
in time and scope to situation observed by officials. 
The Union army struggled with establishing a consistent policy with regard to displaced 
people until the war’s latter stages, when their numbers were at their highest. It was not until 
January 1864 that the War Department set a standard policy of ration distribution for displaced 
people. Washington communicated this order to commanders in the field. “Refugees,” according 
to General Orders No. 30 from the War Department, were to receive: 
10 oz. of pork or bacon, or 1 lb. of fresh beef; 1 lb. of corn meal five times a week, 
and 1 lb. of flour or soft bread or 12 oz. of hard bread twice a week; and to every 
100 rations, 10 lbs. beans, peas, or hominy, 8 lbs. of sugar, 2 quarts of vinegar, 8 
oz. of candles, 2 lbs. of soap, 2 lbs. of salt, and 15 lbs. of potatoes when practicable. 
To children under fourteen years of age, half rations will be issued; and to women 
and children, roasted rye coffee, at the rate of 10 lbs., or tea, at the rate of 15 oz. to 
every 100 rations.78 
Though the amount of supplies allowed to the uprooted citizens in this instance does not appear to 
be great, the issuance of rations and other supplies over a sustained period could become rather 
expensive for the army and, because of this, they could not subsist these people long term. 
In other instances, officials grew tired of these people receiving what they termed handouts 
and suggested that they take on some form of employment as a means of earning their subsistence. 
Union officials hoped that by using the influx of displaced persons as a cheap labor force they 
could both reduce the number of dependents as well as reduce the army’s burden of caring for 
them. For example, General Odon Guitar suggested that people who received aid help to construct 
a rail line extension from Rolla, Missouri fifteen miles west to the Big Piney River in May of 1864. 
“The inauguration of this work will afford labor to hundreds who are now subsisting upon the 
bounty of the Government,” Guitar proposed, “thus relieving the country from this unnatural tax 
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upon its resources, and these suffering and unfortunate people from a degrading dependence 
entailed upon them by their patriotism and devotion to the Government.”79 While this project never 
saw the light of day, it does offer a glimpse into the opinions of some officials with regard to the 
subsistence of so many people. Other proposed labor ventures included the manufacture of 
uniforms for prisoners of war, but like Guitar’s plan, it was nothing more than a proposal.80 One 
cannot blame these military officials for offering creative options for handling their problem, as 
the army brass did not offer any solutions of their own. The problem was one that they had not 
planned for and, therefore, it required some creative solutions to reduce the number of people 
dependent on the army as well as minimize the burden of these people on the army. 
By the spring of 1864, the war in the West was very much going the Union army’s way. 
With the fall of Vicksburg the summer before giving the army full control of the Mississippi, 
giving way to the Union occupation of Little Rock, the Federals pushed through the region, 
strengthening its grip. The spring of that year, the Union army attempted to complete their conquest 
of the region with the Red River Campaign. General Nathanial P. Banks, often labeled as a political 
general, would lead military and naval forces up the Red River from New Orleans, meeting up 
with General Frederick Steele, who would move his forces south from Little Rock. The goal of the 
campaign was to capture Shreveport – the headquarters of the Confederate Army of the Trans-
Mississippi, defeat Confederate Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, capture thousands of bales of 
cotton from the many plantations in the area, and organize pro-Union governments in the region. 
The Red River Campaign, if successful, could be the gateway for an invasion of Texas. In the end, 
the campaign was a Union failure in that it lost to a force smaller in number. Battles at Mansfield 
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(April 8) and Pleasant Hill (April 9) forced the Union army to fall back, drained a vast amount of 
Union resources, and cost Banks his job. There would be no more major Union offensives in the 
state for the rest of the war, leaving Confederate forces holding the southwestern part of the state.81 
Because of this steady stream of displaced civilians resulting from the Red River 
Campaign, different commanders began to develop a clearer policy towards them, while others 
distanced themselves from them. The closest the Federals came to a clear policy came with the 
attempted creation of a refugee bureau within the army’s organization. This attempt to organize a 
refugee bureau came in a general order issued by Assistant Adjutant-General J.W. Barnes by 
command of Major-General Dodge in the Department of Missouri in December 1864 – General 
Order, No. 238. In that order, he wrote that “[f]or the purpose of better providing for the wants and 
of improving the condition of the large number of refugees in this department, and to organize in 
the different districts a uniform system for their care, a refugee bureau is hereby established.”82 
The army assigned the responsibility for displaced people to army chaplains, who often wrote 
about the plight of these people. 
Union army chaplains encountered displaced people often. These men proved to be the 
most sympathetic as chaplains often kept detailed accounts of their encounters with displaced 
people. “Refugees from Secessia come into camp nearly every day,” began Chaplain Rev. Francis 
Springer in a July 1863 journal entry, “generally in small companies either of men or of families 
consisting of women & children. In the latter case they come in ox wagons, a small boy or woman 
being the teamster. Their wagons are usually loaded with bedclothes, wearing apparel, provisions, 
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a few cooking utensils, & such other articles of family convenience as they could pack on or tie to 
the wagon bed.”83 Chaplains recorded a number of similar instances in their wartime journals. 
These men served as the point of contact for displaced people as they encountered the army, most 
often in the capacity of superintendent of refugees.84 As a result, various military commanders 
believed that chaplains were the most qualified to help uprooted citizens. This process of having 
the chaplains in charge of uprooted citizens would continue under the organization of the Bureau 
of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Lands created in March of 1865 lasting in dwindling 
capacity until 1872. 
The Federal policy regarding displaced people did not always move forward in a linear 
pattern. Military orders might aid people in one part of the region, but not another. Often, orders 
that pertained to these citizens were ad hoc in nature. Like General Order, No. 238, other orders 
only affected uprooted citizens who fell under the command of the Department of the Missouri – 
not Arkansas. Had similar orders been implemented throughout the region, the plight of these 
residents may have been improved much sooner, therefore reducing their burden on the Union 
army. Emblematic of the Federal position was that with one-step forward like General Orders, No. 
238, there were steps back. This was evident with the army continuing to distance itself from 
displaced people, even late in the war. For example, an army official writing from Pine Bluff, 
Arkansas, detailed how the army distanced itself from people who came into their lines: 
. . .in relation to the protection or dispersion of refugee families, the major-general 
commanding instruct you that you will make such provision for them as may best 
suit your convenience so far as not inconsistent with the public interest. Their 
destitute condition demands that they be subsisted until they are able to raise crops. 
This you are authorized to do. . . . The officer detailed in authorized to have and 
use public means of transportation for their benefit; is also charged with procuring 
seeds, plowing their grounds, constructing cabins, &c. It is suggested that an 
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abandoned plantation in the vicinity of your post should be appropriated for their 
use, and all who are unable to provide for themselves be required to remove to it. 
This removes them from contact with the troops, and is for this reason a precaution 
against demoralization.85   
The army helped them by issuing the necessary supplies to farm abandoned Confederate 
plantations, but its ultimate goal was to remove them from their lines as much as possible. In many 
ways, this communication is a microcosm of the army’s policy towards displaced residents. The 
army continued its practice of not having a standard policy in the form of colony farms. 
Splintered Solutions: Union Officials Try to Solve the Crisis 
The lack of food production in the region created a tremendous burden on the remaining 
residents and made it difficult for uprooted residents to return. This was in addition to the 
Confederate government’s tax-in-kind policies imposed on Southern farmers and the poor weather 
in the region for much of the war. As a result, the associated poor harvests led to food shortages in 
Arkansas.86 The suspension of raising crops in the region took its toll on the locals as well, not just 
the army. The difficulty of a reliable food source in Arkansas caused many citizens to leave their 
communities in high numbers. After the fall of Vicksburg in the summer of 1863 and then the fall 
of Little Rock that fall, the Union army had a more sustained presence in the region, putting a 
greater burden on the few farmers who stuck things out to this point in the war. “This is deplorable, 
not so much on account of the expense of feeding them,” noted the New Era, “as from the injury 
the community at large is receiving by the almost total suspension of farming operations.”87 With 
the army’s sustained presence in the region after 1863, this only added to the food shortage and 
some officials sought a solution. 
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By 1865, the war’s destruction was evident in the many communities that were located in 
that path. Residents of Arkansas and Missouri, who chose not to flee the opposing armies or 
guerrilla forces and ride out the war in their communities, stripped the land of every possible 
resource. There are many accounts of the deplorable condition of the countryside along the 
Missouri-Arkansas border. One instance, reported in the New Era in July 1865, detailed that: 
the destitution of Northern Arkansas and Southeast and Southwest Missouri . . . that 
the destitution of that part of the Department of Missouri is almost beyond belief. 
The men have been absent for years, and the servants having left, the inhabitants 
have been reduced to the verge of starvation. Many of them are now living on 
greens, slippery elm bark and roots. The elm tree have been stripped of their coats 
clear up to the branches.88   
Much of southern Missouri and Arkansas lay in waste. There were few people around to raise 
crops and, even if there were, the land was not in the best condition to produce anything of 
substance. Historian Michael B. Dougan notes that food was especially difficult to procure in 
Arkansas in 1864 and 1865 and having the army around, often consuming agricultural goods and 
foodstuffs, made things more difficult. “The absence of a reliable grain supply crippled the Prairie 
Grove campaign,” notes Dougan, “making impossible a sustained campaign in northwest Arkansas 
or into Missouri. After the fall of Little Rock and the subsequent loss of the Arkansas River valley, 
it became impossible to sustain the army on Arkansas foodstuffs.”89 The Union army needed 
residents to return to the region so that they could produce the necessary food to sustain its 
continued occupation of the region. 
The Union army offered protection for displaced citizens who returned to their farms and 
plantations. It needed these people to raise crops and take an active role in their communities now 
under Federal occupation. For the army, what good was it to hold this area if no one was there and, 
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furthermore, how would the army remain if no citizens were available to raise crops? The bluecoats 
wanted citizens to return so badly that they even offered up animals for their use on these farms if 
they returned. In western Arkansas for example, the Federals used these tactics to encourage people 
to return to their homes once the Federals took control. On December 21, 1863, the commanding 
General John McNeil issued a circular that alerted citizens “to the vast advantages that must accrue 
to its citizens by a prompt return to their farms, workshops, and other legitimate avocations, of all 
who, from any cause, have abandoned their homes since the commencement of hostilities, and 
who may now desire to give assurance of their loyalty, and to hereafter maintain the integrity of 
the Federal Union.”90 While the colony farms relieved the army’s burden of providing for 
displaced people who made their way to the army, there were still people who remained out of the 
army’s reach. With McNeil’s circular, the Federals hoped to reach out to displaced people who 
may have desired to return home but wondered if it was safe. In addition to these promises, the 
army promised to make the transition as easy as possible, provided one took an oath of loyalty of 
course, allowing them to return to the relative normalcy of their pre-war lives. This, however, was 
only part of the solution. 
For some military officials, one potential solution to the problem in the region was the 
establishment of colony farms there in late 1864 into 1865.91 Colonies were attempted or proposed 
in Missouri, Arkansas, and Kansas. These operations were small-scale agricultural settlements 
farmed by men who also serve as soldiers enlisted to protect that farm from marauding guerrilla 
bands and Confederate troops. People were asked, and in some instances military officials 
demanded, that they be organized on to one of these colonies. Companies of fifty or more men 
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usually operated colony farms, also called farm colonies or post colonies. Because of the high 
number of displaced persons, barren landscapes offered no prospect of food for these communities 
or the army – which needed this food for its soldiers. These farm colonies were located on 
confiscated or abandoned Confederate plantations in which displaced people raised crops for 
themselves and their families as well as the army.  
The leading advocate for the creation of these colonies was Colonel Marcus La Rue 
Harrison. His experience with displaced whites dated back to 1862, when he organized many 
Arkansas Unionists into what became the First Arkansas Cavalry Regiment. His experimentation 
with the colonies began in May of 1864 where his plan was to “keep them near home to operate, 
reporting to me or other proper person by letter once or twice a month, and as large a number as 
may be kept raising crops.”92 Colony farms had the potential to reduce the army’s burden of 
providing food and shelter for these people by enabling them to provide it for themselves by raising 
crops on abandoned Confederate plantations. These colonies also served as encouragement for 
other displaced citizens to return to their homes near the communities where these post colonies 
were located, as they would help to provide some stability for that community. The military chain 
of command received requests for the establishment of these colonies from various military 
officials. By late 1864 into early 1865, Harrison pushed for more colonies in Arkansas and had the 
support of the governor, Isaac Murphy. In early 1865, Harrison requested the organization of 
another colony with the following purpose: 
In order to facilitate the return to their homes of citizens of Arkansas now in 
Southwest Missouri and hasten the restoration of law and order in our State, I have 
respectfully to request, upon the application to you of citizens of known and tried 
loyalty, requesting authority to organize colonies of militia at Springfield, Mo., that 
you issue authority to such persons you shall deem properly qualified to raise such 
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companies, with a view to their returning and again locating near their homes in 
this State.93 
For Harrison, these colonies would transition displaced Southern whites to the postwar world. 
Farms would provide an opportunity to get these men back on their feet and be prosperous in the 
new landscape created by the war. 
Colony farms were scattered throughout southern Missouri and were located in northwest 
and central Arkansas. Generally, most were in areas that were firmly under Federal control. 
Colonies dotted the countryside in the Arkansas counties of Washington, Benton, and Madison 
counties in northwest Arkansas. By late March 1865, Harrison reported that these three counties 
had “sixteen fresh colonies as agricultural settlements . . . they number and aggregate of about 
1,200 men . . .”94 The exact number of these colonies in Arkansas, as noted by historian Michael 
A. Hughes, was difficult to determine.95 Colony farms could be very large in size and population. 
Harrison bragged about three Arkansas colonies indicating, “[n]ot less than 15,000 acres will be 
cultivated this summer by them.”96 Based on the reports from different military officials, it is safe 
to say that, by early 1865 with the end of the war imminent, farms manned with displaced residents 
were plentiful throughout the region. 
In addition to raising crops, most of these colony farmers served as soldiers, creating what 
Harrison called ‘fortifications’ at or near these farms. Hughes’s brief study of these colony farms 
deftly notes that Harrison “thought in terms, rather, of agricultural settlements made up of armed 
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farmers, perhaps not unlike Israeli kibbutzim.”97 Harrison noted that the participants were very 
happy on these colonies and, because of that, would not consider joining any kind of guerrilla band 
taking up arms against the army. Harrison also hoped that these post colonies would serve as a 
barrier against guerrillas, especially in northern Arkansas and southern Missouri where guerrillas 
had been a problem for the army. As an added benefit, these colony farms would not only help 
individuals who participated, but the entire community, as all would benefit from the food 
produced on these colonies. Protection of these farms was a key factor in developing a relationship 
between them as well as strengthening their loyalty to the Union during Reconstruction.  
One’s placement on these experimental farms was contingent, like we have seen with other 
forms of aid, on their loyalty. Brigadier General Cyrus Bussey beamed about Harrison’s colony 
project indicating, “the loyal people are preparing to cultivate the land in the vicinity of these 
places [in Arkansas].”98 With their loyalty, they received protection from the army as well as an 
opportunity to be a part of these colonies. For example, one official order appropriated the Pulaski 
County, Arkansas, plantation of one James B. Johnston, a Confederate sympathizer, “for use and 
occupancy by destitute refugee families as a home, farm, or colony.”99 This same order went 
further in that it offered protection to loyal families provided by Company F, Fourth Arkansas 
Cavalry Volunteers. Protection of displaced persons working on these colony farms was important 
if the army wanted them remain and cultivate the land. The cooperative effort between them also 
built trust between these still skittish white Southerners and the army. As one might expect, some 
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people were not trusting of the army given their individual experiences in the past. Together, 
however, these colonies could help build or strengthen the one’s loyalty. While loyalty was 
important to receive aid or for placement on a colony farm, it was not always necessary, especially 
given the circumstances surrounding many displaced Confederate soldiers. 
Complicating things for the Federals was the fact that a number of displaced whites who 
made their way to Union lines and forts – and sometimes to the colony farms - were former 
Confederate soldiers. There were instances of citizens who remained to wander the region because 
they had deserted the Confederate army. One in particular incident near Fayetteville in early May 
of 1865 included a Confederate army major, named Cooper, who told an official “all his men 
except ten have surrendered to the colonies; that he is disgusted with the war, and will never fight 
again.”100 With the war over and perhaps nowhere to go, these Confederates joined one of 
Harrison’s colonies. Perhaps Harrison viewed the colonies as having the potential to ease the 
transition of his former foes back into the fold of the Union or, Harrison was perhaps using this as 
another opportunity to brag about the success of his colony project. For better or for worse, 
Harrison’s bragging about his farms may have brought about some unwanted attention from his 
superiors. 
 These operations did not come about without debate from within the military command. 
Harrison’s chief antagonist over these colonies was the general and career politician Cyrus Bussey. 
Initially, he was not against the formation of these colony farms for displaced people and was not 
against Harrison’s efforts that began in early March of 1865, though this is not to say that he was 
enthusiastic about the whole project. Based on the back-and-forth letters written by the general to 
other officers, he was not thrilled at the fact that displaced civilians were growing in number near 
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military posts. “I am very much embarrassed with the very large number of destitute people who 
are colonizing near the posts of this command.”101 He wanted to be sure that the process for the 
formation of these colonies left little controversy and minimized any friction between the army 
and the citizens. He also certainly understood displaced residents’ dire situation by the early 
months of 1865 and wanted to do what he could to help their situation. General Bussey 
passionately wrote, “I am doing everything in my power for the suffering people in this 
country.”102 He felt that these colonies would be beneficial to both the army and displaced people 
because, if things stayed as they were, the army would run out of food and be unable to provide 
for civilians who sought refuge at the fort in a few months. Therefore, at the start, Harrison’s 
immediate superior was on board with the colony plan. 
As early as March 31, 1865, General Bussey demonstrated his skepticism of Harrison’s 
colony project when he reminded Harrison in an official communication that “[t]hese colonies 
must be organized by the people for their own protection, and no person will be compelled to 
join.”103 At this point, the general was concerned that citizens were not taking part in these colonies 
of their own free will. A little over a month later on May 3, the general “directed Colonel Harrison 
to rescind his order” regarding these colonies but allowed the colonies to continue if the people 
organized in these colonies were happy with the arrangement.104 Bussey reiterated his belief that 
the people were not the willing colony participants that Harrison made them out to be. So it appears 
in this instanced that displaced people were forced into Harrison’s colony project and, as one might 
imagine, this was not a part of winning white Southerners hearts and minds nor did it improve the 
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Yankee image in their minds. Nearly a week later, an angrier Bussey vented, “Permit me to state 
that these colonies are not formed by the people, but by Colonel Harrison,” began one of the 
general’s complaints about Harrison, “who has virtually driven the people from their homes to 
these colonies.”105 He made it known that he did not approve of Harrison’s tactics in creating some 
of these colonies. Bussey’s back and forth opinions about Harrison and his colony farms once 
again muddy the waters of Federal policies. Harrison’s experiment appeared to offer an ideal 
situation to both the army and displaced people, but it only adds more evidence to the army’s 
failure to implement a uniform policy towards uprooted people. 
 While Harrison is probably the most successful with his colony project towards the end of 
the war, and despite his and Bussey’s disagreements over the whole project, it does not appear that 
these were the first proposed colony farms. One of the more interesting examples involves General 
Thomas Ewing, Jr. Before he issued General Orders No. 11, he toyed with the idea of solving his 
guerrilla problem with the post colonies later proposed by Harrison. Like Harrison, Ewing hoped 
that these Union farms would serve as barriers to potential raids from irregulars while at the same 
time putting displaced people to work. “I think that the families of several hundred of the worst of 
these men should be sent,” began Ewing in an August 3, 1863 letter, “with their clothes and 
bedding to some rebel district south, and would recommend the establishment of a colony of them 
on the Saint Francis or White Rivers, in Arkansas, to which a steamboat can carry them direct from 
Kansas City.”106 Ewing thought about using colony farms to remove them from areas where his 
army operated, and thus removing potential guerrilla fighters away from his operations there. This 
had the potential to have gone a long way to solve his guerrilla problem with minimal disruption 
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of the four counties in western Missouri. The above letter concerning post colonies predates his 
General Orders, No. 11 by nearly three weeks which creates the possibility that had his request for 
these colonies been approved, he may not have had to issue General Orders, No. 11 therefore 
eliminating the need to alienate Unionist citizens. Rather than remove everyone from the four 
western Missouri counties, thus uprooting more people, he would have had the ability to clear the 
area of only the worst offenders to his army and civil population. Though Ewing’s proposed 
Missouri colony farm never took shape, it demonstrates just how viable the colony option was 
with regard to mitigating the problem for the army in the West. 
The establishment of these farms caused division among Union officials and had a 
questionable effect on the large number of displaced persons descending upon the Union army. 
They did not lure every person back to their home. Because of the confusion surrounding the 
official policy concerning colony farms, there were pleas at the local level for them to return home. 
These pleas “assured amnesty for all past political offences on renewing their allegiance to the 
Union,” noted an editorial in the Little Rock Daily Gazette, “[t]hey will be restored to their rights 
and property, and protected in them.”107 As the end of the war neared, the army and various local 
officials wanted these people to return home and be productive members of their communities. 
Part of the army’s desire to end Southern whites’ displacement was that it would hasten a return 
to normalcy for those communities now under Federal control; the other part had to do with raising 
crops for the coming year. 
Conclusion 
With the end of the war, came the end of the Union army’s handling of the displacement 
crisis. Not because they solved the problem, but because these people were passed off to the newly 
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created Freedmen’s Bureau after the war ended. For uprooted citizens, the end of the war did not 
mean the end of their life on the run as many continued to wander the region through the early 
years of Reconstruction. Had the Federals not failed in implementing a direct and consistent policy 
with regard to displaced whites in the region, the crisis could have been mitigated and displaced 
whites could have returned home much sooner or might not have left their homes at all. Federal 
policies towards uprooted citizens during the early years of the war were enacted in piecemeal 
fashion and varied from place to place. In addition, these varied policies were self-serving in that 
they focused on reducing or eliminating the burden of providing for displaced residents. Displaced 
men redeemed themselves in the eyes of some of these military men by acting as spies or, joining 
their ranks and enlisting in the army. This was the ultimate demonstration of loyalty – a 
precondition for the army’s subsistence of destitute and displaced residents in many instances. The 
Confederate army also saw displaced men come into their ranks, but the instances of this happening 
were not as frequent and those who did join came nowhere close to replacing men lost to casualties 
and desertion. There was no direct order ‘from the top’ instructing various military commanders 
on how to handle the particular situation that they encountered. Herein lies the difficulty in having 
an across the board policy – the situation encountered by the army varied from place to place. 
Variations in how the army issued rations to uprooted citizens demonstrates this point. Because of 
these variations, potential solutions to the problem like assessments or colony farms were not 
effective in any way. As a result, civilian organizations were asked – and in some instances were 
forced – to step in to help alleviate the suffering of these people. Where these people were left 
wanting by the army, benevolent aid societies in the West stepped up to fill the gap created by the 
Federals. 
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CHAPTER 4: BENEVOLENT AID SOCIETIES & DISPLACED PEOPLE 
 
“The historian of this war will devote a very important chapter to the influence of the war in 
developing the philanthropy of the nation.”1 
- Rev. J.P. Thompson, February 12, 1865 
 
Benevolent aid and local aid societies played a critical role in assisting both the Union army 
and, after the war, the Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Lands in aiding both 
displaced whites and freedmen in the Trans-Mississippi West. These societies also helped whites 
scattered about independent of the army or other governmental organizations. Because the army 
was not fully prepared to handle the crisis, benevolent aid societies stepped in to pick up the slack 
left by the army until the Freedmen’s Bureau assumed care for these people at the war’s end. These 
aid societies, in addition to their duties helping sick and wounded troops, they assisted the army 
by providing supplies and caring for displaced people throughout the region. While some aid 
societies were able to help more uprooted citizens than others, both regional and national 
organizations stepped in to help where the armies could not. This nineteenth century philanthropic 
mission, born out of war, eased the burden by displaced whites. To pay for their efforts, these 
organizations hosted large-scale fundraising events that enticed like-minded citizens to help in 
their charitable mission. 
The Western Sanitary Commission (WSC) provided the fullest response to the crisis in 
Missouri and Arkansas. The Commission proved to be the most flexible in its wartime operations 
with regard to displaced residents in the region. This organization provided food, clothing, shelter, 
and they displayed the Protestant impulse to reform white Southerners during Reconstruction. It 
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evolved in such a way that allowed it to not only ease the burden these people put on the army, but 
ease the suffering of them as well. It provided food, clothing, and shelter in the form of refugee 
homes, education, and transportation for the large number of people who made it into their care 
and sought political solutions to the problem the region. 
While the WSC provided the fullest response in the region, other national organization also 
became involved in an attempt to alleviate the suffering of displaced people in the region. 
Numerous aid societies did their part to bring attention to the situation in Arkansas and Missouri, 
while still maintaining a national outlook on helping those forced from their homes and 
communities and made destitute. This national outlook, however, caused these organizations to 
lose their focus on the plight of people in the Trans-Mississippi region, minimizing their impact 
there. With their headquarters often located somewhere on the East Coast, usually in New York 
City, their gaze often remained focused on locals needed their help as well as people in trouble on 
the other side of the Mississippi River, in western Tennessee and western Kentucky. 
Because of the WSC’s organization, its headquarters in St. Louis, its ability to work with 
other, smaller aid organizations, and its outstanding ability to raise much-needed funds to help 
displaced residents in the region, it proved to be the most adequate aid agency. Through 
fundraising efforts like the Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair of 1864, the Commission raised an 
enormous sum of money to help uprooted residents. It was through its efforts coordinating the 
Sanitary Fair that the Commission was able to utilize the efforts of the St. Louis Ladies’ Union 
Aid Society, allowing it to do all of the little things right when it came to helping people. People 
made their way from Arkansas and southwestern Missouri to Rolla and Springfield and then 
directed by the army to the WSC in St. Louis. The combination of these factors made the 
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Commission the best-suited organization to handle the increasing number of uprooted people in 
the region. 
The Rise and Expansion of Benevolent Aid Societies 
In the most general of terms, benevolent aid societies were organizations that acted on a 
charitable and often religious impulse to assist in the war effort. From the time of Puritan leaders 
like John Winthrop to founding father Benjamin Franklin, nineteenth century philanthropic efforts 
were cultivated in the American colonies. Rooted in the teachings of George Whitefield, Winthrop, 
and other influential figures from the Great Awakening, the charitable impulse in American society 
filled a void that the newly created republican government could not fill. “The practice of 
philanthropy – that segment of social activity that encompasses the giving of time and money for 
public benefit – was pervasive,” notes historian Kathleen D. McCarthy, “encompassing citizens of 
different economic strata, racial backgrounds, and religious beliefs.”2 During the early republic 
and antebellum periods, aid and relief societies were gender-based. Women, excluded from the 
public sphere at this time, took the lead when it came to helping needy people. Often rooted in the 
church and religious teachings, often with an evangelical tilt, aid efforts in the United States 
allowed women to take leadership roles and effect social change in a time when men often denied 
them positions of power or any kind of political voice. American philanthropy followed this course 
until 1861. With the Civil War came a change in the course of the American philanthropic 
movement when it shifted from being gender-based to being class-based after the war.3 
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The Crimean War (1853-1856), according to various aid organizations, was the turning 
point for American philanthropists as there is little mention of their involvement in the Mexican-
American War (1846-1848). By the time of the Civil War, these societies often used and advocated 
more modern medical techniques learned from the experiences of the British and the French in the 
Crimean War. These modern techniques included open-air hospitals – for proper ventilation – and, 
proper daily maintenance, and a field ambulance service. Aid societies also offered 
recommendations to the War Department based on what they had seen in the field. Quite simply, 
these organizations wanted to centralize relief efforts for the army and the army’s Medical 
Department. 
Civil War era sanitary commissions were usually affiliated with the United States Sanitary 
Commission. The United States Sanitary Commission (USSC) had outposts in New York, 
Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, and other communities throughout the North.4 These organizations 
tended to focus on their own religious and philanthropic missions rather than politics. They proved 
to be very important in the explanation for the Federals’ victory as they helped to compensate 
where the Federal government lacked in taking care of its soldiers after they left the field. “One 
current of postwar thought argued that the war had been won no just on the battlefield but also on 
the home front,” historian James Marten reminds us, “rather than emphasizing only the bravery of 
soldiers, many observers highlighted the superior character of all Americans and gave equal credit 
to the efforts of home front volunteers and organizations such as the U.S. Sanitary Commission 
and the U.S. Christian Commission.”5 These organizations filled a void created by modern war. 
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Examples of these organizations include the Western Sanitary Commission, the United States 
Sanitary Commission, Northwestern Freedmen’s Aid Commission, the United States Christian 
Commission, the American Missionary Association, the American Union Commission, the St. 
Louis Ladies’ Union Aid Society, and the Ohio Refugee Relief Commission to name only a few. 
Some were national, some regional, and others local in character. “From the beginning of 
hostilities,” observes historian Robert Bremner, “the needs of destitute people in occupied portions 
of the Confederacy, refugees and escaped or abandoned slaves demanded the attention of Northern 
military commanders, civilian officials, and agents of the major relief commissions.”6 Bremner’s 
assessment held true in the West as the crisis became increasingly urgent with each passing year 
of the war forcing aid societies to move beyond their original intent of helping wounded soldiers.  
Volunteers filled the ranks of these benevolent aid societies, usually coming from urban 
areas and often from the Northern upper classes, doing their part for the soldiers and, later, 
displaced people. Many members of these aid societies were simply continuing their antebellum 
reform efforts, especially abolitionists.7 Early in the war, their work included providing bandages 
and medicines to wounded soldiers as well as establishing soldiers’ homes, giving wounded and 
dying soldiers a place where they could recuperate or die in peace. In addition, these same 
volunteers played a role in the burial and transport of dead soldiers so that they could experience 
“the good death.”8 Both men and women served within the ranks of these organizations with men 
occupying the administrative roles and women serving the immediate needs for the troops and 
displaced people. Many of the women who volunteered served as nurses and some, like Dorthea 
                                                          
6 Robert H. Bremner, The Public Good: Philanthropy and Welfare in the Civil War Era (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1980), 91. 
7 See Lorien Foote, Seeking the One Great Remedy: Francis George Shaw and Nineteenth-Century Reform (Athens: 
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8 See Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage Books, 
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Dix, hoped to incorporate those new medical techniques to minimize the spread of disease and 
infection among injured soldiers.9 
Because the war was a sanguinary conflict in the extreme, concerned citizens created both 
sanitary and Christian organizations to deal with the crisis. While there were differences and 
similarities between each type of organization in both appearance and operation, their overriding 
goal was helping the soldiers when the army or the government could not, as it was unprepared for 
such a large number of casualties. The biggest difference was that the Christian Commission 
tended to soldiers’ moral and spiritual needs while the Sanitarians tended to their physical and 
material needs. “While the Christian Commission was motivated by humanitarian sympathy and 
religious benevolence,” historian Drew Gilpin Faust points out, “the Sanitarians regarded such an 
approach as unduly sentimental, lacking the hard-headed realism and the order and discipline 
necessary to a modern age and a modern war.”10 Both groups, despite their different approaches 
and views of each other, each played a key role in the Union victory. 
Chief among the sanitary organizations was the USSC and the WSC. The creation of 
sanitary commissions in England and France and Florence Nightingale’s nursing corps during the 
Crimean War inspired a number of philanthropic-minded people, mostly women, to create a 
similar organization in the United States once war began.11 Following a well-researched inquiry 
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into the needs of the army and a good amount of public campaigning, Commission organizers 
pushed the Federal government to support their endeavor for such an organization. Finally, on June 
13, 1861, President Lincoln in more of a bow to public pressure rather than a belief in its 
possibilities, established the USSC. “Lincoln’s Fifth Wheel,” as it became known, hoped to aid 
the Union Medical Department in its efforts caring for Union troops.12 Similar to the modern-day 
Red Cross in how it functioned, the USSC hoped to streamline efforts to care for wounded Union 
troops on a national level. “Efficiency, organization, expertise, and order were their governing 
watchwords, layered on top of female expectations about the proper ways to care for the sick; and 
the medical department of the Union Army was in sad need of these contributions.”13 Based on 
the accounts of its origins, displaced whites were not a part of the USSC’s original scope.14 
For the most part, the USSC ignored the plight of displaced whites in Missouri and 
Arkansas making the creation of the WSC that much more important. For example, there are no 
mentions of displaced whites in an 1863 report about the USSC’s operations in the Valley of the 
Mississippi and only a brief mention in the 1864 report of the same name.15 Because many East 
Coast elites operated it, with Frederick Law Olmsted as its General Secretary, the USSC neglected 
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many of the wants and needs unique to the West. A search through the records of the Sanitary 
Commission yields little about the organization’s work when it came to aiding people displaced 
by war in the East or the West. Much of this neglect came about because of its center of operations 
– New York City. 
The Creation of the Western Sanitary Commission 
With the start of the war, St. Louis citizens began to see a number of wounded soldiers 
migrate to their city from the various battlefields in Missouri and Arkansas, especially after the 
battle of Wilson’s Creek. “In the days ahead the number of wounded swelled to nearly 1,000 after 
the men injured at Wilson’s Creek made their painful journey by wagon for more than 100 miles 
to the railhead of the southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad at Rolla,” notes historian Louis 
Gerteis, “and then by train to St. Louis.”16 St. Louis citizens, including Adaline and John Couzins, 
took many of these soldiers to the city’s hospitals and various charitable organizations, but this 
would not be enough. The Sanitary Commission operated hospitals in St. Louis, Jefferson City, 
Ironton, Benton Barracks, and Springfield – all in Missouri.17 Injured soldiers who could not be 
cared for right away lingered in the streets, where it sometimes it took weeks to receive care. In 
St. Louis, both its citizens and facilities were unable to cope with the steady stream of wounded 
soldiers. 
Prominent citizens took it upon themselves to create an organization that would help these 
wounded troops and their families who made their way to St. Louis looking for care and treatment. 
The WSC also helped soldiers’ families if they died in battle or were unable to provide for their 
families. “In many cases a husband had been killed or drafted into Confederate service,” as 
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historian William Parrish reminds us, “leaving a wife and small children to fend for themselves.”18 
St. Louisian Jessie Benton Frémont, the wife of General James Frémont and daughter of famed 
Missouri senator Thomas Hart Benton, lobbied in Washington D.C. she pled for much needed 
assistance back home. While in Washington D.C., Jessie Benton Frémont had the ear of Dorthea 
Dix, a well-known philanthropist and advisor to President Lincoln, and Dix agreed to come to St. 
Louis to evaluate the situation on the ground to see what could be done to alleviate the suffering 
in St. Louis. 19 
Before the two women returned to St. Louis, Unitarian minister and prominent St. Louisian 
William Greenleaf Eliot had already devised a plan to help meet the growing crisis in his city.20 
The Unitarian Church viewed philanthropy through the lens of self-reliance, encouraging its 
members to perform charitable work in their communities in their path to individual salvation. 
This message came from the work of the popular transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson and his 
essay Self Reliance (1841).21 Eliot’s plan for a philanthropic organization to assist the army in the 
West, based on these religious principles, became the Western Sanitary Commission. It became 
official when Frémont issued Special Orders, No. 159 on September 5, 1861, creating the WSC. 
Frémont based his order on Eliot’s framework verbatim.22 In addition to Eliot, James E. Yeatman 
- an industrialist, banker, and philanthropist and ally of Eliot - became a commissioner for the 
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organization along with the local physician Dr. John B. Johnson, entrepreneur Carlos S. Greely, 
and local grocer George Partridge.23 Many of these men worked together in the St. Louis Provident 
Association before the war, so they were not new to philanthropy. Yeatman, a former slave owner 
turned abolitionist, moved to St. Louis at the start of the war and led the WSC. He guided the 
organization in its efforts to help wounded soldiers and later, displaced people who trickled into 
the Gateway City seeking help from the organization.24 
With each passing year of the war, the WSC became increasingly important in the region, 
not just for its care of wounded soldiers, but also for its aid for people across the region. As Parrish 
observed, “. . . the Western Sanitary Commission played a central role in helping to alleviate 
suffering by troops and refugees in the Mississippi Valley and the Trans-Mississippi Theatre 
during the Civil War. . . .”25 Besides assisting people in St. Louis, it helped people in places like 
Rolla, Springfield, Cape Girardeau, and Pilot Knob, Missouri; Helena and Little Rock, Arkansas; 
Leavenworth and Fort Scott, Kansas; and places as far away as Vicksburg, Mississippi. At the 
inception of the WSC, however, the USSC did not want cooperation, but subordination of its 
Western counterpart. 
With the creation of the WSC, a rivalry emerged between it and its eastern counterpart, 
with Olmsted playing a key role in that rivalry.26 With the USSC highly centralized, mostly 
because of Olmsted’s efforts, it wanted to have control of relief efforts in the west in addition to 
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its established duties in the east. Leaders of the USSC wanted the WSC to operate as a ‘branch’ of 
the USSC.27 It could tend to the needs of the army in the Western Theatre, but it would fall under 
the umbrella of operations of the USSC. Both Yeatman and Eliot argued on behalf of their 
organization’s independence that the situation in the West was different and the WSC, as a local 
organization, was better equipped to handle it. Olmsted and the USSC shot back that they felt what 
the WSC was doing was an example of sectionalism. They worried that having a separate relief 
organization in the West would upset the national cooperation for relief efforts. The WSC 
continued to deal with these debates, even after the war’s first year. “In a few years it will be 
forgotten that the Western Sanitary Commission had a separate existence,” noted an 1863 WSC 
report, “and whatever it may have done will fall into the general result, to swell the grand total of 
patriotic zeal.”28 While the WSC hoped that both organizations could just move forward and focus 
on the war effort, this would not be the case. Also contributing to the rivalry were disagreements 
about how the W.S.C operated and organized. 
The rivalry continued in the public eye until the fall of 1863, when Olmsted stepped down 
as head of the USSC. While disagreements continued, each organization did their best to try to 
stay out of each other’s way and the WSC would not become a branch of the USSC.29 The WSC 
clearly wanted to work with the USSC towards the same goal of helping the troops and winning 
the war. In a discussion of its origins within the context of this rivalry, a WSC annual report for 
1862-1863 stated, “the most hateful of all jealousies and controversies are those among 
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philanthropic or charitable associations, and their possibility should be avoided at almost any 
inconvenience or loss.”30 The WSC hoped that all philanthropic organizations could just focus on 
the immediate task and move forward with their respective relief efforts. 
The WSC encountered uprooted people who were desperate for help. Many police stations 
held these people in places like St. Louis, but these police stations could not hold them and they 
turned many over to these aid societies. The army sent a great number of them to these aid societies, 
as it was incapable of providing for so many destitute and hungry people while others sought out 
the help of these organizations in places like St. Louis. Headquartered in St. Louis, the WSC saw 
the dire situation of these people first hand. “They often arrived in families, consisting of from 
four to eight or more, ill-clad, partially diseased children, with a sick mother, having no husband, 
or both parents being in poor health, without means to pay for a night’s lodging, or a mean of 
victuals.”31 With these arrivals happening more and more frequently, the dispossessed came to 
depend upon organizations like the WSC. While these organizations’ original function was to care 
for the wounded and provide for soldiers serving in the war, their functions expanded to include 
displaced whites and freedmen with each year of the war. 
The earliest examples of aid for displaced people from benevolent aid societies came as 
soon as the army passed them on to these societies when they could no longer care for them. The 
Union army lacked any kind of uniform policy towards these people and, because of this, relief 
from the army was sporadic and oftentimes, lacking. Often, people in need received the minimum 
amount of supplies from the army, usually in the form of rations, or the army simply forwarded 
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them to another military installation more equipped to handle the large numbers of Southern whites 
coming into their lines. The army, however, could not provide everything that so many men, 
women, and children needed to survive. It could provide protection but it could not always provide 
clothing, food, education, and shelter for any extended period. For the army, the objective was to 
remove as many civilians from their lines as possible, reduce this burden so that the army could 
move freely, and not have them drain their often-limited resources. Because of the army’s 
inconsistent policy towards uprooted people in the region, they came to rely upon the different 
benevolent aid societies. In many instances, the army guided needy individuals to the care of these 
organizations, as they were better suited to provide for these people. In the army’s view, this helped 
both the army and the increasing number of displaced persons. 
People in the region needed an organization like the WSC. As the flow of people increased 
into the second and third years of the war and the Union army was unable to handle them, they 
made their way either on their own or under the direction of the army to the WSC expecting help. 
Displaced men, women, and children came to St. Louis from the western and central parts of 
Missouri, northern Arkansas, and sometimes as far away as Texas. The WSC pleaded for help 
from citizens as early as the winter of 1861, when it noted in a report that: “Donations of money, 
clothing for men, women and children, and provisions of every kind are earnestly solicited, to be 
sent immediately to the office of the Sanitary Commission, corner of Fifth and Chestnut streets. 
The members of the commission will take charge of the same, and use them to the best advantages 
for the refugees, under the order of Major General Halleck.”32 Because the army expected aid to 
be temporary, its role with regard to displaced residents was crucial, as they were better equipped 
for the long term, though no one knew exactly what ‘long term’ meant. While Frémont’s original 
                                                          
32 “An Appeal to the Charitable for the Refugees from Southwest Missouri,” Daily Missouri Republican [St. Louis], 
December 5, 1861. 
218 
 
 
 
order that established the organization said nothing specifically about aid for them as a part of its 
operations, the WSC eventually expanded its operations to meet the challenge posed by these 
people. With each passing year of the war, uprooted whites inundated St. Louis coming from 
locations across the region. Because of this, the WSC moved to include them under the umbrella 
of its operations. 
People poured into St. Louis from the start of the war, but it is not until the WSC’s 1864 
reports, which included a special report concerning displaced Unionists, that evidence first appears 
of the organization’s operations concerning assistance in the region.33 This is not to say that the 
organization did not offer aid to people before this date, but 1864 appears to be when the crisis hit 
a breaking point for the organization. The Commission made this clear when they posed a question 
in their annual pamphlets. Care for these people was important and, the WSC argued, that their 
welfare was the responsibility of any citizen who supported the Union:  
Who will care for the poor white refugee, equally the victim of a barbarous 
civilization with the oppressed slave, more helpless and sorrowing, and whom none 
seems to pity? Who will give of his abundance to help take care of the poor orphans 
of these people, and to aid in fitting them for the better civilization of which they 
must hereafter form a part? Who will help the poor widows and their children who 
come to us in penury, in destitution and in rags, whose husbands have been 
murdered by friends who roam the sparsely settled regions of the south-west in 
guerrilla bands, and perpetrate their cruelties with impunity, burning widows’ 
houses over their heads, and driving them and their little ones from their miserable 
homes, to seek the Federal lines, and cast themselves upon the charities of the 
North?34 
The answer to this question was most assuredly the WSC. Because it was a fluid organization, it 
was better able to provide for the large number of people than the army could. To help the 
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increasing number of uprooted whites from Arkansas and Missouri, it provided aid in a variety of 
different ways, demonstrating the ways in which it could handle change. This aid was both direct 
and indirect. 
The WSC served people indirectly in that they could help prevent situations where the 
displaced could be taken advantage. There were individual accounts who took advantage of the 
crisis and attempted to pass themselves off as a person in need of help, making a few dollars in the 
process. While these accounts were not the norm, they certainly raised the alarm for aid societies, 
as they did not want such accounts to turn off potential donors or volunteers. These imposters, like 
a man named J.C. Hall who “said that he was a loyal refugee from Mississippi, whose story had 
warmly interested several in the city[,]” told his tale to the congregation of a New York church.35 
His story had all of the elements of any good account from a displaced person – Confederate troops 
robbed this loyal man right in front of his family, had a child murdered by these troops right before 
his eyes, and made a narrow escape to the North. The congregation, having heard so many similar 
tales of woe, offered to help Mr. Hall. From here, the church took up donations for Mr. Hall and 
his wife – his likely accomplice - who “made a handsome sum,” and a kind citizen even offered to 
put him up until he was back on his feet.36 Eventually, citizens discovered Mr. Hall for the imposter 
that he was and prosecuted him for his swindling ways. The fact that this incident appeared in a 
St. Louis newspaper reveals that many citizens were on the lookout for imposters like Mr. Hall, 
often casting suspicious eyes on the real people in need. This, as one could imagine, only made 
the experiences of displaced people even more difficult to endure.  
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Benevolent aid societies, like the WSC, served as a buffer of sorts for these vulnerable 
individuals. Swindlers might try to give desperate people incorrect information as a means to profit 
from their circumstances. For example, in another case of fraud, a man claiming that the displaced 
man needed to pay a wharfage swindled “a poor Arkansas refugee,” who had recently landed on 
the levee with his oxen and wagon, out of 14 dollars.37 The man refused to pay at first, but upon 
the threat of arrest, in addition to not wanting to be bothered, he handed over the money to the 
man. Accounts like this serve as cautionary tales to both individuals and organizations who wanted 
to help needy people and the uprooted whites themselves. As in any time of crisis, some individuals 
want to take advantage of the situation for their benefit. The situation in Missouri and Arkansas 
was no different as swindlers often exploited displaced people. Left to the streets of St. Louis or 
the wandering, lonely roads of the countryside, people were vulnerable to fraud. The WSC shielded 
them from various swindles, though it is difficult to quantify exactly how many. Fraud cases, like 
this, also contributed to the suspicion cast on displaced whites by aid workers and donors. This 
form of protection classifies as indirect aid, which the WSC was happy to do, but their strength 
lay in giving direct aid to the people who made into their care. 
One way that the WSC directly aided people was by providing transportation. First, it 
looked to see if any friends or family might take them in and, if these relatives were able to provide 
help, it transported them to where they could care for them. The WSC explored this option because, 
as a charity organization, they had to look to cut costs in order to help as many people as possible. 
To send uprooted whites to friends and family in the North, the WSC covered transportation costs 
for those who were able to take advantage of family help. In the end, providing transportation costs 
was much cheaper than clothing, food, and shelter a displaced family or individual for an extended 
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period. Many times, railroads offered a discounted rate for needy people and, in some instances, 
free passes. These free passes helped to drive down costs for the Sanitary Commission. The North 
Missouri Railroad, the Pacific Railroad, the Saint Louis, Alton, and Chicago Railroad, and the Iron 
Mountain Railroad, for example, all provided free passes to many persons in need under the care 
of the WSC. The numbers of people helped by the WSC are worth noting. For example, with 
regard to these numbers, in its 1864 Report on White Union Refugees of the South, the WSC 
recorded:  
The whole number of refugees for whom transportation has been obtained from the 
Government, and from the railroads, and steamboats, by the Commission, to assist 
them to reach their friends, or places of employment, in the Western free States, 
from Oct. 17th, 1863 to Oct. 25th, 1864, is 202 men, 493 women, and 682 children, 
making a total of 1377 persons, besides many young children under four years of 
age, who passed without any fare being charged.38 
Uprooted whites did not necessarily have to make it all the way to St. Louis to receive help from 
the WSC and the railroads. Even before they reached the WSC’s St. Louis headquarters, leaders 
hoped to accelerate the transportation of these people to the care of friends or family or finding 
them some form of employment.39 Care for dispossessed whites who did not have family or friends 
offering a place of refuge, left many of these citizens to remain at St. Louis and depend on material 
assistance from the WSC for extended periods. This was in addition to the men, women, and 
children who continued to stream into the city. 
 People entered St. Louis with only the clothes on their back and whatever few belongings 
that they could carry. Displaced people needed all kinds of things to make life bearable and 
benevolent aid societies helped fulfill those needs. So many people did not have time to gather any 
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kind of personal belongings nor did they were unable to transport these items when they fled their 
homes and communities. Because of this, many did not bring proper clothing for their journey. 
This is understandable, as many did not know how long or how far their displacement would be. 
This proved to be especially difficult when facing the cold winters, which could sometimes reach 
“unparalleled severity.”40 Recognizing the clothing needs of the many cold and freezing people, 
the WSC provided “thousands of coats, pantaloons, under-clothing, women’s dresses, shawls, 
shoes, comforters and other articles of bedding, to the more destitute.”41 The Union army may 
have provided temporary relief in the form of rations, but one thing that it could not provide for 
these people on a large scale was clothing. Through the many donations received by the WSC, 
they were able to provide them with the necessary raiment. Other means of assistance supplied by 
the WSC included items like cooking stoves and what the organization deemed “necessary articles 
of furniture” were provided so that people could be self-sustaining, therefore not causing a drain 
on the organization’s or the government’s resources.42 
Refugee Schools, Homes, and Orphanages 
The WSC dealt with the large number of displaced children by establishing school, homes, 
and orphanages. Many were orphans in need of help. In addition to material assistance like food 
and clothing, the WSC provided schools for children who were in St. Louis for any extended 
period. Historian Stephen V. Ash notes, “[p]ublic education provided another example of the 
Yankees’ Victorian social conscience at work.”43 Schools established by the WSC were located in 
St. Louis, Missouri, down the Mississippi River to Vicksburg. While uprooted Unionist children 
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elicited sympathy from many Northerners, so too did the children of displaced Confederates. 
“Yankee civilians often had some sympathy for the plight of Confederate children,” according to 
historian Lisa Tendrich Frank, “largely because of the gendered presumption that these civilians, 
especially the female ones, were helpless and had little understanding of politics or war.”44 These 
schools, in some ways, served as a manifestation of that sympathy. 
For uprooted children, the war was especially hard and perhaps, thought WSC members, 
schooling could serve as a way to take their minds off the war and other troubles that they had 
experienced in their displacement. As a result, the WSC organized a number of schools throughout 
the region. “It [WSC] has also established a school at Benton Barracks, for the children of 
refugees” began an organizational report on its schools, “under Miss Samantha Monroe as teacher, 
where 140 children have received instruction since last June [1864].”45 Since many people 
remained at military posts that did not have any schools, schools established by the WSC allowed 
children to receive instruction while the organization helped their families back to their feet. These 
schools also maintained an uplifting purpose with regard to these destitute people as well as an 
opportunity to remake these children, especially Southern children, in the Northern image. 
In war-torn areas like Vicksburg, Mississippi, the WSC assisted with the establishment of 
a Free School for Refugees. The Commission described some of the pupils here as lazy – because 
they could sometimes be found sleeping on benches or in corners of the school. The organization 
attempted to combat this kind of behavior among this class of people. A class that the WSC referred 
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to as poor white trash.46 A WSC agent, named Mr. N.M. Mann, used this term in one of his reports 
to the Commission about displaced Southern whites. Mann wrote, “The greatest distress prevails 
among the class known as ‘poor white trash,’ who knowing nothing, are responsible for nothing, 
but suffer all.”47 WSC agents mention, on more than one occasion, that these displaced white 
Southern Unionists were, unlike African Americans, unable or unwilling to help themselves.48 
Certainly, issues of race and class were at play here. For Mr. Mann, these people were of a 
condition that was “even more deplorable than that of the negroes.”49 Like the Union army 
following the Emancipation Proclamation or the army of nurses who treated wounded troops, aid 
societies were not above discriminatory practices towards African Americans.50 While aid-minded 
Northerners viewed the institution of slavery as a national scourge, the fact that so many non-
slaveholding Southern whites did nothing to end it was even more damming. Contact with the 
peculiar institution made many of these displaced whites arrogant and unwilling to help 
themselves.51 
Despite their preconceived notions of Southern whites, the Commission took an active role 
in educating these Southern whites in the Northern tradition. For the WSC, “the work of educating 
and elevating the offspring of these poor people is deemed of the first importance, as they must 
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hereafter blend with the higher and better civilization of the Free States, or become the vagrants 
and pests of society.”52 This statement, taken from one of the many individual reports sent by 
school representatives to the WSC, demonstrates its educational goals directed at people in its care. 
It is certainly telling as to what the WSC hoped to accomplish with the many schools that it 
operated and supported. Not only was the WSC supporting these schools for the sake of education 
for displaced residents, they also hoped that these schools would uplift, what it viewed as, the poor 
Southern people. The WSC’s views of poor Southern whites supports Ash’s assertion that such 
impressions “and the preconceptions they validated, strongly influenced northerners’ relations 
with southern civilians throughout the war, particularly their policy toward poor whites.”53 Not to 
mention the staggering statistic that, according to the organization’s final report in 1866, “[o]f all 
the refugees who applied to the Commission for assistance, not more than one-tenth were able to 
read and write.”54 The WSC and other aid societies vowed to help displaced people and their 
children; this included remaking them in the Northern image. 
Benevolent aid societies made it clear that, with so many destitute whites in their care, they 
would do their best to remake the worst of these cases removing any Southern tendencies in order 
to create new citizens molded in the Northern image. They hoped to take advantage of what 
historian Emory M. Thomas described as a “heightened sense of class consciousness among 
yeoman and laboring classes of Confederate Southerners.”55 That is they hoped to use situations 
created by the war to remake much of that section of poor, white, antebellum Southern society – 
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many uprooted by the war. As with the Union army’s general position towards the dispossessed, 
the WSC did what it could to make them as self-sustaining and self-reliant as possible, minimizing 
their impact as much as possible. It demonstrated this by providing the aforementioned 
transportation in that it sent some people to places where they might find employment. Perhaps 
this was a means of operating in a utilitarian fashion – helping as many people as possible or doing 
the most good. 
These attitudes expressed by benevolent aid societies and the American people in general 
were very much a reflection of the Victorian beliefs towards the poor and the charitable impulse. 
This was also a lesson in the Protestant work-ethic in that the organization did its best to simply 
help these people get back on their feet by providing life’s bare necessities or employment, not 
provide extensive assistance. Historian Anne Rose reminds of this fact when she states, “The idea 
that steady labor secured social discipline was the point of the Protestant ethic most often cited by 
the Victorians.”56 The various aid societies’ make this point with their educational programs for 
displaced whites once in their care and they take full advantage of reaching them through charity. 
This wartime charity expanded upon the ad hoc forms of charity and assistance already provided 
by the army. The Commission hoped to remake these destitute Southerners in the Northern image 
and they certainly had many opportunities to do given that so many people were in their schools 
and living in refugee homes. 
Refugee homes proved to be an important component of the WSC’s program to help 
uprooted people in the region. Initially, the Commission established these homes to provide a 
reception point for people who flooded into St. Louis in 1861 and 1862. These homes also served 
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as a place where the sickest people could recover before Commission agents arranged 
transportation so that they could be with friends or relatives. People who were unable to recover 
from their ailments died in these homes. “Over three thousand Refugees were received and aided 
here in the six months from February to July, 1865,” noted contemporary observers Linus Brockett 
and Mary C. Vaughn in their account of women, “and both children and adults were taught not 
oily elementary studies but housework, cooking and laundry work; the women were paid moderate 
wages with which to clothe themselves and their children, and were taught some of the first lessons 
of a better civilization.”57 In addition to the homes in St. Louis, the organization established other 
homes in Rolla, Pilot Knob, Springfield, and Cape Girardeau, Missouri, because of the high 
numbers of displaced people in these places. The Commission’s 1864 report on refugees detailed 
the construction of a large home intended to house two thousand people. Unfortunately, this 
building was never finished as it had been destroyed by fire in 1864 much to the dismay of the 
“poor refugees, and to many destitute soldiers’ wives and widows, for whom they were 
intended.”58 Representatives of the Commission supervised the day-to-day operations of homes in 
these places. Refugee homes served as temporary living quarters for these people until the WSC 
sent them to the care of friends or family or until they found some form of employment. 
Because of these children, there were a number of orphan homes created in St. Louis and 
other cities and towns in Missouri. For example, the WSC contributed to the establishment of a 
refugee and orphan home in Springfield, Missouri, run by a local philanthropist who would also 
serve a teacher for the children.59 In many instances, the Commission sent these children to other 
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philanthropic organizations in the city. Late in 1863, it sent over forty of these children to the 
Church of the Messiah and the Protestant Orphan Asylum, both in St. Louis. Here, displaced 
children “were cared for; and if sick, retained till they were restored to health; instruction was 
given to them in the daily school, and homes provided for them, by indenture to suitable persons 
applying for them at these institutions.”60 The WSC utilized the efforts of other, local philanthropic 
organizations in St. Louis to help them with the number of children who came into their care. 
These local organizations provided medical care, education, and employment for children on 
behalf of the Sanitary Commission. Unfortunately, the Commission’s records say nothing about 
the “indentures” mentioned above. Did these children have a say in these indentures? Was the 
organization paid for providing these children as indentures? If so, did the WSC use these fees to 
help offset the costs of caring for these people? Interesting questions to be sure, but the point made 
here is that the WSC was not afraid to utilize other organizations or individuals’ help. 
The WSC and like-minded organizations wanted to help these displaced children. Some of 
these relief efforts for orphans were private endeavors. Many newspapers pleaded with the 
Missouri public to help stating that, in fact, it was their duty to do so. Like with the adults, 
benevolent aid societies hoped to remake these orphan children in the Northern image – or least in 
the image of Northern industriousness. In southwestern Missouri, a group of independent women 
was doing their best to help people who wandered in that part of the state. These women had every 
intention of finishing what they had started and not allowing people to be taken to the WSC in St. 
Louis. In a plea from a Mrs. J.S. Phelps, published in the Missouri Republican, she wished to help 
uprooted whites in the southwestern part of the state and reminded citizens that “[w]e have several 
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reasons for wishing to keep these children, and raise them in Southwest Missouri.”61 Here, the 
paper stated that the women there were prepared to help until the end of the war. Why keep them 
there and not send them to St. Louis where they could be better cared for? Phelps continued, “we 
wish to place these children on a farm, and teach them to earn their own living. Nothing is more 
injurious to children than to supply all their wants, without their making an effort for themselves. 
We see the bad effects even among the rich, and what will it be to the poor orphans, reared in your 
city orphan homes?”62 Not only do these women want to remake these children into good Union 
citizens, but also a critique of the WSC Here, Mrs. Phelps insinuates that it was not properly 
remaking these displaced Southern whites in the proper way, only creating a dependent class of 
citizens. Phelps offers her idea as an experiment counter to the one performed by the WSC in St. 
Louis. “If the children are sent here to St. Louis you will have them to support, indirectly, by small 
contributions to fairs, and other ways.”63 Mrs. Phelps and her fellow benefactors hoped to care for 
these children, removing the burden from St. Louis citizens. In addition, she hoped to produce 
loyal Missouri citizens. 
Donations from local citizens and assessments imposed by Union officials on disloyal 
Missouri citizens initially funded these homes. After President Lincoln ended these assessments 
in 1863, the government paid for aid while the local quartermaster paid for the rent of a home for 
these displaced people. “By an arrangement with Generals Schofield and Rosecrans,” began the 
Commission’s account of these homes, “rations and fuel are allowed from the Government, and 
the rent is paid by the Quartermaster; but the incidental expenses of the home, and the charities in 
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clothing, money, &c., are provided by the Commission.”64 These homes were vital as they often 
served as a point of transition. These homes ended people’s lives on the run, giving them a moment 
to weigh what their next step might be. For orphans, these homes provided them with an 
opportunity to find suitable homes and attend school. Most importantly for uprooted individuals, 
families, and orphans, these homes offered an opportunity to rebuild their lives. 
While there were no explicit conditions placed on displaced people to receive 
transportation, clothing, or any form of relief from the WSC, one would think that loyalty was a 
factor in receiving this aid as it was with the army. There is no indication that loyalty was required, 
however, reading through the Commission’s reports in 1864 and 1865 indicate that loyalty was 
certainly preferred. Refugees “uniformly claim to be Union people,” a WSC observer noted at 
Pilot Knob, Missouri, “are willing enough to take the oath of allegiance, but do not really 
understand what is essential to loyalty, or the merits of the conflict in which we are engaged.”65 
White Southerners who were not in the antebellum elite, had loyalties that were much less firm. 
Historian Harold Hyman concluded “[a]t the other end of the scale of patriotic adhesion were the 
many thousands of Southerners who had never been wholehearted participants in rebellion or who 
had always been covert or dangerously open Unionists.”66 The organization acted out of sincere 
Christian charity helping everyone in need, regardless of his or her loyalties – Union or 
Confederate. This observation continued “[n]evertheless they are human beings; and although in 
the lowest stage of civilization, they are thrown upon our charity and with their children must be 
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provided for, improved as much as possible, or be left to perish.”67 In short, it was the WSC or no 
one for people in need of aid – these people could very likely die without its help. According to 
the many personal stories detailed by the WSC reports, there were not large numbers of displaced 
Confederates making their way into St. Louis. Because many white Southern yeoman had 
“property to protect, yeoman for the most part remained on their farms,’ observes Ash, poor 
Southern whites with very little to lose or gain in the war, “sought their fortune with the 
Yankees.”68 Uprooted Confederate sympathizers appear to have made their way further south, 
deeper into the Confederacy. For Southerners who decided to depend upon the WSC for aid, they 
would have to make some changes to how they lived their lives. 
The Freedmen and Union Refugees’ Department and the St. Louis Ladies’ Aid Society 
As the problem became more acute by 1864, especially in St. Louis, the WSC created a 
special department so that they could better handle the needs of these displaced citizens who came 
into their care. On March 17, 1864, the organization created the Freedmen and Union Refugees’ 
Department (FURD), to better care for the uprooted whites and freedmen in the region. This also 
allowed the Commission to distribute goods to these people in a more efficient manner. Sanitary 
commissioners well aware of the fact that the flow of people into St. Louis would continue at least 
as long as the war. The creation of this department allowed the WSC to continue its assistance in 
a more organized manner. In the circular that announced the creation of the department, it 
reiterated the sacrifice for the Union made by these people. “For the ‘Union refugees,’ it would 
seem that no other plea can be needed,” the WSC circular reminded fellow Unionists, “than the 
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simple statement that they have been deprived of all their property, and been driven from their 
homes, simply because they would not be rebels.”69 In addition to better handling displaced whites 
and freedmen who came to the St. Louis for help, the WSC used the creation of this department to 
remind Northerners that they still needed donations to carry on with their work. The creation of 
the FURD indicates just how pressing the situation was. Furthermore, the Commission’s creation 
of the department demonstrates its ability to meet the crisis. The Commission, with the aid of 
generous donors as well as fellow organizations like the St. Louis LUAS, was better able to meet 
the demands of the crisis in Missouri. The army continued to send displaced people who it 
encountered in the region into St. Louis causing the organization to evolve and improve its aid 
mechanisms. 
While the WSC mirrored policies of the Union army in that it pushed some people onto 
other organizations for help, as they did with displaced orphans, they did so for utilitarian purposes. 
The WSC sought to help as many people as they could. If this meant that the Commission utilized 
the help of other organizations, the WSC accepted this as a necessary, realistic view as they 
realized that they could not help every person who came into their care. The physical and financial 
burden placed upon the WSC with the constant flow of individuals and families into St. Louis was 
enormous and it could not do it without the help of another aid society located in the Gateway City 
– enter the St. Louis Ladies’ Union Aid Society. 
Following the Camp Jackson incident in May 1861 when pro-Union forces captured a pro-
secession militia at Camp Jackson just outside of St. Louis, a group of well-to-do women from the 
city decided to act. Their creation, the St. Louis Ladies’ Union Aid Society (LUAS), attended 
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wounded troops and, as the number of displaced people increased, helped people who made their 
way into the city in search of help. Organized on August 2, 1861, the Society was an all-female, 
patriotic organization that worked alongside the Commission to aid wounded soldiers and, later, 
displaced whites. These ladies’ aid societies, remarked historian Nina Silber, “comprised an 
extensive network of women, both young and old, whose efforts sustained the largest military 
operation on American soil.”70 These women supported the war effort in the Trans-Mississippi 
West. 
As with the other ladies’ aid societies located throughout the United States, the LUAS 
rolled bandages for wounded soldiers, served as nurses in the many hospitals in and around St. 
Louis, as well as helping with other miscellaneous tasks within the WSC This included the day-
to-day operations of homes and schools for displaced people. These women packed and shipped 
supplies to the battlefield and recruited fellow women to serve as nurses. If the WSC was the 
machine, the Society was the angel in the machinery in that these women, for many soldiers and 
displaced people, served as the face of the organization’s care. Historian Adam Arenson argues 
that women’s efforts “were “essential to the Commission’s success.”71 Women provided a caring 
face and gentle touch for the many in need that passed through the doors of the WSC. The LUAS 
also helped with the WSC’s fundraising efforts throughout the war and played a vital role in the 
organization and its fundraising efforts. While the Society’s initial concerns were the wounded 
Union soldier, these concerns broadened as the crisis worsened around St. Louis. 
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As the war progressed, the LUAS aided the large number of people who made their way to 
St. Louis. This increased aid by the Society is evident in the changes made to the society’s 
preamble that moved beyond the inclusion of wounded soldiers to include all “who suffer at the 
cause of the Union, and also sick and wounded prisoners of war.”72 Like the WSC, the LUAS had 
to be malleable in its operations given the situation by the war’s midpoint. Women from the LUAS 
would visit the Refugee Home to provide care, deliver supplies, and offer Biblical instruction for 
the dispossessed. In addition to its broadening of aiding those affected by the war, the LUAS 
accounted for nearly a third of the WSC’s total fundraising dollars.73 The LUAS’s makeup was 
women from the St. Louis well-to-do class with Northern backgrounds. Women like Adeline 
Couzins and Anna Clapp served as leaders of LUAS and made it their patriotic duty to care for 
people in need. While the LUAS’s efforts were an important component to the WSC’s overall 
operations, it was not enough. To both raise awareness of the situation in the region as well as 
much-needed funds for the organization, the WSC held a large sanitary fair in 1864.74 
The Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair 
An important event that both brought attention to displaced whites in the region and raised 
money for the benefit of these people was the Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair of 1864. The fair 
collected donations as well as much-needed supplies for people in need in Missouri and Arkansas 
and it was the only one of its kind west of the Mississippi River. Sanitary fairs were popular as a 
means of fundraising and they occurred all over the country in 1863 and 1864 in St. Louis, 
Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago. By 1864, relief agencies, including the WSC, were running 
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out of funds and these sanitary fairs helped to refill the charity coffers. Sanitary fairs were a 
fundraising event intended to help citizens and soldiers in need, as well as serve as a welcomed 
distraction and morale boost for those who served on the homefront. 
With a carnival-like atmosphere, sanitary fairs often contained art galleries, soda fountains, 
a bakery, and books to keep its patrons occupied for three weeks. The 1864 Sanitary Fair in St. 
Louis began on May 17, lasted through June 18, and went a long way in accomplishing its intended 
goals. The fair had a total of fifty-four booths showcasing a variety of wares including sewing 
machines, a floral center, fountains and gardeners, a New England kitchen, a German Kitchen, and 
a fine art department – to name a few. The main building, a point of pride for the WSC, measured 
114 feet by 525 feet and lit by 3,000 gas jets supplied by over one mile of pipe. The building 
featured grand arches supported by pillars with the names of the prominent Union generals 
including the likes of Grant, Rosecrans, Sherman, Porter, Hancock, etc. inscribed on their 
surface.75 In addition, prizes like a red, white, and blue quilt valued at $125.00, a piano, a billiard 
table, a buggy, many bars of silver straight from Nevada), a few paintings, and a farm were raffled 
off to patrons. This 500 acre farm, named Smizer Farm and valued at approximately $40,000.00, 
was donated by Captain L.P. Marin of the Davenport, Iowa, Quartermaster Department.76 At the 
outset, these raffles very controversial as some citizens felt that they sanctioned gambling, but, 
despite these initial objections, the raffles went off without a hitch. Raffles were not the only part 
of the sanitary fair to drum up controversy. The sale of intoxicating liquors also generated 
controversy at the fair for the most obvious of reasons, though this too went off without any 
problems during the sanitary fair. Reverend Alpha Wright, who had recently attained the title of 
                                                          
75 William Y. Thompson, “Sanitary Fairs of the Civil War,” Civil War History Vol. 4, No. 1 (March, 1958): 62. 
76 Jasper W. Cross, “The Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair, St. Louis, 1864,” Missouri Historical Review Vol. XLVI, 
No. 3 (April, 1952): 243. 
236 
 
 
 
Superintendent of Refugees in the Trans-Mississippi West, even paid the sanitary fair a visit. To 
visitors of the Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair, it was quite the spectacle. Because it served as the 
longest fair in terms of duration, it provided hours of entertainment at the cost of helping wounded 
soldiers and displaced Southern whites.77 The WSC utilized newspapers throughout the region to 
bring in visitors and money to the 1864 fair. 
Published circulars in newspapers throughout the region brought attention to the 
Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair and directed those interested to send supplies and financial 
donation items to various WSC offices as well as bring whatever donations they could to the fair.78 
The Commission published similar circulars in both national papers like Harper’s Weekly as well 
as a wide array of local papers throughout the region. On the opening night of the fair, one of these 
newspapers helped to convey the excitement brought about by the fair. “This city is decidedly full 
to-night,” began an editorial in the Morning Herald of St. Joseph, Missouri, “and has been 
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unusually lively to-day. The hotels are crowded, the streets are thronged, and everybody is 
apparently filled with patriotism and enthusiasm.”79 In addition, newspapers ran circulars provided 
by the WSC that explained how important raising funds for soldiers and displaced people was and 
encouraged citizens to attend the fair and give whatever donations that they could. Often 
accompanied by newspaper editorials encouraging citizens to attend the fair, newspapers 
throughout Missouri made clear the plight of the displaced whites and why the organization needed 
funds so badly. “In undertaking this great task, the undersigned rely, not only upon the people of 
St. Louis and of Missouri, but upon all their fellow-citizens throughout the ‘Union.’ It is not 
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sectional work and they make no sectional appeal.”80 While put on by the WSC, it hoped that help 
would not be limited to only people in the West. Organizers hoped that all like-minded individuals, 
North and South, would lend their support. The crisis must have appeared to be unrelenting by 
1864 to many who served in the WSC. Wave upon wave of people streamed into the Commission’s 
St. Louis office in search of food, shelter, and clothing. “There are thousands of homeless whites,” 
read a circular for the Fair, “made so by the rebellion. These displaced Unionists are in great 
numbers, and in utter destitution, at different places within our army lines, especially in St. 
Louis.”81 The St. Louis fair was very well advertised and went a long way in raising awareness of 
the plight of Union soldiers and displaced whites in the region, it also raised the status of the WSC 
given the fair’s success. 
The sanitary fair focused a great deal of attention on displaced whites in the region. The 
WSC had to do something so that it could continue its efforts assisting people beyond 1864 and 
the Sanitary Fair played a key role in allowing these efforts. Receiving no help from the USSC or 
the American Union Commission (AUC), the WSC relied on the cash and supplies that came out 
of the fair. After the WSC calculated all of the fair’s expenses, the fair yielded $554,591.00 in cash 
and material donations utilized by the Commission for its aid efforts.82 While sanitary fairs helped 
raise funds – over half a million dollars - for the WSC’s operations, it was not nearly enough. The 
organization had increased its aid efforts in the region and hoped to continue these efforts as long 
as it could.83 
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The WSC organized the Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair in a way that framed the 
sufferings of both uprooted Southern whites and freedmen as a sacrifice made upon the altar of 
Union. It was the duty of patriotic Americans to support these people because they waved the flag 
of the United States in Confederate territory. Pleas for this support, however, were not without 
racial qualifications. The WSC was very careful to separate freedmen from displaced whites in 
their appeals to the Northern public. The sanitary fair sought to help displaced people and donors 
could specify whom they wanted their donation to help. “’The Freedmen’s and Union Refugees’ 
Department of the Sanitary Fair, and donors will be careful to designate clearly, whether their 
contributions are ‘For Freedmen,’ or ‘For Refugees,” or for both at the discretion of the Western 
Sanitary Commission.”84 With the WSC, there was a continued effort to separate displaced 
Southern whites from displaced African Americans – not just in language but in financial 
donations as well. There is a variety of explanations for such an approach. Perhaps such a 
separation came from a fear that if the two groups were lumped together, donations to the WSC 
could suffer. Another explanation looks to the racial attitudes of the day. Whatever the reason, the 
organization hoped to maximize donations for these people – white or black – and felt that by 
allowing donors to identify whom they were helping might help them achieve this goal. 
The American Union Commission and the Refugee Relief Commission of Ohio 
While the WSC operated mostly west of the Mississippi River, the AUC, like the USSC, 
had a national scope and quickly became influential on a national level. The AUC had offices in 
Chicago, Boston, Cincinnati, Louisville, Nashville, Memphis, and Cairo (IL). While the 
Commission had influence in Washington, it did not have nearly the same impact on the region’s 
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displaced persons as the WSC. Founded in New York in 1864, the AUC sought relief on a national 
level. Because of its national character, the Commission was much more diverse in its 
organization, operating in North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas. The 
AUC helped in the areas of emigration - people who wished to migrate to the South - and education 
for the destitute and displaced residents. In addition to these areas, the AUC sought to aid displaced 
whites by raising funds and establishing refugee homes like the WSC. In a report of its origins, it 
noted that the organization was “enabled to provide permanently for from seventy-five to a 
hundred thousand refugees, and to relieve the country from the evils of a gigantic pauperism.”85 
Because the AUC was national in its character, it was very limited in its western operations. For 
example, in a pamphlet written about its origins and operations, the only two states mentioned that 
lie west of the Mississippi were Louisiana and Arkansas. This same pamphlet contains two 
accounts about the situation in Arkansas, one from J.H. Leard, the army chaplain in charge of 
helping people in Arkansas, and the state’s governor, Isaac Murphy.86 These accounts published 
by the Commission, generally, were appeals to help the displaced and destitute people of their state 
with rather generic language. 
The AUC was an organization designed to aid the displaced and received much attention 
from historians for this endeavor. However, the Commission receives too much credit for their 
help of displaced persons. Historians have made a variety of claims detailing the AUC’s wartime 
efforts.87 Historian Ira V. Brown claimed that the AUC “was distinctive in that it offered relief to 
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both black and white refugees.”88 Perhaps this was ‘distinctive’ during Reconstruction, given that 
Brown’s article covers the years 1865-1869, but it is certainly not accurate in general. While the 
WSC did not use the term black refugee, instead choosing to use the word contraband, it did aid 
anyone who came in need of assistance. It is a slight distinction used by the WSC, perhaps to elicit 
more donations from Northerners or choosing to stick with the legal term for displaced African 
Americans given the fact that, until the Thirteenth Amendment, these people were legally 
contraband in a Border State like Missouri.89  
 Leaders of the AUC were proud of their wartime efforts. In a series of speeches from 
organization officials given in Washington City in early 1865, they trumpeted about their efforts 
towards wartime displacement – even if it focused their efforts on displaced whites east of the 
Mississippi. Speeches by Reverend L.P. Thompson (President of the organization from New 
York), Colonel N.G. Taylor (of East Tennessee), and Senator James R. Doolittle (from Wisconsin) 
praised the work of the Union army and detailed the plight of displaced people in the United States. 
In his speech, Reverend Thompson laid out “four distinct classes” who had “been thrown directly 
upon our hand for sympathy and aid.”90 The first of these classes were the wounded soldiers, 
followed by African Americans, loyal Southerners, and displaced whites. “REFUGEES,” 
exclaimed Thompson, “who are stranded within our lines by the tides of war—home-less, 
friendless, penniless-driven out by their fears-driven out by threats-driven out by guerilla 
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invasions—driven out by starvation—driven out by the advance of the rebel armies, and again by 
the order of our own commanders under military necessity.”91 Here, Thompson very clearly 
explained the situation. Thompson continued his speech with hope that the AUC would provide 
some organization to the situation that the Federal military lacked. Given what we know about 
how the army operated in the region with regard to displaced whites, Thompson’s assessment is 
correct. The problem needed some kind of uniform policy and these benevolent aid societies 
provided at least some form of organization. 
Where Thompson and the AUC, however, fall short is their focus on displaced residents in 
the East. Thompson gives a great many examples of their experiences there, like Georgia for 
example. While Thompson directly referenced the role of guerrilla attacks as a factor in one’s 
displacement, though he does not mention the displaced in Arkansas and Missouri specifically. In 
his speech, Thompson discussed the plight of displaced residents in Nashville, Vicksburg, and 
Memphis, but said nothing of people in Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, or Louisiana. Colonel Taylor, 
who also spoke, discussed displaced persons in East Tennessee, where he had recently served.92 
Did the AUC assume that the WSC had things in those states under control? Did a rivalry exist 
between the two organizations, similar to that between the USSC and its Western counterpart? 
Both Abbott’s records and these speeches do not indicate that this was the case. Therefore, the 
AUC and the WSC both came to embrace aiding displaced people; both appear to have a different 
geographic focus. This does not mean, however, that similarities did not exist between the two 
organizations with regard to helping displaced Southern whites. 
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 Like the WSC, the AUC was weary of, but determined to help the poorest of the poor while, 
at the same time, not creating a dependent class of people in the process. The AUC was careful to 
mention that displaced whites came from various sections of Southern society. Before the war, 
some were rich, some were quite poor, and many of them fell in between those two extremes. 
People who Thompson and the AUC hoped to uplift were people classified as poor white trash. “I 
wish to be distinctly understood that I am not characterizing Southern society, as a whole; by no 
means;” instructs Thompson, “but I am pointing your attention to a class now brought to the 
surface by the upheavings of war.”93 Like the WSC, the AUC hoped to use the war and the crisis 
created by that war to remake the white Southerner in the Northern image. The AUC made this 
clear in its founding principles. Its “purpose is not to aid in restoring the old order of things which 
the war has swept away, but to cooperate with all who are now sincerely seeking the restoration of 
the Union, in re-establishing it upon the basis of universal freedom, education, industry, and 
Christian morality.”94 Both organizations hoped to eliminate that group labeled as poor white trash 
and this was possible through the various forms of aid provided by the AUC and WSC. When it 
came to people in the region, however, there is no doubt that the organization best positioned to 
help was the WSC. The WSC and the AUC, however, were not alone in their wartime aid for 
displaced residents, as other organizations would enter the fray later in the war. 
The Refugee Relief Commission of Ohio (RRCO) was a private organization that also 
helped people displaced in the West by late 1864.95 While it did not provide as much help as the 
WSC or the AUC, the aid that this organization provided to displaced persons in Arkansas and 
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Missouri is worth noting. Organized in March of 1864 and headquartered in Cincinnati, the RRCO 
sought “to afford aid to refugees, whose homes have been destroyed by the effects of war, or who, 
from the necessity of obeying military orders, were obliged to seek aid and homes among 
strangers.”96 Inspired by the number of people that came into Cincinnati along the Mississippi to 
the Ohio River connection, the RRCO’s mission was no different from any of the aforementioned 
aid societies who aided displaced white Southerners. The RRCO sent relief goods to places like 
Murfreesboro, Nashville, Cairo, and Little Rock. In addition to these supplies, the RRCO 
established a refugee home in Cincinnati to function like the one established by the WSC in St. 
Louis. Goods sent to these places included shoes, coats and jackets, calico, muslin, bonnets, and 
shawls – to name only a few of the items. 
While the organizational records do not have a particular geographic focus, the efforts of 
the RRCO appears to focus on displaced whites coming from those states in that composed the 
Upper South – Tennessee, Arkansas, and Kentucky – especially those who came from East 
Tennessee who outnumbered people from the other states by nearly double. The focus here makes 
sense given that so many people from these states made their way to the Queen City, but there 
were also people from as far away as Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, the RRCO sought to 
bring attention for uprooted whites in the West. For example, in a December 1864 circular, the 
RRCO asked loyal Unionists across the North for whatever aid that they could provide. Most 
importantly, the R.R.O.C. reiterates that this crisis is a national issue and wants to make everyone 
aware, especially people in the East. “We ask the pastors of churches to call the attention of their 
congregations to this subject; and particularly would we ask the Eastern States who have thus far 
been exempt from the din of battle, and the sufferings to which we allude, to help the border towns 
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in bearing what should be a common burden.”97 The leaders of the RRCO felt that many in the 
East had forgotten the plight of people in the West. By 1864, the crisis in the West had strained 
the many benevolent aid societies located there. These organizations needed the help of 
Northerners and Easterners if they were to improve the condition of the large numbers of displaced 
white Southerners. 
 According to the RRCO’s First Semi-Annual Report in 1864, most in need of help were 
women and children. Of the 435 people of people in the home in Cincinnati, 281 were female and 
151 were under the age of 10 years old.98 Like the AUC and the WSC, the RRCO was quick to 
judge individuals who came into their care. According to this same report, the RRCO did not view 
a great many of these people too favorably. While the AUC and the WSC labeled a portion of 
displaced people as poor white trash and hoped to rehabilitate them in the Northern image, the 
RRCO had a less than favorable opinion of these people. The RRCO wrote unfavorably about one-
third of individuals who came into their care, expressed hope for another third, and completely 
understood the situation of the final third of people who needed help. The portions of people who 
help the most favorable view were women whose husbands died in service to the Union army. The 
other two-thirds, however, the RROC did not view them as favorably. For example, “[o]f these 
refugees about two-thirds are worthy people, though they are ignorant and have apparently always 
been poor; they are industrious and anxious to improve, and seem honest and simple-hearted.”99 
The RRCO, like the AUC and the WSC, hoped to elevate them to a higher status more in line with 
other white Northerners. The RRCO saw no hope for the final lot of people it encountered. “About 
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one-third are lazy and dirty, and so apathetic as to leave little hope for improvement in this 
generation; still they are not likely to swell the police reports of the North.”100 Though the RRCO 
took these people in and gave them much-needed aid, they do not attempt to remake them in any 
way, shape, or form, and, in many cases, simply ship them elsewhere. 
 The RRCO, like other aid organizations, also helped by providing transportation to places 
located across the North. There is no indication in any of the RRCO’s documents as to why they 
chose this course of action. “A large majority of these refugees have, as will be seen” the RRCO 
described, “been assisted to places in the interior of this State, to Illinois, Indiana, New York, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and to other New England States, and means have been 
furnished them for expenses when necessary.”101 Again, the RRCO deserves credit for choosing 
not to simply dump them on the streets of Cincinnati, which would not have served either party’s 
interest. Transporting displaced residents northward appears to be a cost-saving measure for the 
RRCO, as it was for the Union army and the WSC, most preferred transportation northward to 
reunite with family and friends. “Seven out of ten ask to be sent to the country, to some friend they 
have known, and where they can find work adapted to their habits.”102 Only a small percentage of 
people aided by the RRCO were from point further west like Missouri and Arkansas. Because of 
the higher percentage of people from the Upper South in the RRCO’s care, it would have been 
more likely that they would have family and friends in states like Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Michigan.  
Asking Washington for Help and the Transition to the Freedmen’s Bureau 
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Leaders of these benevolent aid societies could be very political and sought to have their 
organizations known to the Federal government in order to maximize support. For example, James 
Yeatman, the head of the WSC was politically active on behalf of his organization. He attended a 
variety of ceremonious events, like an April 1865 ceremony at Fort Sumter with President Lincoln, 
and he kept in regular contact with him. Yeatman wrote numerous letters to the president 
concerning his organization’s affairs, but few concerned the plight of displaced whites. While there 
was a letter detailing the early wartime conditions in St. Louis, most were letters of support for 
Salmon Chase as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or letters of introduction for a variety of 
associates seeking an audience with the president. Yeatman did not use his relationship with the 
president to advocate for uprooted whites. 
There were instances where leaders of aid organizations did write the president asking for 
help with regard to displaced Southern whites. For example, Edgar Conkling, a special agent for 
the RRCO, wrote to both Congress and the president of the United States seeking aid for these 
people. Conkling wrote Congress asking for farming equipment and seed for the coming growing 
season. Conkling felt that doing so would help keep noncombatants nearer to their homes therefore 
reducing the number of persons coming north as well as prevent the creation of a pauper class. 
“The beneficial moral effects of such a policy to the government,” began Conkling in his January 
1865 petition to Congress, “in begetting greater loyalty in the South, will vastly exceed its cost.”103 
Perhaps Conkling wrote this petition so late in the war encouraging a national policy towards 
uprooted Southern whites. Such a national policy could ease the transition into Reconstruction. To 
ensure support of his petition to Congress, Conkling wrote Lincoln that same January asking him 
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to convey his support for these people.104 In the postscript of his petition, Conkling encouraged 
other organizations to sign and forward the petition as well as propose unity among the benevolent 
aid societies. Conkling pleaded with other like-minded organizations: “Would it not be well for all 
such organizations [who aid displaced Southern whites], outside the city of New York to become 
branches of the American Union Commission in New York, and thus make a united national effort 
to re-instate the South to a condition, self-supporting?”105 While such a national union of aid 
societies never took hold, Conkling certainly sought to maximize the ability to aid uprooted whites 
in the South by combining the resources and talents of organizations like the AUC, RRCO, and 
the WSC. 
In March of 1865, with the war in its final throes, the Federal government created the 
Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees and Abandoned Lands. Congress tasked the Freedmen’s Bureau 
with assisting freedmen and displaced whites under the supervision of the War Department. With 
the creation of the Bureau, President Lincoln recognized the efforts of the WSC when he tendered 
an offer to make James Yeatman, commissioner of the Bureau. Lincoln’s Secretary of War Edwin 
M. Stanton repeatedly asked the president in a series of letters in March 1865 if the head of the 
WSC might be interested in the post. “Gen. Sherman tells me he is well acquainted with James 
Yeatman,” Lincoln wrote Stanton about the potential appointment, “& that he thinks him almost 
the best man in country for anything that he will undertake[.]”106 Yeatman’s supporters thought 
that he was best suited for head of the Bureau given his organizational experience with the WSC. 
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However, it was Yeatman’s brother, Thomas H., who pushed for the appointment.107 Yeatman, as 
General Sherman predicted, declined the president’s offer leading creating a post-war opportunity 
for General Oliver O. Howard. 
Even though Yeatman declined an opportunity to assist displaced whites into 
Reconstruction, he provided some information regarding the condition of people who the WSC 
encountered as well as some advice on how they should be handled moving forward. He 
understood the challenges faced by both freedmen and the government’s task of creating a new 
social order in Reconstruction. He feared that the government would ignore those whites by 
focusing too much on the recently emancipated slaves of the South. Certainly, freedmen and 
women had the sympathies of many in the North and this was evident by the amount of assistance 
provided by the many charitable and religious institutions there. For Yeatman, this was evident in 
the fact that schools for freedmen were increasing in numbers throughout the West. Schools for 
displaced whites, however, were non-existent. This made no sense to him because, in his opinion, 
these uprooted whites were in worse shape than the freedpeople. These people were as “inferior, 
in many respects, to the recently emancipated negroes[,]” Mr. Yeatman advised, “[t]hey have all 
the false pride and arrogance engendered by the institutions of the South, without having been 
taught to labor, considering that it is degrading work, because ‘niggers work.’”108 For him and the 
WSC, it was an absolute necessity to change the habits of displaced people by eliminating their 
Southern tendencies. Because of their inability to work or find any kind of suitable employer, 
Yeatman advised that they could use a little help from the government. Now that the war was over, 
the government could give some of its extra horses, plows, and wagons to these whites so that they 
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may eke out some kind of existence. In addition, the government should also provide whatever 
clothing, furniture, and as much as six months food rations to get them started. If these people 
returned to their desolated homes and communities, Yeatman warned, they would “simply starve 
to death” as they had no means to provide for themselves.109 He suggested that the government, in 
the form of the Freedmen’s Bureau, continue most of the policies of the WSC by giving them 
clothing, food, and the ability to work. The Bureau inherited a large number of people when it 
established operations in Arkansas in May of 1865 and would face challenges that it never 
expected.110 
Conclusion 
Benevolent aid societies in the West played an important role in transitioning the care of 
displaced whites to the Freedmen’s Bureau. These organizations served as important caretakers, 
taking them from the care of the army and providing for them until they found permanent homes 
or employment, or until the Freedmen’s Bureau took over. Assisting the army with the care of 
these people until the war was over was vital in that it reduced their burden upon the army, allowing 
the army to focus on the Confederate army. Benevolent aid societies aided people with food, 
shelter, clothing, and most importantly, education. Through education, aid societies hoped to 
remake white Southerners in the Northern image. With very little help from the Federal 
government, these aid societies were able to raise funds from donors across the North to fund their 
endeavors. By 1864, with the crisis reaching critical mass in the region, the WSC organized the 
Mississippi Valley Sanitary Fair in an effort to raise more funds, proving that it led the way in the 
West. Through their efforts, the benevolent aid societies of the West were the caretakers of 
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uprooted whites. The W.S.C shared what it had learned in its dealings with these people in the 
form of its final report issued as 1865 ended. With the war over, a new organization was tasked 
with caring for these displaced whites – the Freedmen’s Bureau. One question remained with the 
surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox on April 9, 1865: how would the Bureau aid these 
people and transition them back into their lives. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ENCOUNTERS DISPLACED PEOPLE, 
1865-1866 
 
“Then the word ‘refugee’ applies only to whites. I would inquire further it, under this law and 
under the operations of the Freedmen’s Bureau, all white men who were not rebels and who 
were as poor as the negroes are entitled to the same privileges and the same protection that 
negroes are?”1 
- Kentucky Unionist Green Clay Smith asking about the status or displaced whites with the 
creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau, January 30, 1866 
 
With the end of the war, the United States attempted to be just that, united. The conclusion 
of the Civil War during the spring of 1865 forced Americans to face the human cost of that war 
and ask questions about what that sacrifice meant – the sacrifice of approximately 750,000 men. 
In addition to battlefield casualties, there were a significant number of civilian casualties caused 
by the war, some estimates near fifty thousand.2 These casualty numbers combined with the 
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln on April 14, 1865, added urgency for Americans to 
make sense of that war. For people of the Civil War Era and the historians who have written about 
it, a number of questions should be asked. What did the war mean? Was it simply the end of 
slavery? Would new definitions of citizenship, the state, equality, or freedom arise? “The war’s 
staggering human cost demanded a new sense of national destiny,” reminds historian Drew Gilpin 
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Faust, “one designed to ensure that lives had been sacrificed for appropriately lofty ends.”3 The 
reunification of the North and the South would force the people and the government to forge a path 
with the answers to these questions. First, the new president and the Congress would have to get 
on the same page. 
During Reconstruction, Congress and President Andrew Johnson debated over what shape 
it would take. While President Lincoln started the process of reconstruction during the war, the 
new president and Radical Congress would have to evolve a national policy to both reunify the 
divided nation as well as make good on the sacrifice of so many during the war. The government 
implemented a variety of presidential and legislative acts in an effort to consecrate that sacrifice – 
the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction. 
“While historians continue to pose fresh questions about Reconstruction,” notes historian Paul A. 
Cimbala, “they cannot escape the fact that the Freedmen’s Bureau remains at the center of much 
of the discussion about how Republicans tried to translate victory and emancipation in war into a 
new order in peace.”4 Part of the reason for the Bureau’s centrality to any discussion about 
Reconstruction comes from the interference of the president. Johnson imposed his interpretation 
of the form that Reconstruction should take and, as a result, the agency would be the battleground 
for Johnson and the Radical Republicans’ disagreements over that very issue. For displaced whites 
in the war’s aftermath, the Bureau would be important in to alleviate their suffering and put their 
lives back to normal. 
                                                          
3 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Random House, 
2008), 268. 
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 With Congress’s establishment of the Freedmen’s Bureau in early 1865 and the 
appointment of General Oliver Otis Howard as its head, it established a number of offices 
throughout the South. Agents descended upon offices in Missouri and Arkansas and immediately 
began working on a variety of issues. Their primary task was to reduce the number of displaced 
people in the region in addition to its duties of helping freedpeople. Displaced whites came to these 
officials in search of help – they wanted food, clothes, employment, and other necessities of life. 
Each group, initially, was suspicious of each other. A key link in its chain of providing aid were 
the Union army chaplains. They were a humanizing element in the bureaucratic machinery because 
they were most often the point of contact for so many displaced and destitute people. In addition, 
the Bureau, because it was so unprepared, tried to either transport displaced whites to places where 
they could be helped or, the agency simply left these people to seek aid from the state – especially 
displaced residents in Missouri. The agency provided what it could, but the overwhelming need 
forced it to rely on the continued support of benevolent aid societies at times as well as shifting 
the burden of care for displaced whites onto the states. This chapter is an analysis of early 
interactions between the Bureau and displaced people of the region. 
Continued Help: Benevolent Aid Societies Assist the Freedmen’s Bureau 
As soon as the war ended, the number of displaced whites in the region quickly 
overwhelmed the Bureau and it needed help. As uprooted people heard about the end of the war, 
many began making their way back to their communities in an attempt to start rebuilding their 
lives. Howard, understanding the impact that this would have on his agency, hoped to harness the 
charity of the benevolent aid associations across the newly reunited nation. A little over a month 
after Lee’s surrender, Howard issued Circular No. 2 on May 19, 1865. Section II of this Circular 
laid out Howard’s goals of cooperation with these aid societies. It began: “But it is not the intention 
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of the government that this bureau shall supersede the various benevolent organizations in the 
work of administering relief.”5 Howard hoped that the Bureau would serve in a support role for 
these organizations. To secure this cooperation, he invited the continued support of these 
organizations. “I invite, therefore, the continuance and co-operation of such societies I trust they 
will still be generously supported by the people, and I request them to send me their names, lists 
of their principal officers, and a brief statement of their present work.”6 With this order, the Bureau 
utilized benevolent aid organizations whenever they could to provide aid for both displaced whites 
and freedpeople. 
The Bureau sometimes directed displaced whites towards whatever benevolent aid 
societies were active in the region. For example, Union army chaplain Hiram Stone noted the 
orders of one Captain G.E. Dayton: “During the month of May, the Refugees must be disposed of. 
The Government will not feed them except in extraordinary caces [sic]. They will therefore have 
to depend upon Public donation and Private Charity.”7 Sprague was especially tough on the 
displaced and destitute, hoping that aid societies would continue their efforts into Reconstruction. 
“On assuming office Sprague called on all officers of the government, military commanders, and 
treasury agents for information relating to his problem,” observed historian Thomas Starling 
Staples, “and expressed a hope that benevolent associations would continue their work and relieve 
the government of the expense of educating and caring for the moral and social welfare of the 
refugees and freedmen.”8 It is important to remember that, for better or for worse, the Bureau 
                                                          
5 United States Congress, Executive Documents Printed by Order of The House of Representatives, During the First 
Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1865-1866 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1866), 178. 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Chaplain Hiram Stone to Captain G.E. Dodge,” July 7, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State 
of Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 6, NARA. 
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handled issues on a state-to-state basis and, this instance, was simply Sprague’s determination of 
the best way to handle the problem of displaced people in his district. Howard also hoped that aid 
agencies would continue their work, offering them the lead in areas where they were already in 
operation. “It is not the intention of the Government that the Bureau shall supersede the various 
benevolent organizations in the work of administering relief. This must still be afforded by the 
benevolence of the people through their voluntary societies, no government appropriations having 
been made for this purpose.”9 Howard built a working relationship with these aid societies to 
maximize the agency’s available aid. 
In some instances, benevolent aid societies took it upon themselves to aid the Bureau in 
providing for displaced whites. The American Union Commission (AUC), in a broadside 
published shortly after Appomattox, described how its services aided displaced and destitute 
people across the South and that the entire nation had to do what it could for these people. The 
AUC continued: “In its origin it had the sanction of President Lincoln; it now enjoys the cordial 
approbation of President Johnson; it receives from the War Department transportation and other 
facilities so far as is consistent with the public service; and in providing for refugees, it is in hearty 
co-operation with the Bureau for Refugees and Freedmen, who are still, as heretofore, dependent 
on voluntary contributions, through benevolent societies for needful assistance.”10 Working 
alongside the Bureau, the AUC and other like-minded organizations hoped to help displaced 
residents and integrate them back into the American nation. Given the demands placed upon the 
Bureau in the months following Appomattox by displaced Southern whites, it likely welcomed the 
support from these benevolent organizations. 
                                                          
9 Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, Major General United States Army, Volume II (New 
York: The Baker & Taylor Company, 1908), 220. 
10 American Union Commission, n.d. Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M1027, Roll 7, NARA. 
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Providing aid for displaced whites came with a certain amount of societal baggage. The 
Bureau, like a predominant segment of American society, worried that if they kept providing food, 
medical aid, and shelter to these people, they would become a permanent class of dependents – 
wholly dependent on the Bureau and the government. Both the president and Howard believed 
this. To a certain degree, many volunteers in the benevolent aid societies believed this. Like the 
colony farms developed by Union officials in the war’s final months, continued perceptions about 
what displaced whites should have to do in order to receive aid transitioned from the army to the 
Bureau. This makes sense as so many former army officials staffed it. For example, John Moore, 
Captain of the 15th Missouri Cavalry wrote to Sprague from Cassville, Missouri, on July 20, 1865: 
“The greater portion of Refugees who are subsisted by the Government at this are situated on 
abandoned farms in the surrounding country and a majority of them have small crops planted 
which as soon as they have time to come to maturity will be able to subsist themselves.”11 While 
they were waiting to see what would become of them, many displaced whites cultivated farms in 
the area, which the Bureau hoped would be enough to furnish them with food for the coming 
months. In a way, it was similar to the colony farms developed by M. LaRue Harrison during the 
war’s final months. The exception being that those who farmed the land were no longer in need of 
armed protection. 
In some instances, the Bureau sought displaced whites for employment in the various 
offices in the region. Bureau offices often sent out requests searching for able-bodied men and 
women amongst displaced whites and freedpeople.12 Howard worked with benevolent aid societies 
throughout the South in an effort to put many displaced whites to work. He also extended this offer 
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to freedmen. Howard stated, “I stated that the demands for labor were sufficient to afford 
employment to most able-bodied refugees and freedmen; that assistant commissioners were to 
introduce a practical system of compensated labor.”13 At first, this offer for employment appears 
to be a sincere offer of a job. A few lines later however, Howard revealed his real intentions. First, 
he wrote how the freedmen have to work hard to remove the prejudices of their former masters 
and he reminds them that they cannot simply remain idle post-emancipation. Howard also revealed 
his feelings regarding displaced whites who received aid from the Bureau. He notes that displaced 
whites must “strive to overcome a singular false pride which shows certain almost helpless 
refugees willing to be supported in idleness.”14 There are a few explanations for such a statement 
from the head of the Bureau. Perhaps Howard held a prejudiced view towards Southern whites 
given their support of the Confederacy. Alternatively, Howard could have held a hardline view 
that these whites have to reestablish themselves immediately, with little help from the Bureau. 
Howard and other officials often noted how quickly freedpeople were able to establish themselves 
and, with this happening before their eyes, wanted to hold displaced whites to the same standard. 
Whatever the explanation, Howard felt that a number of displaced whites were not pulling their 
weight when it came to reestablishing themselves in the postwar settlement. 
The War’s End and the Creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
The roots of the Freedmen’s Bureau are found in the American Freedmen’s Inquiry 
Commission, started in March 1863. As early as 1862, African American leaders, led by the likes 
of Frederick Douglass, began asking questions concerning freedpeople in the aftermath of the Civil 
War. Douglass feared the potential of a federal agency limiting the rights of freed slaves, while 
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many radicals wanted something much more, some kind of permanent agency to provide oversight 
for freedpeople. This Commission, with members appointed by the Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton, was tasked with finding ways to help freedpeople in the wake of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. The work of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission played a key role in 
shaping what the Bureau would look like in its postwar form. The Commission concluded in its 
final report of May 15, 1864, that some kind of agency should be established to ease the transition 
from slavery to freedom for African Americans. 
The Commission created an agency that fell somewhere in between what Douglass wanted 
and what the Radicals wanted. While many Northerners were uneasy with the proposition of a 
large government agency to provide oversight for the lives of ex-slaves, they recognized that 
something, if only temporary, had to be done. The Bureau was, according to scholar and activist 
W.E.B. DuBois, “one of the most singular and interesting of the attempts made by a great nation 
to grapple with vast problems of race and social condition.”15 From this report, Congress, led by 
Radical Republicans like Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, 
constructed a Freedmen’s Bureau Bill to aid freedpeople in the aftermath of the Civil War. By 
early 1865, with the end of the war in sight, the bill, excluding whites, was before Congress for 
approval.16 
The Bureau, in its earliest form, was to distribute food, clothing, fuel, and other necessities 
to freedpeople, many of whom had fled their masters to seek freedom during the war or found 
themselves driven off farms and plantations after emancipation. This bill also included the 
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confiscation and redistribution of planters’ lands to the freedpeople. Quite simply, it was to help 
freedpeople in their transition from slavery to freedom. This version of the bill, however, said 
nothing about aiding displaced Southern whites. A change in the language of the bill had to come 
before they could be included under the umbrella of the agency’s operations. 
Just before Congress was to vote on the bill in March 1865, a series of debates moved 
members of Congress to make changes to include either displaced or destitute Southern whites in 
the Bureau’s efforts throughout the South, as they did not want to have the appearance of 
discriminating against color. These debates started as soon as 1863 and 1864 and came about 
because of differences in the Republican Party on the shape that this agency would take, with some 
party members wanting to include loyal whites alongside freedpeople. Some wanted the new 
agency to function as a guardianship for freedpeople while more conservative members of the 
party, like John P. Hale of New Hampshire and John B. Henderson of Missouri, felt that doing so 
would destroy freedpeople by simply replacing one master with another. It exposed rivalries 
between eastern and western Republicans and it allowed Democrats the opportunity to try to water 
down or destroy any kind of bill to assist freedpeople after the war. Representatives from the 
Midwestern states led the way when it came to the inclusion of displaced loyal whites in the 
Freedmen’s Bureau bill, with Robert C. Schenck of Ohio leading the way. Historian Herman Belz 
has noted how Schenk pushed for the inclusion of loyal refugees within the agency’s scope: 
Schenck’s plan was to create in the War department a bureau of refugees and 
freedmen, to continue during the rebellion and to have effect in rebel states and in 
loyal districts within the operation of the army. Notably brief in comparison to 
previous freedmen’s proposals, the bill contained two substantive provisions. The 
first gave the bureau authority to supervise, manage, and control all subjects 
relating to refugees and freedmen, while the second authorized the President to 
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provide relief assistance to freedmen and refugees and assign to the bureau for their 
benefit the temporary use of abandoned lands.17 
This last minute change to the bill to include displaced whites meant that they would fall under the 
umbrella of its operations and the Bureau would operate as a part of the War Department. Groups 
like the American Union Commission supported Schenck when he sought support for his version 
of the bill. The final Freedmen’s Bureau Bill states that with regard to these people, “the Secretary 
of War may direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful for the 
immediate temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their 
wives and children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct.”18 Both the House and the 
Senate accepted the change and the revised bill passed and President Lincoln signed it on the same 
day.19 
This change to include displaced Southern whites was evident in the agency’s new name – 
the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands. Like previous versions of the bill, it 
was to help both displaced whites and freedpeople in the aftermath of the war. The Bureau would 
settle disputes, provide transportation, and establish schools – to name only a few of the things that 
it would be tasked with during its operation. It was an example of a major expansion of Federal 
authority, setting into motion a gradual expansion of that authority over the coming decades.20 
Congress placed parameters on the duration of the agency’s operations in that it would only operate 
for only one year, so Congress would have to renew the bill on a yearly basis.21 
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Before the Bureau could begin work in earnest, the Union army had to end the war by 
defeating all Confederate armies. While many Americans like to think that the Civil War ended 
with General Robert E. Lee’s surrender to General Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865, at 
Appomattox Court House in Virginia, many fail to realize that while Lee’s army was the largest 
army, it was not the only army. Later that April, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston 
surrendered to General William T. Sherman in North Carolina and the armies gradually left the 
field in both the East and West. Small-scale skirmishes continued in Arkansas at Snake River and 
Monticello in late April. This is because, outside of Lee and Johnston’s armies – the two major 
Confederate armies - commanders were on their own when it came to surrendering their armies 
and, if they did make that decision, what the terms of that surrender would be. Lieutenant General 
Richard Taylor, the last major Confederate commander left in the West, surrendered to Union 
Major General Edward Canby at Citronelle, Alabama, on May 4, 1865. With Taylor’s surrender, 
Union troops made their way into all parts of the region, establishing Federal control throughout 
the entire South. These Union soldiers were there to protect citizens as well as build trust amongst 
citizens there with the hopes of getting them back to work on their farms and businesses. 
With the Confederate armies surrendered, one fear remained, especially for General 
Sherman: guerrilla fighters in the region. Sporadic guerrilla warfare continued into the summer of 
1865, so much so that “many community courts had ceased functioning” in the Trans-Mississippi 
West.22 There were fears by many in the North that remnants of the Confederate armies would 
pursue a larger guerrilla war to achieve its goal of independence. This, however, did not come to 
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be and by the late spring of 1865, the Bureau was able to begin helping displaced whites and 
freedpeople in the South. 
Once the agency began operations, a number of things stood in the way of providing relief. 
First was the language of the bill that created it in the first place. During the Bureau’s early months, 
its efforts were constrained by a “lack of specificity” with regard to its functions as prescribed by 
the Bureau Bill, which made its task that much more difficult.23 Second, defeated Confederates 
did not view the agency’s presence in the South too favorably. Many conservative Southern whites, 
especially the former planter class, disliked the Bureau and the agents who represented it. Even 
though they had been defeated on the battlefield, they retained their commitment to their way of 
life and belief in small, limited government and states’ rights. Resenting the expansion of federal 
power that would make it harder for them to return to the antebellum status quo and might 
embolden African Americans to resist their authority, these Southerners often harassed the Bureau, 
made the agency and its officials feel unwelcome and thus making it hard for agents to conduct 
their work. Many felt that the agency interfered in their return to normal in terms of black/white 
relations. These whites, who maintained their antebellum paternalistic structure, argued that they 
better understood African Americans. Therefore, these Southern whites should remain in charge 
when it came to the affairs of freedpeople. Historian Eric Foner has noted, “most Southern whites 
resented the Bureau as a symbol of Confederate defeat and a barrier to the authority reminiscent 
of slavery that planters hoped to impose upon freedmen.”24 These displeased Southern whites 
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would not get their way in that, despite its shaky start, the Bureau would find its way and operate 
in earnest throughout the region.  
Operating as a part of the War Department, the Bureau provided a variety of services for 
both freedpeople and displaced whites.25 With its posts spread throughout the South, the Bureau 
provided education, food and clothing to destitute and displaced citizens, legal and medical 
services, aided in the location of family members, and settled both freedpeople and displaced 
whites on the region’s abandoned or confiscated plantations across the South. Foner succinctly 
summarizes the agency’s duties to include “introducing a workable system of free labor in the 
South, establishing schools for freedpeople, providing aid to the destitute, aged, ill, and insane, 
adjudicating disputes among blacks between the races, and attempting to secure for blacks and 
white Unionists equal justice from the state and local governments established during Presidential 
Reconstruction.”26 In addition, it provided child welfare services, income maintenance, medical 
care, work projects, government housing, provisions for the elderly and sick, employment 
counseling, legal counseling, resettlement, and protective services. Through this list of services, it 
hoped to remake Southern society – black and white – as a part of its postwar mission. The 
Freedmen’s Bureau, argues Victoria Olds, a former Associate Professor of the School of Social 
Work at Howard University – the school named in his honor, “was ahead of its time in its ability 
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to offer comprehensive family-centered services.”27 In short, the Bureau had a monumental task 
in front of it and Howard accepted that challenge. 
O.O. Howard came recommended to President Lincoln by the Secretary of War. Stanton, 
notes historian George R. Bentley, “selected a comparatively unknown major general of 
volunteers, a man who offered the same attributes as Stanton’s plan for Reconstruction: he would 
appeal to Lincoln; yet in all probability he could be fitted into the Radical scheme.”28 While he 
was not the Lincoln administration’s first choice to lead the Bureau, that honor went to the head 
of the Western Sanitary Commission James E. Yeatman, but when he refused, Howard would be 
the man with which Congress pinned its hopes for the Bureau’s success.29 Born in Maine, he was 
educated at Bowdoin College in Maine and then, later, at West Point where he served as a 
mathematics professor. He fought at First and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, 
Gettysburg, and did a stint in the Western Theatre later in the war. Howard lost his right arm at 
Fair Oakes in June 1862 and many remembered him for insisting that his men attend temperance 
and prayer meetings. For these efforts, Howard earned the nickname the Christian General. 
Howard was a stern man and, as a moral crusader, held firm in his support for African American 
suffrage and land redistribution for freedpeople during Reconstruction. 
A transition from slave to wage labor and civil rights for African Americans would prove 
to be a tough test. General Howard, because of his limited resources, used the services of his army 
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personnel to fill the agency’s ranks. This was at the suggestion of Stanton, who Howard recalled 
told him to “use my officers as I liked in the control of the new Bureau, I supposed I was to continue 
in command of the Army and the Department of the Tennessee, certainly till the final muster out.”30 
Having Howard maintain many of his officers helped it function most effectively, with a number 
of civilians employed at the local level to achieve this task. Men who were antebellum lawyers, 
physicians, tailors, farmers, merchants, and bootmakers all filled staff positions at the Bureau in 
Arkansas.31 Howard’s officials, notes historian Paul Skeels Pierce, “were all military men, who, 
through active service had become more or less familiar with social, economic, and educational 
conditions in the south.”32 These military men would make a number of decisions that affected the 
lives of many displaced Southern whites in the region while it remained focused on their primary 
task of helping freedpeople.  
The Bureau’s Organization in Arkansas and Missouri 
The Bureau’s operations in Arkansas and Missouri began in May 1865 with Brigadier 
General John W. Sprague in command at his St. Louis headquarters.33 When he heard President 
Lincoln’s 1861 call for troops, Sprague, a native New Yorker, raised a company of infantry and 
relocated to Cincinnati. From there, he worked his way up the ranks in various Ohio units 
eventually reaching the rank of Brigadier-General in 1864. He fought in battles throughout 
Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and he was with Sherman in his March to the Sea. 
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Sprague operated as the Bureau’s Assistant Commissioner for the Missouri-Arkansas District. 
Sprague was in charge of the agency in Missouri, Arkansas, Indian Territory, as well as parts of 
Kansas, around Fort Leavenworth and Fort Scott, and in Quincy and Cairo, Illinois. The Bureau’s 
operation in Missouri received a great deal of support from the local, foreign-born German 
population many of whom served with the Union in the war and remained steadfastly loyal 
Republicans. As a result, the Bureau did not feel a need to maintain an office there.34 
By September 1865, officials decided to move the agency’s regional headquarters from St. 
Louis to Little Rock. The situation in Missouri was far less violent than what the Bureau faced in 
other Southern states and it had just revised its state constitution eliminating slavery, making it 
that much easier to shift their center of operations in the region to Arkansas.35 For the most part, 
Missourians did not have any major objections to the Bureau’s efforts and General Howard felt 
that Missouri’s laws adequately protected freedpeople. As a result, he made the decision to end its 
activities there to better focus on the situation in Arkansas. On September 19, 1865, General 
Sprague received orders from General Howard and relocated his headquarters south to Little Rock. 
It would remain there until the Bureau’s operation ended in 1872: “Maj. Genl. Howard wishes me 
[J.S. Fullerton] to instruct you to withdraw the operations of the Bureau from the State of Missouri 
as soon as you can do so safely. After leaving St. Louis it will be best for you to establish your 
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Head Quarters somewhere within the State of Arkansas.”36 Nearly a month after this dispatch, 
Circular No. 13 from the Bureau made official notice that the state’s poor and displaced people 
should be cared for by the local government. It announced, “The issue of Rations by this Bureau 
in Missouri will cease on the 31st inst., the wealthy and prosperous State of Missouri is able and it 
is hoped willing to care for its own poor.”37 Deconstructing this statement demonstrates how the 
agency’s lack of a national mission encouraged officials to leave displaced and destitute whites to 
the care of the state. In addition, in Missouri, that was exactly what happened. 
By October 31, 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau had completed its move to Little Rock. With 
a number of offices scattered throughout the state (see Fig. 5.1), the Arkansas offices were 
organized much the same as the agency’s national headquarters in Washington D.C. Its staff often 
consisted of a Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent of Education, a Surgeon-in-Chief, a 
Chief Quartermaster, an Assistant Adjutant General, a Disbursing Officer, as well as a variety of 
subordinates scattered throughout the state. Historian Randy Finley notes that the Arkansas Bureau 
had 79 agents; this included 36 civilians and 43 army officers beginning in July of 1865.38 
Subordinates were often in charge of the smaller sub-districts in the region that had civilian 
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employees to help with more of the day-to-day activities of the different offices. Agency personnel 
operated in twenty-four different counties throughout Arkansas.39 
 
In some instances, the Bureau retained military officers in a civilian capacity to assist with 
their operations. These men wrote and reported about the day-to-day efforts concerning 
freedpeople and displaced whites in the area, sending these reports up the chain of command. In 
turn, those at the top of the agency’s command sent directives down to these lower-ranking 
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Fig. 5.1: Arkansas Freedmen’s Bureau offices. Source: http://www.argenweb.net/crawford/maps/images/arka 
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personnel on how to handle the situation on the ground in Missouri and Arkansas.40 These officials’ 
first task included a determination of who would qualify for aid. 
While the original Freedmen’s Bureau Bill laid out the intended targets of the agency’s 
resources, that did not stop officials in the field from requesting or offering clarification regarding 
displaced whites. During the summer of 1865, many agents realized that the task before them was 
to be much greater and more difficult than anticipated. Were some uprooted whites entitled to the 
agency’s help while others were not? Because so many people were in need of help, combined 
with the fact that the Bureau had very limited resources, officials wanted a clear-cut definition of 
who would be eligible for aid to maximize the use of their resources. Sprague did the best that he 
could when he sought clarification on this very point. For example, Sprague made it clear as to 
whom the agency would help under the banner of the term refugee in his Circular No. 12, issued 
on September 11, 1865. “The term ‘Refugees’ as mentioned in the Act of Congress establishing 
the Bureau means those persons who fled from their homes on account of the war and are now 
absent therefrom. If rations are issued to other persons, even destitute citizens, not contemplated 
under the law the offer who issues the same may be rendered liable therefor.”41 Both agents and 
displaced people used this designation throughout the primary sources. This was not a decision 
made by Sprague, but one that came from the top – Howard. Sprague made sure that his officials 
understood who was to receive aid from their offices as well as who might be excluded from 
receiving aid and the consequences for giving aid to the wrong people. As agents dispersed 
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throughout the West, they put out their feelers in an attempt to gauge the situation there and handle 
it in an efficient manner. Even with this preparation, officials were sometimes surprised with the 
magnitude of the situation in the region. 
A number of Southern whites, not just displaced whites, needed the Bureau’s help. In 
addition to the people left to wander the region, others, for a variety of reasons, needed the 
assistance. The language it used, with regard to displaced Southern whites, in official reports and 
communiques could sometimes be confusing. Officials noted instances of aid for freedmen, 
destitute, and refugees throughout its records sometimes refugee freedmen or white 
refugees/destitute refugees. It appears as though the agency did not often differentiate between 
destitute whites and displaced whites in Arkansas. “The Bureau ministered to the needs not only 
of freedmen and ‘refugees,’” observes historians John Cox and LaWanda Cox, “but also to 
impoverished ex-Confederates under special congressional appropriations and by interpreting 
‘refugees’ as ‘liberally as possible to prevent starvation.’”42 This is what makes ascertaining any 
kind of numbers or estimates of displaced whites difficult. Sifting through Bureau accounts of their 
situation does not illustrate all of the hardships faced by many poor whites at the end of the war. 
Historian J. Wayne Flynt has noted “[w]hen the Civil War ended in 1865, there were many more 
poor whites in the South than when it had begun five years earlier. Plantation owners and once 
affluent merchants stood in breadlines in some Southern cities. Only pride kept others from joining 
them. Hard times usually fell heaviest on the poor, and the lot of common whites worsened.”43 
Many different poor people came to the Bureau in search of aid, including many displaced whites. 
Because the agency did not discriminate based on race, as detailed in the final bill passed by 
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Congress, and all impoverished persons were welcome to its aid, a number of destitute whites 
received help. 
Displaced people might request help from the Freedmen’s Bureau a few different ways. 
More often than not, displaced whites presented themselves at a local office or they wrote to the 
local superintendent explaining their situation and needs. Local newspapers published account of 
people in need. Officials would often detail these requests and the circumstances of these people 
to their superiors and other officials and note if they warranted any action by the Bureau. Other 
times, officials took note of their interactions with freedpeople and displaced whites in the 
communities they served and made suggestions for rations, transportation, etc. based on this 
contact. 
Unfortunately, the agency’s records do not offer much detail as to who these displaced 
people were as there is no indications of what their lives might have been like before the war came 
or what became of them after they contacted the Bureau for help. In the lists that detail 
transportation for displaced people, there were names of the head of household and accompanying 
family members. References were quite matter of fact as one would expect from a department ran 
by military officials. The Bureau often referred to these people in simple numbers and, usually, a 
corresponding amount of rations that displaced people needed. For example, in a letter dated June 
19, 1865, General Sprague communicated to Howard “on the 31st of May, there was only 236 
colored people in Missouri who asked for assistance from Government, this includes Men, 
Women, & Children while there was 4452 White Refugees who were subsisted in whole or in part 
by Government.”44 Sometimes, agents described their situation and other times, as in this instance, 
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they were lumped in with descriptions of freedpeople who were also in need of aid. Even with this, 
the descriptions still offer very little as to who these people were. 
Andrew Johnson, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and Displaced Whites 
 With the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson 
assumed the presidency. A North Carolinian by birth and a Tennessean by deeds, Johnson would 
be the man that would lead the nation as it began to rebuild the nation in the aftermath of Lincoln’s 
death and civil war. Added to Lincoln’s reelection ticket in 1864 because he had served as the 
Democratic military governor of Tennessee, Lincoln hoped he would provide for a more balanced 
ticket in the 1864 presidential election. Johnson proved to be a capable leader in Tennessee – he 
helped establish civil government in that state and supported emancipation.45 Lincoln won 
reelection in 1864 guiding the nation out of civil war and, with the tragic event at Ford’s Theatre; 
Johnson would be the man in the Executive Mansion as Reconstruction began. 
When Johnson took office, many Americans waited to see whom the new president really 
was. Would he continue Lincoln’s program of reconstruction begun in 1863, or would he pursue 
his own course? Andrew Johnson was a white southern Democrat who had long held similar views 
to most Southern whites, although he did not look kindly on the former planter class. When it came 
to aftermath of slavery, he feared any kind of black political power in the South or elsewhere. 
Here, he was in disagreement with Radical Republicans in Congress who supported civil rights for 
freedmen. Another area where he was in disagreement with the Radicals was the nature of 
readmission for Southern states that had seceded from the Union during the winter of 1860-1861. 
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The new president held the view that the Southern states had never left the Union and, as a result, 
he believed that they should be able to reestablish their state governments and resume their role in 
the nation. While the Radicals vehemently disagreed, Johnson believed that the Federal 
government had no right to interfere in the affairs of those states – especially matters concerning 
freedpeople. It is in these disagreements that Congress and the president would be at odds for the 
next two years.46 
From 1865 to 1867, Johnson forged a far different path than many expected. Lincoln, in 
the interest of quickly ‘binding the nation’s wounds,’ hoped to allow for the speedy readmission 
of the Southern states idealized in his 10 percent plan, a part of his Proclamation of Amnesty and 
Reconstruction issued in December of 1863.47 Lincoln’s Wartime Reconstruction offered amnesty 
to most Confederate officials, but he did not extend the franchise nor any other civil rights to 
freedmen. Parts of Lincoln’s vision for the postwar nation were already in place in areas that had 
been under Union control, especially parts of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee. 
Presidential Reconstruction, with Johnson at the helm, included “control of local affairs by 
the individual states, white supremacy, and the quick resumption of the South’s place within the 
Union.”48 Johnson’s Reconstruction policies made it easy for conservative white Southerners to 
establish Black Codes throughout the former Confederacy, which limited the freedom of African 
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Americans. This included the president opposing the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendment – 
the latter necessitated by Johnson’s acquiesce to the Black Codes - as well as the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.49 These differences over the process of Reconstruction led to a number of disagreements 
between the president and the Republican-controlled Congress, though none would be more heated 
then the debates over the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau beginning in 1866. In addition, Johnson 
would complicate relief efforts when he issued a number of pardons because of his Amnesty 
Proclamation in May of 1865.50 Before these debates began in earnest, however, Bureau agents 
had begun to fan out across the South. 
As one might expect, agents’ attitudes towards displaced whites ran the gamut. Some 
views, like that of Howard, were practical with regard to the situation at hand. As Cox and Cox 
have noted, “The charges that the Bureau demoralized labor by ‘supporting men in idleness’ were 
largely partisan attempts to discredit the Bureau. At the very start of his administration, General 
Howard recognized and set about correcting the serious relief situation that had developed at 
various points where the army had been distributing rations. His early regulations regarding food 
rations enjoyed ‘great discrimination,’ and strict accountability, to ensure that rations would be 
issued only to the ‘absolutely necessitous and destitute.’”51 Not everyone took such a realistic 
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approach to the situation. Just like Union troops, both high and low-ranking officials offered their 
opinions of displaced whites, many of these opinions were not favorable. 
In their description of aid to displaced people, the Bureau often revealed their Victorian 
attitudes towards dependency as well as allegations that aid generated need for these people.52 
Opinions of displaced whites often contained some kind of allusion to their lack of work ethic, 
which was common given that this was a commonly held view in the Victorian Era. According to 
Victorian attitudes, these people were poor and would continue to be poor until they picked 
themselves up by their bootstraps and got to work. Victorians tried to distance themselves from 
the poor, the urban poor or otherwise, whenever they could. For example, in a discussion about 
photographers during the Civil War and Reconstruction, historian Louise Stevenson noted how 
they very often ignored the poor in their work, which was an expression of Victorian values of the 
time. “Images of the poor might have raised disturbing questions: What if America contained too 
many people who would never have parlors? What would this democratic republic become if too 
many voters were not educated, thinking citizens who fulfilled their civic obligations? . . . 
Victorians put actual distance between themselves and the poor.”53 Through order and regularity, 
Victorians hoped to achieve the common good and this could not be accomplished through 
idleness. Those who subscribed to these ideas knew no regional boundaries as these views 
outshined regional differences.54 
As officials descended on the South and encountered Southern whites, many had already 
formed opinions about them. For example, Chaplain Hiram Stone offered his opinion of these 
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people in a July 1865 letter: “My experience has been that there is a large class of indolent and 
thriftless people who will act the vagrant so long as a morsel of Government Charity is to be had. 
Really I do not think there are many Refugees in this region who need suffer if they will neither 
work or return to their homes.”55 Such an assessment of displaced people ignores the consequences 
wrought by the war in every way. Stone, as chaplain, would be more sympathetic to the plight of 
these people, one would think. Here, Stone put all of the blame for the situation on the people, 
ignoring a variety of outside forces that probably played a role in their situation by the summer of 
1865. 
As relief for these white Southerners continued into Reconstruction, some agents felt that 
this reliance on the continued charity of the agency was a continued dedication to the Southern 
cause.56 Only months before, these people were the enemy. It is no surprise that these feelings 
lingered months after the war’s end. Other officials, from Howard all the way down the chain of 
command, did the same with their initial impressions of displaced people. These feelings, 
combined with contemporary views of the poor, formed a certain set of opinions directed at many 
of these poor Southern whites who came to the Bureau for aid. These opinions are in line with 
their contemporaries, given Northerners’ views of Southerners as well as their opinions of relief 
for the poor during the Victorian Era. 
What other factors might have influenced officials’ attitudes towards displaced whites? 
Perhaps the magnitude of the situation surrounding displaced whites influenced the opinions of 
these officials who viewed them in such a negative light. “Refugees in large numbers,” Sprague 
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reported to Howard in June 1865, “and in most pitiable and destitute condition, have been flocking 
to our posts for subsistence – most of them are of the lowest type of humanity to be found in this 
country – they are willing mendicants and paupers; some are worthy people suffering the extremes 
of poverty and sickness.”57 Sprague’s statement provides a window into his personal views on the 
situation. On the one hand, he talks about the large number of people and how many are in need. 
Sprague also felt that some of them were simply lazy or unwilling to alleviate their situation for 
themselves, relying on the government for subsistence. Officials did their best to assess the 
situation for themselves, though in time, they would hear from the people about their situation. As 
soon as the war ended, many uprooted whites in the region communicated their situation hoping 
to bring attention to their plight. 
Many displaced people thought of the Bureau as, quite simply, the Federal government. 
This was not necessarily a bad thing, as the government meant help for these people. Given the 
ordeal that many displaced whites had just experienced, they felt as though the government was 
one of the few entities that could deal with the magnitude of their situation at the end of the war. 
The Bureau, historian Ira C. Colby reminds us, “implemented and coordinated four major 
programs throughout the reconstructed states: rations distribution, health care, educational 
programs, and a judicial system.”58 Displaced whites could take advantage of any one of these 
services offered by the agency. While rations were important for many displaced whites in that 
they would satisfy an immediate need, they sometimes needed help resolving longer-term issues, 
often legal in nature. 
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One displaced Missourian, a woman named Mary S. wrote to the Superintendent of the 
Bureau in St. Louis for help in the form of rations for her and her child. Her husband, who was 
unnamed in the letter, enlisted in the Union army following the destruction of their home by 
guerrillas in 1862. Wartime guerrilla activity in western Missouri combined with General Ewing’s 
General Orders No. 11 forced her to seek refuge in Henry County, Missouri, for the remainder of 
the Civil War. Until April 1865, she eked out a living on her husband’s modest army pay. By April 
1866, however, she had nothing left and was on the verge of starvation. With this, she was 
compelled to ask for help. “Reduced to poverty and worse after five years anxiety and 
disappointment I am at last obliged to address the Representatives of the U.S. Government for 
support and relief.”59 Mary hoped that by communicating her situation to the Freedmen’s Bureau, 
it would be able to help provide food for her and her child as well as help resolve the matter of her 
husband’s wartime pay. 
While the primary focus of the Bureau was to provide much needed aid to freedpeople and 
displaced whites, it provided a variety of other services. People took advantage of these services 
in great numbers, especially once the dust of war had settled. Needy people might have viewed the 
agency as much more than a source of temporary aid in the form of food or clothing; they may 
view it as a point of contact with which their other disputes could be resolved. Individual accounts 
such as these are plentiful in the Bureau records. These accounts could be letters sent directly to a 
particular office or letters from officials detailing the many visits paid to these offices by displaced 
people. “Given the chaotic conditions in the postwar South, agents spent most of the time coping 
with day-to-day crises,” reminds Foner, “and did so under adverse circumstances and with 
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resources unequal to the task.”60 Sometimes, people contacted the Bureau collectively, often as a 
community, hoping for a response because of their numbers as there were instances where all or 
most of a community asked for help. 
The crisis faced by the Bureau in both Missouri and Arkansas was daunting to say the least. 
Nevertheless, the agency did its best to protect those who needed it. With guerrillas marauding the 
countryside, people were still scared and sought help and protection. A Fort Smith New Era 
account, entitled “A Refugee Mother and Seven Children,” detailed the situation encountered by 
officials by the late spring of 1865: 
We saw at the police station last night a middle aged woman surrounded by seven 
small children, the eldest eleven years old, and the youngest four years. Three of 
the young ones were born at one birth, and two of the others were twins. She came 
from Madison county, Arkansas. Her name is Mrs. Harp, and she said her husband 
had died of measles, while serving in the 1st Arkansas (Union) cavalry. She was in 
destitute circumstances, having no money, no friends, and no roof to shelter her 
numerous and tender brood from the cold rain and the chill air. The whole family 
were barefooted; shoes and stockings being unknown to their little feet. They 
obtained lodgings last night in the calaboose, and we trust the benevolent people of 
the city will make some better provision for them today.61 
Accounts like this were common throughout much of Arkansas and parts of Missouri at the war’s 
end. A woman, whose husband had died in service to the Union, confronted the reality that she 
would have to be the sole provider for her seven children. 
At the start of the agency’s operations in the region in the summer of 1865, there were 
estimates regarding the number of people who needed help. In one instance, officials estimated 
there to be approximately 147,000 rations needed in Arkansas just for the months of July and 
August 1865. The number needed in Missouri for the same period was about 38,000 bringing the 
total of rations needed to 185,000 - versus approximately 232,500 rations needed for freedmen 
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during the same period. The author of the report further noted that these were only estimates and 
should be interpreted as such, as the situation had the possibility to change rapidly.62 Another 
report from the same period found that the “government issued rations to 4,452 white refugees and 
236 freedmen in Missouri. In Arkansas the number of persons to whom rations were issued is not 
stated.”63 While it is difficult to determine an exact number of displaced whites in the region at the 
end of the war, it is safe to say that their numbers overwhelmed the Bureau, at least initially. From 
June 1865 through November 1868, the Bureau issued approximately 20.3 million rations in 
thirteen Southern states and the District of Columbia. Twenty-six percent of these rations were 
issued to displaced whites.64 Once on the ground, officials continued to assess the condition of 
displaced people who very badly needed their help.  
Other encounters between Bureau agents and displaced whites demonstrate how under 
prepared it was. Displaced residents from the across region came to the agency in such large 
numbers, not only could agents not provide enough rations, but they had trouble keeping their 
supplies under lock and key. One agent asked for manpower to secure his supplies in November 
of 1865: “I need a person of intelligence and discrimination to make arrests – also nearly every 
day it is necessary for me to issue rations to Refugees returning home also it is necessary for me 
to have some one [sic] to take charge and issue rations & wood to the Refugees in camp as the 
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building containing the rations is broken into and they are stolen and persons at the camp get a part 
of the wood who are not entitled to it.”65 Displaced whites, as indicated here, swarmed Bureau 
offices to, not only receive aid, but take whatever they could for their continued survival. It was a 
very desperate situation for them and they acted accordingly. Many displaced whites were 
desperate and they came to the realization that the Bureau was unprepared for the number of people 
who needed help, so they went around the agency to take what they needed. 
Agents had to not only somehow attempt to gauge their number, but also determine their 
condition and their immediate needs to help them more efficiently. This would allow the agency 
to have not only the proper amount of supplies but also the supplies needed most by displaced 
people. For example, Sprague asked of his subordinates: “I respectfully request that you direct all 
officers serving with you having in charge matters in reference to the Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands to at once report to me the condition of their work in detail, so that I may be 
advised of the number of White Refugees and Freedpeople who are now being subsisted in whole, 
or in part by the Government, their condition, and all information in their possession that will assist 
me in the discharge of my duties.”66 Reports poured in from all over the Bureau’s Arkansas-
Missouri district on the condition of displaced people. Only when these reports began to roll in did 
officials begin to understand the gravity of the situation on the ground based on the numbers of 
supplies that displaced people needed. 
Like the army, the Bureau issued rations to satisfy the immediate needs of displaced whites 
and freedpeople who came into their care. Rations requested for displaced whites could be quite 
staggering in terms of the number needed on a monthly basis. Agents were very precise in their 
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orders in that they required regular reports about how many rations would be required for displaced 
whites and freedpeople for the coming months. Some reports offered a county-by-county 
breakdown of rations needed for the coming month. For example, an August 30, 1865, report from 
Sprague to Howard requested for Missouri, Arkansas, and Kansas, a total number of 77,105 rations 
just for displaced whites.67 Other reports detailed what kind and estimated quantities of various 
supplies for the months ahead. Sprague again wrote Howard in which he provided an extended list 
of what people needed for the remainder of 1865 (See Fig. 5.2) as well as another estimate for 
rations for the fourth quarter of that year: 38,628 in Missouri and 137,658 for displaced 
Arkansans.68 These amounts demonstrate the fluidity of the situation faced by the Freedmen’s 
Bureau. Additionally, it demonstrates how difficult it would be to provide for the many displaced 
people in the region. 
522 Hats 504 Caps 45 Cap Covers 
373 Uniform Coats 2088 Great Cloaks 677 prs [pairs] Trousers 
1343 Jackets 241 Sack Coats 378 Flannel Shirts 
277 pr [pair] Drawers Knit 350 pr Stockings 193 pr Boots 
315 pr Shoes 5000 pr Shoe Strings 1507 Blankets Woolen 
221 Blankets Rubber 420 Comforters 195 Pillows 
57 Mattresses 226 pr Mittens 21 Haversacks 
16 Knapsacks 29 Chairs 13 Washstands 
1 Water Cooler 7 Iron Pots & Skillets 2 Scrub Brushes 
5 Axes 10 Coffee Pots 74 Tin Cups 
56 Tin Plates 40 Table Spoons 86 Table Knives 
44 Table Forks 41 Dippers 45 Wash Basins 
1 Wash Board 28 Fire Shovels & Pokers  
Despite the Bureau’s efforts, their work did not immediately satisfy the needs of displaced 
whites. Many individual accounts concerning the situation in the region detailed the challenges 
faced by the agency in both the short-term as well as the long-term. In the months immediately 
                                                          
67 J.W. Sprague to O.O. Howard,” August 30, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of 
Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 1, NARA. 
68 J.W. Sprague to O.O. Howard,” September 27, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of 
Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 1, NARA. 
Fig. 5.2: List of requested supplies for the Trans-Mississippi West from J.W. Sprague. J.W. Sprague to O.O. Howard,” 
September 27, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 1, NARA. 
284 
 
 
 
following the end of the war into the fall, officials came face to face with the displaced residents 
who they came to aid. Writing from Pilot Knob, Missouri, a collecting point for displaced whites 
from the region, Union chaplain C.H. Lovejoy reported during August of 1865 that he saw “. . . 
some new and pressing cases of destitution. . . .”69 This certainly sheds light on just how fast the 
situation changed and displaced people multiplied for the Bureau during its early stages in dealing 
with them. Still, officials examined everyone on a case-by-case basis to determine if they really 
were in need of rations. In this report, Lovejoy expressed skepticism that these people needed 
immediate relief and they would be questioned and observed. The people here were those that the 
war left behind. 
Soldiers’ wives were of special concern for Bureau agents. Lovejoy notes that special 
attention must be given to “soldiers’ wives and widows” as they did not receive money from their 
husbands and could not find work in the area to make any kind of living. The chaplain does not 
reveal if these widows and soldiers’ wives were Union or Confederate, but it does reveal the 
hardships faced by these women when their husbands left for war. It also demonstrates the 
important role played by these women in the aftermath of the war. Historian Stephanie McCurry 
notes this pattern extensively in her most recent work. “That ‘soldiers’ wives’ emerged as the term 
of self-discipline for the great majority of poor white Southern women tells us something very 
significant about the transformative possibilities of politics in war.”70 Lovejoy concluded, “Their 
condition is truly a sad one.”71 
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From these Bureau reports, we are able to learn little about those displaced whites, though 
some offer clues. Union army captain Thomas Abel, writing from Little Rock, detailed the 
situation in Arkansas to his superiors by early January 1866. Abel began his nine-page letter with 
an overview of the situation based on reports from those in the field. He toured the state in 
December 1865, made his own observations, and gathered information from other agents from 
various parts of the state. Abel noted that people came from as far away as fifty miles from the 
garrison at Fort Smith. He goes on to detail who some of these people were, at least in terms of 
numbers, at Fort Smith. “Of that number,” Abel continues, “about fifty-five are men who are either 
sick, lame or blind, two hundred and fifty are women who represent themselves as widows, or the 
wives of the above mentioned class of men. Two hundred and seventy are children over fourteen 
years of age, and seven hundred and twenty five are children under fourteen years old.”72 Again, 
in trying to ascertain that those seeking rations are actually in need, the agent questions those who 
are asking for more than who are actually present at the garrison – individuals asking for more 
than what they would need. Perhaps there are mothers who left their children behind or children 
asking for parents, grandparents, or other family members who were unable to make the trek to 
Fort Smith to ask for aid in person. He is most interested in the widows where he wonders in the 
letter if their husbands are “living.” Perhaps these women were doing what Abel suspected, trying 
to get extra rations – for whatever reason – to sell or because they simply did not know if they 
would be able to get back to ask again. It is also possible that their men were either at home or still 
displaced, too embarrassed about their condition to ask for aid. 
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Abel tells a similar story about displaced whites further north at Fayetteville and then 
Clarksville. Many in Fayetteville were often hungry and some were homeless. Like people at Fort 
Smith, it was mostly women and children in Fayetteville – with many of them widows of Union 
soldiers killed in battle. The area he travelled between these two communities was in complete 
devastation according to Abel. The situation at Clarksville was so bad that entire families, in 
addition to being in a near constant state of starvation, slept on beds of grass and leaves in the 
corner of abandoned plantations “and scarcely garments to hide their nakedness.”73 Overall, Abel 
paints a rather bleak picture in Arkansas during the final months of 1865 – at least in the handful 
of places that he had visited. 
Freedpeople are not absent in Abel’s lengthy report to his Bureau superiors. He briefly 
mentions freedpeople present at these locations, but, according to his observations, they appeared 
to be getting along fine. Occasionally, he would mention the number of rations that they needed 
or how many freedpeople might be present at a given location. This report, like those from other 
agents, compared freedpeople and displaced whites. When these comparisons were made, 
freedpeople were often cast in a more favorable light. For example, in this case, Abel discusses 
the prospect that they might work so that they are not reliant on the government. Abel ended his 
report with the following observation: “The people throughout the country seem anxious to have 
some system of labor adopted, but their talk and actions prove that selfish motives alone prompt 
them. Their first questions are ‘will Agt. [Bureau agents] have power to make the Nigers [sic] 
work.’ I found some idle Freedmen at every town, more at Ft. Smith than any other, but I saw more 
idle whites than negroes [sic].”74 Is he talking specifically about displaced whites? Is he referring 
to those who formerly made up the planter class? It was not out of the ordinary for the Bureau to 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. Underlining in the original. 
287 
 
 
 
try to put displaced whites to work and, even in Abel’s report; there were agents who wondered 
about the work ethic of these displaced whites before the war. Usually, they concluded that these 
people were lacking in their work ethics before the war as well. Reports like Abel’s often raise 
more questions than they actually answer. 
Similar statements about displaced whites poured in to Washington from Bureau offices 
across the region. Sensing that the number of people who needed rations – displaced whites, 
destitute whites, and freedpeople – the agency began to think aloud about utilizing the 
transportation to shift the burden of these people away from the Bureau. Their first choice it seems 
would be to turn them loose to work the land and provide their own subsistence through the fruits 
of their own labor. However, Abel notes that the land around Little Rock was in “exhausted 
condition” and this would not be possible.75 It was for reasons such as this that, like the Union 
army and the different benevolent aid organizations that came before it, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
often organized transport for people who could find shelter and other aid with friends and family 
elsewhere in the country. Displaced whites were usually transported by rail and were sent all over 
the country, wherever they could receive help, usually from friends and family. 
Other times, the Bureau provided transportation for displaced people who simply wanted 
to return home. In November of 1865, agent W.S. McCullough, wrote about those seeking 
transport. In a quickly scrawled note, McCullough wrote from DeValls Bluff, in eastern Arkansas, 
“I would respectfully request and order for transportation to their homes for the following named 
families who are sick, destitute, and depending upon the government for support but who have 
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farms at home and think if they could get to them they could support themselves and are anxious 
to go.”76 He then notes the names of four families and a sick man who needed travel: 
Catherina McClinton and two children Jacksonport, Ark. 
Jane Greene and one child to Ft. Smith, Ark. 
Lima McCormick and four children Jacksonport, Ark. 
John R. Means, wife and three children and sick man Elijah Hox to Jacksonport, Ark.77 
In this instance, there is very little description of who these people were, what consequences 
brought them to the Bureau in search of help, or what became of them once they left the care of 
these agents. What we can deduce from this particular document is that there were people who 
simply wanted to go back home – to work, to be reunited with families, to return their lives to 
some kind of normalcy. Not everyone who came to the agency for help wanted it to be long term 
nor were all of these people who sought help lazy, in line with contemporary views. Three of the 
four families – or parts of families – were women and children. Perhaps the Confederate army 
conscripted their husbands, perhaps these men had gone into hiding to avoid having to serve in 
either army, or, perhaps, they had been killed in the war or during their time on the run. It is hard 
to tell. 
A wide range of people took advantage of the Bureau’s transportation opportunities. Pierce 
notes in his work about the agency how it “furnished free transportation to four classes of persons: 
white refugees, freedmen, teachers, and officers and agents of the bureau.”78 Pierce goes further 
explaining that this transportation was prevalent during 1865 and 1866. After 1866, a combination 
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of a decreased need for this transportation as well as a number of abuses of the system extremely 
limited this service by the Bureau.79 Pierce estimates that it transported 3,892 displaced people 
during the period of May 5, 1865 through March 20, 1869 at a cost of approximately 
$213,886.36.80 This transportation was not cost effective when compared to the issuance of rations 
to those in need. “Transportation is more expensive and logistically more difficult than providing 
rations,” observes historian Robert C. Lieberman, “and presumably any given individual needs to 
be transported only once, whereas relief is a continuous need.”81 The Bureau’s transportation 
program served the immediate purpose of transitioning displaced whites back to some kind of 
normalcy. 
A number of Bureau records detail the transportation of both displaced individuals as well 
as entire families to be with others who could provide assistance, easing their transition back into 
peacetime. Transportation provided for uprooted whites in the region sent them to places like 
Texas, Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and places as far away as New York and New England. Often, 
displaced people had relatives there who could care for them or they were able to find employment 
of some kind. For example, in October 1865, the Bureau office in Little Rock helped “F.S. Flowers 
and wife” to Montgomery, Alabama, and “Rev. A.R. Davis, wife, and child” to Bowling Green, 
Kentucky.82 A secretary, a chaplain, or some other low-level official often scratched out this 
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information in a hastily penned hand. These documents were minimal in detail therefore rendering 
particulars about their condition and circumstances lost to history. In other instances, the Bureau 
might provide transportation that was local in nature, perhaps sending displaced people somewhere 
else within the state or just across the border. A December 1865 report noted a “Barry Putnam & 
son & daughter & two children” to be transported from St. Louis to Providence, Missouri.83 The 
agency transported both individuals and entire families out of the region in order to reduce their 
impact on the agency’s resources, especially during the first year of Reconstruction. 
The Role of Army Chaplains in Freedmen’s Bureau Operations 
Chaplains served in the army for a variety of reasons including their own idealism or they 
served at the request of some of the more religious officers. In addition to their religious duties 
that included the performing of funerals and distributing religious literature, many of these men 
helped hospitalized troops or maybe they would go off to secure some good reading material for 
the men. In many ways, they became roaming pastors, preaching to soldiers on the move. Many 
soldiers tried to make sense of the war within the framework of religion and the chaplains helped 
in that effort. “Specifically, from the middle of 1863, many troops in both armies saw the war as 
God’s punishment for ‘our sins,’ though Northerners and Southerners differed in who they meant 
by ‘our’ and what they mean by ‘sins.’”84 Soldiers did not always welcome the chaplains, an 
outsider in a band of brothers. Soldiers often viewed these men as a fifth wheel or a nuisance to 
the regiment or company. Over time, however, chaplains would often carve out a place of their 
own within these military units, catering to not only the needs of the unit, but to the needs of the 
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individual soldier. With the war over, chaplains entered the fray of the Bureau and officials charged 
them with the task of aiding displaced people.85 
Sometimes, these chaplains served in a dual capacity – they were both the post chaplain as 
well as the Superintendent of Refugees, who served as a part of the Freedmen’s Bureau, for a given 
geographic area. Even as the war ended, they served the spiritual needs for soldiers as well as 
displaced Southern whites. For example, in a general order issued by Major-General Dodge in the 
Department of the Missouri in December of 1864: “For the purpose of better providing for the 
wants and of improving the condition of the large number of refugees in this department, and to 
organize in the different districts a uniform system for their care, a refugee bureau is hereby 
established. Each district commander will appoint an officer (a chaplain if possible) as 
superintendent of refugees, whose duty is shall be to look after the interests of the destitute refugees 
in his district.”86 Chaplains would continue to assist displaced people under the umbrella of Bureau 
operations. 
Army chaplains often served as the face of the Bureau for so many displaced whites. 
Chaplains, whose duties were “so diversified that one must be cautious in making generalizations,” 
played a key role in dealing with any and all matters pertaining to displaced people during the later 
stages of the war into the Reconstruction period.87 Moreover, while this observation is true as it 
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pertains to the army, the Bureau utilized the service of chaplains most frequently to aid displaced 
residents. Chaplains often helped them find transportation to be with family members in other parts 
of the country or they might help them procure rations from the agency. In much of the Union 
army and Bureau’s written correspondence concerning the displaced, matters were often referred 
to the chaplain of a given district to handle and report to a commanding officer. Chaplains also 
detailed the size and scope of the situation as well as the amount of supplies needed/received for 
these people. 
While a number of chaplains served displaced people throughout the Trans-Mississippi 
West after the war as a part of the Bureau, one name stands out in the region: Alpha Wright. 
Wright, originally from Vermont, graduated seminary and preached all over the country as an 
ordained member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. After his tours around the country before 
the war, Wright settled in Missouri where, as a strong Unionist, he joined the Twenty-fifth 
Missouri Volunteer Infantry as a chaplain in 1863 and he served in that capacity for the remainder 
of the war. On June 27, 1865, in Circular No. 4, Sprague assigned Wright as Superintendent of 
Refugees for the states of Missouri and Kansas under the Freedmen’s Bureau, headquartered in St. 
Louis.88 Because of this appointment, Wright’s name appears in a number of records that pertain 
to the agency’s dealings with displaced people in Missouri, Arkansas, and Kansas during 1865 and 
1866.89 Wright, and other men like him, served the Bureau and performed a variety of functions, 
aiding both displaced whites and freedpeople. 
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Chaplains dutifully cared for the needs of displaced whites and freedpeople and reported 
all of the details to the Bureau. For example, Chaplain C.H. Lovejoy worked with Wright to obtain 
second-hand clothing sent to Pilot Knob, Missouri, in June of 1865, for “a few cases of great 
destitution for clothing. Chaplain Wright when here said that there was second-hand clothing that 
could be had,” Lovejoy continued, “if so, we could dispose of a box of it to great advantage.”90 
They offered suggestions on how to procure additional supplies as well as advice on how to reduce 
the needs of displaced people and freedpeople. Usually this meant soliciting donations from the 
local population or requesting supplies from the benevolent aid societies to shift the cost of 
providing for displaced people in the region. Sometimes, some Bureau officials accused chaplains 
of being too generous. In one instance, an official accused a chaplain of being too generous, 
perhaps, in whom he qualified as displaced. Bureau agent D.H. Williams complained that 
displaced whites exaggerated their status in an effort to get supplies from the government. 
Williams wrote to Sprague from Clarksville, Arkansas, that these displaced residents were taking 
the advantage of the chaplain. “The officer in charge of the Refugee Dept. here is a chaplain (Rev. 
Z. Keeton, 2nd Ark. Inf.) and I think too kind hearted and unsuspecting for this [business?]”91 Here, 
perhaps the chaplain better assessed the needs of these people, was perhaps too generous with 
supplies, or, if Williams was correct, residents who were not in any kind of need took advantage 
of him.  
Displaced Whites vs. Freedpeople: Treatment by the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Throughout the records of the Bureau, it separated freedpeople from what the agency 
generically labeled as refugees or destitute whites. Certainly, the debates over race that were 
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present when Congress decided to include whites under the agency’s umbrella of operations, were 
not over as they poured over into the agency’s efforts. From the various meticulously kept charts, 
detailing the number of rations disbursed to freedpeople and displaced whites to the many 
transportation arrangements carried out by the Bureau, officials went out of their way to detail 
whom, amongst displaced whites and freedpeople received what kind of aid. Aid given to refugees 
would be listed in one column while aid for freedmen would be listed in another. While no official 
communication from Washington was found regarding these classifications between the two, it 
does raise questions about why this practice was adopted. Was this something performed at some 
offices and not others? Was this practice used as a means to keep track of who received the aid to 
perhaps back arguments against aid for one group or the other? It is unclear as to why this was 
done but it does show that even Bureau aid could be segregated in nature. 
While agents separated the two groups when it came to aid, this was not the case when it 
came to enforcing order, displaced whites and freedpersons were sometimes lumped together in 
the interest of maintaining order. These orders, issued by local Bureau offices, usually contained 
some kind of prohibition. For example, Special Order No. 7, issued on October 24, 1865, in 
Monticello, Arkansas, prohibited the sale of alcohol to freedmen or displaced whites. “All persons 
are hereby inhibited from selling, giving or allowing to be drank on their premises, any intoxicating 
liquors to or by Refugees, or Freedmen, unless accompanied by a permit from the Supt. 
Freedmen’s Office, or a certified statement from a practicing physician showing that such is 
necessary as a medicine.”92 Such an order hints that the Bureau viewed both displaced whites and 
freedpeople as a threat to order and, as a result, they banned the sale of intoxicants to these people. 
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Agents often made it clear that freedpeople were their first priority, even though Congress 
established the Bureau based on a non-discrimination policy. The attitude conveyed by many 
officials expressed, at times,” Sprague wrote to Howard during that first summer of peace, 
“frustration directed at displaced whites who came into their care in search of help. “I am satisfied 
that the Freedmen of this State will establish and support their own schools almost entirely, if the 
Government protects them, but this is not true yet of the White Refugees.”93 For these officials, 
like Howard and Sprague, displaced whites were somehow still unprepared to do the same. They 
viewed these whites in much the same way that the Western Sanitary Commission had in their 
relief efforts. Officials viewed them with a disdain draped with the prejudices of wartime 
stereotypes of these displaced whites. Perhaps this was because of antebellum prejudices towards 
Southern whites or maybe it was because they were still viewed as the enemy. Because of this 
treatment by the Bureau, many displaced whites turned to their state government for help. 
The Bureau and the States 
Relief for freedpeople and displaced whites in the South raised many questions about 
government aid. Historian Denise Wright has argued that states evolved their own welfare policies 
during the war, before the arrival of the Freedmen’s Bureau. “The individual state of the former 
Confederacy had established welfare policies and programs during the war;” Wright notes, “by 
providing assistance to the South’s white poor, the Freedmen’s Bureau continued an established 
practice.”94 For many Southerners, the agency was the proverbial ‘tip of the sword’ when it came 
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to government aid. Howard did not hide his feelings on this subject when it came to the Bureau. 
More often than not, Howard, in line with contemporary beliefs, preferred to “have responsibility 
for paupers, including indigent refugees and freedmen, restored to local officials.”95 The war 
caused a change in how relief for the poor was carried out; it was a significant shift in public policy 
on this issue. Local governments in the South carried this burden often via property and poll taxes 
beginning in 1863. This was in addition to other programs aimed at relief programs for the widows 
of soldiers started a few years earlier.96 Howard and his actions towards the poor serve as an 
example of dealing with this change, an attempt to reinforce those beliefs. “From the start I felt 
sure that the relief offered by the Bureau to refugees and freedmen through the different channels,” 
Howard recalled in his autobiography, “being abnormal to our system of government, would be 
but temporary.”97 Howard and his agents attempted to have local officials handle many of these 
situations, especially in Arkansas. McCurry notes, “The American Civil War forged a new 
understanding of the relationship between citizens, subjects, and the state and a renegotiation of 
the social contract.”98 Many displaced Southern whites made their way to the Bureau in search of 
relief, only to be turned away to seek relief from their local government. 
In many instances, the Freedmen’s Bureau attempted to work with Arkansas’s Unionist 
governor Isaac Murphy in resolving pleas for assistance from the state’s citizens where the agency 
held the state government responsible as much as possible. For example, Sprague forwarded the 
application of one Mary E. Davis and her pleas for assistance regarding food for her and her 
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starving children, as well as a request for her deceased husband’s pay she felt was owed to her. 
Sprague reminded Governor Murphy in a March 22, 1866, letter that there were “hundreds of poor 
women in this State who are suffering for the common necessaries of life, and yet there is due 
them from the General Govt. for services rendered by their deceased husbands, enough to relieve 
their pressing wants.”99 Here, Sprague asked the state to step in to prevent these kinds of claims, 
which he felt were the state’s responsibility, from reaching his office at the Bureau, again 
illustrating the agency’s limited resources. Asking the state to step in and fulfill the needs of these 
needy Southern whites was not uncommon. “Opponents demanded that any assistance rendered to 
poor Confederate veterans or their families come from the southern states rather than the U.S. 
government.”100 In the post-war debates over not only who should receive aid, but also who would 
give it, Americans and their military leaders shared the view that the states should share the burden 
for this aid. 
Many Southerners also shared this belief and this was evident in the number of letters and 
petitions to their state officials requesting relief. Citizens’ wartime requests for assistance were 
common in the South, but these governments usually failed in providing any significant aid. “State 
and Confederate governments offered a variety of direct and indirect relief to the impoverished, 
but in quantities insufficient to meet the needs. The result was disillusionment with those 
governments, which worked to underpin popular support for the war.”101 While some white 
Southerners went to the Bureau in search of assistance, others hoped that their local officials would 
answer their pleas for help. “Although many southerners, white and black, had received aid from 
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the U.S. government through both the army and the Freedmen’s Bureau before the end of 
Reconstruction in the 1870s,” historian Jennifer Lynn Gross reminds us, “southerners largely 
rejected the ideological underpinnings of that aid.”102 People petitioned their government asking 
for help on a wide variety of issues: bringing a son or husband home from the war, relief from the 
poor living conditions many faced because of the war, and pardons for a son or husband convicted 
of desertion, avoiding conscription, or the breaking of some other wartime measure. What these 
petitions show, argues historian Amy E. Murrell, was that “[t]hese men and women were frustrated 
with a perceived lack of government support for their welfare. Their frustration, some historians 
conclude, represented disillusionment with the war on the part of white Southerners and 
undermined any chance of cultivating a common identity or purpose among them.”103 Many 
citizens in the West expressed this sentiment in one way or another, especially communities who 
were hardest hit by the war. 
Communities throughout Missouri and Arkansas, especially as displaced whites returned 
to their homes, contemplated how they might rebuild. Many faced untold destruction in their 
communities. The destruction here was physical in the form of destroyed buildings, pillaged 
possessions, or ravaged fields. Other times, the destruction was social in that some aspect of the 
war – fighting between the armies, guerrilla fighters’ constant raids on Southern and Border State 
communities, etc. - had torn entire communities apart. As a result, a number of Southern 
communities needed help and the Freedmen’s Bureau provided a great opportunity to put them on 
the road to recovery. In the summer of 1865, entire communities began to ask the agency for help 
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in order to achieve that goal. For example, the people of Lexington, Missouri, asked the agency 
for help in September of 1865. These citizens described the problem to the Bureau in three parts, 
thus their reasons for needing assistance: 
1. There are in this city and vicinity upwards of two thousand Refugees and Freedmen. 
2. Many of these are without regular employment, and consequently, poor and often without 
the necessities of life. 
3. The scarcity of houses, and, the corresponding high rents, compel many to live together in 
the same rooms, and hence there has been among them much sickness, suffering, and 
death.104 
Perhaps the five people who signed this document had exhausted other resources on an individual 
basis or these communities simply believed their numbers might draw more attention. 
Similar petitions came to the Bureau from citizens in need of help in Arkansas as well. For 
example, petitions from the citizens of Lewisburg, Arkansas, to help “Negroes and indigent Whites 
of this place and the surrounding county.”105 Written on January 2, 1866, and addressed to J.W. 
Sprague, this petition from thirty-five citizens requesting a Bureau agent for their community, 
putting a name forward of one of their own – Mr. Edward J. Morrill. Sprague received a similar 
petition from the citizens of Johnson County a little over a week later. The same for Pope and Yell 
Counties – all “refugees and Freedmen” and all in need of food, shelter, and supplies. Perhaps they 
wanted one of their own on the inside of the agency or maybe they had requested help before only 
to receive no response from agents. This could have also been their first attempt to contact the 
agents in search of aid. Freedpeople and whites asked for help collectively, demonstrating that 
both needed help from the agency. 
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Writing to the governor for some Arkansans was simply not enough. Some sent a 
representative to the Governor’s Mansion in Little Rock requesting help. This might have been 
made necessary because the governor had not replied or because their situation was so desperate, 
citizens felt that a face-to-face visit was important. In one instance, John C. Brown, a former soldier 
of the 4th Arkansas representing Hot Spring County, visited the governor requesting relief in 
January of 1866 (See Fig. 5.3). While he did not leave with any promised aid, he did leave with 
what appears to be a letter of introduction from the governor. Unable to help, Murphy referred Mr. 
Brown to the Bureau for relief. “He comes to seek relief for strong families in that county [Hot 
Spring County] – soldiers’ families – will you be so good as to hear him and if possible devise 
some plan to give relief.”106 Murphy expressed his displeasure and frustration that he had not heard 
from his Bureau agent responsible for that part of the state after he had gone north, concluding: “I 
fear his mission will be a failure.”107 Both worked together to grab the ear of the Bureau, directing 
aid where it was needed most. 
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While asking for help as a community had its benefits, so did asking for help at a more 
personal level. Citizens of communities in Arkansas and Missouri also wrote to their elected 
officials on an individual basis. For example, James Penney, another citizen from Paraclifta, wrote 
the governor in April 1865, asking him to “suppose you were in the army, your family at home . . 
. was out of bread, had no one of them able or large enough to go after it for them . . . .”108 Citizens 
not only needed protection from irregular military actions, but they also needed help providing for 
their families – food, shelter, clothing, and housing. Both armies and the remaining citizens 
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Fig. 5.3: Letter of introduction 
for John C. Brown from Isaac 
Murphy, January 31, 1866.  
Source: Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the 
State of Arkansas Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, 
Microfilm M979, Roll 7, 
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stripped the countryside of any sort of sustenance for the people, so these citizens who could not 
envision a solution to their local problems wrote their elected officials for help. Sometimes, they 
wrote as a single county or, in other instances, multiple counties combined their grievances. 
Another from the citizens of Dallas and Clark Counties, addressed to “His Excellency Gov 
Flannigin [sic],” detailed the destruction caused by “Jayhawkers, deserters, and stragglers from the 
Army.”109 Pleas for help from citizens indicate just how acute the situation concerning irregular 
troops was in Arkansas. The theft and outright destruction of personal property proved to be so 
terrible that local officials could not fix the problem; hence, the various petitions seeking help from 
the governor.Citizens often asked for assistance in procuring food and, most importantly, 
protection from forces who wished to do them harm. In many instances, entire communities did 
not know where to turn with regard to their situation at home. There are many instances of 
Arkansas citizens writing on their behalf asking for help from high-ranking state officials, most 
notably, the governor. “Writing was to them a means of opening a dialogue with government 
leaders [,]” Murrell observes with regard to the number of petitions sent by white Southerners, “as 
a result, their relationship with their leaders appears more giving and less adversarial than 
previously portrayed.”110 These letters and petitions are rather straightforward in nature, simply 
asking for relief – even if temporary – and state how dire their situation is. For example, a J.L. 
Sumner wrote to Governor Murphy – who he addressed as “My Dear Old Friend” – during the 
spring of 1866 about widows and orphans in need in Madison County in the northwestern part of 
the state who needed help. “There are very many families here, that are perfectly destitute, depend 
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upon what little they can beg from their neighbors – no one has anything to share without 
disfurnishing themselves.”111 Citizens wrote about being near starvation or that they had no food 
because of guerrillas or poor harvests. There is no discussion in these appeals of one’s political 
leanings, citizens are not leveraging their whiteness in any way, nor are they criticizing their local 
or national officials in any way. They simply state that they need help, why they need help, and 
that they are loyal to the Union. 
Governor Murphy received a number of letters and petitions from Arkansas citizens after 
the war. Not all of these citizens, however, wrote from inside the state. In one instance, a man 
named Wiley S. King wrote to the governor of Arkansas from Rolla, Missouri, during the summer 
of 1865. Writing from Rolla, Mr. King pleaded for help from the governor. A loyal citizen who 
had two sons fight in the Union army, one had been killed, Mr. King stated his desire to return 
home to Arkansas. The area around Rolla was so unsettled, however, he requested the governor to 
send federal troops to escort him back home. “I want to return home vary [sic] bad and I will 
petition you to send about some [?] federall [sic] soldiers to fulton County to help to enforse [sic] 
the civil law as there is some people thare [sic] that will bee [sic] opposed to the law being enforsed 
[sic]. I will endeavor to do my part I want that contry [sic] to flourish once more.”112 The war’s 
impact on displaced whites lingered long after the armies fired the final shot. It is unclear what 
became of Mr. King after he wrote this letter to the governor, but the uneasiness many in the region 
experienced after the war can be felt here. While other displaced people wrote Murphy for help 
procuring food or clothing, this man wrote for assistance in getting back home. It certainly adds 
variety to the kinds of letters sent to the governor pleading for help. 
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While a fair number of petitions and letters from Arkansas citizens can be located in the 
historical record, few can be found in Missouri from Missouri citizens. This may demonstrate 
better/more control from local authorities in Missouri, thus negating the need for local 
communities in that state to request the help of their governor. Though the aforementioned letter 
indicates that the situation was not perfect with regard to law and order. This does not mean, 
however, that such letters do not exist. It just shows that things appeared to be better in Missouri 
than in Arkansas in the immediate aftermath of the war. The lack of such pleas may also show, 
especially later in the war, how stable the military situation was in Missouri with the increasing 
Union presence. The Union army was well in control in Missouri for much of the war and, as a 
result, attended to the needs of the citizens who resided there. 
Other petitions notified the Bureau of people running low on their monthly rations. 
Historian Mary Farmer-Kaiser has noted, “over the first year of operations, between June 1865 
and August 1866, the bureau distributed more than thirteen million rations of food to southerners, 
almost nine million directed to freedpeople.”113 Petitions of this sort were prevalent during the 
spring of 1866 when community members wrote to the office in Little Rock pleading for rations. 
Citizens in Sevier County, Arkansas (Jefferson Township) wrote the Bureau in hopes of making 
them aware of their situation. “We the undersigned citizens of Jefferson Township and the county 
and state as aforesaid do depose and say on oath that we have not got one month’s provisions on 
hand and we do further swear that the number and ages added to our names is true.”114 This 
petition, penned by a H.G. Littlefield on behalf of his fellow citizens, then listed the names of 
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eighteen heads of household and the numbers in each household both over and under the age of 
fourteen years. There are similar petitions from the citizens of Pike County (White Township), 
Saline County (DeKalb Township), and others during the early months of 1866. These petitions 
support Colby’s analysis of the inconsistency of aid on a state-to-state basis. Colby contends that, 
due to a lack of direction and a lack of national support, it remained to the individual states where 
the agency operated to generate funding for its operation. Because of this, expenditures for rations, 
education, and health care varied among the Southern states and led to the agency’s ultimate 
failure. “If the Bureau had been viewed from an institutional perspective,” Colby notes, “white 
refugees might have utilized services and greatly expanded the Bureau’s impact on the South.”115 
While a number of Southern whites sought the help of the Bureau, a great deal more stayed away. 
Andrew Johnson and the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill Veto 
One of the first pieces of paper to come across President Johnson’s desk was the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill in February 1866. This bill, proposed by Illinois senator Lyman Trumbull 
and passed by Congress just after the New Year, sought to extend the life of the agency, provide 
direct funding for its operations throughout the South, and allow agents to have jurisdiction over 
cases that involved African Americans. This jurisdiction included protection from unfair labor 
contracts and providing the agency with the ability to punish state officials who denied them basic 
civil rights. Johnson could have signed the bill to indicate his support of the Radical Congress and 
signify that he stood with freedpeople. Johnson, however, so this bill differently than those 
Republicans who put him on the ticket and, subsequently, into the Executive Mansion. He saw the 
bill as an opportunity to slow if not stop any progress made by the Republicans as well as assert 
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his authority as President of the United States. This veto served as Johnson’s first clash with 
Congress, but it would not be his last, in his years as president.116 
In his veto message to Congress, President Johnson laid out why he rejected the Bureau’s 
extension. He believed that he could not authorize such an agency as it served to expand federal 
powers at the expense of the states. When it came to the Bureau’s operation costs, Johnson held 
strong to fiscally conservative beliefs. He also echoed the sentiment that the agency would create 
a dependent class of citizens and he (mis)characterized the agency as a permanent branch of the 
government, which it was not.117 The president’s veto message, while acknowledging some kind 
of federal responsibility for freedpeople, took a shot at displaced and destitute whites who 
depended on the Bureau. Johnson stated in his February 19, 1866, message: 
The institution of slavery, for the military destruction of which the Freedmen’s 
Bureau was called into existence as an auxiliary force, has been already effectually 
and finally abrogated throughout the whole country by an amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, and practically its eradication has received the 
assent and concurrence of most of those States in which it at any time had existed. 
I am not, therefore, able to discern in the country any thing [sic] to justify an 
apprehension that the powers and agencies of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which were 
effective for the protection of freedmen and refugees during the actual continuation 
of hostilities and of African servitude, will now, in a time of peace and after the 
abolition of slavery, prove inadequate to the same proper ends.118 
Here, the president indicates that with the end of the war, and, by result, the end of slavery, destitute 
and displaced whites no longer needed the support of the government vis-à-vis the Bureau. While 
his statement here is only one of many that would infuriate Republicans, it does hint at some deeper 
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sentiments regarding displaced Southern whites present in its operations. “Throughout its 
existence,” reminds Foner, “the Bureau regarded poor relief as a temptation to idleness.”119 In his 
message, Johnson said the same thing, very much aligned with Howard’s view, though his using 
the end of the war and the end of slavery as his reasons for discontinuing aid for displaced whites 
and freedpeople is a different way of thinking about it.  
Conclusion 
 With President Johnson’s veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill during the early months of 
1866, agents came to the realization that their work would be made more difficult because they 
would be caught in the middle of an ideological battle between Johnson and the Republicans in 
Congress. The Bureau helped displaced whites throughout Missouri and Arkansas from the war’s 
end in April/May 1865 into 1866. Often charged with this task were the many army chaplains who 
stayed on to work for the agency after the war. Howard placed these chaplains in charge of 
providing for displaced whites who made their way to the Bureau in search of help. Displaced 
whites from across the region came to the Bureau in search of relief and received it. Led by General 
O.O. Howard, the agency had what they felt to be a clear mission in helping the thousands upon 
thousands of freedpeople throughout the South, but it was unsure of what to do when it came to 
helping displaced whites. To be sure, the Bureau needed help and they received is from aid 
societies like the Western Sanitary Commission. While agents were suspicious of Southern whites 
who came to them for help, they put their initial suspicions aside and issued rations, provided 
transportation, and employment for so many of these people. In the Trans-Mississippi West, the 
Bureau consolidated its operations to a headquarters in Little Rock, effectively ending their efforts 
in Missouri. Howard concluded that freedpeople were adequately protected there and he felt that 
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the support of Missouri’s displaced and destitute citizens should fall squarely on the shoulders of 
the local government. As a result, many displaced citizens wrote to their local officials requesting 
aid to ameliorate their condition or simply requesting the Bureau to hear their needs. This view 
that the states should provide relief for its citizens, not the Bureau, not only came from the head 
of the agency, but it was a view that many Americans shared at that time. During the Bureau’s first 
year of operation, tensions regarding where its focus should be emerged. It became clear that the 
agency wanted to focus on the plight of freedpeople and its distrust of displaced whites fueled that 
narrowed focus. Combined, these factors made for a very difficult task for the Bureau when it 
came to the aid of displaced citizens. 
 Complicating things for the Bureau and their operations throughout the South was the 
leadership of new president Andrew Johnson. Johnson held views on how reconstruction should 
proceed that differed from his predecessor in many ways. The new president was against any kind 
of large-scale federal programs and agencies that interfered with, what he felt were the affairs of 
the individual states. His first major clash with the Radical-controlled Congress was his veto of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (1866). These clashes, however, would continue as the agency moved 
forward with its program of building schools and establishing hospitals for freedpeople and 
displaced Southern whites. Johnson thwarted attempts at land redistribution to not only 
freedpeople, but to displaced whites, and his Proclamation of Amnesty issued in May of 1865. 
This proclamation, President Johnson’s continued disagreements with the Radical Congress, and 
a famine that affected much of the South during the early part of 1867 would prove to be the end 
of the Bureau’s relief for the wartime displaced. From here, the agency’s mission would change 
and displaced whites were no longer a part of its plans. 
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CHAPTER 6: HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS, & LAND REDISTRIBUTION FOR 
DISPLACED WHITES, 1866-1868 
 
“According to the best information I could get, there seems to be no part of this place leased, but 
all the occupants were placed there by this Bureau as destitute Refugees with the hopes that they 
might assist a little in supporting themselves, thus relieving the Government of a part of the 
expense and trouble.”120 
 
With the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau and its operation in Arkansas and Missouri, a 
great deal of work lay ahead in an effort to reduce the number displaced whites there. Hindered by 
the constant disagreements between the president and Congress, the agency worked to establish 
hospitals, schools, orphanages, and embark on a system of land reform to ease the transition to 
wage labor for freedpeople and help displaced and poor whites. Concerns about dependency not 
only influenced Washington’s decisions regarding the agency, but it also affected decisions made 
by agents and superintendents at the local level. “While some needy individuals could find brief 
assistance from the federal government through the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands,” reminds historian Jennifer Lynn Gross, “many found themselves reliant 
primarily upon traditional sources.”121 As a result, there were debates over where displaced whites 
should go for aid and how much of that aid the agency should provide. 
By late 1865, much of the Bureau’s operations in the region focused on Arkansas. While 
Missouri ratified a new state constitution that banned slavery in 1865, the situation in Arkansas 
would be much different and the Bureau witnessed this first hand during the following three years. 
The state remained in political limbo until it ratified its new constitution in 1868. This, combined 
with the Bureau’s decision to close up its offices in Missouri, made the reconstruction of Arkansas 
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the agency’s primary focus in the region moving into 1867 and 1868. “Arkansas was a difficult 
state to reconstruct,” General Howard remembered after the war, “and progress, especially in the 
line of justice was slow enough. There were numbers of desperadoes in remote places, especially 
in the southern districts. They evaded punishment by running across the State line, so that the 
emancipation acts and the civil rights law had little effect.”122 Howard and his agents had their 
work cut out for them in Arkansas, which was made more complicated with the actions of the 
president through 1868. By the end of that year, the president was embroiled in impeachment 
proceedings, Congress had gradually weakened the power of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and 
Arkansas completed all of the steps for readmission to the Union effectively ending the agency’s 
operations in the region. It would be a long road for the Bureau in the region, beginning less than 
two months after the war’s end. 
President Johnson’s Amnesty Proclamation and Land Reform 
At the end of the war and large numbers of people, civilians and soldiers alike, returned to 
their homes and many displaced whites wondered, quite simply, what now? As parts of Arkansas 
came under Union control, areas around Little Rock soon as the fall of 1863, increasing numbers 
of uprooted families took refuge on abandoned lands throughout the state. The spring and summer 
of 1865 would prove to be a period of great consternation for many displaced whites settled on 
these lands as early debates in Washington would demonstrate how difficult land reform would 
be. While the Freedmen’s Bureau was charged with the task of determining what would happen to 
abandoned and confiscated lands, the new president would instead heavily influence the immediate 
future of these people. 
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While the Freedmen’s Bureau decided personnel, established branch offices across the 
South, and put a massive relief effort into motion, President Johnson announced his Amnesty 
Proclamation on May 29, 1865. This proclamation and the pardons that it permitted restored all 
property rights, except slaves, to former Confederates provided they took an oath of allegiance and 
would support emancipation. Many Radicals in Congress wondered what the president hoped to 
achieve with these pardons. Some congressmen wondered if Johnson was using this as an attempt 
to break up the lands of the plantation owners, hoping to create a new yeoman class of Southerner, 
while others thought that he might be doing it to force Southerners to accept his brand of 
Reconstruction.123 The president’s Amnesty Proclamation sent a ripple effect through the Bureau 
as it put the status of abandoned lands throughout the South into question.124 
In the Amnesty Proclamation, fourteen classes of white Southerners were excluded, 
including prominent Confederate officials and owners of property valued at more than $20,000 – 
called the twenty thousand dollar clause - had to apply for a pardon in writing, on an individual 
basis, to Johnson. It is important to note, however, as historian Richard B. McCaslin has pointed 
out, that “[b]eing pardoned did not automatically entail a restoration of confiscated property.”125 
Still, many former Confederates applied for pardons, some even visiting the Executive Mansion 
in person to do so. By the fall of 1865, the Johnson Administration issued a large number of 
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pardons, sometimes hundreds of them per day. Other white Southerners sought pardons under the 
twenty-thousand-dollar clause in Johnson’s proclamation. These pardons served as an example of 
how eager the administration was to move forward, forgiving many men who took part in or were 
responsible for the war. All of this was a part of what historian David Blight has called the “politics 
of forgetting” throughout much of the South.126 
Of course, to receive amnesty from President Johnson, one had to take an oath of allegiance 
affirming his or her loyalty to the United States of America. Once a former Confederate soldier or 
supporter took the oath, one could head down the path of amnesty. Some former Confederates 
simply took the oath and moved on with their lives in the reunited United States. Of course, there 
were various reasons why one would do so – some truly believed that they wrong to oppose the 
United States while others did so simply to reclaim property. Others, however, remained loyal to 
the Southern cause, if only in their minds. For example, an Arkansas Bureau agent investigating 
an abandoned property case in Helena noted how the owner – or soon to be former owner – reacted 
when it came to taking the oath of allegiance: 
The claimant to the within query [?] property abandoned it voluntarily, she bore the 
character of being a bitter rebel, and still has the reputation of being such, from 
information which I have received from the Comdg. Officer of the District, she 
refused to take the oath. The House in question is used as a Home for Refugees, 
was used as such by Mrs. Coombs for more than 18 months & is very much needed 
by the Bureau for that purpose. I am told Mrs. West left Helena sooner than take 
the oath.127 
 
As long as these dispossessed property owners chose not to take the oath, their property remained 
in federal hands and could be used as agents saw fit. Sometimes this meant shelter for freedpeople 
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or displaced whites, a place where they would work, or they might simply occupy a property until 
the government or the legal owners forced them out. In this case, the owner’s refusal to take the 
oath meant that displaced whites could continue their residence on Mrs. Coombs’s property. This 
pleased both the Bureau and those displaced people who chose to live there.128 
In Arkansas, the end of the war was to bring about the end of rule by the planter class in 
the state. However, this was not the case – at least in Arkansas – as so many conservatives had 
their rights restored rather quickly. While the war ruined many planters financially, their 
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Fig 6.1: Certificate that served as proof that one took Johnson’s Amnesty Oath. Source: “William A. Adams to 
Superintendent,” Aug. 23, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, 
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representatives regained power at the state level very quickly. McCaslin has argued that Johnson’s 
Amnesty Proclamation played a key role in this happening in Arkansas. In addition, the 
proclamation allowed for the repudiation of Republican initiatives for African American rights, 
education, and growth in the economic sector across the state. The proclamation had immediate 
effects during Reconstruction, but it also had long-standing consequences as well. “Amnesty, then, 
as administered by Johnson on the advice of many others,” McCaslin points out, “led not only to 
the continuance of conservative politics in Arkansas, but also protracted postponement of 
substantive social and economic progress in the state.”129 For many former Arkansas Confederate 
veterans, simply taking the loyalty or amnesty oath (see Fig. 6.1), was enough for them to pick up 
where they left off before the war. 
Debates raged in Congress over the shape of land reform across the South. By April 1865, 
the Bureau had large tracts of land in its possession to distribute how in accordance with precedent 
and procedures laid out by Congress and many Radicals wanted to see Confederate property 
holders punished. The most prominent Radical in Congress, Thaddeus Stevens, called for the 
confiscation of all large Confederate estates and redistribute that land to freedpeople. In September 
1865, during a speech in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Stevens reminded his audience about the need 
to punish those Confederates. “Look again, and see loyal men reduced to poverty by the 
confiscations of the Confederate States,” Stevens began, “and by the rebel states, see Union men 
robbed of their property, and their dwellings laid to ashes by rebel raiders, and say if too much is 
asked for them. But, above all, let us inquire whether imperative duty to the present generation and 
to posterity, does not command us to comply the wicked enemy to pay the expenses of this unjust 
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war.”130 Stevens wanted to punish former Confederates by dividing their estates into forty-acre 
plots and use the sale of these lands to pay off the cost of the war. “Let us forget all parties, and 
build on the broad platform of ‘reconstructing’ the government out of the conquered territory 
converted into new and free States,” advised Stevens as he ended his speech, “and admitted into 
the Union by the sovereign power of Congress, with another plank – ‘THE PROPERTY OF THE 
REBELS SHALL PAY OUR NATIONAL DEBT,’ indemnify freedmen and loyal suffers – and 
that under no circumstances will we suffer the national debt to be repudiated, or the interest scaled 
below the contract rates; nor permit any parts of the rebel debt to be assumed by the nation.”131 
Stevens wanted to punish ex-Confederates for their role in the war, eliminate any kind of influence 
from the planter class, with freedpeople as the beneficiaries of this policy. While many fellow 
Radicals supported Senator Stevens’s idea, it never gained any kind of traction and, in many ways, 
only served to highlight differences within the Radical faction of the party.132 
For Confederates and Confederate supporters who had their lands confiscated, they would 
not simply allow the Bureau to take them over without a fight. “Land was the major form of wealth 
in the state,” reminds historian Thomas DeBlack, “and the commodity on which economic, social, 
and political power were based.”133 During the war, planters abandoned their lands and, as a result, 
it was confiscated by the government, leaving large tracts of land unoccupied and unworked. The 
original Freedmen’s Bureau Bill detailed this provision in Section 4: “to every male citizen, 
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whether refugee or freedmen . . . shall be assigned not more than forty acres of land, and the person 
to whom it was so assigned shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land for the term of 
three years at the annual rent not exceeding six per centum upon the value of such land . . . .”134 
The Bureau had to operate with regard to these abandoned lands until they received official word 
on any change in status. As a result, the agency placed a great number of displaced whites on 
abandoned and confiscated lands until they heard from their superiors, or debates in Washington 
were settled, that they had to return the land to its legal owners by way of the amnesty program. 
Just how much land was in the Bureau’s hands nationally and in the Trans-Mississippi 
West? While it is difficult to determine an exact figure, historians have come up with a few 
estimates based on its records. “In the fall of 1865,” Louis S. Gerteis calculated that “the Bureau 
controlled about 800,000 acres of arable land, enough at most for 20,000 family farms of forty 
acres or 160,000 five-acre plots.”135 Howard’s estimate in December of 1865 was a bit less than 
Gerteis’s. In his Autobiography, Howard put the acreage under his control at 768,590 acres for the 
entire South. This served as the high point in terms of acreage as it was before any large scale land 
restorations to Southerners who took the amnesty oath. In Arkansas and Missouri, the agency 
controlled 18,736 acres of land by the end of 1865, with none of it yet restored to its former owners. 
Of that land, all of it was under cultivation by freedpeople and displaced whites according to 
reports.136 Once many former Confederates took Johnson’s Amnesty Oath, acreage in possession 
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of the Bureau dropped steadily in 1866, 1867, and 1868. Bureau land holdings fell to about 140,000 
acres across the South by 1868.137 
What enabled the Bureau to control this large amount of land legally? Essentially, there 
were two classes of property where it had legal control with regard to redistribution to displaced 
whites and freedpeople. The first class included property abandoned by Confederates. Many 
Confederate Arkansans left their homes to areas more firmly in the hands of their army, especially 
after Union forces won key victories during the fall of 1863. The other class of property comprised 
those lands confiscated by the Union army. This usually involved the property of local politicians 
or prominent families who supported the Confederate cause, which Union military officials used 
as headquarters from which they conducted the war. Because the Confederate government had no 
property in Arkansas, most of the Bureau’s property holdings came from individuals with ties to 
the Confederate government.138 While agents did not often specify which of the above conditions 
existed when they took possession of a tract of land, there were a number of accounts that detail 
what they had and how they intended to use it. 
During the summer of 1865, the Bureau’s land reform policy was unclear and could be 
confusing. This, in part, came from both the Bureau and President Johnson trying to get their own 
policies enacted out in the field. First, General Howard issued Circular 13 on July 28, 1865 that 
specified the land distribution process to both freedpersons and displaced whites. This order 
instructed agents to “select and set apart such confiscated lands [this was not to exceed forty acres] 
and property as may be deemed necessary for the immediate use of Refugees and Freedmen, the 
specific division of which into lots, and the rental or sale thereof according to the law established 
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by the Bureau, will be completed as soon as practicable and reported to the Commissioner.”139 For 
Howard, the pardons issued by the president did not allow for the restoration of lands settled by 
freedpeople and displaced whites, according to the original Bureau Bill. Johnson, of course, 
disagreed with him and demanded that the general rescind Circular 13.140 
 Because of the president’s protest of Circular 13, Howard responded with Circular 15 on 
September 12, 1865. This order allowed for the restoration of all property confiscated by the 
Bureau if the previous owners of the land provide the proper evidence. The Bureau required 
evidence that those seeking property restoration had taken the oath of allegiance and had the legal 
title to the land. The only restriction on restoration of confiscated property was with regard to 
displaced whites and freedpeople who were already on the land. “No land under cultivation by 
loyal refugees or freedmen will be restored under this circular,” Circular 15 stated, “until the crops 
now growing shall be secured for the benefit of the cultivators, unless full and just compensation 
be made for their labor and its products, and for their expenditures.”141 Howard granted displaced 
whites and freedpeople a reprieve. While he tried to operate according to the dictates of Congress 
and the president, Howard attempted to consider their situation. At the very least, those working 
abandoned lands would be able to finish the growing and harvest season. 
Circular 15 quickly altered the path of land redistribution in the South. Howard and the 
Bureau restored much of the land in its possession before the agency’s operations ended with this 
order. Howard’s order changed the character of the agency as intended with the drafting of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill in March of 1865. It handcuffed agents who would have promoted land 
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ownership among freedmen and allowed displaced whites more time on the many abandoned 
plantations in the region. With Circular 15, as Eric Foner has noted, “Johnson had in effect 
abrogated the Confiscation Act and unilaterally amended the law creating the Bureau.”142 As a 
result, the situation on the ground proved to be quite confusing and discouraging for many 
displaced whites and freedpeople. 
The Matilda Johnson Plantation and Feeling the Continued Effects of War  
One example highlighted just how difficult and confusing the whole process could be for 
both displaced whites and the former landowners and this was the case of the Matilda Johnson 
plantation in central Arkansas. Matilda Johnson came from both an accomplished family and she 
married into another. Born in Kentucky in 1793, Matilda Williams married Benjamin Johnson in 
1811, cementing a prominent place on the antebellum political landscape of Arkansas. Congress 
appointed Benjamin as judge of the Superior Court during Arkansas’s territorial days and he 
became the state’s first federal district judge with statehood. His brother, Richard Mentor Johnson, 
served as Martin Van Buren’s Vice President. Together, the couple became one of the state’s 
founding families and created one of the more powerful antebellum political dynasties. As a part 
of “the Family,” the Johnsons played a key role in shaping the state’s prewar political landscape. 
The couple had eight children and were one of the largest slave owners in Arkansas. The Johnsons 
owned large tracts of land, including their stately home in downtown Little Rock and a plantation 
of approximately 500 acres, twelve miles to the south of the state capitol in Pulaski County, and a 
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number of slaves.143 It was at this plantation that a minor drama played out, highlighting the 
difficulty of the Bureau’s land reform policy. 
The Johnson Plantation, nicknamed the “Refugee Farm” by Bureau agents, had a reported 
ten to twelve displaced families – mostly women and children - living on and working the land 
during the summer and fall of 1865. The Bureau had formally confiscated this land on October 6, 
1865, and, according to one account, the agency placed these families on the land after the 
Johnsons fled the coming Union army a few years before. “These families are almost entirely 
dependent on the Government for support,” agent F.W. Raymond wrote, “having drawn rations 
ever since they first occupied the place.”144 Based on agency records, these displaced families 
industriously raised corn for their own consumption as well as cotton and paid about a third of 
what they produced to the local Bureau office as rent. The arrangement was a positive outcome 
for the Bureau, as it “thus relieve[d] the Government of a part of the expense and trouble.”145 
Unfortunately, agents provided little detail about the names and background of these displaced 
families working on this land. By the fall of 1865, the displaced families on the Johnson Plantation 
produced about three hundred to four hundred bushels of corn.146 
It is not exactly clear how the Johnson’s property came into the Bureau’s possession. A 
couple of the Bureau agents in the Johnson chain of letters do not appear clear as to how the 
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displaced whites were allowed to live and work on this land. Mrs. Johnson’s attorney, George C. 
Watkins tells a different story. The “place was taken up by the Treasury Agent in 1864 and turned 
it over to the Freedmen’s Bureau sometime after and pursuant to an order from the War Department 
issued in May 1865,” Watkins wrote to the Little Rock office, “and that so far as it appears in his 
Office, said farm and land or any part thereof, has not been set apart for refugees or freedmen, or 
rented out or otherwise disposed of, by the Freedmen’s Bureau.”147 While there was no formal 
agreement or contract between the agency and the displaced families working the farm, the agency 
allowed them to reside on the land provided they continued to produce food for their subsistence. 
However the property came under Bureau control, it was indeed abandoned by the Johnson 
family during the war. Mrs. Johnson was a woman of questionable loyalties given her actions 
during the war and her status as a slave owner. Johnson and her family, like others in her 
community, fled upon the arrival of General Steele and his Union forces in Little Rock during the 
fall of 1863.148 Matilda, her children, and grandchildren, as well as “most of the planters on the 
Arkansas River owning slaves retired before it.”149 People like the Johnsons abandoned their 
properties in and around Little Rock and did not return until after the war. In their absence, the 
Federal government took control of these properties and allowed freedpeople and displaced whites 
to stay on the abandoned properties. 
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Upon her return, she took inventory of her properties and discovered a number of displaced 
whites, about whom she does not offer any detail, had occupied her plantation. Johnson took the 
amnesty oath, so that she could begin the process of having her property south of Little Rock 
restored. Johnson wrote local Bureau agents and included with her letter signed documentation 
that stated proof that she had taken the oath, a variety of tax documents as proof of ownership, and 
additional assurances that the property did indeed belong to her and her family – as stipulated by 
Circular 15.150 “Whereupon and in accordance with what I suppose to be the policy off the 
Government to restore this part of the country to a state of prosperity,” Mrs. Johnson wrote, “by 
encouraging a return to the cultivation of improved lands and in view of the circumstances of my 
case, and desireing [sic] as a means of support, to have said farms cultivated next year, and order 
is asked from Major Genl. Howard. . . for the restoration of said land farm and improvements to 
me.”151 Johnson, based on her letters to the Bureau office, does not appear to communicate with 
the displaced whites on her property. She simply communicates to the agency that, as a result of 
her oath, she wants her property restored to her and her family for the coming year. 
Despite being a prominent slave owner who fled as the Union army approached, she 
assured Bureau officials that she had never been hostile toward the federal government and further 
stated that she was willing to cooperate with the government. Additionally, perhaps to elicit pity 
from Federal officials, she reminded them that she was a widow and seventy-two years old. “I 
would further represent to you that I am a Widow,” Mrs. Johnson wrote the local Bureau office, 
over seventy years of age, and committed no act of hostility against the Government, during the 
late troubles which have afflicted our country, and greatly impoverished so many of our people, 
                                                          
150 Mrs. Johnson took the Oath of Amnesty on June 30, 1865. “Matilda Johnson to W.G. Sargent,” October 7, 1865, 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Arkansas Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands, 1865-1869, Microfilm M979, Roll 9, NARA.  
151 Ibid. 
323 
 
 
 
including myself.”152 Matilda Johnson was going to do everything in her power to get her land 
back from the Bureau. 
 
In one of her many letters, Mrs. Johnson complained that these displaced whites were on 
her plantation with no evidence that they had paid any kind of rent for their use of the property. 
She inquired as to who these people living on her plantation had been and who gave them 
permission to be there. In a letter to his captain, Raymond relayed what he had heard about the 
Johnson Plantation and how it became occupied by displaced whites. “According to the best 
information I could get,” he began, “there seems to be no part of this place leased, but all the 
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occupants were placed there by the Bureau as destitute Refugees with the hope that they might 
assist a little in supporting themselves, thus relieving the Government of a part of the expense and 
trouble.”153 She questioned the status of the families on her property who claimed to be refugees; 
Johnson felt that these people exaggerated their condition. Johnson wrote to the local Bureau office 
and indicated that what she had heard about how these displaced whites came to be on her land in 
her absence.  
As I am informed and believe, there is no evidence on the books of your office that 
said lands or improvements have been rented out or disposed of , excepting a 
memorandum in pencil importing that two acres were rented to one Van Fleet , but 
in fact there is are as I am informed and believe about one hundred acres of said 
land in cultivation this year, by some four or five persons, who are not refugees, 
most if not all of them being former citizens of said county, and who claim no right 
to or interest in said lands, beyond the close of the present year, and the privilege 
of gathering the growing crop there on.154 
 
Johnson felt that some of her neighbors had taken advantage of her absence, using her land to their 
benefit. Matilda Johnson demanded them off the land by the end of the 1865 season – a very short 
time away. 
Mrs. Johnson pushed whomever she could and, shortly after, the gears of politics moved 
in her favor. In accordance with President Johnson’s pardon process, Mrs. Johnson would get her 
plantation back, though some legal wrangling was required to get some of the property returned.155 
Throughout much of the region, while Howard and the president debated post-war land reform, 
freedpeople and displaced whites lived and worked on confiscated and abandoned lands across 
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Arkansas. Many people working the land were trying to put the war behind them and look to the 
future, rebuilding their homes and their lives. What happened at the Johnson Plantation serves as 
only one example of the difficulties that these policies would take at the local level. 
While the events surrounding the Johnson Plantation played out in Arkansas, Bureau 
officials began to assess a number of abandoned and confiscated lands in Missouri – especially 
lands vacated by military order. In Missouri, for example, the effects of General Thomas Ewing’s 
General Orders No. 11 still resonated with the many displaced residents there, even by late 1865 
as much of the land remained abandoned. Agents assigned these lands to freedpeople and displaced 
whites, but because of the disagreements between Congress and the president, this process was 
often muddied at the local level. Mary G. [Gostonius?], displaced by Ewing’s order, detailed her 
suffering when she wrote that she had been “Reduced to poverty and want after five years anxiety 
and disappointment I am at last obliged to address the Representatives of the US Government for 
support and relief.”156 For some displaced whites, what happened during the war stuck with them 
and they detailed how this happened in their letters to the Bureau in the months following the 
Confederate surrender. 
Lands confiscated by the Bureau in the aftermath of General Orders, No. 11 caused 
confusion among agents who possessed these lands in accordance with agency policy, but were 
unsure as to how they would dispense these lands. For example, Bureau agent William A. Adams 
wrote from Fort Scott, Kansas, during the late summer of 1865 about land vacated because of the 
order. “There are abandoned lands in Mo. The counties bordering upon Kansas[,]” Adams 
proclaimed, but then continued more cautiously, “Am I expected to go upon the ground and take 
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possession formally with a view to settling some of my people upon them?”157 There is no 
indication that any of these lands fell under the Amnesty Proclamation and, as Adams hinted, 
agents were unsure of what to do with the land in their possession here. With no clear indication 
as to how the Bureau might dispense these lands, the Bureau continued to move forward with 
placing displaced people on it. People affected by Ewing’s order wrote to local agents, asking for 
the restoration of their property or displaced whites asked what their next step might be. 
While the Bureau heard from its own agents who detailed vacant lands in western Missouri, 
displaced whites wrote to the agency about how they might return to their communities. In a letter 
dated April 12, 1866, Mary G. noted to agents that: “In 1863 under the vacating ordinance of 
generals Ewing and Schofield, depopulating the counties of Jackson, Cass, Bates, and northern 
parts of Vernon. I had to leave my home in the latter county which home was subsequently 
destroyed by fire and took refuge in Henry County.”158 She mentioned her husband serving in the 
Missouri militia and fighting guerrillas in that part of the state, though she does not say what 
became of him. In this letter, she wrote how she is barely able to survive off his meager pay that 
they hoped to use to save what remained of their home. “My husband’s pay is but small and as he 
is obliged to save money to pay the taxes on our land from which we have been driven to save it 
from being sold for taxes I can hardly claim his support.”159 In the Bureau, she sought rations for 
her and her child, but also hoped agents could help her save her abandoned property. No reply 
from the Bureau concerning her request could be located, but such a letter is telling. People lost 
property because of the war for a variety of reasons, not just disloyalty or confiscation. As a result, 
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this caused them much worry and they worked hard to keep what they had – no matter what 
condition it was in after the war. 
The impact of the Bureau’s land reform initiatives are difficult to determine. By the 
summer of 1866, it appeared as though the numbers of displaced whites who wandered the 
Missouri and Arkansas countrysides declined in overall numbers. Looking at the accounts of 
different agents who made their way through the region, they indicate that the numbers of uprooted 
people had dropped from the levels seen during the war and the period immediately after. For 
example, agent Thomas Abel, writing from Fort Smith – once a key gathering point for so many 
displaced whites and freedpeople – noted what he had seen in his travels through Arkansas that 
summer. “I found but few Refugees and Freedmen at Fayetteville. Most of them having gone to 
the country – All are self-supporting except a few extremely destitute refugees who depend upon 
the Country and the benevolence of the people for support.”160 Because of the Bureau’s efforts, 
combined with the passage of time, there were visibly less displaced whites in the region nearly a 
year and a half since the end of the war. How much a temporary stay on abandoned lands made a 
difference in the reduction of these numbers may never be known, but it had to play a role, even if 
it was only a small one, in reducing the number of displaced whites. A natural disaster that affected 
much of the South would cause a temporary reversal of this trend. 
The 1867 Southern Famine 
It appeared that by 1867 the Bureau had an impact on the lives of destitute and displaced 
whites in Arkansas and Missouri. By this point, however, despite the number of people returning 
to their farms who renewed their agricultural production, the agrarian sector of the South had not 
recovered. To say that the war greatly affected Southern agriculture and access to foodstuffs is an 
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understatement. Throughout the war, Southerners suffered through various cycles of famine in 
different parts of the Confederacy. While people in the Trans-Mississippi West did not experience 
anything like the destruction of Sherman’s March or Sheridan’s campaign in the Shenandoah, 
which wrought all kinds of destruction on the production of foodstuffs, the people in Arkansas and 
Missouri felt the impact of this inability to produce food in 1866 and 1867. The high number of 
Southern men lost in the war combined with a countryside left in total and utter destruction and 
the planter class’s unwillingness to plant food instead of cotton, primed the South for agricultural 
catastrophe as the region moved into Reconstruction. Other wartime factors like the Union 
blockade primed the pump for the agricultural disaster. 
Heavy rains, alternating with drought, brought about a series of crop failures during the 
1866 season. An infestation of armyworm, a caterpillar like insect that eats both foodstuffs and 
cotton, compounded the situation.161 The combination of these factors led to short crops and, 
eventually no crops, for many farmers. While the pests and droughts had caused problems there 
before, Southerners had never seen anything like this. Farmers had experienced near droughts 
periodically, causing some to switch to sugar cane cultivation, but the droughts typically passed 
and they switched back to whatever crops they grew before the crisis. In Arkansas, the natural 
disasters of 1866 and 1867 resulted in small harvests across the state and caused the bottom to fall 
out of the cotton market. This caused a collapse in prices and sent both freedpeople and displaced 
whites into Bureau offices for support.162 
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The famine affected both freedpeople and displaced whites across the South. Initially, the 
Federal government was unaware of just how severe this drought and subsequent famine had 
become. Northern civilians had trouble believing that the situation was as bad as reports out of the 
South made it out to be. “With little support from Bureau offices,” historian Jim Downs observes, 
“freedpeople as well as white refugees suffered enormously from the lack of rainfall and 
consequent crop failure and deaths of livestock.”163 By 1868, price inflation on everyday items 
made things even more difficult. People who General Howard termed “loyal refugees” would pay 
a price when the famine hit. Howard remarked in his autobiography, “I had abundant authority so 
far as the loyal refugees and freedmen were involved to feed them to the extent of our food 
appropriation; but we had reduced this number to narrow limits when this famine hit upon the 
Southern coast.”164 With this famine, it all but assured a steady demand for relief from people 
across the South. “As a result, the number of rations issued to whites quintupled between February 
and June 1867 while the number to blacks increased just 50%, a further dilution of the bureau’s 
ability effectively to assist freedmen.”165 The agency saw an increased number of displaced whites 
because of this famine, though the exact numbers are difficult to determine. Also difficult to 
determine are the number of these cases that could be labeled as repeat cases, meaning whites who 
remained displaced by the war in 1867. 
Freedmen’s Bureau Schools and Orphanages 
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The Bureau established a number of schools for both freedpeople and displaced whites 
throughout the South, including Arkansas.166 While the agency had limited resources when it came 
to supporting these schools, it did participate in sustaining a number of these facilities in some way 
led by its education superintendent, William Colby. In Arkansas, for example, this proved to be a 
difficult task. “Little infrastructure or precedent existed for an educational system in Arkansas,” 
notes Finley, “despite an 1840 public school law.”167 Even by the Reconstruction period, Arkansas 
lagged behind when it came to money spent on public education compared to neighboring states.168 
Schools here were sometimes slow to take shape for a number of reasons, specifically because the 
Bureau did not always follow through on a number of promises to those who ran these institutions. 
This was not because Arkansans did not want schools for poor whites and freedpeople. The state’s 
wealthier citizens wanted these schools because it served them and their economic interests. 
Educated freedpeople and poor whites would help to provide order and make for a happier work 
force. To be sure, there were also plenty of whites against education for displaced and destitute 
whites, but they were relatively few according to the Bureau. If anything, Southern whites were 
especially against the education of freedpeople and the Bureau received the brunt of that anger.169 
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General Howard, held to his view that states should step in to help their citizens whenever 
possible, but when they could not, he hoped that benevolent aid organizations would fill the void. 
When it came to supporting Bureau schools in the South, he held the same hopes. “The officers of 
the Bureau should afford the utmost facility to benevolent and religious organizations, and to State 
authorities, where they exist, in the maintenance of good schools. Do everything possible, was my 
constant cry, to keep schools on foot till free schools shall be established and reorganized local 
governments.”170 Various aid associations helped to cover the cost for schools operated by the 
Bureau, this included paying teachers’ salaries and paying for books and other supplies for pupils. 
They also helped to staff a number of the schools operated by the Bureau. 
Throughout Arkansas, for example, the American Missionary Association (AMA) 
supported a number of schools, especially schools intended for freedpeople – though they also 
believed that poor whites should benefit as well.171 Support by the AMA and other organizations 
like it included acquiring property for the construction of schools and the payment of teachers’ 
salaries. Benevolent organizations played a key role in the establishment of schools in Arkansas. 
“When the war ended in Confederate defeat, southerners once again had to revise expectations and 
assumptions about assistance to the poor.”172 Howard remained committed to letting these 
organizations do the heavy lifting when it came to the schools. He recalled in his Autobiography 
                                                          
170 Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, Major General United States Army, Volume II (New 
York: The Baker & Taylor Company, 1908), 221. 
171 Much of the focus of the AMA was on plantation schools. See Larry Wesley Pearce, “Enoch K. Miller and the 
Freedmen’s Schools,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1972): 305-327; Larry Wesley 
Pearce, “The American Missionary Association and the Freedmen’s Bureau in Arkansas, 1868-1878,” The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn, 1972): 246-261; Larry Wesley Pearce, “The American Missionary 
Association and the Freedmen’s Bureau in Arkansas, 1866-1868,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 3 
(Autumn, 1971): 242-259. As many as 79 different organizations worked with the Bureau, though this number is 
difficult to determine. Marjorie H. Parker, “Some Educational Activities of the Freedmen’s Bureau,” The Journal of 
Negro History Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter, 1954): 11. 
172 Jennifer Lynn Gross, “’And for the Widow and Orphan’: Confederate Widows, Poverty, and Public Assistance,” 
in Lesley J. Gordon and John C. Inscoe, eds., Inside the Confederate Nation: Essays in Honor of Emory M. Thomas 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 220. 
332 
 
 
 
“’In all this work,’ I announced, ‘it is not my purpose to supersede the benevolent agencies already 
engaged, but to systematize and facilitate them.’”173 As a result, the AMA funded a number of 
schools. 
While Howard was in favor of these aid societies funding and running most, if not all, of 
these schools, he felt that the federal government should step up and fill the void if they could not 
or were unable to do so. For him, the education of Southerners was important – not just for the 
uneducated, but for the postbellum United States in general. “There can be no safety nor permanent 
peace where ignorance reigns. The law of self-preservation will justify the national legislature in 
establishing through the Bureau of Education, or some other agency, a general system of free 
schools, and furnish to all children of a suitable age such instruction in the rudiments of learning 
as may be necessary to fit them to discharge intelligently the duties of free American citizens.”174 
Drawing on the northern model where state-supported schools were more commonplace, Howard 
foreshadowed more widespread, compulsory education in the United States and he offers some 
perspective on what he hoped the Bureau might accomplish with its operations in the South. 
Often, middle-class white women, usually from New England, served as teachers in the 
schools, though teachers came from across the North and parts of the South, some were men and 
some were African American. The American Missionary Association supplied many of these 
teachers who worked in Bureau schools. These teachers reported to the agency’s superintendent 
of education their schools’ progress and the number of students enrolled on a month-to-month 
basis. The Bureau provided transportation for these teachers at the beginning and the end of the 
school year, transporting them from various points in the North. The agency also provided 
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transportation during various vacations during the school year. By the end of 1865, Howard 
recalled that there were 965 organized schools in areas controlled by the Bureau. 
Teaching at Bureau schools was not an easy task. Schools were often located in very remote 
areas, making transportation back and forth rather difficult. Additionally, many of these teachers 
faced threats and were under the watchful eye of suspicious white Southerners. “The teachers in 
Arkansas often had a difficult task; but some of them overcame even ugly prejudice, which is a 
hard thing to do.”175 Additionally, funding issues could make the situation difficult for educators 
as well. The Bureau did not cover the cost books and a number of supplies and teachers had to rely 
on various aid organizations to provide them and, sometimes, these books and supplies were 
promised but never arrived. The Bureau also made numerous promises about fixing facilities or 
responding to grievances, but they did not always follow through either. Teachers could direct 
complaints to local agents and sometimes to the superintendent of education, but results could be 
mixed.176 
The focus for many of these Bureau-supported schools was to promote a mission of 
republicanism amongst a great many Southerners – both black and white.177 Alma Baker, a teacher 
who worked in Missouri noted the need for the education of poor and displaced whites in the 
region. “They are so very wicked. Much lower than blacks in morals.”178 These views were similar 
to the mission of the many benevolent aid societies that operated in the region during the war. In 
a sense, they wanted to remake them in the Northern image. Schools served as a part of the uplifting 
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mission began during the war, especially with regard to the displaced whites it instructed. Fulfilling 
this mission would not be an easy task for the Freedmen’s Bureau. There was the obvious physical 
toll across the landscape of Missouri and Arkansas, but what about the toll that the war took on 
the communities and their people? The situation in the South was so bad that Howard would 
comment, “The educational and moral condition of these people was never forgotten.”179 For 
Howard, these schools would be an important component of the Bureau’s mission in the South. 
Monthly reports provided to the Bureau about the make-up and performance of these 
schools offer some insight into how displaced whites fit into this part of the agency’s operations. 
These reports were a standard form with a list of 19 questions that covered a variety of issues 
relating to the education of displaced whites and freedpeople. It asks for the numbers of refugees 
and freedpeople attending the school in addition to information like the school’s location and 
information about the teachers who work there. Of the 19 questions, three were specific to 
displaced whites read: 
16. What is the public sentiment as to the education of the Freedmen or Poor Whites? 
18. What more can this Bureau do for educating children of Refugees (or Poor Whites)? 
19. How long will Northern charitable aid be needed for Freedmen and Refugee Schools in your 
District?180 
 
There are also questions that pertained to funding and how long such a school might be needed in 
a given area and, most importantly, if the school is being used by locals. This questionnaire served 
as Bureau probes keeping them informed on the developments at these schools. 
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The teachers’ responses, usually written in very careful penmanship, reveal some insight 
into the situation surrounding displaced whites in Arkansas. A number of these reports have very 
little information and much of this arises from the fact that there was little need for a school in a 
given area. Numbers of pupils enrolled might read zero or in the single digits for both displaced 
whites and freedpeople. In these instances, comments written by the teachers offer some 
explanation. For example, one teacher in Pine Bluff noted that the reason for so few whites in the 
school because “there are very few poor whites in my district – and they are very much 
scattered.”181 Though scattered, many might have been reluctant to attend because this same report 
indicates that local whites were strongly opposed to these schools for poor or displaced whites or 
freedpeople.  
In these Bureau schools, there were 1,405 teachers and 90,778 pupils under instruction that 
year. Teachers educated both children and adults in these schools. Another question found on that 
questionnaire addressed the need for adult education:  
17. Are Night-Schools for Adults needed in your District? In what way could they be carried on?182 
 
Some teachers did not respond to this question, indicating that there was no perceived need for 
adult education in whatever location they taught. Other teachers, however, did respond and replied 
that these schools were needed for adults, probably for both black and white. In their response, this 
teacher indicated that all was needed was “teachers and books” in Pine Bluff, Arkansas.183 Howard 
had hoped for more, indicating that these numbers were merely “a drop in the bucket,” but he 
would gladly take it as a step in the right direction.184 
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Despite the low enrollment numbers in many districts across Arkansas, it did not mean that 
people there did not want to attend these schools. In St. Francis and Cass Counties, for example, 
it appeared as though there was a demand for schools there. A September 1868 report indicated, 
according to the teacher sent there, that about one hundred pupils might attend this school, but they 
needed teachers and books before instruction could begin. It is unknown if people at the school 
previously made requests for these items and the Bureau or benevolent aid organizations did not 
come through. Alternatively, this increased need was recent and the Bureau had not yet had time 
to respond. Moreover, as in the previous instance, most whites here were hostile to the 
establishment of the school, “against it so far as the Freedmen are concerned.”185 There is no 
indication from this report that locals were hostile to a white school revealing that much of the 
resistance to Bureau schools was often rooted in race. This echoed Howard’s aforementioned 
statement that establishing and sustaining schools in Arkansas would be a difficult task. These 
schools had to overcome both financial obstacles and negative public opinions of the endeavor. 
Children – black, white, destitute, or displaced – were always a concern of General Howard 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau. While not explicitly laid out in the Bureau’s mission, the agency did 
occasionally care for the many orphans scattered throughout the region. The agency sometimes 
issued rations or clothing for displaced children or provided transportation to reunite them with 
their families so that they could stay with friends, relatives, or perhaps be taken in by an orphanage 
in Little Rock or St. Louis. In the more hopeful instances, the agency reunited children presumed 
to be orphans with their parents. In most cases, the Bureau placed these children in the care of a 
local orphanage, often run by local citizens or the local government. Other incidents saw agents 
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place these children with local families on a temporary or semi-permanent basis. Howard noted 
how “many orphans were apprenticed to people of good character, under humane and liberal 
regulations; and the district, parish, county, or town was for the most part gradually induced to 
care for all except a few extreme cases of poverty which could not be shown to belong to any 
particular locality.”186 No reliable estimates exist for the number of orphaned children who came 
under the Bureau’s care, but they are a part of its record. 
Once the Bureau transported these children off to other parts of the state or set them up in 
local orphanages, it did not mean that the agency did not have to deal with them again. One 
interesting example of this involves an orphanage operated by a “Mrs. Phelps” in Springfield, 
Missouri. This incident serves as a cross-section of Bureau activity and postwar feelings between 
Unionists and former Confederates. In the early months of 1866, agents began receiving 
complaints from local citizens about the Orphan’s Refugee House. While it is not made clear in 
the complaint against this orphanage how these children became orphaned, more than likely it was 
a result of many of the aforementioned consequences of war – the armies, guerrilla warfare, issues 
of loyalty, or the scarcity of food and other necessities. On the surface, the home appeared to house 
about fifty children, many of whom were children of displaced Arkansans. While the documents 
are not clear as to how much, it appears as though the Freedmen’s Bureau provided some kind of 
financial or material support for this orphanage. Springfield citizens, however, wrote to the Bureau 
asking them to take a closer look at Mrs. Phelps and her orphanage. 
In a letter to General Howard dated February 21, 1866, an agent detailed the Springfield 
citizens’ complaints against the Orphan’s Refugee House operated by Mrs. Phelps. First, they 
doubted that the institution had been legally approved to operate as an orphanage and, quite simply, 
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these citizens disapproved of it. While the children there were indeed the children of displaced 
Arkansans, citizens complained that many of these children had a father, mother, or both parents 
still living – they denied that these children were indeed orphans. Even worse, for these citizens, 
the children and their alleged still living parents were of the “Rebel class.” Loyalty, both during 
and after the war, played a role in how displaced people were viewed by their communities. The 
locals wanted the children placed in the care of private families or even a soldiers’ home of some 
kind. The agent remarked, “It is thought that there is no need for the Govt. to extend help to this 
institution. It will be of no benefit to the loyal element.”187 Certainly, there were instances where 
children had been exploited and held as apprentices and, perhaps, this was a part of Mrs. Phelps’s 
operations. The records in this particular case, however, do not indicate that this was the case.188 
Mary Whitney Phelps, the wife of former Missouri Democratic senator (1853-1863) and 
future governor (1877-1881) John Smith Phelps, was a woman of importance in her home state.189 
Herself an orphan, Phelps had dedicated her life to helping children in Missouri by providing 
education and orphanages. Phelps also achieved a bit of fame during the war when she arranged 
for a dignified burial of Union general Nathanial Lyon following the battle at Wilson’s Creek after 
his body had been mistakenly left behind. Her good deed did not go unnoticed by government 
officials in Washington D.C. In recognition of her service to the fallen general and work with 
orphans, Congress awarded her $20,000 that she used to start her orphanage. There were no public 
indications that she was disliked in any way. 
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Months after the initial complaints from Springfield citizens, another agent paid a visit to 
Mrs. Phelps and her orphanage. Thomas Abel visited her during the summer of 1866. Abel, nor 
anyone else in the record, indicate the reason for this particular meeting. Perhaps this was a follow-
up because of the complaints against her the previous February or maybe this visit was strictly 
routine as she ran the orphanage. In his record of the meeting, he paints a more favorable picture 
of Mrs. Phelps and her orphanage in Springfield. He notes that the Bureau appointed her as a non-
salaried civil agent. Abel further noted that while she was not without her flaws, her intentions 
were good. Abel remarked, “Mrs. Phelps is a woman of strong prejudices against the negro having 
once owned slaves but she seems to some extent to have overcome her prejudice and advocates 
the importance of educating and caring for them. There was considerable suffering among refugees 
and freedmen during last winter and much praise is due Mrs. Phelps and the teachers of the colored 
school.”190 There is no evidence here that any of her orphans were African American children or 
that she held any of them against their will. Mrs. Phelps, at least according to Abel, appeared to be 
doing good work for displaced whites and freedpeople alike. Why the conflicting opinions of her 
and her efforts? 
While documents concerning these complaints from the citizens of Springfield are few and 
do not offer any kind of clarification, a couple of explanations are possible for this tension 
surrounding Mrs. Phelps’s orphanage. First, it was possible that these complaints were rooted in 
their Victorian beliefs about charity. For one reason or another, perhaps these citizens directed 
anger at Mrs. Phelps because they did not believe the children in her orphanage deserving of the 
government’s charity. The accusations that these children were not really orphans might be rooted 
in this belief, a means of rationalizing it possibly. Second, these complaints against the orphanage 
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lie in the belief – real or not - that these were children of “the rebel class” and from a different 
state. Wartime animosities could have played a role in their views of Mrs. Phelps and her work 
with the orphanage. Another possible explanation is political – perhaps these citizens were staunch 
Republicans and they used this as an opportunity to attack a woman whose husband was a 
Democratic senator and a man who would run for governor in 1868. Nothing in the sources 
pertaining to Mrs. Phelps offer any clues as to who the complainants were and what their motives 
might have been. Of course, their anger could have been the result of a combination of some or all 
of these factors. Whatever their reasons for disapproving of Mrs. Phelps’s work, such an incident 
offers a window into the Bureau’s role in reconstructing the South. 
Freedmen’s Bureau Medical Division 
The Civil War brought about some of the most unsanitary conditions Americans had ever 
seen. The vast number of unburied human and animal bodies, contaminated water sources, and 
overcrowding in many areas ravaged by the war. These conditions continued well into the postwar 
period throughout much of the South. Downs has noted the effect of these conditions on 
freedpeople both during and after the war: “The Civil War, however, produced the largest 
biological crisis of the nineteenth century, claiming more soldiers’ lives and resulting in more 
casualties than battle or warfare and wreaking havoc on the population of the newly freed.”191 
What were conditions like for displaced whites as they looked for help from the Freedmen’s 
Bureau? 
Only a few months after Appomattox, local agents and national leaders realized the need 
for medical care in the defeated Confederacy. On June 1, 1865, General Howard created the Bureau 
Medical Division. While larger cities like Richmond and New Orleans had functioning hospitals 
                                                          
191 Jim Downs, Sick from Freedom: African Americans Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. 
341 
 
 
 
that cared for many people after the war, it was up to the Bureau to establish facilities that provided 
medical care throughout much of the South. Disagreements between the Radical Congress and a 
president delayed the establishment of a medical branch for the agency and forced Howard to act. 
Concerns in Washington centered on fears that a medical division within the agency might create 
some kind of dependency amongst both displaced whites and freedpeople. During the months prior 
to the creation of this division, the Bureau simply continued to operate army hospitals that operated 
in various localities during the war.192 
With this newly created Medical Division, Howard hoped to avoid chaos across the South. 
In describing the various Bureau components, Howard recalled its creation in his Autobiography: 
“The fourth, just then very necessary, was the Medical Division, which embraced the medical 
attendance of camps and colonies all over the land, and had supervision of all hospitals and 
asylums where were collections of refugees and freedmen with hosts of orphan children. An army 
medical officer of rank was placed at the head of this important division.”193 Out of this came the 
Bureau hospitals that would dot the Southern landscape during the early years of Reconstruction. 
These hospitals, however, did not send an army of doctors into the South to care for the large 
number of freedpeople and displaced whites, it instead set up underfunded and understaffed 
facilities overwhelmed by the needs of Southerners.194 
Most of the hospitals were to support the large number of freedpeople who sought medical 
care upon the arrival of the agency; however, many poor Southern whites needed and wanted 
access to this care as well. Providing care on this scale, however, was not without its problems. 
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First, there were the institutional problems surrounding funding and hospitals. “Plagued by 
inadequate funding, a shortage of hospital beds, and a lack of facilities in rural areas where most 
blacks lived,” notes Foner, “the Bureau nonetheless managed the early years of Reconstruction to 
treat an estimated half million suffering freedmen, as well as a smaller but significant number of 
whites.”195 Financial support for the hospitals was difficult to come by in the nation’s capital as 
the government was always looking to cut funding whenever and wherever it could not to mention 
the fact that any legislation involving the Bureau usually turned into a political circus. 
The government assumed much of the cost for these hospitals as local officials in Arkansas 
did very little to offer any kind of funding or assistance once these hospitals were established.196 
Evidence of this lack of federal and state funding could be found in facilities throughout Arkansas. 
Moreover, unlike its schools, the Bureau constructed these facilities in a haphazard fashion usually 
based on need in a given location, especially in rural areas. For example, a Bureau hospital in Pine 
Bluff lacked proper heating for the winter months and it made taking care of the sick there difficult. 
A woman named Mrs. Dawes, who presumably worked at the hospital, wrote to the local agent, 
Major John Tyler, to indicate that there were no stoves for heating the building. It appears as 
though the agency promised these stoves some months prior to the letter, but they had not yet 
arrived. She noted in a November 1866 letter that the “sick in the hospital are suffering severely 
with cold – the building is open – their blood is thin and clothing will not keep them warm”197 This 
was nearly a year and a half after the creation of the Medical Division and hospitals still lacked 
basic equipment like stoves. Such stories only compounded the suffering for some many displaced 
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whites and freedpeople. To make her point to Tyler as to just how dire the situation was because 
of the delay, Mrs. Dawes continued, “I fear many deaths. . .”198 
With the establishment of these hospitals, hospital staffs ran into a number of roadblocks 
when it came to providing care. Certainly, nineteenth century medical technology had advanced 
little in the previous century. This was an age of home remedies where the cure was often worse 
than the disease. In addition, many doctors, like physicians at the Bureau hospitals, lacked proper 
training. Agents often dismissed some very qualified physicians, as they would not swear an oath 
of loyalty. Loyalty cost the Bureau more than a few good doctors. The war also took its toll on the 
available number of good Southern doctors. The situation surrounding the Bureau’s ability to 
attract good physicians was the fact that the war reduced the overall number of those available to 
work after the war. For example, in 1860, there were 1,222 doctors there with that number reduced 
to 1,026 a decade later. Another factor contributing to the poor quality of these medical facilities 
was the fact that the agency paid low salaries to employees and the staffs were often quite small, 
making the task of treating displaced whites and freedpeople in the region quite difficult.199 
While there were a number of whites who needed medical care, the primary focus of the 
Medical Division was to care for the large number of freedpeople coming to the agency for care. 
A key factor in this larger number was the fact that local and state hospitals cared for a number of 
these whites while they refused African Americans treatment. “According to the Bureau’s 
documentation,” Downs observes, “there were exponentially fewer white people than black people 
who were treated by Bureau doctors – which made it appear to federal authorities that smallpox 
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disproportionately infected freedpeople.”200 By the end of 1865, Howard put the number of 
displaced whites who needed medical care at 2,531 while he put the number of freedpeople in need 
at 45,898, indicating just how large the gap was between these two groups. The mortality rate for 
displaced whites was about 9 per cent while the rate among freedpeople was at 13 per cent.201 
Like the Bureau’s education statistics, displaced whites comprised a much smaller portion 
of those in need of medical care. “The total number in all the country under medical care during 
the eleven months prior to August 31, 1866,” Howard noted in his Autobiography, “was of refugees 
5,784, of freedmen 160,737. Still, there remained September 1, 1866, but 501 refugees and 6,045 
freed people actually in the hospital. The 56 hospitals, according to our plan, were reduced during 
the year to 46; there were, however, established a number of dispensaries at different points from 
which medicines were obtained.”202 While these numbers demonstrate the need for medical care 
was greater amongst freedpeople, it does raise questions about why these numbers for displaced 
whites were so low given how many rations the Bureau distributed to people during this same 
period. 
Perhaps Southern whites – displaced, poor, etc. – did not need medical help following the 
war. They were simply content to return to their homes and resume their lives without any real 
need for medical attention. In addition, it is possible given the Victorian attitudes towards aid 
prevented many from visiting the Bureau hospitals. Other reasons include whites hearing about 
the inferiority of Bureau facilities in terms of staffing and location availability and they had other 
options or, perhaps, pressured them not to visit these hospitals if their neighbors held views hostile 
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to the agency. While the number of rations issued by the Bureau may not be a direct correlation to 
medical care, one would think that these numbers would be more even in their distribution. It is 
difficult to deduce exactly why these numbers were so low from the primary sources available, but 
these are certainly questions worth considering. 
Bureau records contain a number of monthly reports sent to the main office in Little Rock 
from the Surgeon-in-Chief from various locations in Arkansas. These reports often detailed the 
number of people in the different hospitals, though they do not offer a breakdown about who was 
treated. Downs, who reviewed similar reports for his study of the medical crisis faced by 
freedpeople after the war, points out the problems historians face when consulting these records. 
“Instead, federal reports generalized conditions,” observes Downs, “broadly summarized 
problems, and, most important, often kept an eye for any sign of improvement to justify the federal 
government’s withdrawal from the South.”203 The medical reports from Arkansas were no different 
in that they provide little insight into the operation of these facilities. Though the recorded numbers 
are small, often in the single digits, they reveal very little about who came to the hospitals, why 
they came, and how long they stayed. 
The End of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
By the end of 1868, the Freedmen’s Bureau neared the end of its mission. Developments 
in Washington during the early years of Reconstruction had a tremendous impact on its operations, 
as did a number of its decisions at the local level. Following racial violence in Memphis and New 
Orleans in May and July of 1866 respectively, combined with the rise of Black Codes and the Ku 
Klux Klan during the first two years of Reconstruction, Congress decided that something had to 
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be done to stem the tide of violence against freedpeople.204 The Reconstruction Acts, passed by 
the Radical Congress in March of 1867 over the president’s veto, was the Radicals’ response to 
this violence. These acts set the terms for the readmission of the former Confederate states. These 
terms for regaining their place in the Union required the states to draft new state constitutions, 
allowing black men to vote by way of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
disqualification of former Confederates from holding office or voting in the reconstructed state 
governments.  
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By 1868, a number of other factors had come together to further the Bureau’s decline. As 
states began to reestablish their governments, Congress removed federal troops from a number of 
Southern states in accordance with the Reconstruction Acts.205 As a result, there was virtually no 
enforcement of the agency’s already unpopular policies. By this point, the many faces of the 
Bureau – its agents and other employees – started to change. This was rooted in the increasing use 
of civilian employees in its local operations. Howard, as one would expect, preferred the discipline 
of military men in the operation of the Bureau. By 1868, Howard noted that there were 412 
“civilian agents” working for the agency, though these numbers would drop sharply - down to just 
71 – the following year.206 The agency moved from one staffed by military officers, hardened by 
war, to one staffed by a number of civilians who did not always share Howard’s mission. President 
Johnson had always pestered Howard about the staffing of the local offices. Because the Bureau 
was a military agency, it fell under the president’s war powers and gave him a say in how it 
functioned and who would work there. Howard often watched helplessly as Johnson meddled with 
agency personnel, often firing those who disagreed with him as well as awarding jobs to his 
political supporters. This would shift, not end, because of the impeachment proceedings against 
Johnson during the early months of 1868, as Radicals took control of Reconstruction’s path.207 
With the Republicans in control, they also used well-paying jobs in much the same way, rewarding 
political favors. “Moreover,” notes Lieberman, “the creation of several hundred new civilian 
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positions with comfortable salaries represented a sizeable patronage plum to Republican members 
of Congress eager to build their party in the South; despite Howard’s resistance, he was flooded 
with congressional endorsements for civilians seeking Bureau appointments.”208 This caused 
General Howard to have a decreasing amount of influence over Bureau affairs and the reduction 
in military men weakened the agency both visibly and operationally. 
Another factor in the Bureau’s demise came with the agency’s expanded tasks. With 
Congress’s extension of the Bureau over the president’s veto in 1866 came an expansion of its 
mission during the following two years. Developing out of this expanded mission, the agency 
extended itself to include the Freedmen’s Savings and Trust, known simply as the Freedmen’s 
Bank, and it involved itself in paying out bounties to African American army and navy veterans.209 
The bank, chartered in 1865, hoped to teach freedpeople thrift and inspire confidence as they 
employed many black leaders in their offices and often shared offices with the agency.210 While 
the Bureau helped many freedmen collect on their bounties after the war, in 1867 Congress made 
the agency the primary payer of these bounties. The agency performed this task because a number 
of legal sharks tried to swindle these men out of their money by charging exorbitant legal fees in 
collecting their bounties. The Bureau helped black veterans fill out the extensive paperwork to 
receive these bounties and then encouraged them to deposit their money in the Freedmen’s Bank. 
Rather than focusing on the agency’s initial goals – helping freedpeople and refugees – the bank 
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and bounties pushed the Bureau, and much of its military leadership, into unfamiliar territory. The 
agency’s foray into these areas, however, was not the final blow – this would come from Congress. 
While the Bureau officially lasted until 1872, two acts of Congress in July of 1868 brought 
about its decline. First, the Fortieth Congress passed an act on July 6, 1868, that continued the 
agency for another year, with a few modifications. While this act stipulated that the education of 
freedpeople and refugees would continue, all other operations of the agency were to cease. 
Congress stopped funding other ventures pursued by the agency. While Johnson did not approve 
this act, it became law as the ten days in which he could veto the law had elapsed and it went back 
to the House for approval. Second, on July 25, 1868, that same Congress passed “An Act relating 
to the Freedmen’s Bureau and providing for its Discontinuance” over the president’s veto. The 
second act kept Howard in charge of the agency, but it ended its operations as of January 1, 1869. 
Section 2 of this bill laid out the agency’s end:  
And be it further enacted, That the commissioner of the bureau shall, on the first 
day of January next, cause the said bureau to be withdrawn from the several States 
within which said bureau has acted and its operations shall be discontinued. But the 
educational department of the said bureau and the collection and payment of 
moneys due the soldiers, sailors, and marines, or their heirs, shall be continued as 
now provided by law until otherwise ordered by act of Congress.211 
The educational mission of the Bureau would continue, as would its payment of bounties to African 
American soldiers and sailors until Congress said otherwise, but the agency as it had existed since 
the war’s end, was no more. For the next four years, only a shell of the former agency would 
remain. 
With the events of 1868, many who relied on the Bureau for support expressed their 
displeasure at the aforementioned acts of Congress. By 1868, freedpeople, poor whites, and 
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displaced whites “feared for a future without the bureau.”212 To be sure, many Southern whites 
were quite pleased to see the agency disappear, eager to replace Republican rule with home rule 
in their states. Howard noted the reactions to the Bureau’s closing in a letter to the Secretary of 
War: “Many entreaties have come to me from Southern men, white and colored, and from several 
commissioners, to urge upon Congress the continuance of the operations of this Bureau beyond 
the time of its limit by law (January 1, 1869). But after having carefully considered the whole 
subject, I believe it is better not to do so.”213 Howard would later use this letter to the Secretary of 
War to defend himself against accusations that he was against ever closing the agency. For 
Howard, it was a way of finally inducing local communities to help the indigent and freedpeople 
who resided there – something he had pushed for all along. Still, Howard did not leave all Southern 
communities in the cold. He managed to leave recommendations for some of the harder hit areas 
a continuance of rations and hospitals.214 
The Freedmen’s Bureau officially ended on June 28, 1872, when President Ulysses S. 
Grant’s Secretary of War, William Belknap, issued an order that officially ended the agency. This 
was in accordance with the act of Congress dated June 10, 1872. With the dissolution of the 
Bureau, the Federal army took over the agency’s remaining tasks in the South. These troops 
remained until their removal in 1877, as a part of what historians have called “the Compromise of 
1877.”215 Looking back on the agency and its impact on the South, Howard was proud of what the 
agency was able to do: 
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But for the presence of Bureau officers, sustained by a military force, there would 
have been no one to whom these victims of cruelty and wrong could have appealed 
for defense. And the evils remedied have probably been far less than the evils 
prevented. No one can tell what scenes of violence and strife and insurrection the 
whole South might have presented without the presence of this agency of the 
Government to preserve order and to enforce justice. Fallen in the faithful discharge 
of duty, in brave defense of right, in heroic protection of the weak and the poor, 
their names deserve a place on their country’s “Roll of Fame.”216 
Historians have had a far different assessment of the Bureau, which, until recently, many did not 
view in a favorable light. One wonders what the agency might have been able to accomplish had 
it received more support from Washington. 
Conclusion 
The year 1868 was not only an important year for the Freedmen’s Bureau, but it was an 
important year for Arkansas. By January 1868, seventy delegates had convened in the state capitol 
to draft a new constitution. Most of the delegates were radicals, made primarily of people from 
outside of the state – the despised carpetbaggers and scalawags – as well as a number of loyalists 
created a progressive document for the time. The convention had its issues, including intense 
debates over the issue of granting full civil and political rights to African Americans. Voting 
irregularities existed in the voting for the new state charter, but ultimately, the legislature ratified 
the new constitution on April 1, 1868.217 In line with the Reconstruction Acts, the newly elected 
general assembly ratified the Fourteenth Amendment the next day and set a date for elections. On 
July 3, Arkansans elected a new governor, Powell Clayton, a former Federal cavalry officer from 
Kansas and pre-war Democrat-turned-Republican. Then, on June 22, 1868, Congress readmitted 
Arkansas to the Union thus ending its adventure in rebellion.218 By no means was Arkansas’s 
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journey over, readmission to the Union was only the first step in a very long process for Arkansas 
and its citizens to move forward. 
 With Arkansas’s readmission to the Union and the Bureau’s decreased operations, 1868 
marked the end of its operations in the Trans-Mississippi West assisting both freedpeople and 
displaced Southern whites. While its educational efforts continued in various capacities throughout 
the South, the agency was as far as Howard was concerned, finished with its mission. In 1865, the 
Freedmen’s Bureau embarked on the task of situating displaced whites on confiscated and 
abandoned lands across Arkansas. Large tracts of abandoned and confiscated lands were at the 
Bureau’s disposal in Missouri and Arkansas. Western Missouri still had vacated lands resulting 
from General Orders, No. 11 with these lands at the Bureau’s disposal. Many uprooted people 
lived and worked on a temporarily on a number of plantations, often under the Bureau’s watchful 
eye. With President Johnson’s Amnesty Proclamation that May, things became increasingly 
complicated for the both the Bureau and the displaced whites residing on these soon to be 
reclaimed lands. While the president and General Howard went back and forth through Circulars 
13 and 15 during the summer of 1865, any major land reform pursued by the Bureau came to a 
screeching halt. Displaced whites like those who resided on the Matilda Johnson Plantation near 
Little Rock, were soon forced off their temporary quarters as a result. 
 By 1866, the Bureau became more involved with education and healthcare for freedpeople 
and displaced whites in the region. Like the Bureau’s battles with the president over land reform, 
similar battles continued in this area. Only a small number of displaced whites, however, took 
advantage of these programs. Problems with funding, adequate facilities, and the views of local 
whites, all hindered any kind of progress by the agency in this area and possibly deterred whites 
                                                          
Clayton, The Aftermath of the Civil War (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1915); Richard Nelson Current, 
Those Terrible Carpetbaggers: A Reinterpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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from seeking these services. While it did not provide direct funding, the Bureau also assisted 
locally with orphanages, as so many children displaced by the war either lost their parents or were 
unable to find them once hostilities had ended. Even Bureau oversight in this area ruffled feathers 
in local communities. While 1865 could be characterized as the ration-giving period, 1866 and 
1867 might be labeled as the medical and educational period – of course had famine not hit the 
South in 1867. The famine of 1867 had been, in many ways, building since the start of the war 
with Mother Nature playing a key role in the form of droughts and heavy rains but also the refusal 
of the South’s planter class to grow food instead of cotton during the war years. The resulting 
influx of poor and displaced whites and freedpeople caused a temporary uptick in rations issued 
by the Bureau in 1867, but a combination of the aforementioned factors rendered the agency 
powerless, especially with regard to displaced whites in the region. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The outbreak of civil war in 1861 not only signaled the bell for the clash of armies across 
much of the nation’s south and mid-section, but it also brought about some of the largest 
movements of civilians that the young nation had known. While this study focuses on those people 
in Arkansas and Missouri, it is important to remember that the war forced a number of people from 
their communities, from Virginia to Georgia and from Tennessee to Texas and Louisiana; a great 
number of Southerners fled the war. The clash of armies, roaming guerrillas, and tests of loyalty 
sent a great number of people on the run at various times during the war. This was not a single, 
regional displacement by any means but one that occurred on a community-by-community basis 
and its effects felt long after the armies had left the field. With each passing year, and the mounting 
numbers of displaced whites, armies, governments, and aid societies dealt with the crisis. 
Understanding the circumstances that created so many displaced white Southerners during 
the war and how various governmental agencies’ responded to their plight is critical if historians 
are to better understand the impact of the war on civilian populations. Not just the war in general, 
but the war in the Trans-Mississippi West – a different and vastly understudied aspect of the Civil 
War. Displaced whites were a hot potato of sorts both during and after the war in the sense that no 
one really wanted to help them. Local benevolent aid organizations and both governments viewed 
them as a burden. A burden to each side’s war effort and, after the war, a burden to helping 
freedpeople. Sure, these agencies helped them, but in a way that gave the sense that these people 
were simply being brushed out if the way. Displaced Southern whites were simply given minimal 
amounts of aid in the form of rations before they were transported somewhere else, where 
organizations might be more eager to help them. As the number of displaced people mounted by 
the final two years of the war, neither army had any kind of clear plan in place to assist the region’s 
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uprooted citizens. Through these reactions to displaced people, historians can see how unprepared 
local border communities were for this war. Furthermore, this shows how the borders between 
Union and Confederate were not as clear-cut as contemporaries might have expected them to be. 
These divided loyalties only served to complicate responses to the problem of displaced whites.  
 A focus on displaced whites reveals a number of things about the impact of the war in the 
Trans-Mississippi West. The handling of displaced people here demonstrates a complete lack of 
preparedness by the United States government and the army in that each failed to put forth any 
kind of plan for these people with each passing year of the war and the intensification of the crisis. 
With each battle in this region, the wants and needs of displaced whites was made clear and the 
Union army was unable or unwilling to deal with the problem. Additionally, the army’s pursuit of 
guerrilla fighters across the region contributed to their inability to deal with the crisis and, in some 
instances, making it worse. The Federal government offered no solution, despite its awareness of 
the situation there and, as a result, neither did the army. This was evident the army’s foisting of 
displaced people on to local communities or benevolent aid organizations. 
Studying displaced whites also exposes how loyalties played a role in southern Missouri 
and northwestern Arkansas. Receiving aid from the Union army or the Freedmen’s Bureau often 
required some kind of affirmation of loyalty to the United States government, but it also shows 
how divided many communities in the region were. Mountain Federals in northwestern Arkansas 
as well as other Unionists scattered throughout the region faced constant pressure from local 
Confederate supporters and local governments loyal to the Confederate cause. This pressure often 
led to the displacement of many men, women, and children, often made worse by the actions of 
the armies and guerrilla fighters. While many people held strong to their loyalties, there were 
356 
 
 
 
instances where one’s loyalties were hidden or malleable. Many whites held these loyalties as a 
means of preserving one’s property or receiving help. 
The Confederate government, like its Northern adversary, failed to recognize the crisis 
among its own citizens. Despite the fact that many loyal Confederates made their way out of the 
region, to areas deemed more secure, the government failed to offer any kind of help for people 
who needed it. The government did offer some relief to its citizens, but this was often limited to 
the families of soldiers and the reduction of taxes for citizens pushed to the brink of starvation. 
Displaced whites should have been more of a concern for the government as some of them were 
the families of Confederate soldiers, which forced a number of men from the front to check on or 
care for their families. This added to a number of internal problems for the government, which 
served to weaken the war effort in each passing year of the war. 
Aid organizations in the region reached their limits because of the number of displaced 
whites who came seeking their help. This created a need for organizations like the Western 
Sanitary Commission, which made them vital to the survival of so many displaced people in the 
region. Because governments and armies were so focused on fighting a war, many neglected to 
account for the effect of that war on the various communities that it touched. This was the same 
for aid organization scattered throughout the country. Unfortunately, for these aid organizations, 
it was the armies and the governments who relied on them to help solve the problem. While they 
were unprepared, aid organizations did what they could to organize themselves and focus their 
efforts on helping those people who came in search of help. Civic-minded citizens heeded the call 
and followed down the path of the European counterparts, forged only a decade earlier, and created 
ad hoc methods of dealing with the increasing number of displaced people who sought their help. 
As a result, organizations like the Refugee Relief Commission of Ohio, the American Union 
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Commission, and the Western Sanitary Commission did what they could to help displaced whites 
in the region. 
After the war, the Freedmen’s Bureau looked to help displaced people, but not at the 
expense of the many freedpeople who needed their services. The Bureau did what it could, given 
its mission, and issued rations to a number of displaced whites in the region. In addition, the agency 
did what it could to situate uprooted people on lands abandoned by Confederates or confiscated 
by the Federal government. Benevolent aid societies still aided the Bureau where they could, but 
it was primarily General Howard’s task to reduce the number of wartime displacements so that his 
agency could focus on the task of assisting the millions of freedpeople across much of the South. 
Through the issuance of rations, the creation of schools and hospitals, and the placement of 
displaced whites on abandoned lands throughout the region, Howard and the Bureau moved to 
reduce their number throughout the South. While battles between the president and Congress made 
this task more difficult, the agency worked hard to help both displaced whites during the early 
years of Reconstruction. 
Overall, penetrating all of these areas is Victorian anxiety about dependency. The Union 
army, Northern and Southern governments, benevolent aid organizations, and the Bureau, at one 
time or another, expressed fears that helping displaced whites had the potential to create a 
dependent class of people across the region. Contemporary opinions about the poor and relief for 
the poor influenced the actions of the aforementioned organizations as well as their opinions about 
displaced whites. Uprooted people were sometimes referred to as poor white trash or Northerners 
opined that they needed to be educated in the ways of the North. Cutting through these 
contemporary views of displaced people, we see the ways in which they inspired people to help, 
but also offer opinions on both how these people became uprooted and how they might be able to 
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improve their situation. All of this reveals a window in which to view outsiders’ perceptions of 
displaced whites and the aid that was offered during the war and after. 
While historians work to tell the story of these displaced people, it is important to note that 
Americans noticed their wartime plight. Both during and after the war, stories about uprooted 
citizens made their way into American popular culture – sometimes over issues of loyalty, other 
times over the hardships experienced by these displaced people. Poems, songs, and plays were 
used to highlight the plight of displaced whites during and after the war. One poem entitled The 
Refugee, appeared in the September 17, 1864, issue of Harper’s Weekly. The poem relayed the 
suffering of so many Unionist mothers in the South. Popular media tried to relay the feeling of 
having a son fight for the other side: 
“But where were they, her noble boys, 
In this her hour of woe?” 
“Ah! They had sought the battle-field 
Ere fell this fearful blow.” 
 
“Two were with Grant when Vicksburg fell.” 
“The other, where was he?” 
“Another flag above him waved 
At Richmond, under Lee.” 
 
“And him she mourns as worse than dead, 
For in this deadly strife 
He battles on the side of those 
Who took his father’s life.”1 
 
The mother here is heartbroken by the thought of one of her sons fighting for the very side that 
sent her and her family on the run, depriving them of the nice life that she and her family had 
                                                          
1 “The Refugee,” Harper’s Weekly, September 17, 1864, 606. The full version of this poem is located in Appendix 
B. 
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before the war. Digging deeper into these sources to uncover the plight of so many civilians across 
the South will help historians to understand the war and its impact. 
While historians have touched on the plight of these displaced whites before, even if in a 
limited fashion, we need to learn more broadly about their experiences – both during and after the 
war - and what we might be able to learn from those experiences on a larger scale. While some 
research exists concerning displaced people in the East, more should be written about their 
experiences and how these experiences are part of a larger narrative. We have heard a number of 
accounts from those people who had the means to relocate because of the war. More research is 
needed regarding displaced people who were not so lucky, those who were left to wander for much 
of the war and after. Historians need to paint a better, more complete picture of those displaced by 
the war in the East, Virginia in particular, and link that with the stories of other displaced people 
across the South. How did the armies, governments, and various aid societies deal with the crisis 
across the entire Confederacy? Did the same or similar displacement factors exist across the South 
and the Border States? Were their differences from one region of the Confederate States in 
comparison with another? In addition, what can be said about both displaced blacks and whites? 
Are their wartime experiences intertwined and, if so, how? Certainly, the questions are there and, 
digging a bit deeper in the primary sources, I believe that the sources are there as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Southern Wagon1 
Come all ye sons of freedom and our southern band 
We’re going to fight the enemy and drive them from our land 
Justice is our motto and Providence our guide 
So jump in the wagon and we’ll all take a ride 
Chorus 
Wail for the wagon 
The Secession wagon 
The South is a wagon 
And we’ll all take ride 
Secession is our watch-word, our rights we all demand 
And to defend our firesides we’ll pledge our hearts and hands 
Jeff Davis is our president and Stephens by his side 
Brave Beauregard our general will join us in the ride 
Chorus  
Our wagon plenty big enough, the running gear is good 
Tis stuffed with cotton round the sides and made of southern wood 
Carolina is our driver with Georgia by her side 
Virginia’ll hold the flag up and we’ll all take a ride 
Chorus  
There’s Tennessee and Texas also in the ring 
They wouldn’t have a Government where cotton wasn’t king 
Alabama too and Florida have long ago replied 
Mississippi in the wagon anxious for the ride 
Chorus  
Arkansas, North Carolina and Missouri were slow 
But now they hurry they’ve found where they must go 
There’s Old Kentuck and Maryland each won’t make their mind 
So I reckon after all we’ll have to take them up behind 
Chorus  
Our cause is Just and holy our Men are brave and true 
To whip the Lincoln Cut-Throats is all we have to do 
                                                          
1 “The Southern Wagon,” n.d., Lorraine Blore Raglund Collection, 1863-1981, Box 2: File 4, Special Collections at 
the University of Arkansas (Fayetteville).  
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God Bless our noble army – in Him we all confide 
So jump into the wagon and we’ll all take a ride 
Chorus 
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Historians have written a great deal about the American Civil War and, until recently, much 
of that scholarly activity has focused on military battles and the effectiveness of the Union and 
Confederate armies on the war’s outcome. During the past few decades, social historians have tried 
to dig beneath that narrative to situate the war in the eyes of American citizens and how that war 
affected their lives. With this, there has been a focus on the Northern and Southern homefronts, 
African Americans, and soldiers’ motivations to fight – all rooted in the wartime experience. In 
this discussion, however, there is very little attention paid to the plight of Southern whites 
displaced by the war. In “’A Lonely Wandering Refugee’: Displaced Whites in the Trans-
Mississippi West During the American Civil War, 1861-1868,” I argue that displaced whites, both 
during and after the war, were largely pushed off by the armies, the U.S. and Confederate 
governments, and the Freedmen’s Bureau to local aid organizations in Missouri and Arkansas. 
Through an analysis of both Union and Confederate army records, Freedmen’s Bureau records, 
personal correspondence of local citizens, local and national newspapers, and regional aid 
organizations, I have detailed the treatment of uprooted people in the region. 
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From the start of the war in 1861, battlefield clashes, guerrilla warfare, hunger, Union, war 
policies, Confederate conscription, and conflicts over loyalties sent many whites on the run and, 
almost immediately, they encountered one of the armies in search of help. As it encountered these 
people in the region, the Union army provided enough rations to support displaced whites until the 
army transported them to Union-controlled areas where they received aid, most often, from private 
benevolent aid organizations. While soldiers held a variety of opinions of these people and their 
situation, the army was vastly unprepared for the number of people who came into their lines 
seeking support. While there was no clear policy on how to handle the large number of displaced 
whites, it was not they did not try. Colony farms and other programs were attempted to put 
displaced people back on their feet but because the army’s lack of consistency, nothing came from 
these attempts. The Confederate army, on the other hand, did nothing to support those displaced 
whites who came into their lines. If anything, Confederate soldiers left the ranks because of 
peopled uprooted by the war because so many of those men, women, and children sent on the run 
were their own friends and families back home. 
Aid organizations in the West, like the Western Sanitary Commission in St. Louis, often 
filled the void of caring for these displaced whites. While these organizations originated out of the 
need to care for wounded soldiers, they expanded their mission to include help for displaced whites 
who came from across Missouri and Arkansas. By the war’s midpoint, they provided temporary 
shelter, food, and the necessities of life for people on a short and long-term basis. To reduce the 
numbers of displaced whites dependent upon their care, organizations also provided transportation 
to these people, often sending them north to be with friends and family. As one would expect, care 
for these people over the final two years of the war was expensive and, as a result, they held 
sanitary fairs to raise money for their endeavors. The most prominent such fair was the Mississippi 
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Valley Sanitary Fair held in St. Louis in 1864 that raised a great deal of money for their efforts. 
The Western Sanitary Commission and like-minded organizations provided care for displaced 
whites both during the war and into Reconstruction, as the Bureau relied on their continued support 
of displaced people. 
With the dawn of Reconstruction, the Freedmen’s Bureau fanned out across the South to 
help both freedpeople and displaced whites. The Bureau stepped in to help when local governments 
could or would not do so. During the early months of Reconstruction, the Bureau placed a number 
of displaced people on abandoned and confiscated lands throughout the region. This, however, 
was quickly complicated by debates in Washington between the Radical Congress and President 
Andrew Johnson. The issue at hand in these debates concerned the fate of former Confederates 
and their property. While the agency also offered rations, provided transportation, offered 
schooling, and medical care, it was their placement of displaced people on abandoned lands that 
proved to be the most successful. Once the president removed this option, the Bureau moved to 
make displaced, and now destitute, whites to be self-sufficient as quickly as possible. For the 
Bureau, displaced whites were a hindrance on its primary focus – assisting freedmen. While the 
Bureau did what it could when it came to aiding displaced people scattered throughout the region 
at the close of the war, it came undone because of what happened in Washington. This, by 1868, 
rendered the Bureau ineffective in Arkansas and throughout much of the South. 
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